If I understand your question correctly, you’re wondering if the court will fault for your ex-spouse’s claims that you are failing to act responsibly when it comes to making and keeping doctor appointments for the child, and perhaps also criticizing your judgment when it comes to matters of the child’s health care.
Many judges are suckers generally for claims of child abuse and neglect. What do I mean? None of them want to be blamed for failing to notice and failing to protect. And so when faced with allegations of child abuse or neglect or parental misconduct toward a child, many of them are on the side of caution, claiming that they are simply looking out for the best interest of the child, when in far too many cases they’re simply looking out for their own best interests (that’s usually what erring on the side of caution does and means in family law—abusing a parent’s reputation and parental rights, so that a court doesn’t have to risk making “the wrong choice” when deciding on allegations of child abuse and neglect).
If instead, your ex is accusing you of misconduct by scheduling doctor appointments for your children without conferring and agreeing with the co-parent before the doctor appointments are scheduled and attended, then if your question is whether your ex will prevail, then if the law and/or court order requires you and your ex/co-parent to confer with each other before you can exercise your “final say” authority to schedule the appointments over your ex’s/co-parent’s objection, then you are likely in the wrong and likely to be found to be in the wrong.
Before terminating a parent’s rights, the court must find that termination is “strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest.” This analysis must be undertaken from the child’s point of view. Utah lawprovides that termination is strictly necessary only when, after exploring possible placements for the child, the juvenile court concludes that no other feasible options exist that could address the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights. If the child can be equally protected and benefited by an option other than termination (such as permanent custody and guardianship awarded to someone other than the parent or parents), termination is thus not strictly necessary. The strictly necessary analysis is designed to ensure that the court pause long enough to thoughtfully consider the range of available options that could promote the child’s welfare and best interest. If a court has complied with its statutory obligations, its resultant best interest determination is entitled to deference by an appellate court. Long-term guardianship arrangements are typically only in a child’s best interest where the guardians and the parent have a working, relatively healthy relationship in which they are both willing to work together to preserve the parent-child relationship and where the child has a healthy relationship with both the guardian and the parent. Thus, when a parent and potential guardian have little to no relationship, the particular circumstances of the case may indicate that permanent custody and guardianship will not meet the children’s needs as well as termination of parental rights. This post is a summary of the law as stated in the recent Utah Court of Appeals opinion in the case of In re K.R. – 2023 UT App 75 (filed July 13, 2023).
I cannot speak to what the law is in all jurisdictions, but I can answer this question as it applies in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah).
Custody battles can arise between married and unmarried parents. Without conducting deep analysis of the question of whether one can you file a defamation case against the other parent while one is involved in a child custody case, I am aware of no legal prohibition against it and while it’s rarely advisable to engage in two different lawsuits with the same person at the same time, I can think of no reason why the pending child custody case (just a child custody case, not a divorce case) would cause any fatal legal or procedural impediments to successfully prosecuting a defamation case is pending simultaneously.
In the divorce case of Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988). Here is the pertinent part of that decision from the Utah Supreme Court:
Glen’s first argument is that Judge Tibbs improperly considered Elaine’s tort claims in the divorce action. We held in Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985), that it is improper to try a tort claim, as such, within a divorce action. Accord Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 1983). Tort claims, which are legal in nature, should be kept separate from divorce actions, which are equitable in nature. As a practical matter, if spouses have tort claims pending against each other which are likely to have a bearing on the outcome of the divorce action, those claims should be resolved prior to the divorce proceedings.[4]
In this case, Glen contends that Judge Tibbs combined the two proceedings and used the property division and alimony award as a means of giving Elaine damages properly attributable to her tort claims. The record does not support this contention. Judge Tibbs was fully informed that the tort claims were being tried in a separate action before Judge Ballif. For that reason, Judge Tibbs stated in his findings and conclusions that he had avoided consideration of the merits of the tort claims qua tort claims, and our review of the record provides us with no cause to dispute that assertion. It is true that some of the facts relevant to the tort claims were considered in the divorce proceeding, including Elaine’s medical and living expenses incurred as a result of the shooting, as well as Glen’s role in causing her injuries. However, it was not improper to take those factors into account in the context of the divorce action. As we explained in Walther, 709 P.2d at 388 (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 109, 138 P.2d 252, 254 (1943)), “[I]njuries and attendant medical expenses [caused by a spouse’s tort] may be considered” in deciding the level of need of the other spouse in a divorce proceeding. And because Elaine’s counterclaim for divorce was based on Glen’s cruelty to her, it was proper for Judge Tibbs to consider the issue of Glen’s fault in causing those injuries. Merely because Judge Tibbs considered facts relevant to the divorce action that were also relevant to the tort action does not mean that he impermissibly adjudicated the tort claims in the divorce action.
———————
[4] To do otherwise may raise significant concerns if a fact question with respect to which a party has requested a jury and is entitled to a jury verdict is first decided by a judge in an equitable proceeding. Cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11, 79 S.Ct. 948, 956–957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (the federal constitutional right to a jury trial of legal issues may be lost through prior judicial determination of equitable claims only in the most imperative circumstances). However, those concerns have not been raised by the parties to this case.
In the case of Walther v. Walther (709 P.2d 387 (1985)), the Utah Supreme Court opined:
In Lord v. Shaw, Utah, 665 P.2d 1288 (1983), we observed:
[T]he trial court held that the plaintiff was barred by res judicata from suing her ex-husband for torts which occurred during the marriage, because his liability for any tort should have been litigated in the divorce action. We do not comment on this ruling other than to observe that actionable torts between married persons should not be litigated in a divorce proceeding. We believe that divorce actions will become unduly complicated in their trial and disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in the same action. A divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and may well involve, as in this case, a request for trial by jury. The administration of justice will be better served by keeping the two proceedings separate.
Id., 665 P.2d at 1291 (citation omitted). The trial court should not have tried the wife’s tort claim as part of this divorce action. That part of the award is therefore vacated.
Is there any question whether the court would benefit from hearing testimony from these kids? Even if, arguendo, the court were to discover these kids are liars?
It means that the child custody order is a temporary, as opposed to a permanent and final, order of the court.
Why would a court enter a temporary child custody order? For obvious reasons and necessity. If to parents are fighting over custody of a child and what the ultimate child custody and parent time order will be, it will likely take a year or two before that case goes to trial. The child needs to be taken care of during that period (known as the pendente lite period in the litigation; pendent lite literally means “while the litigation is pending”), and so the court will issue temporary orders as to how much time the child spends with each parent until the final child custody order is made.
These temporary orders are not to be intended have a “prejudicial” effect on the outcome of the final child custody award (but that is rarely the case).
“Prejudicial” in a legal sense means a preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience, harm or injury that results or may result from some action or judgment. As you can imagine, if the existence or purported success of a temporary order was cited by the court as evidence that the temporary order must become the permanent order of the court, then the so-called “temporary” order is anything but. To assert that a temporary custody order has proven itself to be better than any other possible custody order on the grounds that it has been in place to the exclusion of any other possible custody arrangement would be an example of giving the temporary order prejudicial impact and effect.
And now to address the elephant in the room:
Courts routinely claim that temporary child custody orders cannot and will not have a prejudicial effect on the final child custody order. That is simply not true.
Now clearly, if a court found the temporary orders to be disastrous for the child, and the court will need to impose a different permanent custody order for the sake of the child’s welfare and the sake of the court’s legitimacy.
But what about a temporary order that isn’t best for the child but isn’t manifestly catastrophic? How can anyone believe a judge who says that he or she isn’t looking to the track record of that sub-optimal, so-called temporary order when determining what the permanent child custody order should be?
It takes an extremely intellectually disciplined judge to disregard that temporary orders track record as evidence in favor of that temporary custody arrangement.
Instead, however, most judges will take the path of least resistance and adopt as the permanent order a temporary order that hasn’t been a patent failure, and then cite in support of that decision the fact that the parent opposing that schedule has “failed to produce sufficient evidence” to rebut the proposition that the so-called temporary order is in the best interest of the child. Judges will deny that they do this, but it’s obvious that they do. Do you see the problem with this approach?
