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Category: Jurisdiction

If You Were Married in One State but Now Live in Another State, Which State’s Law Would Apply if You Divorce?

Many people wonder whether they must file for divorce in the state (or even the country) where they were married, even if they never resided there or no longer reside in that state or country and have not resided there for months or years.

The answer to the question of whether one must file for divorce in the state (or even the country) where one was married is: no. You can file for divorce in the state where you or your spouse currently reside(s).

In the context of divorce, “reside” or “residency” has a specific and objective meaning. With the exception of a few states, you cannot simply consider or declare yourself a resident of a state for divorce filing purposes, you must meet requirements for establishing residency before you qualify to file for divorce in a particular state.

Based upon the research I conducted in responding to this question, the states with the shortest residency requirements are, and I have provided a list below. This list consists of generalities. I do not claim that my research is perfectly accurate, there are other requirements that can affect qualifications for filing for divorce in certain states and remember that states can change their residency requirements. Before you decide to file for divorce in a particular state, confer with an attorney in that state to ensure you and/or your spouse meet(s) all residency requirements):

SHORTEST (0 days)

Alaska, South Dakota, Washington

You have to stay there after you file for divorce, but you don’t have to have lived there a minimum period of time before filing for divorce.

LONGEST (one year)

Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, West Virginia

NEW YORK

New York kind of fits in both the shortest and the longest categories, but only under certain circumstances. There is no minimum period of time required to establish residency if both spouses live in New York and the cause for divorce occurred in New York. Otherwise, it’s 365 days if 1) one spouse lived in New York one year, and 2) the couple must have either been married in New York or lived in New York at some point in time as a married couple. If only one spouse lives in New York and none of the factors above apply, you can’t qualify as a resident for divorce purposes until you have resided in New York for 730 days.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

Eric Johnson’s answer to If you got married in one state but live in another, which state’s rules would apply if you divorce? – Quora

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If a Family Court Judge Orders That a School District Provide Certain Documents and the District Does Not Respond at All, Believing That the Court Has No Jurisdiction, Can the Order Be Enforced, or Is Something Else Going on That I Don’t Understand?

If the court does not have jurisdiction to issue an order to the school district or has issued a defective order, then the school district has every right to oppose the order.

If the court has jurisdiction to issue an order to the school district, and the order is valid, then school district is legally obligated to comply with the order and risks being sanctioned by the court if it fails or refuses to comply. However, if neither one of the parties to the lawsuit or the court itself does not take steps to enforce the order, then it doesn’t really matter whether the court has jurisdiction or whether the order is valid.

So, if a legally enforceable order exists, if the school district is not complying with it, and the court is not taking action on its own to enforce the order, then you will need to file a motion with court seeking and order and the action necessary to enforce the order.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/If-a-family-court-judge-orders-that-a-school-district-provide-certain-documents-and-the-district-does-not-respond-at-all-believing-that-the-court-has-no-jurisdiction-can-the-order-be-enforced-or-is-something-else

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Mower v. Mower – 2023 UT App 10 – Death of Spouse Before Court Rules

2023 UT App 10

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LIDIA V. MOWER,

Appellant,

v.

THOMAS W. MOWER, Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20210101-CA

Filed January 20, 2023

Fourth District Court, American Fork Department

The Honorable Roger W. Griffin No. 124100133

Cassie J. Medura and Jarrod H. Jennings, Attorneys for Appellant

Douglas B. Thayer and Mark R. Nelson, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Thomas E. Mower and Lidia V. Mower stipulated to a bifurcated divorce in which the district court dissolved their marriage but reserved for trial all other issues, which were the subject of contentious litigation. Thomas died after the trial concluded but shortly before the court issued its ruling that would have resolved all but one issue. As a result of Thomas’s death, the court held that it no longer had jurisdiction over the divorce action and closed the case, indicating that Lidia could pursue any surviving claims in probate court against Thomas’s estate.[1]

¶2 On appeal, Lidia argues that the court erroneously concluded that the unresolved claims in the divorce action abated on Thomas’s death. Thomas’s son, Thomas W. Mower (Thomas Jr.), in his capacity as special administrator of the Estate of Thomas E. Mower, by special appearance represents his late father’s interests on appeal. See generally Utah R. App. P. 38(a), (c). We hold that under the facts of this case, Thomas’s death did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to resolve most of the unresolved claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Thomas and Lidia married in 2001. Lidia initiated divorce proceedings in 2012. The ensuing litigation was very contentious and involved complex issues including grounds for divorce, a request for a retroactive increase in alimony,[2] custody of and parent-time with their child born during the marriage, child support, the potential equitable division of a large estate that was arguably “worth upwards of $150,000,000,”[3] and attorney fees.

¶4 In May 2013, on the parties’ stipulation, the district court entered a bifurcated decree of divorce, dissolving the parties’ marriage but reserving all other issues for trial. The court ruled that it would “value the estate as of the date this divorce decree enters rather than at the day of trial” and that “[a]ll other issues of dispute will remain open for further resolution by the Court.” Following entry of the bifurcated divorce decree, both parties remarried.

¶5 Four and a half years later, the bench trial in this case, which “included voluminous exhibits and witness testimony,” was held over the course of sixteen days between November 2017 and December 2018. Although the matter came under advisement awaiting a final ruling in January 2020, the district court “held status conferences to work through issues as they arose,” with the most recent one being held in July 2020.

¶6 Thomas passed away on August 2, 2020. The following day, the district court issued a ruling stating it would close the divorce action in twenty days unless it received a valid objection and a supporting memorandum. Lidia objected, filing a Motion for Entry of Final Property Division and a Rule 25 Motion to Substitute Party. Regarding the latter motion, Lidia requested that “the personal representative or other appropriate party” be substituted in the divorce action “to allow the Court to issue a final ruling regarding property settlement and all outstanding financial issues in this case.” See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (“If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.”). Thomas’s counsel opposed Lidia’s objection and motions.[4]

¶7 In February 2021, following argument on the issues, the court overruled Lidia’s objection and denied her motions. The court first stated that shortly before Thomas’s death, it had completed “its findings of fact and was prepared to issue a ruling reserving only a single outstanding issue that [it] intended to invite the parties to address via supplemental briefing.” Despite this, following a lengthy discussion of Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, 416 P.3d 487, the court held that its prior orders regarding child support, parent-time, and custody abated upon Thomas’s death and that Lidia, as the surviving party in a bifurcated divorce, was required “to pursue unresolved equitable claims to marital property before a probate court.” A few months later, the court issued a Final Order, stating, “Due to the untimely death of [Thomas], this court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter and this matter is closed.” ¶8 Lidia appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Lidia argues that the court erred in closing the divorce action on the ground that Thomas’s death caused it to lose jurisdiction.[5] “We review a court’s determination of jurisdiction for correctness, granting no deference to the lower court.” In re S.W., 2017 UT 37, ¶ 7, 424 P.3d 7.

ANALYSIS

¶10 In concluding that Thomas’s death caused it to lose jurisdiction over the divorce action, the district court relied heavily on our Supreme Court’s opinion in Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, 416 P.3d 487. In that case, during the pendency of a divorce action, the husband executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the marital home to his mother in an effort to prevent the home from being distributed as part of the marital estate. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The husband thereafter died, causing the district court to dismiss the divorce case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 5. The wife then sued the mother, seeking to set aside the quitclaim deed under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act (the UFTA). Id. ¶ 6. The district court in that case ultimately ruled that the husband’s transfer of his interest in the home to his mother was fraudulent under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 8.

¶11 The mother appealed, arguing that the wife’s claim was barred because the UFTA requires an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship at the time a claim under the act is filed, which relationship the husband’s death had extinguished. Id. ¶ 9. Specifically, the mother argued that the wife’s claim against the husband “for the whole of the marital estate, including the right to preserve the joint tenancy” in the marital home, id. ¶ 14 (quotation simplified), became unenforceable when the husband died because one “cannot bring a claim against a dead person” and because “court orders that award a spouse with property abate upon the death of a spouse,” id. ¶ 16. See generally id. ¶ 12 (“The existence of a claim, or right to payment, is at the heart of the debtor-creditor relationship.”); id. ¶ 19 (“A claim for equitable distribution arises when one party in a marriage threatens divorce.”).

¶12 Quoting its prior decision in In re Harper’s Estate, 265 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1954), our Supreme Court reaffirmed that

when the death of one of the parties occurs after the entry of a divorce decree and before the decree is final the decree becomes ineffective to dissolve the marriage, death having terminated that personal relationship. However, the occurrence of death does not abate the action itself and to the extent that property rights are determined by the decree it remains effective and becomes final.

Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 20 (quotation simplified). See id. ¶ 28 (reaffirming the precedent set forth in In re Harper’s Estate). In other words, the Court held that “[t]he death of a spouse during a divorce proceeding abates the action concerning the dissolution of marriage, but it does not abate the action itself when certain property rights have been determined by the court.”[6] See id. ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). Conversely, “all interlocutory orders that are effective only during litigation,” such as orders restraining the parties from selling property or dissipating the marital estate, “abate upon the dismissal of a divorce case.” Id. ¶ 27. The court noted that this was in line with “the general rule followed in virtually all jurisdictions . . . that, after one of the spouses dies during a divorce proceeding, and during the time an appeal is pending or during the time when an appeal may be taken, a divorce or dissolution action abates with respect to marital status of the parties but does not abate with respect to property interests affected by the decree.” Id. ¶ 20 (quotation simplified).

¶13 Finally, the Court held that “[c]laims that survive the death of a party are typically chargeable against that party’s estate” and cited rule 25(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a means through which to pursue such claims. Id. ¶ 30. See Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (“If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.”). Because the Court presumed that the wife’s “claim for the whole of the marital estate, including the right to preserve the joint tenancy” in the marital home was not extinguished and was still valid,[7] it held that “a debtor-creditor relationship existed between Husband’s estate and Wife at the time Wife filed her UFTA claim.” Id. ¶ 36 (quotation simplified).

¶14 In sum, as relevant to the issue presented in the current appeal, Porenta provides three major takeaways. First, if a spouse dies prior to entry of a final divorce decree, the marriage no longer requires dissolution because death already “terminated that personal relationship.” Id. ¶ 20 (quotation simplified). See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 194 (2022) (“A cause of action for divorce is purely personal, ends on the death of either spouse, and does not survive for the benefit of a third party.”); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 118 (2022) (“[A] divorce suit abates when one party dies while the suit is pending and before a decree on the merits, because the death terminates the marriage, thus rendering the divorce suit moot as it relates to the parties’ marital status.”). Second, court orders entered prior to the final divorce decree determining the property rights of the parties do not abate on the spouse’s death. See Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 20. However, any “interlocutory orders that are effective only during litigation abate upon the dismissal of a divorce case.” Id. ¶ 27. See id. ¶ 27 n.13 (“This is not unique to the area of divorce law. Interlocutory orders that expressly expire at the end of litigation do just that, regardless of the type of case or how the litigation finally ends.”). And third, certain unresolved claims or rights arising from a divorce action may still be pursued following the spouse’s death. See id. ¶ 36. See also 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 118

(“[G]iven the circumstances presented, a portion of the dissolution action may survive an abatement of the rest of the action.”).

¶15 Regarding the third point, because the issue had not been adequately briefed, the Porenta Court specifically declined to address “[w]hether a claim for equitable distribution or some other property claim survives the death of a spouse during a divorce proceeding,” Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 17, which the Court characterized as “an issue of first impression in Utah,” id. ¶ 28. Put differently, although the Court held that a district court’s orders determining the parties’ property rights do not abate upon a spouse’s death, it declined to determine whether the same was true for unresolved claims for equitable distribution or other property claims. In any event, the case before us is on a different footing, which likewise does not necessitate that we address that specific issue.

¶16 Unlike in Porenta, Thomas died after the district court entered a bifurcated divorce decree dissolving the parties’ marriage but leaving all unresolved issues for a trial that ultimately would not be held for several more years. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b) (“The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross claim, counterclaim, or third party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross claims, counterclaims, third party claims, or issues.”). Accordingly, because Thomas and Lidia’s marriage had already been dissolved at the time of Thomas’s death, we need not address the effect the death of a spouse has on the underlying claim for equitable distribution of the marital estate in the situation where the parties are still legally married at the time of the death.

¶17 Rather, the issue before us is more straightforward. As previously discussed, the reason a divorce action generally abates upon the death of a party is because the death already “terminated that personal relationship,” Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 20 (quotation simplified), thereby “rendering the divorce suit moot as it relates to the parties’ marital status,”[8] 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 118. But here, the parties stipulated to a bifurcated divorce, and their marriage had been dissolved several years prior to Thomas’s death. Indeed, both Thomas and Lidia had remarried. For that reason, unlike in Porenta, Thomas’s death had no legal effect on the parties’ already dissolved marriage and therefore the ground on which the divorce action discussed in Porenta abated—i.e., mootness—is not present here.

¶18 Utah courts regularly use bifurcation under rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “to allow divorcing spouses to more expeditiously obtain a divorce before embarking upon the sometimes more complex and time-consuming tasks of determining property division and deciding matters of support.” Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶ 8, 996 P.2d 565. It is uncontested that a district court’s jurisdiction “to enter equitable orders relating to the property belonging to the marital estate” is unaffected by the bifurcation. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified). See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). Indeed, the Utah Constitution directs, “The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute[.]” Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022) (“Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution or by statute, the district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal.”). Furthermore, divorce courts are generally “well

¶19 Here, because the parties’ marriage was already dissolved prior to Thomas’s death, mootness—a jurisdictional bar, see State v. Legg, 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 25, 380 P.3d 360—does not apply to most of the claims at issue.[9] Because no other constitutional or statutory bar to the district court’s jurisdiction exists in the case before us, the district court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over all of the claims that remained at issue and in dismissing the divorce action on that ground. See Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943, 955 (Colo. 1997) (stating that when one party to a divorce proceeding died following dissolution of the parties’ marriage in a bifurcated divorce, “the dissolution action did not abate, and the district court properly maintained jurisdiction over the marital estate to conduct hearings to resolve financial matters raised in the dissolution proceedings”); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1995) (agreeing “that the trial court maintained jurisdiction to enter the final judgment determining the parties’ property rights subsequent to the wife’s death” where the court had dissolved the marriage prior to her death); Barnett v. Barnett, 768 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (“[T]he death of a party after entry of a written, signed judgment of dissolution but prior to the rendition of a decision on a timely motion for rehearing concerning matters collateral to the adjudication of dissolution did not affect the dissolution decree or divest the court of jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues between the parties.”); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 194 (“Once a decree in divorce is granted and, thereafter, one of the parties dies, the court can continue with the equitable distribution of marital property.”).

¶20 In cases such as this, in which “a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.” Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). See Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 30 (stating that “[c]laims that survive the death of a party are typically chargeable against that party’s estate” and citing rule 25(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a means through which this may be achieved). But whether to substitute a party remains within the district court’s discretion. See Bradburn v. Alarm Prot. Tech., LLC, 2019 UT 33, ¶ 8, 449 P.3d 20 (“A district court’s substitution ruling is a discretionary one[.]”). Additionally, as Thomas Jr. points out, the district court “has inherent discretionary authority to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where another court has concurrent jurisdiction.” See Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah 1977) (“[A]s part of the inherent power that our district courts have, as courts of general jurisdiction, they undoubtedly could refuse to exercise jurisdiction if convinced that it would place an unreasonable burden upon some or all of the parties, or upon the court, to try the case here.”); id. (“[T]he trial court does have concurrent jurisdiction and the power of discretion as to whether or not it will invoke that jurisdiction in a particular case.”). These are all considerations that we leave to the district court’s discretion on remand.[10]

CONCLUSION

¶21 The district court was not required to dismiss the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction following Thomas’s death. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to reconsider Lidia’s Motion for Entry of Final Property Distribution and Rule 25 Motion to Substitute Party.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

[1] Because the individuals share the same last name, we follow our usual practice of referring to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.

[2] Lidia sought a retroactive increase of alimony for 51 months, which represented the span between entry of a temporary order awarding her alimony and her remarriage.

[3] This included the determination of what portion of the large estate constituted marital property and what portion constituted Thomas’s separate property.

[4] Thomas’s counsel continued to represent Thomas’s interests immediately after his death pursuant to Stoddard v. Smith, 2001 UT 47, 27 P.3d 546. See id. ¶ 11 (“An attorney has an ethical obligation to take the necessary steps to protect a deceased client’s interests immediately following the client’s death[.]”).

[5] Thomas Jr. asserts that the district court did not actually rule that it lost jurisdiction over the divorce action. Instead, he suggests that the court simply exercised its “inherent equitable discretion in deciding to leave [Lidia] to pursue those claims in probate court.” But although the court’s initial ruling did not invoke the specific term “jurisdiction,” it nonetheless concluded, with our emphasis, that “Utah precedent requires a surviving party in a bifurcated divorce to pursue unresolved equitable claims to marital property before a probate court.” And in its Final Order, the court clarified, “Due to the untimely death of [Thomas], this court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter and this matter is closed.” Accordingly, the court did, in fact, conclude that it lacked jurisdiction and closed the divorce action on that ground.

Lidia also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to substitute Thomas’s personal representative in the divorce proceeding under rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But because the basis of the court’s denial of that motion was its lack of jurisdiction, which ruling we ultimately reverse, we remand to the district court with instructions to reconsider the rule 25 motion on the merits. See generally State v. De La Rosa, 2019 UT App 110, ¶ 4, 445 P.3d 955 (“Trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law.”) (quotation simplified).