When the court:
imposes one and only one custody schedule during the pendente lite phase of the case,
claims that this one and only one schedule will not have a prejudicial effect on the ultimate permanent child custody order,
refuses to implement any other proposed schedule to test and evaluate it against the other schedule,
bars the other parent from implementing his/her proposed custody schedule in any kind of real life/real-time setting during the pendente lite phase,
then cites to the other parent having failed to produce sufficient fact(s) that his/her proposed custody schedule better serves the best interest of the child,
and cites to the track record of the so-called non-prejudicial temporary order as fact(s) in support of the argument for imposing it as a permanent order,
the so-called non-prejudicial temporary order is anything but.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Teenager Child (16) refuses to see me after spending a month with my ex. I have 50% custody. What can I do about it? I’m a stricter parent unlike my ex who lets him play computer games all day and night.
Each jurisdiction may have different laws and rules governing a situation like yours, but I will answer your question as it applies to the state of Utah in my experience as a divorce and family lawyer.
Many people believe that at a certain age a minor child has the “right” in Utah to choose with which parent he/she will reside. Not true. Unless a court orders that a minor child has such a right, no such legal right independently exists.
But then there’s life in the real world, which shows us just how far a court’s power to enforce a child custody award order reaches. As a practical matter, if a child is big and strong and strong-willed enough to refuse to comply with the child custody order, there is little a court can do or will do to compel a child to comply.
Thus, trying to enforce a child custody and parent-time award by enlisting the help of the court is usually fruitless.
It’s maddening when a child is too young and immature to understand that living with the irresponsible, excessively permissive, and/or absentee parent is doing that child more harm than good. Unfortunately, unless the child does something or some things bad enough to land him/her in juvenile detention, a court can’t really force the child to live anywhere.
As I stated in answer to a question similar to yours: some courts try to get creative and impose sanctions on a noncompliant child by essentially ordering them “grounded”, but again, if the child chooses not to comply, there is little the court can do or feels is wise to do to the child. I’ve seen a court try to get a child to comply by ordering her barred from participating in her beloved dance classes and driver education courses (so that she can’t get her driver license unless she lives with the court ordered custodial parent) as long as the child refused to live with the court-ordered custodial parent. In that case, however, the child outlasted the court, i.e., she kept living with the noncustodial parent and stopped attending dance and driver’s ed. classes. Then the court found itself in the awkward position of preventing the child from getting exercise and driving to and from her job and other worthwhile, even necessary activities, so the court relented (both in the best interest of the child and to save face). This is a lesson that most courts learn when they try to use the coercive powers of the court against children to enforce child custody orders.
Besides, even if you could force a child to live with you or spend time with you as court-ordered, a child who is forced to do much of anything is only going to resent it and resent you for making him/her do it.
The only viable option you have is to be the most effective parent you can. That doesn’t mean abandoning good parental practices, but it may mean adjusting your approach from a “good” and “reasonable” one to an approach that entails necessary parental care and supervision that fosters love and affection, an approach that still holds children accountable, without estranging them.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277\
When someone wins custody of a child, does the child come to the courthouse to be taken by whoever is awarded custody or do they go to the home of the child to take them? How does this usually go?
Thank you for asking this question. It is a basic question that many parents have and yet very few are willing to ask for fear of looking ignorant. Questions and asked our questions unanswered, and you’ve asked a very basic but very important question that deserves to be answered clearly and fully.
A court can issue an order that the parties meet at the courthouse with the child and physically transfer custody of the child from one party to the next at the courthouse.
Rarely is it necessary for a court to issue an order that the parties meet at the courthouse with the child and physically transfer custody of the child from one party to the next. For example, if there is a dispute between two opposing parties (Party A vs. Party B) over custody of a child, and if the child is already in the custody of Party A when the court awards custody, then there will be no need for an order directing one party to turn the child over to the other party.
In most child custody cases long before the child custody award is made, a temporary order (or order pendente lite) has been issued by the court awarding custody to one of the parties. After all, the child needs to be cared for and have a place to live while the litigation is pending, which is why these temporary custody orders are made. So if the party to whom temporary custody was awarded wins permanent custody, there will be no need for any kind of transfer of custody of the child from one party to the other.
But if the party who was awarded temporary custody of the child is not awarded permanent custody of the child after the trial, usually what happens is the losing party will comply with the court’s order to turn custody over of the child to the prevailing party. Fortunately, in most custody disputes, the losing party is gracious in defeat and — even though perhaps heartbroken or bitterly angry over the outcome — will comply voluntarily with the court orders and in turn the child over to the prevailing party without incident. The way that works is the court may (and often will):
order the losing party (in whose physical custody of the child was before trial) to have the child ready for the prevailing party to pick up the child at the losing party’s house at a set date and time.
order the losing party to bring the child to the prevailing party’s house at a set date and time.
order that the child be brought to a third party’s home (a relative or mutual family friend) or workplace (often a social worker) to spare the losing party from breaking down in grief or anger in front of the child or to help generally ease the transition from the losing party to the prevailing party.
If the court is concerned that a verbal and/or physical altercation might arise if custody is exchanged at the losing party’s house or if the losing party were ordered to bring the child to the prevailing party’s house, the court may order the parties to exchange custody of the child at a police station, so that the police can keep the peace and make an arrest if either or both parties become unruly.
If the court is concerned that the losing party might try to abscond with the child before the prevailing party can take custody of the child, then the court may order the police or the deputy sheriff to accompany the losing party to the losing party’s home to ensure that the child is not kidnapped or concealed or absconded with before the prevailing party can take custody of the child.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
What will happen if the court ruled in favor of a mother to have the custody of her child but the child refuses to go with her and she prefers to stay with the father?
This situation (and this question) comes up a lot. I will answer the question as it applies in my experience to the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah).
SHORT ANSWER: The general rule of thumb is that if the child is a teenager and has the guts and the will to defy the court’s custody orders, then that child is going to live with the parent with whom he or she wants to live because the court is essentially powerless to force the child to comply with the child custody order, i.e., the court finds it more trouble than it is worth to enforce a child custody order against a defiant teen.
LONGER ANSWER:
Technically, the child has no choice in the matter, once the court has issued its child custody ruling and resulting orders. In other words, just because somebody doesn’t want to follow court orders doesn’t mean that he or she is free to disregard them or to act as a law unto himself or herself. This proves to be true of court orders pertaining to adults. Child custody orders, and the children affected by them, however, are in reality a different matter.
In the law we have two terms that help to describe the situation: de jure and de facto. De jure means that which is which applies as a matter of law. For example, as a matter of law, your child is ordered to spend most of his/her time in the custody of mother, with the father spending time the child on alternating weekends and a few odd holidays. De facto means that which is or that which applies as a matter of fact (in reality, and not as the court may artificially require). So while as a matter of law your child is required to live with mother, if in reality (as a matter of “fact”—this is where the “facto” in “de facto” comes from) the child refuses to live with mother and stays at the father’s house, that is the de facto child custody situation.
When A) the de jure and de facto situations conflict in a child custody situation, and B) the child is old enough, strong enough, and willful enough to continue to the court’s custody orders, the court often (not always, but usually) feels that they are practicably powerless to force children to live with a parent with whom they do not wish to live.
Normally, when an adult will not comply with the court’s order, One of the tools a court can use to enforce compliance is its contempt powers. Those powers include finding and jailing the noncompliant person. But with children, that power is, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. Children usually have no money with which to pay a fine, and Utah does not allow courts to jail minors for mere contempt of court.
Some courts try to get creative and impose sanctions on a noncompliant child by essentially ordering them “grounded”, but again, if the child chooses not to comply, there is little the court can do or feels is wise to do to the child. I’ve seen a court try to get a child to comply by ordering her barred from participating in her beloved dance classes and driver education courses (so that she can’t get her driver license unless she lives with the court ordered custodial parent) as long as the child refused to live with the court-ordered custodial parent. In that case, however, the child outlasted the court, i.e., she kept living with the noncustodial parent and stopped attending dance and driver’s ed. classes. Then the court found itself in the awkward position of preventing the child from getting exercise and driving to and from her job and other worthwhile, even necessary activities, so the court relented (both in the best interest of the child and to save face). This is a lesson that most courts learn when they try to use the coercive powers of the court against children to enforce child custody orders.