[6] Our Supreme Court also abandoned, as “clearly dictum,” a statement in one of its prior decisions that purported to overrule In re Harper’s EstateSee Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 22, 416 P.3d 487. Namely, the Court abandoned the statement that “the death of one or both parties to a divorce action during the pendency of the action causes the action itself to abate and the married couple’s status, including their property rights, reverts to what it had been before the action was filed.” Id. (quotation simplified). In other words, the Court rejected “the proposition that the parties’ property interests in the marital estate are frozen in time during the pendency of divorce litigation” and that “[i]f a party dies before the divorce becomes final, . . . property rights in the marital estate . . . are transported back in time to what they held before the divorce case was filed,” id. ¶ 23, which includes the reversal of any transfers of property that might have occurred during the pendency of the divorce action, id. ¶ 23 n.8.

[7] The court employed this presumption because the mother had not carried her burden of persuasion regarding whether property claims raised in a divorce proceeding survive the death of a spouse. See Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶¶ 32, 36; infra ¶ 15.

[8] The mootness doctrine “is a constitutional principle limiting our exercise of judicial power under article VIII of the Utah Constitution” and “not a simple matter of judicial convenience.” Transportation All. Bank v. International Confections Co., 2017 UT 55, ¶ 14, 423 P.3d 1171 (quotation simplified). “A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants,” State v. Lane, 2009 UT 35, ¶ 18, 212 P.3d 529 (quotation simplified), thereby rendering a decision “purely advisory,” Transportation All. Bank, 2017 UT 55, ¶ 15 (quotation simplified). established as courts of equity that retain jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter for the purposes equity may demand.” Potts v. Potts, 2018 UT App 169, ¶ 13, 436 P.3d 263 (quotation simplified).

[9] Not all claims raised in the current divorce action concerned property rights. For example, it is undisputed that the claims related to custody, child support, and parent-time abated upon Thomas’s death. On remand, the district court should dismiss any remaining non-property claims that were rendered moot by Thomas’s death.

[10] We note that, sequentially, it may be more prudent for the district court to equitably distribute Lidia and Thomas’s marital estate—which potentially represents only a portion of Thomas’s vast estate that is the subject of the probate proceeding—rather than punting these issues to the probate court, especially where the district court had already prepared a ruling resolving all but one of the issues raised in the years-long divorce action that it superintended.

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Do I have to pay the court to go to trial?

Do I have to pay the court to go to trial?

I am a divorce and family lawyer. I was asked this question and was a little surprised that this wasn’t widely known: 

In Utah, do I have to pay the courthouse and/or the judge or courthouse personnel for every day my divorce or child custody trial takes place?  

Answer: No.  

You are charged nothing for use of the courthouse, judge, and courthouse personnel for your trial, no matter how long the trial is set to take. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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Should I intentionally botch my hair follicle test?

Would it be better to botch my hair follicle test so it reads nothing, or allow the judge and the world to see what I’ve been doing the last 6 months? 

First, learn the truth about hair follicle drug test accuracy. 

Second, reduced to its essence your question is, “Should I lie/deceive?” No, you should not. 

Third, when people try to lie and deceive to gain an advantage, those who are caught in their lies and deception cannot be trusted anymore, even when they tell the truth. 

See “The Boy Who Cried ‘Wolf’”https://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/35/aesops-fables/375/the-boy-who-cried-wolf/   

I know you don’t want to suffer for your wrongdoing. Few do. But it is part of the process of being accountable, responsible, and changing for the better. 

I know you fear (and with good reason) the punishment being excessive and unfair. But that doesn’t justify engaging in more wrongdoing. Two wrongs don’t make a right. 

If you are serious about being a responsible adult and changing for the better, you may, after conferring with a good (meaning not only a skilled but a decent) lawyer want to tell the court how you wrestled with this problem to show the court that you understand the difference between truth and lies, right and wrong, paying the price for one’s wrongs, and that you want no more and no less than for the punishment to fit the crime. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Would-it-be-better-to-botch-my-hair-follicle-test-so-it-reads-nothing-or-allow-the-judge-and-the-world-to-see-what-Ive-been-doing-the-last-6-months/answer/Eric-Johnson-311    

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How do you get pet custody after a breakup?

I cannot speak on what the law is in every jurisdiction, but according to Utah (Utah is where I practice divorce and family law), the answers are: 

If by “breakup” you mean the breakup of a marriage by divorce: 

Pets are property, and so they are treated like property, although because they are living creatures they are not treated as a coffee table or money in a bank account would be, obviously. 

And usually pets are not an asset but are more of a liability. In other words, while I can sell a used coffee table and while I can spend my half of the money I was awarded out of the joint marital bank account, owning and caring for a pet costs money. If one spouse is willing to take on the liability associated with caring for a pet and the other spouse is not, then who gets the dog or cat or iguana won’t be in dispute. 

But if both spouses love the dog and both of them want to keep the dog for himself/herself, then who is awarded this particular piece of property can lead to a vicious and expensive fight. We can’t split the dog in half, as we could with money in the bank. But we could award one spouse the dog and then compensate the other spouse with an award of other marital property equal to the value of the dog. That often happens. 

But what about the intangible factors of pet ownership? While I can go out and buy a replacement coffee table if my spouse gets in divorce the one we bought together, it’s not as easy simply to buy a replacement dog. People become emotionally attached to pets and certain kinds of pets (especially dogs, I hear), and that emotional bond is often unique to that animal. Just as losing a child is not “cured” simply by adopting a “new” one, the relationship one formed with a pet is sometimes impossible to replace like one would replace a lightbulb. 

Still, there is only so much a court can do when faced with who gets Fido. What options are there? 

If the court decides that one spouse must be awarded the sole ownership and control of the pet, then the court will usually award the pet to one spouse and award the other spouse marital property of equal value. 

If the court decides that the parties to the divorce will “share custody” of the pet as if it were a child who spends time in the custody of both parents, the court can do that too. The court could order that Fido spends a week with ex-wife, then a week with ex-husband (or impose some other schedule). 

If by “breakup” you mean the breakup of a cohabitant (unmarried) relationship: 

If two people cohabit (that means “live together and have a sexual relationship without being married”), and if during that relationship: 

  • the couple both contribute money toward the purchase of a dog (or cat, or iguana, etc.) so that it’s a joint purchase and they are co-owners, and then the couple breaks up and they can’t agree who gets to keep the dog, then they could go to court to have the matter resolved. The judge could either order the dog sold and the proceeds of sale divided equally between the owners or award the dog to one of the parties and order that party pay the other half the value of the dog. 

OR 

  • one member of the couple buys a dog to which the other member of the couple becomes attached, and then the couple breaks up, the other member of the couple has no ownership rights in the pet. 

Had the couple been married when the pet was purchased—even if it was not a joint purchase—then because the couple was married when the property (i.e., the pet) was acquired, the pet is marital property. But when a couple is not married, if one member of the couple purchases something in his/her individual/separate capacity, then that person is the only owner. It’s not “joint” property. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/How-do-you-get-pet-custody-after-a-breakup/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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How do I file a response in a divorce if the summons is invalid?

How do I file a response in a divorce if missing the court’s address for filing invalidates the summons?

Be very careful getting cute with procedural technicalities. If you were served with a summons that is defective only because it does not include the address of the courthouse where the underlying action was filed, you may or may not have an argument for defective service of process. But to test that theory you may have to take the risk of being defaulted and then moving to set aside the default and default judgment and hoping you prevail on that motion. That is not a risk I would be willing to take myself. 

What you need to do immediately is consult a good attorney (i.e., a knowledgeable, skilled one) and fast, i.e., before the time in which to file a responsive pleading has expired, so that if you, after conferring with at least one good attorney, determine you need to file something with the court before the responsive pleading time expires you can. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/How-do-I-file-a-response-in-a-divorce-if-missing-the-court-s-address-for-filing-invalidates-the-summons/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

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How difficult is it to get a divorce from a spouse who has disappeared?

How difficult is it to get a divorce from a spouse who disappeared +10 years back? No note, no trace, no explanation. If you urgently need to remarry, what processes would one need to prepare for? 

I can’t speak for all jurisdictions, but in Utah (where I practice divorce law), the answer to your question would be: 

  1. It does not matter whether you can find your spouse to serve him/her in person with a summons and complaint for divorce. Why?
  2. Because the law anticipated situations where a potential defendant in a lawsuit might try to hide and avoid service of process in the hope that “If you can’t serve me with the summons and complaint, then you can’t sue me!” How?
  3. By making provision for serving someone who is hiding or avoiding service: 

 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b)(5)(A) and (B): 

(A) If the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, if service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or if there is good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service, the party seeking service may file a motion to allow service by some other means. An affidavit or declaration supporting the motion must set forth the efforts made to identify, locate, and serve the party, or the circumstances that make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. 

(B) If the motion is granted, the court will order service of the complaint and summons by means reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the named parties of the action. The court’s order must specify the content of the process to be served and the event upon which service is complete. Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court’s order must be served with the process specified by the court. 

This means that you could obtain leave from the court to serve your spouse by a certified mailing of the summons and complaint to your spouse’s last known address, or by a having a copy of the summons and complaint delivered by FedEx or UPS to your spouse’s last known address, or by emailing a copy of the summons and complaint to your spouse’s last known e-mail address, or by sending an instant message or text message to your spouse notifying him/her that a divorce action has been filed in court against him/her and directing him/her to obtain and review a copy that is in file with the court, or (although this happens a lot less), publishing the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which publication is required. 

4. After your hiding/disappeared spouse has been served by one of the alternate means provided in Rule 4(d), if your spouse does not file a responsive pleading within the time given to do so, then you can apply for entry of your spouse’s default and request entry of default judgment against your absentee spouse.  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277 

https://www.quora.com/How-difficult-is-it-to-get-a-divorce-from-a-spouse-who-disappeared-10-years-back-No-note-no-trace-no-explanation-If-you-urgently-need-to-remarry-what-processes-would-one-need-to-prepare-for/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

 

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What is MyCase and why should I care?

MyCase is an online system developed by the Utah State Courts system that you can sign up for free of charge and use in your family law case and certain other kinds of cases, but because this is a divorce and family law blog/video, we’ll focus on its features in a divorce and family law context. You can use MyCase to:  

  • view your case history (a record of what has happened in your case)  
  • see the date and time of your next scheduled court appearance 
  • view the documents that the opposing party and the court have also filed in your case 
  • pay fees  

Can a pro se party (meaning a party who is not represented by an attorney) file a divorce complaint or petition using MyCase? No, not currently. As of now there is no case filing available through MyCase. 

Can a pro se party file documents with the court through their MyCase account? No, not currently. As of now divorce is not a case type that is active for accepting electronically filed (also known as “e-filed”) documents through MyCase. 

Only those who are parties to a case can use MyCase. MyCase cannot be used to look up information about other cases. Even if you are represented by an attorney in your divorce or separation case, you look up information about your case on MyCase, if you have a MyCase account. To learn more about other features of MyCase and to create your own MyCase account, go to: 

https://www.utcourts.gov/mycase/  

and 

https://pubapps.utcourts.gov/MyCaseWEB/LoginServlet  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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How do you protect your assets from divorce, lawsuits, etc.?

How do you protect your assets from divorce, government confiscation, lawsuits, garnishments, or seizure? 

Best way: own nothing. The government (in all its forms) cannot seize from you that which you do not own. 

Downside: when you own nothing, you control nothing. If your wife, for example, owns the car you drive and the house in which you live, there’s no guarantee she and the car and the house will always be around for you. 

You may have heard about creating an irrevocable trust or family partnership as a means of protecting your assets from creditors, and depending upon your situation and the laws of the jurisdiction that governs you and your assets, that may be a viable option. To know that, however, you would need to inquire with an attorney who knows and understands the laws of your jurisdiction. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://bestpennystockstoturnintobitcoins.quora.com/How-do-you-protect-your-assets-from-divorce-government-confiscation-lawsuits-garnishments-or-seizure-1  

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Do you think it’s fair for a non-custodial parent to pay more child support?

Do you think it’s acceptable for the non-custodial parent to have to pay more child support because the custodial parent chooses to barely work or not work at all?  

Generally, no, it is not acceptable. In the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah): “Every child is presumed to be in need of the support of the child’s mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children.” (78B-12-105(1). Duty of parents.) A parent is not legally permitted, by being unemployed or underemployed, to avoid his/her financial support obligations to a child and/or burden the other parent with his/her share of financial responsibility. See Utah Code § 78B-12-203 entitled “Determination of gross income — Imputed income.”  

Subsection (8) provides that one, income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held in a judicial or administrative proceeding and findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation are made. If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings considering, to the extent known:  

(i) employment opportunities;  

(ii) work history;  

(iii) occupation qualifications;  

(iv) educational attainment;  

(v) literacy;  

(vi) age;  

(vii) health;  

(viii) criminal record;  

(ix) other employment barriers and background factors; and  

(x) prevailing earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.  

Subsection (8)(c) further provides, “If a parent has no recent work history or a parent’s occupation is unknown, that parent may be imputed an income at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater or lesser income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.”  

Subsection (8)(d) further provides, “Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a temporary nature:  

(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents’ minor children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;  

(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;  

(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or  

(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent’s presence in the home. If you are an underemployed or unemployed parent who believes you can gain the child support system, you are mistaken.  

So, in Utah if you you are an underemployed or unemployed parent who believes you can game the child support system, you are mistaken. If you are the other parent who is confronted with an underemployed or unemployed parent who is trying to game the child support system, know that the law is on your side, so long as you can prove that the other parent is underemployed or unemployed and needs to have a reasonable income imputed to him/her for the purpose of determining each parent’s financial child support obligations. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Do-you-think-its-acceptable-for-the-non-custodial-parent-to-have-to-pay-more-child-support-because-the-custodial-parent-chooses-to-barely-work-or-not-work-at-all-4/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Can someone legally move out without notice and turn off utilities?

The judge finalized our divorce a month ago. My ex-husband decided to move out without any notice and then he turned off all utilities service. Can he legally do that without saying anything?

It depends upon 1) the rules and statutes that apply in your jurisdiction; and 2) the provisions in your decree of divorce (and related orders, if in your jurisdiction divorces end with multiple orders, as opposed to all of the orders in one “Decree of Divorce” document). 

For example, in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah), there is no law that specifically prevents a divorced spouse from canceling the accounts for the household utilities.* Indeed, if, in a divorce proceeding, the house is awarded to one of the spouses and the other spouse must now move out, many such divorced spouses have good reason for canceling the accounts for the household utilities, and that is to ensure they are no longer billed and held liable for utilities for a house in which they no longer reside.  

If the provisions in your decree of divorce (and related orders, if in your jurisdiction divorces end with multiple orders, as opposed to all of the orders in one “Decree of Divorce” document) prohibit one’s ex-spouse from canceling or otherwise interfering with the other’s utilities, then the affected ex-spouse could move the court to hold the offending ex-spouse in contempt of court and seek to have the offending ex-spouse sanctioned for contempt.  

Now clearly there are usually better ways of handling the situation than secretly closing the accounts notifying the ex-spouse after the fact or not telling the other spouse at all and letting him/her discover it on his/her own, but just because it’s ill-mannered does not make illegal. And if there is no provision in the decree of divorce or related orders that don’t expressly prohibit you and your ex from canceling the utilities that are presumably in your joint names (because you presumably open the accounts when you were married to each other), there may be nothing (and their likely is nothing) that you could do through the courts to punish your ex-spouse for his/her actions.

———————————

*If a divorced couple has minor children, it might be possible to argue that cutting off the utilities to the house could constitute child abuse under Utah Code § 76-5-109. If the couple has a disabled child, one might argue that canceling the utilities account(s) is abuse or neglect of a disabled child. § 76-5-110 (Abuse or neglect of a child with a disability). I don’t know if one could argue that canceling the utilities to the house could be construed as “criminal mischief” as defined in Utah Code § 76-6-106(2)(b)(i)(A) or (B) or (ii). 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/The-judge-finalized-our-divorce-a-month-ago-My-ex-husband-decided-to-move-out-without-any-notice-and-then-he-turned-off-all-utilities-service-Can-he-legally-do-that-without-saying-anything/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Is it illegal for a lawyer to charge their ex client for a copy of their case file?

Is there anything illegal about a previous lawyer wanting to charge their ex client for a copy of their case file?

I can’t answer for all jurisdictions, but in Utah the answer is: 

  • If you were previously given your case file or previously given a copy of your file—and lost those—so now you want another copy of your file (and assuming your lawyer still has a copy of your file), then it’s fair for your former lawyer to charge you a reasonable fee for the cost of making you another copy of your file. You’re not entitled to a free copy or copies. 
  • If you were not previously given your case file or previously given a copy of your file, then Rule 1.16(d) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice – Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “The lawyer must provide, upon request, the client’s file to the client. The lawyer may reproduce and retain copies of the client file at the lawyer’s expense.” Thus, if you have not requested a copy of your file, you are entitled to your file (not a copy, the file itself). 
    • How long must your attorney keep your file after representation terminates? I’ve been told no less than three and no more than five years. Rule 1.15(a) provides, “[O]ther property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.” So if representation terminated more than 5 years ago, your old lawyer is not required to keep your file any longer, and so if you want a copy of your file then, you are likely out of luck. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Is-there-anything-illegal-about-a-previous-lawyer-wanting-to-charge-their-ex-client-for-a-copy-of-their-case-file/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Is it possible to get court transcripts for custody hearings?

Every jurisdiction is different regarding which court hearings are open to the public and whether recordings of their proceedings are available to the public or even to the parties’ themselves. 