Courts don’t want to dedicate their own resources and law enforcement resources to 1) literally dragging a child out of one parent’s home and literally stuffing the child into some other home; and 2) doing so repeatedly when the child refuses to stay put. It’s a waste of law enforcement resources and the fear is the child will eventually run away (and act out in other self-destructive and dangerous ways), if not allowed to live with the parent of his/her choosing.
And courts don’t want to punish a parent for the misconduct of a child. Some courts have tried to punish noncustodial parent by holding them responsible for their children’s noncompliance with the court orders, but that doesn’t work when the noncustodial parent truly isn’t at fault. Courts realize that a noncustodial parent cannot simply, for example, 1) push the child out the door, lock it behind the child, and wish the child well in subzero degree weather; or 2) manhandle the child into the custodial parent’s car, then be charged with child abuse. And punishing the noncustodial parent often only serves to lead the child to be more determined to defy court orders.
As you can imagine, a child’s “power” to choose where he/she lives usually does not arise until the child is old enough and strong enough and willful enough to exercise some degree of autonomy over which parent with whom he/she lives. That doesn’t usually happen until children reach approximately the age of 12 or 14, although some children may start younger. Children under that age are typically unable or too afraid to exert their own preferences and wills.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
David Pedrazas, Attorney for Appellant Laja K. M. Thompson, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN and SENIOR JUDGE KATE APPLEBYconcurred. [22]
HAGEN, Judge:
¶1T. W. (Father) appeals the district court’s custody order awarding S. A. (Mother) primary physical custody of their son (Child). In so doing, the court rejected the custody evaluator’s recommendation that Father be awarded primary physical custody. The court also scheduled parent-time in accordance with the minimum parent-time schedule in Utah Code section 30-3-35, as opposed to the optional increased parent-time schedule in section 30-3-35.1. Father argues each of these rulings was made in error. Because the court sufficiently supported the parent-time schedule it ordered as well as its rejection of the custody evaluator’s recommendation, we affirm.
BACKGROUND [23]
¶2Father and Mother ended their relationship before Child’s birth. The following year, Father petitioned for custody. Father later moved to Grantsville, Utah to live with his now-wife and her children, along with Father’s other child from a prior relationship. Grantsville is approximately fifty miles from Sandy, Utah where Mother resides.
¶3Shortly after his move, Father requested a custody evaluation. The court-appointed custody evaluator initially recommended Mother be awarded primary physical custody, but at a trial on that issue, the parties stipulated to joint legal and physical custody, with each parent enjoying alternating weeks of equal parent-time. The stipulated terms were then set forth by the court in its parentage decree. At the time, the logistics of complying with an alternating week schedule were relatively easy because Child was not yet attending school.
¶4Around the time Child was to begin kindergarten, a dispute arose over whether Child would attend school near Mother’s home in Sandy or near Father’s home in Grantsville. Father moved for a temporary restraining order that would specify where Child would attend school. After a telephonic hearing, the court commissioner recommended that, for the time being, Child would attend school in Sandy pending an evidentiary hearing.
¶5Child had been attending school for several months when the evidentiary hearing was held in December. After conferring with counsel off the record, the court expressed “some concerns about the workability of [Child] residing in Grantsville and going to school in Sandy or residing in Sandy and going to . . . school in Grantsville.” The court reasoned that the alternating week schedule was unworkable, and the parties agreed that now that Child was in school “continuing the commute [was] not in [his] best interest.” The court ultimately found that “the commute from Sandy to Grantsville is approximately 50 miles and can take approximately 50 minutes, and sometimes more, in the morning” and, “[f]or various reasons, including road/weather conditions, [Child had] been late to or missed school.” Because the long commute was unworkable, the court recognized that the issue before it was “a much larger issue than just determining where [Child] goes to school”—it would require “a change in the parent-time arrangement” as well. To resolve both the parent-time arrangement and where Child would attend school in the future, the court set the matter for trial.
¶6Before trial, the custody evaluator submitted an updated report. The evaluator recommended that Father and Mother be awarded joint legal custody but that Child’s primary physical residence be with Father. The evaluator made this recommendation based on two considerations. First, he opined that Father was “in a more stable physical situation” than Mother because he owned his house and was “not likely to move,” whereas Mother “rent[ed] an apartment and ha[d] a history that raise[d] concern about her ability to maintain a consistent residence.” Second, he noted that Child had developed “positive and reciprocal relationship[s] with his [half-sibling and step-]siblings,” who resided with Father, and Child would “attend school with them as well as receive guidance and support from them academically, socially and emotionally.”
¶7During trial, Father introduced a letter from Child’s therapist explaining that Child had been diagnosed with an adjustment disorder caused by “a stressor in [his] life.” That letter further stated that Child was experiencing “significant impairment in social, occupational or other areas of functioning.”
¶8Mother testified about Child’s emotional and social challenges as well. She explained that Child’s school counselor had been helping him to make and keep friends and to learn “what’s acceptable social behavior” and “how to control [his] emotions in school.” Mother testified that although Child was “struggling with focus and attention in school” as well as “emotional outbursts,” he had “improved.” She recounted that Child “struggled with making friends in the beginning,” but was “finally making more” and by that time had friends at the school. Because Child “knows the school now” and “knows the people,” Mother did not “feel that [it would be] right” to “rip [him] away from [the progress he had made] and have him start all over in a new school.” Given that Child was “in therapy for adjustment disorder,” she believed that “[h]aving him switch schools would just exacerbate that [condition]. He again would have to adjust to a huge change in his life.”
¶9Mother also testified about her work schedule. She described how she had started her own business so her schedule would be “flexible” for Child, that she “make[s her] own schedule,” and that the reason she did this was “to be available to [Child] and his school needs and his extracurricular needs . . . so that [she could] revolve [her] work around [her] son.” Mother testified that she and Child have a regular daily routine with a set schedule for school, homework, extracurricular activities, playtime, and sleep when Child is residing at her home in Sandy. Mother asserted that requiring Child to commute to school from Grantsville “probably has at least something to do with [Child’s] activity in school,” that “he hates [the commute],” and that he is sometimes late to school because of “the weather” or “accidents on the freeways.”
¶10 After considering the original evaluation, the updated evaluation, and the other evidence presented at trial, the court issued its custody order. It found that because of Child’s “current emotional and behavioral issues which [had] been diagnosed as an Adjustment Disorder with disturbance of conduct,” his “psychological and emotional” needs were the deciding factor and those needs would benefit from residing primarily with one parent. In support, the court found that Child “struggles in social settings” and has “behavioral issues,” “emotional outbursts,” and “difficulty making friends.” Moreover, “the commute is hard on [Child]” as he was “tired in school,” had “been late on several occasions,” and had even “missed school” because of the long commute.
¶11 Having decided that it was in Child’s best interest to reside primarily with one parent, the court ruled that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother to be the primary custodial parent because Mother’s testimony was “credible and persuasive” regarding the negative impact a change in school would have on Child. The court found changing schools would require Child to “start all over—start at a new school, make new friends and re-adjust,” negatively affecting the progress he had made establishing friends. Moreover, Mother had the ability to provide the “maximum amount of parent-time with the maximum amount of flexibility,” and Mother had “established routines in the morning, evening, and with regard to homework and playtime.”
¶12In keeping with its custody determination, the court also ruled that, “solely” because of “the 100-mile round-trip commute,” the parent-time schedule of “every other week for five days in a row, was not in [Child’s] best interest,” and that the parent-time schedule would be altered in accordance with Utah Code section 30-3-35—Utah’s minimum parent-time schedule. The court ruled that “on alternating weekends, [Father] shall have parent-time from the time [Child’s] school is regularly dismissed on Friday until Sunday at 7 p.m.” Additionally, Father was awarded a mid-week overnight during which Father “pick[s] up [Child] after school, and [Mother] pick[s] up [Child] the next morning.” The court explained, “The new parent-time schedule is in the best interest of [Child]” because “it allows [him] to maximize his time with [Father] while eliminating the constant, back-to-back days of commuting.”
¶13 After the court filed its custody order, Father filed a motion for new trial as well as a motion to amend the court’s findings. The court denied both motions. Father now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶14Father challenges the district court’s custody order on two grounds. First, he alleges the court failed to articulate sufficient reasons for rejecting the custody evaluator’s recommendation to award him primary physical custody and that the court based its custody determination on an erroneous fact. Second, he alleges the court failed to make sufficient findings about why it did not award increased parent-time pursuant to Utah Code section 303-35.1.
¶15 On appeal, we review the district court’s custody and parent-time determination for abuse of discretion. LeFevre v. Mackelprang, 2019 UT App 42, ¶ 17, 440 P.3d 874. This discretion is broad; indeed, as long as the court exercises it “within the confines of the legal standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions, we will not disturb the resulting award.” Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988) (cleaned up). We review the court’s “underlying factual findings for clear error.” LeFevre, 2019 UT App 42, ¶ 17. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the law.” Id. (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
The Rejection of the Evaluator’s Recommendation
¶16 Father first challenges the district court’s decision to award primary physical custody to Mother. When determining custody, the court considers many statutorily defined factors, including “the parent’s demonstrated understanding of, responsiveness to, and ability to meet the developmental needs of the child, including the child’s . . . physical needs; . . . emotional needs; . . . [and] any other factor the court finds relevant.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2) (LexisNexis 2019).24 But the factors the court considers are “not on equal footing.” See Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491. “Generally, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight.” Id.
¶17 Although the district court has broad discretion to make custody determinations, it “must set forth written findings of fact and conclusions of law which specify the reasons for its custody decision.” Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1215 (Utah 1996). The findings “must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5, ¶ 27, 414 P.3d 933 (cleaned up). The district court’s conclusions must demonstrate how the decree “follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence,” Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶ 17, 169 P.3d 754 (cleaned up), “link[ing] the evidence presented at trial to the child’s best interest and the ability of each parent to meet the child’s needs” whenever “custody is contested,” K.P.S., 2018 UT App 5, ¶ 27.
¶18 Father contends that the court failed to “articulate sufficient reasons as to why it rejected [the custody evaluator’s] recommendation[]” that Child should primarily reside with Father. “[A] district court is not bound to accept a custody evaluator’s recommendation,” but if it rejects such a “recommendation, the court is expected to articulate some reason for” doing so. R.B. v. L.B., 2014 UT App 270, ¶ 18, 339 P.3d 137.
¶19 Here, the court sufficiently supported its rejection of the custody evaluator’s recommendation. The custody evaluator recommended that the court award primary physical custody of Child to Father for two reasons: (1) Father was in “a more stable physical situation” and “not likely to move,” and (2) Child had a “positive and reciprocal relationship with his siblings and [would] be able to attend school with them as well as receive guidance and support from them academically, socially and emotionally.” The court found the evaluation “very helpful” but did “not agree with the ultimate recommendation.”
¶20 The court based its rejection of the custody evaluator’s recommendation on several factors. First, the court disagreed that Mother’s rental apartment was less stable than Father’s living situation because both Mother and Father had relocated multiple times in the last few years and both testified that they intended to stay in their current homes. Second, although the court agreed that keeping the siblings together “would be beneficial” to Child, the court did not “give this factor quite the weight” that the custody evaluator did, because Child had never “lived exclusively with his siblings” and their relationship was not the same as a relationship “between siblings who have been reared together prior to the separation between the parents.”
¶21 The court also detailed how physical custody with Mother would better serve Child’s “psychological and emotional needs.” It found that Mother had “established routines” with Child “in the morning, evening, and with regard to homework and playtime.” She “lived a one[-]child-centered life” and indeed had “built her life around her son”; whereas, Father’s attention was divided among several children. Mother also enjoyed “flexible” self-employment that allowed her to personally provide care for Child, whereas Father’s work schedule was “less flexible” and would require surrogate care.
¶22 The court further determined that it was not in Child’s best interest to change schools, which would be required if Father were awarded primary physical custody. The court emphasized the need for “consistency” and “routine” for Child, as he was exhibiting signs of being “under stress,” “struggle[d] in social settings,” and had “behavioral issues,” “emotional outbursts,” and “difficulty making friends.” In light of these factors, the court determined that “making too many changes all at once” would not be in Child’s best interest. Most notably, the court found Mother’s “testimony credible and persuasive regarding the impact a change of school would have on [Child], given his current condition and the Adjustment Disorder diagnosis.” Because Child had made significant progress “adjusting” to his current school and establishing friendships, the court found that requiring Child to “start all over—start at a new school, make new friends and re-adjust”—would “impact the progress” he had made and would not be in his best interest. Consequently, granting Father primary physical custody, which in turn would require Child to transfer to a school in Grantsville, was not in Child’s best interest.
¶23 Father contends that the court erred because it rejected the custody evaluator’s “recommendation solely based on [an] ‘Adjustment Disorder with disturbance of conduct’ diagnosis” even though “at no[] time was there any testimony as to how [the diagnosis] affected the Child, and/or how it related to the Child’s relationship with each parent.” But the court did not rest its decision solely on the fact that Child had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder. Instead, it considered evidence that the disorder was caused by stress, that it manifested as behavioral and social impairments, and that introducing a change such as transferring schools would exacerbate these problems. Specifically, Father introduced a letter from Child’s therapist explaining that Child had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder caused by “a stressor in [his] life” and that he experienced “significant impairment in social, occupational or other areas of functioning.” Mother also gave extensive testimony regarding Child’s struggles with “focus,” “emotional outbursts,” and “making friends,” and she detailed the improvements he had made in those areas. She further testified that, in light of Child’s adjustment disorder diagnosis, “having him switch schools would just exacerbate that” condition and undo the progress he had made because it would require him to “start all over.”
¶24 In sum, the evidence presented at trial sufficiently supports the court’s ruling that Child’s best interests, i.e., his “psychological, physical, and emotional” needs, were best met by Mother being awarded primary physical custody, “outweigh[ing] the factors favoring” a custody award in favor of Father. And the court’s careful evaluation of that evidence certainly “articulate[s] some reason” for rejecting the custody evaluator’s recommendation. See R.B. v. L.B., 2014 UT App 270, ¶ 18, 339 P.3d 137. Thus, the court acted within its discretion in rejecting the custody evaluator’s recommendation and awarding Mother primary physical custody.
The Parent-Time Schedule under Utah Code Section 30-3-35
¶25 Father also contends that the district court erred because it did not adopt the optional increased parent time schedule set forth under Utah Code section 30-3-35.1 without making sufficient findings. We disagree.
¶26 “[D]istrict courts are generally afforded broad discretion to establish parent-time.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 16, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up). When parents do not agree to a parent-time schedule, Utah Code section 30-3-35 prescribes a “default minimum amount” of “parent-time for the noncustodial parent,” unless “‘the court determines that Section 30-3-35.1 should apply’ or a parent can establish ‘that more or less parent-time should be awarded.’” Id. ¶¶ 5–6 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 303-34(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-335(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021)). Under that default minimum parent-time schedule, the noncustodial parent is entitled to time with the child on “one weekday evening and on alternating weekends, which include Friday and Saturday overnights.” Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 6. Thus, the noncustodial parent, at minimum, enjoys “two overnights in a typical two-week period.” LeFevre v. Mackelprang, 2019 UT App 42, ¶ 20, 440 P.3d 874.
¶27 The court “may consider” an “optional parent-time schedule” set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-35.1(1)–(2), (6), which increases parent-time from two overnights to five overnights in every two-week period “by extending weekend overnights by one night, and affording one weeknight overnight each week.” See Id. ¶ 21; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.1(6) (LexisNexis 2019). The court may adopt the optional parent-time schedule when either (a) “the parties agree” or (b) “the noncustodial parent can demonstrate the presence of at least four factual circumstances.” LeFevre, 2019 UT App 42, ¶ 22 (cleaned up); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.1(2).