Every jurisdiction is different regarding how court proceedings are recorded too. 

Not every jurisdiction makes a written transcript of court proceedings. 

Most jurisdictions make audio or video recordings of court proceedings at a certain level, and divorce and family law proceedings are on that level. 

In the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah), the court makes its own audio recordings of divorce another family law court proceedings. These proceedings are open to the court, and thus the audio records of the court proceedings are public record, meaning that they are available to the public. Utah courts do not, at the trial court level, make written transcriptions of court proceedings. 

If you wanted to obtain a transcript of Utah family law court proceedings, you would need to take the audio recording of those proceedings and have them transcribed. If you wanted to use the transcription for appeals purposes, you would have to have the record transcribed by a stenographer approved by the court. It might also be possible to make your own transcript and to utilize that, if the opposing party agreed that your transcript was a true and complete and accurate transcription of the proceedings. 

Generally speaking, if all you want is a written transcription of the recordings of court proceedings for your own personal use, there’s nothing to stop you from doing so. And with advances in transcription technology, the cost of transcription have plummeted from what they were just 10 or 20 years ago. There are online transcription services such as http://Rev.com or Otter.ai – Voice Meeting Notes & Real-time Transcription that don’t do a perfect job of transcription, but do a very good job of transcribing for very little money. These types of services make obtaining transcriptions of court proceedings easier and less expensive than ever before. 

Transcripts can be very useful in establishing certain facts that may have otherwise escaped the court’s attention had they not been recorded and transcribed. Judges hate listening to audio recordings, but are much more receptive to reading a transcript of the very same recording because it’s much easier to isolate those portions of the recording in the transcript that are relevant to the issues before the court.  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Is-it-possible-to-get-court-transcripts-for-custody-hearings/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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What are the primary concerns in determining parenting issues? Why?

What are the primary concerns of the courts in determining parenting issues? Why? 

In Utah (and in no particular order), the court must consider the factors articulated in these sections of the Utah Code when making a legal and physical custody award: 

  1. § 30-3-10. Custody of a child — Custody factors. 
  2. § 30-3-10.2. Joint custody order — Factors for court determination — Public assistance. 
  3. § 30-3-34. Parent-time — Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
  4. § 30-3-35.1. Optional schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
  5. § 30-3-35.2. Equal parent-time schedule. 

If I were to create a list of all factors from the above-referenced Utah Code sections, this answer would be too long, which is why I have provided hyperlinks to the Code sections for your review.  

CONCERN FOR FATHERS. What do fathers encounter far too often (not always, but far too often): “How can I rule against the father’s request for an award of joint equal legal and physical custody without my ruling appearing to be contrary to the facts, contrary to the best interest of the children and the irrational, biased or arbitrary, inequitable, discriminatory, unconstitutional thing that it is?” 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-primary-concerns-of-the-courts-in-determining-parenting-issues-Why/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Are divorce records public?

I cannot speak for all jurisdictions, but for the jurisdiction where I practice divorce law the answer is “yes”. See Utah Code § 30-3-4(2)(b):

§30-3-4. Pleadings–Decree–Use of affidavit–Private records

(b) If the court finds that there are substantial interests favoring restricting access that clearly outweigh the interests favoring access, the court may classify the file, or any part thereof other than the final order, judgment, or decree, as private. An order classifying part of the file as private does not apply to subsequent filings. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Are-divorce-records-public/answer/Eric-Johnson-311 

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How easy is it to change your child’s last name?

I cannot answer this question as it applies in all jurisdictions, but I can answer the question as it applies in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah): 

Here are the applicable Utah Code sections: 

42-1-1. By petition to district court — Contents. 

Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a petition therefor in the district court of the county where he resides, setting forth: 

(1) The cause for which the change of name is sought. 

(2) The name proposed. 

(3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 

42-1-2. Notice of hearing — Order of change. 

The court shall order what, if any, notice shall be given of the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open court of the allegations of the petition and that there exists proper cause for granting the same. 

42-1-3. Effect of proceedings. 

Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest whatsoever. 

That seems fairly easy, right? I agree, it does seem easy (it deceptively seems easy), and if all you needed to do was go by what the Utah Code says is required of you to get a name change, you’d be right. But for reasons I do not understand, there are many “unwritten rules” governing a name change in Utah, whether for an adult or a minor child. Otherwise stated, if all you did was: 

  • file a petition in the court stating: 
    • the cause for which the change of name is sought; 
    • the name proposed; 
    • that you or your minor child have/has been a bona fide resident of the county for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 
  • schedule the hearing on the petition; 
    • prove three allegations that you were required to make in the petition; 
    • prove that there exists “proper cause” (whatever that means) for granting the petition for change of name;

that should be all you need to do, according to the Utah Code. But if that is all you did, there is a good chance your petition would be denied. So what are the “unwritten rules” you need to abide by to get a name change for yourself or your minor child? A good place to find out is here: 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/How-easy-is-it-to-change-your-child-s-last-name/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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In re Adoption of E.M.F. – 2022 UT App 43 time in which to appeal

In re Adoption of E.M.F… – 2022 UT App 43

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF

THE ADOPTION OF E.M.F. AND M.S.F.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

S.S. AND B.S.,

Appellants,

v.

J.F.,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20200490-CA

Filed March 31, 2022

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Joseph M. Bean

No. 182900024

Jason B. Richards, Attorney for Appellants

Emily Adams and Sara Pfrommer, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1        In this stepparent adoption case, B.S. (Mother) and S.S. (Stepfather) appeal the district court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of J.F. (Father), with whom Mother shares two children, E.M.F. and M.S.F. (collectively, the Children). We do not reach the merits of the case, however, because we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Although Mother and Stepfather contend that the court rule dictating this result is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, we conclude that Mother and Stepfather have not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist for us to consider their constitutional argument.

BACKGROUND

¶2        Mother and Father were involved in a relationship between 2009 and 2014, during which time the Children were born. Mother has always had full physical custody of the Children since her separation from Father. Later, Mother married Stepfather. Mother and Stepfather then petitioned for Stepfather to adopt the Children and to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶3        The matter proceeded to a two-day bench trial in December 2018. After hearing the evidence, the district court concluded that Mother and Stepfather had “not met their burden by clear and convincing evidence of any of the statutory requirements for terminating [Father’s] rights,” and the court accordingly denied the petition for adoption. The court announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law in court, explaining, “That will be the order of the Court.” It further announced that it did not “inten[d] to do written findings of fact and conclusions of law” but that “[c]ertainly anybody who would like to can do it themselves and submit it to the Court for approval.”[1] Similarly, the court’s December 11, 2018 minute entry from trial states, “The court does not intend on issuing written findings of facts and conclusions of law, either party may submit their own consistent with the court’s ruling for approval if they wish.” That minute entry was signed electronically and designated as an order of the court on December 13, 2018.

¶4        Neither side chose to submit findings and conclusions consistent with the court’s decision,[2] and neither side submitted a proposed judgment pursuant to rule 58A(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Aside from the court’s exhibit tracking record filed a few days after trial, nothing more was filed in the case until Father, acting pro se, moved to release the trial transcripts on March 11, 2019. In his motion, Father asserted that the “records and transcripts [were] required for [him] to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law requested by [the district court judge].” One month later, the court entered a certificate of destruction, stating that the court clerk had destroyed the exhibits on April 4, 2019.

¶5        Nothing else was entered on the court’s docket until December 2019, when Mother and Stepfather’s attorneys withdrew, and then Mother and Stepfather, acting pro se, filed an objection to a proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order prepared by Father.[3] Among other objections, Mother and Stepfather complained that Father “failed to properly provide a copy of the proposed order to [them] before filing the document with the Court.” The court held a telephone conference the next month during which it indicated that the proposed findings “will be held due to the pending objection.” At a later hearing, the court decided to “sustain[]” Mother and Stepfather’s objection and ordered Father to submit amended findings with two specific revisions.

¶6        As ordered, Father then filed a proposed amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. Finally, on June 9, 2020, the district court signed the amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The court reiterated its conclusion—rendered 546 days earlier—that, as a matter of law, Mother and Stepfather had “not met their burden to show by clear and convincing evidence any of [the] statutorily required bases for terminating [Father’s] parental rights,” and the court thus denied the petition for adoption. On June 22, 2020, Mother and Stepfather filed a notice of appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶7        On appeal, Mother and Stepfather challenge the district court’s denial of their adoption petition. But Father contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, arguing that Mother and Stepfather did not timely file a notice of appeal in light of rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In response, Mother and Stepfather insist that they timely appealed under their view of the relevant timeline and rule 58A. “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law.” Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Utah Transit Auth., 2020 UT App 144, ¶ 22, 477 P.3d 472 (cleaned up). Likewise, the interpretation of a rule of civil procedure is a question of law. See Ghidotti v. Waldron, 2019 UT App 67, ¶ 8, 442 P.3d 1237.