¶28 But even if either of these two prerequisites is satisfied, the district court is not obligated to adopt the increased parent-time schedule.25Under Utah Code section 30-3-35.1, the court “is authorized, but not required, to consider the optional increased parent-time schedule as described in the statute.”Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 13. The statute “provides legislatively established standards for the district court to apply in evaluating whether increased parent-time is warranted, and it eliminates the need for a district court to independently fashion an increased parent-time schedule by providing a detailed schedule for the court to modify or adopt.” Id. ¶ 16. But by providing “the district court with some guidance and tools for adopting increased parent-time schedules,” the legislature did not eliminate “the court’s discretion to apply those tools in the best interest of the child.” Id. To the contrary, the statutory language plainly indicates that the adoption of the increased schedule is permissive rather than mandatory. See id.
¶29 Nonetheless, Father argues that once the court “considered” section 30-3-35.1, it was obligated to make findings articulating why it rejected the increased parent-time schedule suggested by the statute. In setting the parent-time schedule, the court largely adopted the minimum schedule set forth in section 30-3-35, except that it increased the weekday evening parent-time to a mid-week overnight. As a result, the only difference between the increased parent-time schedule under section 30-3-35.1 and the schedule actually ordered is an additional weekly Sunday overnight. Father contends that “the trial court should have addressed how it was in the best interest for [Child] to be returned home on Sunday as opposed to Monday morning for school.”
¶30 But Father misunderstands the statutory scheme. When parents cannot agree to a parent-time schedule, section 30-3-35 provides a presumptive minimum, but the district court still retains discretion to award more time than the statute provides. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34(1)–(2) (“[T]he court may . . . establish a parent-time schedule” but “the parent-time schedule as provided in Section[] 30-3-35 . . . shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled.”). If the court orders more parent-time than the presumptive minimum, it may “independently fashion an increased parent-time schedule” under section 30-3-35, or it may adopt the “detailed schedule” set forth in section 30-3-35.1. See Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 16. In any event, in awarding parent-time, the court is simply required to “enter the reasons underlying [its] order.” See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34(3). The statute does not require the court to articulate specific reasons for rejecting all other alternatives, such as an additional Sunday overnight that would necessitate another long commute to school every other Monday.
¶31 In keeping with the statutory requirements, the court entered sufficient findings to support its parent-time award under section 30-3-35. The court ordered that “[Father] shall have parent-time pursuant to the guidelines established in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35” and articulated its reasons for customizing that schedule to allow Father an additional mid-week overnight. The court explained that it was
interested in maximizing [Father’s] time (along with his family) with [Child]. Section 30-3-35 permits a mid-week visit. It is in [Child’s] best interest to have a mid-week visit at [Father’s] home. [Child] will benefit from doing homework with [Father], [his stepmother,] and his siblings. And, because it is only one day a week, the impact of the commute will be minimized. The parties can determine which day works best for them and [Child].
The court concluded that “[t]he new parent-time schedule is in the best interest of [Child]—it allows [him] to maximize his time with [Father] while eliminating the constant, back-to-back days of commuting.” These findings adequately support the ordered parent-time schedule.
CONCLUSION
¶32Custody and parent-time determinations “may frequently and of necessity require a choice between good and better.” Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Utah 1982). The broad discretion we accord the district court “stems from the reality that in some cases the court must choose one custodian from two excellent parents.” Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah 1996). That is precisely the situation the district court faced here. And “where analysis reveals that the best interests of the child would be served equally well with either parent,” we cannot say the “court has abused its discretion in awarding custody to one parent over another.” See id. at 1216. Because the district court sufficiently supported its rejection of the custody evaluator’s recommendation for primary custody and articulated the reasons for the parent-time schedule it adopted, we defer to the court’s sound judgment. Affirmed.
But before I elaborate, let’s ask and answer this question first: is the legal system designed to protect the visitation (“visitation” is also known as “parent-time”) rights of noncustodial parents?
The answer to that question is, ostensibly: yes. But as I stated above, regardless of how well the legal system may be designed or may intend to protect the parent-time/visitation rights of noncustodial parents, designs and intentions are meaningless without proper enforcement.
And just how well are the designed/intended protections of noncustodial parent visitation/parent-time administered and enforced? Terribly, for the most part.
How so? Some jurisdictions make interfering with the noncustodial parent’s visitation/parent-time a crime. Criminal statutes, however, are of no protection to a noncustodial parent or two that noncustodial parent’s relationship with his/her child if the police won’t issue citations or make arrests for violating the criminal statute and if prosecutors won’t prosecute violations of the criminal statute.
Virtually all jurisdictions have provisions in their law for punishing violations of visitation/parent-time orders in decrees of divorce and degrees of child custody and parent time. If, however, you are the wronged noncustodial parent (meaning that the custodial parent has flouted the court’s orders and denied/interfered with visitation/parent-time), yet the court does not hold the offending parent accountable by holding him/her in contempt of court and sanctioning him/her for the contemptuous act(s), then contempt of court is not a deterrent.
Many jurisdictions provide for a parent who has been denied court ordered visitation/parent-time to receive what is known as compensatory or “make-up” time with the children. And that’s sensible. If the other parent denies you a weekend or a holiday with your children, then the court has the power to award you a “make-up” weekend or holiday. Again, however, such concepts and provisions in the law are meaningless when courts don’t enforce them. And many courts won’t.
Why won’t courts get tough on custodial parents who interfere with and/or deny noncustodial parents there visitation/parent-time? Two main reasons. One, some courts believe that because it’s hard enough on a child to be denied time with one parent, taking time away from the offending parent so that the parent who was denied visitation/parent-time can spend time with the child simply “solves” one problem (denial of time with one parent) by causing another (denial of time with the other parent). Two, some courts just don’t care enough to enforce the laws on the books, and the cost of trying to hold these disobedient judges accountable is usually far too expensive and far too risky (you don’t want to antagonize the judge).
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
I have custody of my child. He left to go to his mom’s last Friday for the weekend. He is refusing to come home because he wants to live there. What happens now?
I will answer this question in the context of my experience as a lawyer in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law, which is Utah.
And that answer is: realistically speaking, probably nothing.
As a divorce and family law attorney, I have been on both sides of this issue, meaning I’ve represented the parent with custody of the child who won’t come back, and I’ve also represented the noncustodial parent to whose house the child has “fled” and won’t leave.
This is a weird area of Utah law because you’ll hear the legislature and the courts tell you that children don’t get to choose where they live, and then when children do that very thing (i.e., refuse to live where the court orders them to live), the courts find themselves essentially powerless to change anything. At least that’s my experience over the 24 years I’ve been in practice.
Briefly, if the children are old enough that they cannot be physically controlled by a parent and forced into a car from the noncustodial parents house back to the custodial parent’s house, then the courts are usually not going to intervene. This means that a court will, in fairness and realistically, tell the parents that pragmatically there’s really nothing that they ought to do to enforce the child custody order if the child himself or herself is old enough to put up a fight and/or call the police and/or DCFS and report you for child abuse if you try to force them into the car to go back to the custodial parent’s house. Besides, the child who is old enough to put up a fight is also likely old enough to run away from the noncustodial parents home if anyone tries to force him or her to reside with a parent with whom the child doesn’t want to live.
And so, you get in a situation where the child is disobeying the court’s custody order, but most courts either don’t have the cats to hold the child in contempt of court or don’t feel it is appropriate to sanction a child who won’t comply with the court’s child custody orders. Yet these same courts will also often refuse to modify the child custody award because they don’t want to acknowledge that children, of all people, have the de facto power to defy court orders with impunity.
Next, you need to be aware of the possibility that your custodial parent ex will try to blame you for your child refusing to return to the custodial parent’s home, regardless of whether that is true. Many times, a perfectly innocent noncustodial parent will tell his or her acts and the court, “Look, I’ve told the child what the court order is and that both our and I are expected to comply. But the child refuses to comply anyway. Now what you want me to do? Kick the child out and lock the door behind him?” Some courts sympathize with that predicament, others don’t buy it. Which means it is entirely possible that you would be held in contempt of court for doing absolutely nothing wrong, if the court believes you enticed or coheirs the child to say he or she wants to stay with you. So you need to keep that in mind.
So if you are a noncustodial parent of a child who refuses to reside with the court ordered custodial parent, then you must ask yourself a few questions:
First, if the child refusing to live with the custodial parent because the child is a spoiled brat who has no legitimate reason for refusing to live with the custodial parent? If the answer is yes, then you as the noncustodial parent have both a legal and moral obligation to talk the child into going back to the custodial parent’s home, or if persuasion doesn’t work, imposing limitations and restrictions and punishments upon the child so that the child won’t get the impression that he or she is in charge.