¶8        In the event that this court agrees with Father on the correct operation of rule 58A, Mother and Stepfather assert that the rule is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this case. Constitutional challenges present “questions of law.” Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 27, 344 P.3d 581, abrogated on other grounds by McCloud v. State, 2021 UT 51, 496 P.3d 179. But when, as here, an issue was not preserved in the district court, “the party must argue that an exception to preservation applies.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 27, 416 P.3d 443.

ANALYSIS

¶9        We begin by addressing Father’s contention that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over this matter. We then address Mother and Stepfather’s constitutional argument aimed at defeating Father’s jurisdictional contention.

I. Appellate Jurisdiction

¶10 Father contends that this court does not have appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal. According to Father, because a separate judgment was not filed after the district court announced its findings and order from the bench on December 11, 2018, the decision was considered final and appealable 150 days after that date under rule 58A(e)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and any notice of appeal should have been filed within thirty days of May 10, 2019. Father asserts that the court’s amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order—entered on June 9, 2020—could not “restart the period for filing a notice of appeal” and that Mother and Stepfather’s June 22, 2020 notice of appeal was therefore untimely. In contrast, Mother and Stepfather contend that the June 9, 2020 order constituted the required separate judgment and that they timely filed their notice of appeal from that order.[4] We agree with Father.

¶11      This case turns on the application of rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to determine when the time to appeal began to run. Rule 58A(a) provides that “[e]very judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document ordinarily titled ‘Judgment’—or, as appropriate, ‘Decree.’” Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(a). Of particular import here, rule 58A(e) states,

(e) Time of entry of judgment.

(e)(1) If a separate document is not required, a judgment is complete and is entered when it is signed by the judge and recorded in the docket.

(e)(2) If a separate document is required, a judgment is complete and is entered at the earlier of these events:

(e)(2)(A) the judgment is set out in a separate document signed by the judge and recorded in the docket; or

(e)(2)(B) 150 days have run from the clerk recording the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment.

Id. R. 58A(e). This provision “makes explicit the time of entry of judgment” and resolves the problem of “endlessly hanging appeals.” Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2020 UT 33, ¶¶ 12, 14, 467 P.3d 833 (cleaned up).

¶12 The parties agree that “a separate document” was required in this case, so they therefore agree that rule 58A(e)(1) does not apply here. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(a); see also Griffin, 2020 UT 33, ¶ 17 (stating that a judgment “must be set out in a separate document that is prepared by the prevailing party and signed and docketed by the court”). Accordingly, this case falls under rule 58A(e)(2).

¶13      Rule 58A(e)(2) sets forth two events, the earlier of which will trigger the time when a judgment becomes complete and entered. The first occurs when “the judgment is set out in a separate document signed by the judge and recorded in the docket.” Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(A). In Griffin, the Utah Supreme Court explained that when rules 58A(a) and 58A(e)(2)(A) are “properly implemented, the separate judgment signals clearly that the case is over and the appeal and post-judgment motion clock has started to run.”[5] 2020 UT 33, ¶ 17.

¶14      Alternatively, “when the prevailing party fails to prepare a separate judgment, rule 58A(e)(2)(b) creates a backstop by establishing that the ‘entry of judgment’ occurs once ‘150 days have run from the clerk recording the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(B)); see also id. ¶ 25 n.5; Utah R. Civ. P. 58A advisory committee notes to 2015 amendments (“[I]f a separate document is required but is not prepared, judgment is deemed to have been entered 150 days from the date the decision—or the order confirming the decision—was entered on the docket.”). Indeed, the current version of rule 58A(e)(2) was adopted in response to the supreme court’s direction for the rule to “set a maximum time . . . for filing an appeal in cases where the district court’s judgment has not otherwise been finalized.” Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King, 2013 UT 13, ¶ 27, 297 P.3d 619; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 58A advisory committee notes to 2015 amendments (explaining that the current rule addressed “the ‘hanging appeals’ problem” that the supreme court identified in King); Griffin, 2020 UT 33, ¶¶ 9–11, 14.

¶15      Here, at the end of the bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Father and announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record on December 11, 2018. Neither side prepared a separate judgment, and thus rule 58A(e)(2)(A) did not apply. See Griffin, 2020 UT 33, ¶ 17. Nevertheless, the clerk “record[ed] the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment” when the clerk recorded the court’s December 11, 2018 minute entry. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(B). The “backstop” of rule 58A(e)(2)(B) therefore kicked in to “establish[] that the ‘entry of judgment’ occur[red] once ‘150 days ha[d] run from the clerk recording the decision.’” See Griffin, 2020 UT 33, ¶ 17 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(B)). We thus agree with Father that the court’s judgment was complete and entered in May 2019—after 150 days had transpired since the clerk recorded the court’s minute entry in December 2018. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(B).

¶16      Further, because a party’s notice of appeal “shall be filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from,” Utah R. App. P. 4(a), and because Mother and Stepfather’s June 22, 2020 notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after May 2019, we conclude that their appeal was untimely,[6] see Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,

¶ 11, 13 P.3d 616 (indicating that deadlines for notices of appeal “must be adhered to in order to prevent cases from continually lingering and to ensure finality in the system”). “Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss.” Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 8, 5 P.3d 649. Accordingly, we have no choice but to dismiss Mother and Stepfather’s appeal without reaching its merits. See id.

II. The Constitutionality of Rule 58A

¶17 Notwithstanding, Mother and Stepfather contend that if rule 58A operates to deprive this court of jurisdiction over their appeal, rule 58A is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this case because the rule “fails to provide notice to parties when an order is final for the purposes of appeal.” At the outset, Mother and Stepfather concede that they did not preserve this issue and that they are thus raising it for the first time on appeal. Given this lack of preservation, Mother and Stepfather further recognize that this court “generally will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the first time.” (Quoting State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).) Yet they suggest this court should reach the constitutional issue under either the plain error or the exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule.

¶18 Mother and Stepfather “must establish the applicability” of an exception to the preservation rule to raise the issue on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 443. But appellants will not carry their burden of persuasion on an unpreserved issue if they do not supply “a plain error or exceptional circumstances analysis because, in failing to do such an analysis, [they] will have necessarily failed to explain why we should reach the issue of which [they] complain[].” Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2017 UT 80, ¶ 25, 416 P.3d 512. We conclude that Mother and Stepfather have not established that either exception applies, and thus we decline to reach this constitutional issue on its merits.

¶19      Although Mother and Stepfather mention the plain error exception to the preservation rule, they have not applied the elements of plain error to this case. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 20 (“To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” (cleaned up)). They thus have not engaged in a plain error analysis, much less shown that the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte declaring rule 58A unconstitutional. As a result, they have not carried their burden to establish the applicability of this exception. See Baumann, 2017 UT 80, ¶ 25; State v. Padilla, 2018 UT App 108, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 542 (rejecting a plain error claim when the appellant “made no attempt to develop or establish” the claim).[7]

¶20 Mother and Stepfather alternatively suggest that the exceptional circumstances exception should apply, warranting our consideration of the constitutional issue for the first time on appeal. But they similarly offer little analysis on this score. They contend only that the constitutionality of rule 58A presents “a unique constitutional question, because it directly pertains to the time set to appeal” and “there is no method to preserve a constitutional challenge that only becomes an issue of controversy on appeal.” We are not persuaded.

¶21 Our supreme court has directed that the “exceptional circumstances doctrine is applied sparingly, reserving it for the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice.” Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 29 (cleaned up). Courts “apply this exception . . . where a rare procedural anomaly has either prevented an appellant from preserving an issue or excuses a failure to do so.” Id. (cleaned up). And once a party shows that a rare procedural anomaly exists, it “opens the door to a deeper inquiry” in which “additional factors must be considered to determine whether an appellate court should reach an unpreserved issue.” Id. Such factors include whether our failure to consider the issue “would result in manifest injustice,” whether “a significant constitutional right or liberty interest is at stake,” and judicial economy. Id. ¶ 37 (cleaned up). This exception thus requires a “case-by-case assessment.” Id. ¶ 38. But it cannot be used “as a free-floating justification for ignoring the legitimate concerns embodied in the preservation and waiver rules.” Id.

¶22 Mother and Stepfather have not met their burden of establishing that exceptional circumstances are present here. This is so because they have not analyzed whether they encountered a rare procedural anomaly and they have not engaged in any “deeper inquiry” of the additional factors relevant to this exception. See id. ¶ 29.

¶23      Without putting it in terms of a rare procedural anomaly, Mother and Stepfather suggest that the constitutional question regarding rule 58A became relevant only on appeal and that they were unable to complain to the district court about notice not being built into the rule. But rule 58A was in operation and became applicable once the district court announced its ruling in court on December 11, 2018.