Second, if the child is refusing to reside with the custodial parent because the custodial parent is truly neglectful and/or abusive, and if you have independently verifiable proof of this, you have the option of petitioning the court to modify the child custody award, changing the custodial parent from your ex to you. While that petition is pending, your child may refuse to return to the custodial parent’s home, and for reasons at least you and the child know to be valid. Whether the court allows your child to stay with you depends upon how your court views the situation and what is best for the child.
If you find yourself in this kind of situation, whether you are the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, this is one of those situations where you need to seek good legal advice immediately, to help ensure that neither you nor the child is victimized.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
I am the noncustodial parent. Our child came to my house for parent-time and now refuses to leave because he wants to live with me. What happens now?
I will answer this question in the context of my experience as a lawyer in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law, which is Utah.
This is a weird area of Utah law because you’ll hear the legislature and the courts tell you that children don’t get to choose where they live, and then when children do that very thing (i.e., refuse to live where the court orders them to live), the courts find themselves essentially powerless to change anything. At least that’s my experience over the 24 years I’ve been in practice.
Now before some of you start licking your lips and scheming, thinking, “I’m the noncustodial parent, but I can change that by simply telling our child to choose to refuse to return to the custodial parent’s house,” you need to be aware of the realities.
If you’re the noncustodial parent and your child or children are under the age of 14 or so, and they claim that they don’t want to live with the custodial parent, there’s a very good chance that the court is going to believe that you are a puppet master who coached the children or otherwise induced or coerced them into claiming they want to live with you. That may not be true, but you’re going to be met with that kind of skeptical presumption. So if you are the noncustodial parent with young children who you assert claim they don’t want to live with the custodial parent, you have an uphill battle ahead of you. If you are the noncustodial parent and a father, you have an almost impossibly uphill battle ahead of you.
If, however, your children are 14 years or older, and you are the noncustodial parent with whom your children say they want to live, it will be harder for your ex and/or the court to presume that the children are lying and/or don’t have good reasons for wanting to live with you. Again, if you are the father making this claim, your claim will be met with more skepticism than if you were the noncustodial mother making such a claim. Why is this? Because there is a pernicious belief in the legal system that fathers are generally worse parents than our mothers, that fathers don’t want custody of their children, and that the only reason fathers would seek custody of their children is to avoid paying child support. As a result of these beliefs, fathers who seek custody of their children are met with not just skepticism, but often derisive skepticism. Forewarned is forearmed.
So, if you are a noncustodial parent who is good and decent, and your child honestly and sincerely comes to you saying, “mom/dad, I can’t stand living with the custodial parent anymore, and I want to live with you,” how do you proceed?
First, if the child refusing to live with the custodial parent because the child just wants to spend more time with you and/or less time with the custodial parent, and the custodial parent is not neglecting or abusing the child in any way, then you as the noncustodial parent have both a legal and moral obligation to talk the child into going back to the custodial parent’s home, or if persuasion doesn’t work, imposing limitations and restrictions and punishments upon the child so that the child won’t get the impression that he or she is in charge. At the same time, the custodial parent needs to acknowledge the child’s desires to spend more time with the noncustodial parent as being a legitimate concern that needs to be addressed and resolved, and that usually means the custodial parent agreeing to give the child and the noncustodial parent more time together. If the custodial parent refuses to do the right thing, you may ask whether it’s wise to petition the court for a modification of the child custody award, so that you and the child get more time together. Unfortunately, odds are that if you file a petition to modify child custody and the only basis for your petition is the child’s desire to spend more time with you, you will probably lose. While it is technically and conceivably possible to win such a petition, usually the courts in Utah require more than just the child’s desire as the basis for a modification. And what form does this “more” take? Typically, you would have to show that the custodial parent is neglecting and/or abusing the child to get a modification of the child custody award.
Second, if the child is refusing to reside with the custodial parent because the custodial parent is truly neglectful and/or abusive, and if you have independently verifiable proof of this, you have the option of petitioning the court to modify the child custody award, changing the custodial parent from your ex to you. While that petition is pending, your child may refuse to return to the custodial parent’s home, and for reasons at least you and the child know to be valid. Whether the court allows your child to stay with you depends upon how your court views the situation and what is best for the child.
If you find yourself in this kind of situation, whether you are the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, this is one of those situations where you need to seek good legal advice immediately, to help ensure that neither you nor the child is victimized.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Why does someone need an attorney when they can just defend themselves in court (pro se)?
Why does someone need an attorney when they can just defend themselves in court?
It really depends on how you define “need” here.
First, understand that no litigant (except a litigant in certain circumstances who is determined to be mentally incapacitated or disabled, in which case the court may appoint an attorney for such a litigant) is required or can be forced to have be represented by an attorney.
This means you cannot be forced to hire an attorney, you cannot be forced to have an attorney appointed for you in criminal cases, even if you qualify for an attorney to be appointed for you.
So, there is no legal mandate that you be represented by an attorney, no “need” to be represented by an attorney in that sense. You won’t be arrested or fined for not being represented by an attorney.
So, from the foregoing we see that you have the absolute right (with the exception of disability/incapacity) to represent yourself in court (that’s known as proceeding “pro se”, which is Latin for “for oneself”).
If, however, prevailing in the litigation is your sole or primary objective, and if you are not well-versed/skilled/confident regarding the law and court procedures, you may determine that you cannot win without an attorney. In that respect, you may determine that you “need” an attorney. In this sense, most people need an attorney. You may have heard the old saw, “A man who represents himself, has a fool for a client.” Abraham Lincoln is reputed to have put it this way: “He who serves as his own counsel has a fool for a lawyer and a jackass for a client.” The reason this is true is because the legal system is not as simple, as non-dysfunctional (sorry, I know that’s a clunky term, but I cannot think of a clearer way to make my point, or as fair as you believe or want to believe. A lawyer is not only helpful for his/her knowledge of the law and court procedures, but also for his/her experience and ability to guide you down the dark, twisted, uphill, rocky, often counterintuitive and dangerous path that is the legal system.
If the stakes are such that you don’t mind bearing the consequences of losing the case (in other words, you can afford to pay and don’t mind paying the fine(s) and/or don’t mind doing the time in jail/prison), then it’s likely you don’t “need” an attorney; otherwise, a prudent litigant needs an attorney.
Should we award custody to the parent who is a lower risk for COVID-19?
Is it reasonable to give custody to the parent who is a lower health risk to the child during the Chinese coronavirus pandemic?
It is reasonable only if the “lower risk” is low enough to necessitate: 1) infringing the right of the children to the care and companionship of their other parent and 2) infringing the right of the parent to exercise his/her parental rights.
If one of you is a frontline emergency room doctor or nurse whose sole job right now is admitting people who are known to be infected with the Coronavirus to the hospital for treatment, while the other is a stay at home parent or a parent who works from home and thus has minimal contact with others, then in that situation it would make sense to award temporary custody of the children to the stay at home parent until the COVID-19 crisis passes.
But consider this: Should health care worker parents be cut off from kids during COVID-19? If a parent works in a hospital then he or she is going to be exposed to diseases of all kinds. It’s not as though once COVID-19 runs its course that this parent is never going to be exposed to other contagious, possibly even deadly, diseases. We don’t consider a parent who is a doctor or nurse inherently “unfit” as a parent just because he or she has a dangerous or potentially dangerous job. Can you imagine what would happen if the law provided that parents with dangerous jobs can’t exercise custody or parent-time of their kids?
It would also make sense for the parent who has been temporarily deprived of physical contact with the kids to be provided with ample and meaningful opportunities for the parent and children to interact by telephone and internet video conference. And it’s only fair that the deprived parent receive compensatory or make-up time with the kids once the COVID-19 crisis passes.