¶24      Rule 58A(a) requires that “[e]very judgment . . . be set out in a separate document ordinarily titled ‘Judgment,’” and, as the prevailing party, Father should have, “within 14 days . . . after the court’s decision,” “prepare[d] and serve[d] on the other parties a proposed judgment for review and approval as to

form.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c)(1). But when Father did not timely serve a proposed judgment, rule 58A(c) gave Mother and Stepfather the option of preparing a proposed judgment themselves. See id. (“If the prevailing party or party directed by the court fails to timely serve a proposed judgment, any other party may prepare a proposed judgment and serve it on the other parties for review and approval as to form.”). They did not exercise that option.

¶25 Because the parties did not avail themselves of the opportunity to prepare a proposed judgment that would lead to the judgment being entered under rule 58A(e)(2)(A), the parties’ inaction meant that, by default, the backstop of rule 58A(e)(2)(B) applied, meaning that a judgment was entered once “150 days ha[d] run from the clerk recording the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment.” See id. R. 58A(e)(2)(B). In other words, time was ticking toward the second event—entry of judgment under rule 58A(e)(2)(B). If Mother and Stepfather wished to appeal the district court’s decision and were concerned that they did not know when judgment would be entered (and thus when they could file a notice of appeal), they had reason to raise that concern with the district court. Parties “cannot sleep on [their] rights and just hope for a favorable outcome.” See Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ¶ 28, 265 P.3d 139, abrogated on other grounds by R.O.A. Gen., Inc. v. Chung Ji Dai, 2014 UT App 124, 327 P.3d 1233.

¶26      And while it would have been unusual, it is not obvious to us that Mother and Stepfather could not have asked the district court for a declaration that rule 58A(e)(2) was unconstitutional on the ground that it did not provide for enough notice of the events relating to entry of judgment. See State v. Van Huizen, 2019 UT 01, ¶ 27, 435 P.3d 202 (stating that appellants “[have] the burden to show that [they were] unable to object . . . at the proper time”). Mother and Stepfather contend that their constitutional challenge only became “an issue of controversy on appeal.” But their complaint lies with an alleged uncertainty that materialized once the district court recorded its decision without entering a separate document to memorialize its finality, and that complaint materialized long before Mother and Stepfather filed their appeal. Under these circumstances, it is inadequate for them to simply assert that they were unable to preserve their constitutional claim. See In re X.C.H., 2017 UT App 106, ¶ 31, 400 P.3d 1154 (requiring parties invoking the exceptional circumstances exception to “demonstrate how the actual circumstances [they] encountered in the [district] court process prevented [them] from raising the [unpreserved] claim”); see also Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 21 n.3 (refusing to apply the exceptional circumstances exception when the appellant did “not discuss the threshold inquiry of the exceptional circumstances exception” and thus did not establish that a rare procedural anomaly existed).

¶27      Moreover, Mother and Stepfather have not engaged in the “deeper inquiry” this court must carry out to determine whether to reach an unpreserved issue under the exceptional circumstances exception. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 29. For example, they have not explained why our failure to consider the constitutional issue “would result in manifest injustice.” See id. ¶ 37 (cleaned up). And based on the record before us, it is far from apparent that it would be unjust for us not to consider Mother and Stepfather’s constitutional challenge to the application of rule 58A, for a couple of reasons.

¶28 First, Mother and Stepfather cannot demonstrate on this record that they did not receive notice of the entry of the district court’s decision. There is a signed minute entry in the court’s docket dated two days after the court announced its decision from the bench. Yet Mother and Stepfather make no mention of this order on appeal; instead, they focus on an unsigned minute entry and ask us to assume they did not receive notice of its entry because no certificate of service is attached. Because Mother and Stepfather do not account for the court’s signed minute entry, and because their argument depends on assumptions, the alleged injustice about which they complain is far from manifest.[8]

¶29 Additionally, even if we were to accept Mother and Stepfather’s invitation to assume they did not receive notice of the minute entry recording the district court’s decision, Mother and Stepfather (while still represented by counsel) had ways to easily resolve their claimed problem of lacking notice of when the clerk recorded the court’s decision. They were present when the court announced its decision from the bench and informed the parties that its pronouncement would stand as the order of the court. Surely, counsel understood that the court’s decision would be recorded in the docket within a few days. But if Mother and Stepfather desired even more certainty, they could have submitted a proposed judgment and, upon its entry, been confident that their time to appeal was running. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(e)(2)(A). And at any time during the months following the court’s announcement of its decision from the bench, Mother and Stepfather could have checked the docket[9] or called the court clerk to determine the date on which the court’s decision was recorded. But Mother and Stepfather forwent all these opportunities. In light of these missed opportunities, we do not believe that it would be manifestly unjust for us to decline to reach the unpreserved constitutional issue.[10] Cf. Dahl, 2011 UT App 389, ¶ 28 (stating that parties “cannot sleep on [their] rights”). For these reasons, we will not apply the exceptional circumstances exception here.

CONCLUSION

¶30 We agree with Father that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we thus dismiss it. We also conclude that Mother and Stepfather have not established the applicability of any exception to the preservation rule and that we therefore may not reach the merits of their constitutional challenge to rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.


 

[1] Mother and Stepfather filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the second day of trial, prior to the court announcing its decision. Their filing did not reflect the district court’s announced decision, and the court did not sign that document.

[2] Rule 52(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law. The findings and conclusions must be made part of the record and may be stated in writing or orally following the close of the evidence. Judgment must be entered separately under Rule 58A.” And rule 54(a) specifies that “‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree or order that adjudicates all claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties or any other order from which an appeal of right lies.” Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a).

[3] This proposed document is not in the record. Mother and Stepfather assert that Father submitted this proposed order to the court on or about December 16, 2019—more than a year after the court announced its ruling from the bench.

[4] Mother and Stepfather assert that Father’s “failure to oppose the entry of the [June 2020] order should be deemed a waiver” of Father’s challenge to appellate jurisdiction. But “because subject matter jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court’s authority to hear a case, it is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time, even if first raised on appeal.” In re adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 25, 266 P.3d 702 (cleaned up); see also Widdison v. State, 2021 UT 12, ¶ 100 n.26, 489 P.3d 158 (Lee, J., concurring in judgment) (“Jurisdiction is not an argument that can be waived or ignored by the parties.”). We therefore reject this argument.

[5] We recognize that because Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2020 UT 33, 467 P.3d 833, was not issued until June 10, 2020, the parties did not have the benefit of its analysis until then. Nevertheless, the parties still should have been aware of the relevant court rules bearing on the events that would trigger the thirty-day period for filing an appeal. Cf. Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 616 (stating that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect” (cleaned up)).

[6] Father originally raised his jurisdictional argument in a motion for summary disposition, which a judge on this court denied on the ground that the June 2020 order was “the proper order used for determining appellate jurisdiction.” Mother and Stepfather now assert that because this court already rejected Father’s “exact same argument” when his motion for summary disposition was denied, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Father from raising the issue again in his appellate brief. We disagree.

The doctrine of claim preclusion “bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously.” Haskell v. Wakefield & Assocs. Inc., 2021 UT App 123, ¶ 13, 500 P.3d 950 (emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26 n.20, 196 P.3d 588 (explaining that res judicata, of which claim preclusion is a branch, “is more appropriately used to describe the binding effect of a decision in a prior case on a second case”). Because Father is not seeking to prosecute a claim that was adjudicated in a prior action, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply. Instead, Father seeks reconsideration of the conclusion, rendered in this case, that this court has jurisdiction over this appeal. This panel has the discretion to entertain Father’s request.

This court’s previous order was signed by a single judge, and rule 23(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure “allows a panel of this court to review the actions of the single judge.” Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 501 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Utah R. App. P. 23(e)(3) (“[T]he action of a single justice or judge may be reviewed by the court.”). Further, while an appeal is pending, this court “remains free” to reconsider its decisions. Cf. IHC Health Services, 2008 UT 73, ¶¶ 26–27 (explaining that the law of the case doctrine generally “allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has ruled on them”). Under the law of the case doctrine, this court enjoys the discretion not to reconsider a prior ruling, id. ¶ 26, but the doctrine “does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and fixing it,” Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring).

Here, we exercise our discretion to reconsider the fundamental issue of appellate jurisdiction. See State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 10, 489 P.3d 152 (“Jurisdiction is the blood in our judicial system. Because of its vitalness, we have an independent obligation to ensure that we have it over all matters before us.” (cleaned up)).

[7] After this case was briefed and argued, this court issued Kelly v. Timber Lakes Property Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, in which we held that plain error review is not available in ordinary civil cases. Id. ¶ 44. Whether plain error review is available in this adoption proceeding is an unanswered question. Mother and Stepfather have not engaged on that question, and for purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that plain error review is available in this case.