Now let’s examine a different job scenario. If one of you is a gas meter reader and the other is a stay at home parent or a parent who works from home, then neither one of you is at high risk of contracting the Coronavirus. Yes, the meter reader will come in contact with a few more people in the course of his/her work day, but not in close contact and not in a way that is likely to risk contracting the virus. So, while the meter reader’s risk is slightly higher than stay-at-home’s risk, both parents are low risk and there is no reason for the kids to be withheld from one parent because of a negligible, slightly higher risk.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
What is the “right of first refusal”? Is it a statutory right in Utah?
Many of you dealing with child custody disputes may have heard the time “right of first refusal” in the context of child care.
This “right of first refusal” or “first right of refusal” is shorthand for a provision that goes into many child custody and parent-time orders.
What it means is that if a parent is unable to provide personal care and supervision for the children when they are scheduled to be with that parent, then the other parent has the “first right” to pick up the children and provide that care for the children, instead of having a babysitter, daycare provider, or other surrogate care provider take care of the children, until the parent with whom the children are scheduled to stay can again provide personal care and supervision.
The principle behind the right of first refusal is that the parents, not surrogate, should be providing as much care for their own children as possible. A good example of this would be when a parent who is scheduled to have the children for particular week or weekend has to go into work to deal with an emergency or out of town for a business trip.
A lot of mean-spirited and malicious parents get very territorial with their custody time and want to limit the amount of time the other parent has with the kids to the bare minimum. In response to this problem, the right of first refusal clause was invented. It requires 1) a parent who is going to be away from the children to notify the other parent that he or she will be away from the children for certain period of time and 2) that the other parent may provide care for the children before the parent can leave the children with a babysitter, in daycare, with a grandparent or neighbor, or any other surrogate provider.
The right of first refusal clause does not provide that you have to notify the other parent if you’re going to be away from the children for half-hour trip to the grocery store.
In situations like that, it wouldn’t make sense to notify the other parent of the right of first refusal and then have that parent drive 15 to 20 minutes or more to the other parent’s house to pick up the kids, and then have the shopping trip over with before the other parent even gets the kids to his/her home. If the children are young enough to be left at home alone for half an hour, a parent is allowed to do so without the right of first refusal applying. If the children are too young to be left at home alone for half an hour, the right of first refusal also does not apply, and instead a parent can have a neighbor or babysitter watch the children for that brief period that he or she is away from home.
And so the right of first refusal clause usually provides that you only have to notify the other parent if you know that you will be away from the children for a period of more than three or four hours. So if you’re going to be an important work meeting half a day or all day, the right of first refusal kicks in if you have to be out of town for several days due to work or a funeral or something like that, then the right of first refusal kicks in.
Some people believe, falsely, that the Utah Code has made this right of first refusal “statutory right,” a legal right. It has not.
Here is what the Utah Code actually provides:
Utah Code §30-3-33:
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to transport the children, to provide the child care. Child care arrangements existing during the marriage are preferred as are child care arrangements with nominal or no charge.
That’s it. This creates no rights. These are guidelines, not legal mandates.
So unless you get the court to order a right of first refusal to take care of the kids in the other parent’s extended absence, you don’t have that right, period.
So if you want the right of first refusal, then you need the court to include such a clause in your child custody and parent-time order.
Some people suggest that the right of first refusal should be made a legal mandate, a statutory right. I’m not so sure.
In my opinion there is no need for there to be a law that provides for an absolute, irrevocable right of first refusal to provide care in the absence of the other parent. Some parents live too far away from each other to make that possible. Other parents have job schedules that make that impossible for them to exercise. It’s a great idea for most couples (if they can set aside their hatred for each other and agree that parental care is better for the kids than surrogate care), which is why that is something that individual parents and their attorneys should come up with on their own and then have the judge include the order. The problem with the Utah Code currently is that it has to many provisions already, not too few, when it comes to child custody and parent time issues.
I would have no problem with a provision in the Utah Code that a right of first refusal should not be denied if it is requested and the requesting parent can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she can make it work consistently and in the best interest of the children, or something like that. Because you and I both know that there are plenty of parents out there who object to the right of first refusal not because it’s a bad idea because they want to alienate the children from the other parent by denying them contact however they might.
It has been my experience that if the parents live close enough together and have work schedules that make it possible for them to provide care for the children when one of the parents would otherwise be scheduled to have the children in his/her custody is unavailable, courts will gladly and wisely include provisions for a right of first refusal.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
“Can my ex use the panic over Coronavirus/COVID-19 to withhold the kids from me?”
“Will I still be free to pick my son up at the end of the week from his spring break visitation? With all the panic over Coronavirus/COVID-19, I am really nervous that the other parent will use it as an excuse to withhold our child from me.”
You’re not alone. And you haven’t been since long before Coronavirus/COVID-19 was a concern.
We divorce and family law attorneys knew it was only a matter of time until Coronavirus/COVID-19 would become relevant to custody and visitation/parent-time disputes.
As most experienced divorced parents know, it doesn’t really matter what the excuse is for defying a court’s custody and visitation/parent-time orders, just that the parent has a legitimate excuse (or what he or she believes will pass for a legitimate excuse).
Parents who have wanted to keep the kids away from the other parent have always used the “Johnny is sick today” excuse, so the Coronavirus/COVID-19 just puts a more contemporary gloss on this old reliable excuse. Why?
Because sickness (real sickness) is often a very good reason for children not to go back and forth between their parents’ respective residences. If Mom or Dad is sick, and the child is at the other parent’s house, it doesn’t make sense to send a healthy child to a sick parent until that parent is no longer sick and contagious. If the child himself or herself is sick, and the the parent who would otherwise be spending time with the child during his/her custody or visitation is not sick, then it also makes sense for the child to stay put until he or she is no longer sick and contagious.
But any parent whose co-parent is a malicious type who wants to keep the children away knows how to game the system with plausible deniability. I can easily see how such a parent could claim that he or she fears the children or other parent may have been exposed to the Coronavirus/COVID-19 and then assert that fear as the basis for withholding custody or parent time from the other parent until the time consuming process of quarantine and testing is completed. It’s also very difficult for a court to discern whether such ostensible concerns were sincere or just a means of interfering with custody and parent time and depriving the parent and child of time with each other. And so these judges err, understandably, on the side of giving the ostensibly concerned parent the benefit of the doubt.
Here’s the unfortunate truth: with Coronavirus/COVID-19 being such a sensational hot topic in the news these days, no judge is going to want to appear as though he or she is not taking a public health crisis seriously.
So if you are the kind of parent who wants to keep kids away from the other parent, expressing fears over the transmission of Coronavirus/COVD-19 is a great way to interfere with the other parent’s custodial and visitation rights with impunity. The odds of you being accused of expressing such fears maliciously are slim to none. Otherwise stated, you’ll almost surely get away with it. That, however, doesn’t necessarily mean that the victimized parent and child do not have an avenue of compensation.
Let’s say that the other parent invokes fears over Coronavirus to keep the child away from the other parent for a period of 2 to 3 weeks. Once the danger has passed, if I were that other parent, then if the other parent will not agree to schedule 2 to 3 weeks of “make-up” or compensatory time that the child and I were denied as a result of the quarantine and testing period, I would go to court and move the judge to award the child and I such a period of compensatory time. The judge could grant the compensatory time on the grounds that it was denied due to sickness or concerns over sickness, and now that the sickness and/or danger of sickness is passed, the parent and child who were denied time together can now spend that entire period together without risk.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
In some jurisdictions, interference with or noncompliance with child custody orders issued by a court are not enforceable by police officers or sheriff’s deputies because there is no statute or statutes that authorize and empower the police to intervene. This is why law enforcement officers do not intervene in such jurisdictions. The only way that law enforcement officers can intervene in such jurisdictions is for a court to authorize and direct law enforcement officers to enforce child custody and parent time orders, and to do so by force if necessary. This is why, when a parent asking for the police to help with enforcement of a child custody or parent time order, will often receive this kind of response from the officer or officers called: “This is a civil matter. We do not have the authority to intervene to enforce your court orders.”
In other jurisdictions, such as Utah, where I practice divorce and family law, laws have been passed and are now on the books making interference with child custody and/or parent time orders a violation of statutory law. They are commonly referred to as “custodial interference laws”.
Do law enforcement officers in such jurisdictions enforce such statutes? Rarely.
Why?
Because being a law enforcement officer is a thankless job. Consequently, with rare exception, law enforcement officers hate enforcing custodial interference laws. Law enforcement officers generally dislike handling disputes between parents over enforcement of custody and parent time orders because it wastes their time and resources and interferes with their ability to prevent and solve serious crimes, such as aggravated assault, rape, burglary, etc. Some officers get lazy sometimes A) don’t enforce laws they consider not worth enforcing and/or B) don’t want to hassle with all the paperwork associated with responding to, reporting on, and enforcing custodial interference laws.
Instead, they will lie to your face and give you the “This is a civil matter. We do not have the authority to intervene to enforce your court orders” line in the hope that you will believe them when they tell you they cannot help you and thus stop asking them for help. [NOTE here: if you are someone who does not deal with law enforcement officers routinely, you would be pardoned for believing law enforcement officers do not lie and lie a lot. So fool you once, shame on them, fool you twice, shame on you. I know this may shock and sadden some readers—I felt that way when I discovered it and could no longer deny it.] Officers who don’t want to enforce custodial interference laws deal with parents who know of the laws on the books and aren’t fooled by the “this is a civil matter” dodge will simply threaten to arrest those parents who won’t back down for “disorderly conduct” and/or “disturbing the peace” (two favorite go to intimidation tactics that law enforcement officers frequently utilize to get people off their backs). Why? Because they can get away with it. More often than not, if you were to complain about law enforcement officers failing and refusing to enforce custodial interference laws, their superiors will nod their heads, thank you for “bringing this matter to my attention,” promise that action will be taken, wait for you to hang up the phone or leave the office, and then never give the matter a second thought.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
make divorce cases more litigant focused and tailored to meeting their needs and the needs of their family, instead of tailoring the cases for the convenience of the courts and lawyers;
focus making divorce cases take less time to work their way through the court system. This reduces anxiety and emotional distress, reduces costs, promotes just and equitable outcomes, and helps prevent other abuses of the legal system caused by delays;
require judges to make commendably detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their rulings on every issue in a divorce case;
rather than make the standard a negative one (e., the ruling stands unless it can be shown to be an abuse of discretion) require that they show that their rulings are as equitable as they could reasonably make them for the parties and their children under the circumstances;
subject to rigorous, forensic psychological examination and evaluation every litigant in a divorce case in which child custody is an issue and where accusations of any kind of physical, emotional/psychological, sexual, financial, or any other kind of abuse of spouse or children are made.
Find out whether the allegations are true
Find out if the accusations are sincere or motivated by malevolence and/or intent to defraud the court
Why? Because:
if you are falsely accused of abuse, it will be the seriousness of the allegations, as opposed to the substance of the evidence, that will determine how your judge rules.
far, far too often courts, when confronted with allegations of abuse, take the easy way out and err on the side of caution. What I mean is that the courts will analyze the situation like this: “I don’t want to determine that there is insufficient evidence to support these abuse allegations only to have a child or ex-spouse wind up in the hospital or dead later. If that happens, then it looks like I failed to protect the ex-spouse and/or child, which will look like I failed to do my job competently. I may end up the subject of news reports that humiliate and embarrass me and lays my job as a judge in jeopardy. But if I take a “better safe than sorry” approach, then while I will be violating my oath of office by infringing on the parental rights of a parent who I am not convinced is an abuser (and thus denying the children that parent’s loving and beneficial impact on their lives), that would be nigh onto impossible to prove (and stories like this rarely makes the news anyway), and I so I all but completely avoid the risk of being faulted for failing to protect. That settles it. I will err on the side of caution.” That’s a gross miscarriage of justice, but it’s far too often what judges do in these circumstances.
I don’t know if it is common for one parent in a divorce (custodial or non-custodial) to villainize their ex to the child, but we know it happens frequently and any time it occurs is too often. And let’s clarify the question a bit too. One cannot “villainize” a parent who is already a villain, so when the question is asked, “Why do some parents in a divorce villainize their ex to the child?,” the question assumes that the other parent is, in fact, a good and decent person and clearly not a villain.
So why do some parents in divorce portray the other parent (who is good and decent) as a villain? It can be due to one or more of the following:
hatred for the other parent, which expresses itself in efforts to alienate the child from his or her other parent;
a parent who hates the other parent may alienate the child from that parent in an effort to seek revenge for wrongs that parent believes the other parent committed against him or her;
fear that a child’s love for one parent comes at the cost of the child love for the other parent;along these same lines:
a misguided belief that unless the child hates one parent the child cannot love the other parent;
an all-consuming need for all of that child’s love and friendship. some parents try to compensate for the loss of the love and companionship of a spouse by making their children fill that need;
a parent’s desire for the children to be that parent’s domestic and emotional servants, which results in that parent doing everything he or she can to ensure the children’s loyalty by persuading them to hate and reject their other parent, therefore leading them to believe that they should have nothing to do with that other parent;
mental illness and/or personality disorders that cause the alienating parent to behave in irrational and inappropriate ways, including engaging in parental alienation.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
What can I file in court for custodial interference? Is it just a matter of filing a motion for order to show cause? Or is there more to it?
ANSWER:
Custodial interference is a crime, so you cannot file a custodial interference action yourself (only a prosecutor can do that). The custodial interference law is found at Utah Code § 76-5-303.
To get the ball rolling on a custodial interference prosecution you need to report the custodial interference to the police or to the local county or city attorney. It almost certainly won’t do you any good, however. Why? Because the police and prosecutors hate the custodial interference law. No, really. I’m not kidding. Rarely, rarely, rarely will the police make an arrest or issue a citation for custodial interference, and rarely will the prosecutor file charges. They simply refuse to enforce the law. “Oh,” you may say, “but my case is so egregious that the police will surely help me.”
No, they won’t.
Is that legal? No. Is that right? No. But they get away with it.
Don’t believe me? Call the police and/or prosecutor; tell them your story. See if they do anything.
You can, however, file against your ex a motion for order to show cause as to why he or she should not be held in contempt of court for his noncompliance with parent-time and/or custody orders. Utah law has specific laws that provide for sanctions for parents who fail or refuse to comply with custody and/or parent-time orders:
Utah Code § 78B-6-316. Compensatory service for violation of parent-time order or failure to pay child support.
(1) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent has refused to comply with the minimum amount of parent-time ordered in a decree of divorce, the court shall order the parent to:
(a) perform a minimum of 10 hours of compensatory service; and
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court order and providing a child a continuing relationship with both parents.
(2) If a custodial parent is ordered to perform compensatory service or undergo court-ordered education, there is a rebuttable presumption that the noncustodial parent be granted parent-time by the court to provide child care during the time the custodial parent is complying with compensatory service or education in order to recompense him for parent-time wrongfully denied by the custodial parent under the divorce decree.
(3) If a noncustodial parent is ordered to perform compensatory service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to schedule the compensatory service or education at times that will not interfere with the noncustodial parent’s parent-time with the child.
(4) The person ordered to participate in court-ordered education is responsible for expenses of workshops, classes, and individual counseling.
(5) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an obligor, as defined in Section 78B-12-102, has refused to pay child support as ordered by a court in accordance with Title 78B, Chapter 12, Utah Child Support Act, the court shall order the obligor to:
(a) perform a minimum of 10 hours of compensatory service; and
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to educate the obligor about the importance of complying with the court order and providing the children with a regular and stable source of support.
(6) The obligor is responsible for the expenses of workshops, classes, and individual counseling ordered by the court.
(7) If a court orders an obligor to perform compensatory service or undergo court-ordered education, the court shall attempt to schedule the compensatory service or education at times that will not interfere with the obligor’s parent-time with the child.
(8) The sanctions that the court shall impose under this section do not prevent the court from imposing other sanctions or prevent any person from bringing a cause of action allowed under state or federal law.
(9) The Legislature shall allocate the money from the Children’s Legal Defense Account to the judiciary to defray the cost of enforcing and administering this section.
There are also these sanctions available to the court to impose for contempt of court:
(1) The court shall determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However, a justice court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $500 or by incarceration for five days or both.
(2) A fine imposed under this section is subject to the limitations of Subsection 76-3-301(2).
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277