[8] Preserving an issue in the district court is important because, among other things, “it allows an issue to be fully factually, procedurally, and legally developed in the district court.” Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2017 UT 80, ¶ 25, 416 P.3d 512. And “[w]ithout the benefit of a fully developed record illustrating both the district court’s thinking and the factual development bearing on the issue at hand, an appellate court is necessarily handicapped in reaching a well-considered decision.” True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 25, 427 P.3d 338. Here, the parties dispute whether the district court “ever provided notice or a copy of the clerk’s minute entry to the parties.” This is the type of factual dispute that could and should have been fleshed out in the district court, and the fact that it wasn’t hinders our ability to analyze the merits of Mother and Stepfather’s constitutional argument. See id.cf. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“Whether a party should be charged with ‘actual notice,’ either in the sense of having actual knowledge or being on inquiry notice, turns on questions of fact.”).

[9] Mother and Stepfather contend that “pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-141(2),” adoption cases are “sealed upon decision and the docket is not readily available on the Utah court’s Xchange system.” Thus, they suggest, they could not have reviewed the docket to determine when the clerk recorded the court’s decision. But section 78B-6-141 does not, by its terms, apply to the court’s docket. And even if it did, it states that any sealed documents are “open to inspection and copying . . . by a party to the adoption proceeding (i) while the proceeding is pending; or (ii) within six months after the day on which the adoption decree is entered.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-141(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2018). Here, where no separate judgment was entered by the court and the court’s signed minute entry is not designated as private or sealed on the docket, it is not apparent that Mother and Stepfather could not have accessed the docket within the 180 days before their appeal was due to ascertain the exact date on which the court’s decision was recorded.

[10] It is also not apparent that if we were to reach the unpreserved issue, we would conclude rule 58A is unconstitutional as written. Mother and Stepfather contend that rule 58A is unconstitutional because it does not require notice of when the court records the decision, and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not otherwise “provide for the service of signed orders through the E-Filing system.” Although we do not resolve this constitutional challenge expressly, we note that Mother and Stepfather are mistaken. Rule 5(b)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “except in the juvenile court,” “[a] paper is served . . . by . . . the court submitting it to the electronic filing service provider, if the person being served has an electronic filing account.”

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277 

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Do I need to show up for court if I was never served papers?

Do I need to show up for court if I was never served papers? I live in South Carolina.

I cannot speak for or about the jurisdiction of South Carolina because I practice law in Utah (so you need to inquire with a lawyer who is licensed to practice in South Carolina), but I can tell you a few things as a general rule of thumb: 

  • Many people are under the mistaken belief that “if they don’t give me them court papers first, the court is powerless to do anything to me”. Not true. Good faith, duly diligent efforts to effectuate service of process on you or at least—depending on the proceedings—notice to you is generally required before court action can be taken against you, but if, despite duly diligent efforts to locate you or chase you down to hand you “them court papers,” you cannot be found or served, there are other ways that a court will deem you to have been served and/or put on notice. 
  • If you hide in an effort to evade service/notice, the court will take that into account and hold that against you. No one can game the system this way. When that happens, the court can order that service on you be accomplished through alternative means. Such as? For example: 
    • the court could order that notice be mailed to your last known address (if you’re not there, that’s your problem, not the court’s); 
    • the court could order that notice be given in the form of an email or text message (to your last-known email address or phone number; if the email address or phone number used is not an address or number you use anymore, that’s your problem, not the court’s); 
    • the court could order that notice be given in the form of an instant message to an open social media account of yours (if you don’t use it anymore, but didn’t close it, that’s your problem, not the court’s); 
    • courts could (as they did frequently in the past, but not so much nowadays) give notice by publishing a notice in the “legal notices”” section of the newspaper (kids, for those of you too young to know what a newspaper is, you can click here) 
  • So if you think that avoiding service of process or closing your eyes and ears to notice is going to thwart the court or the opposing party, the joke’s on you. 
  • If you think you don’t have to appear in court merely because you didn’t receive service of process or notice (or more accurately, did your darnedest to ensure you didn’t get service or notice), again, the joke’s on you.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Do-I-need-to-show-up-for-court-if-I-was-never-served-papers-I-live-in-South-Carolina/answer/Eric-Johnson-311 

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State v. Redden – 2022 UT App 14 – protective orders – enhanced penalties

2022 UT App 14

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
JOEL CHANCE REDDEN,
Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20200700-CA

Filed January 27, 2022

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department

The Honorable Keith C. Barnes

No. 191500842

Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Attorneys
for Appellant

Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1       Joel Chance Redden committed two domestic violence offenses in October 2019, and the district court entered judgment on those convictions in January 2020. In the present case, Redden was charged with violating a protective order in October 2019 when he allegedly called his former girlfriend ten times. Later, the State sought to amend the information to add new charges for violating the protective order, enhanced from class A misdemeanors to third degree felonies based on the domestic violence enhancement statute. Redden opposed the enhancement, arguing that the new crimes had to be committed after his January 2020 convictions. The magistrate agreed with Redden and bound him over for trial on the new charges as class A misdemeanors. The State now appeals, arguing that it could enhance the charges so long as Redden is actually convicted of the new crimes within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. We agree with the State and therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND[1]

¶2       Redden was subject to a protective order that prohibited him from contacting or communicating in any way with Michelle,[2] his former girlfriend. Notwithstanding this directive, Redden contacted Michelle on October 4, 2019, and threatened her. This conduct led the State to prosecute Redden in Weber County, and he pleaded guilty to stalking and violating a protective order, both third degree felonies. Redden entered his plea on December 4, 2019, and the judgment was entered on January 22, 2020 (the January 2020 convictions).

¶3       The present case arises out of Redden’s conduct on October 9, 2019. At that time, Redden was jailed in Texas on unrelated charges, and Michelle was visiting Cedar City, Utah. Beginning at 8:34 a.m., Redden allegedly telephoned Michelle ten times over the next three hours. According to Michelle, she answered the second call, which was a collect call from Redden from the Texas jail. Michelle accepted the call and spoke to Redden briefly. She told him, “Just don’t ever call me again,” and hung up. She also answered one of Redden’s later calls and recorded it, but she did not accept it to speak with him.

¶4       After Michelle reported these phone calls to law enforcement, the State filed an information against Redden in Iron County on December 30, 2019. It charged Redden with two counts of violation of a protective order for his October 9 conduct. It pursued both counts as third degree felonies enhanced from class A misdemeanors based on Redden’s conduct underlying his January 2020 convictions. Yet the State did not present evidence of the January 2020 convictions at a May 2020 preliminary hearing, and consequently, Redden moved to reduce both counts to class A misdemeanors. Although the State moved to continue the hearing, the magistrate denied that request. The magistrate then agreed with Redden and found the State had not met its burden on enhancing the misdemeanors to felony charges, and the magistrate instead bound Redden over on the two counts as class A misdemeanors.[3]

¶5       The State next moved for leave to amend the information. While it would still pursue the two misdemeanor counts (Counts 9 and 10) that had already been bound over for trial, the State sought to include eight additional counts of violation of a protective order, which would be enhanced to third degree felonies based on Redden’s prior convictions. Over Redden’s objection, the magistrate allowed the State to amend the information.

¶6       At the preliminary hearing on the eight additional charges, the State presented evidence to support those eight counts. And unlike in the first preliminary hearing, the State included evidence of the January 2020 convictions. Still, Redden argued that the eight counts could be bound over only as misdemeanors because the January 2020 convictions did not qualify as “prior conviction[s]” to the eight alleged offenses

committed on October 9, 2019. Relying on Utah Code section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B), which applies when “the individual is convicted of the domestic violence offense . . . within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense,” Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019), Redden asserted that to be enhanced to third degree felonies, the new offenses had to be committed within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. The State responded that even though “the prior conviction was for facts arising from October 4,” the enhancement provision in Utah Code section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) required only that Redden be convicted of the new crimes within ten years after his January 2020 convictions.

¶7       The magistrate agreed with Redden that the eight counts could not be enhanced to third degree felonies under the statute. He then determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause “that the offenses of violation of [a] protective order were committed in eight instances.” Accordingly, the magistrate bound Redden over for trial on all ten counts as class A misdemeanors.

¶8       In light of the magistrate’s decision finding no probable cause that Redden had committed the eight third-degree felonies as charged in the amended information, the State “decline[d] to file a second amended information bringing the charges in line with the Court’s findings.” Instead, it moved to dismiss all charges in lieu of amending the information.

¶9       The magistrate granted the State’s request and dismissed all charges against Redden. The two original misdemeanor charges were dismissed pursuant to rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the eight additional charges were dismissed pursuant to rule 7B(c).[4] The State now appeals the order of dismissal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”); id. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2018) (providing that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from criminal cases not involving first degree felonies).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10     The State contends that the magistrate misinterpreted the

enhancement statute when he refused to bind Redden over on the eight counts as third degree felonies. The decision to bind over a criminal defendant for trial typically presents a mixed question of law and fact to which we grant some deference to the magistrate. See State v. Prisbrey, 2020 UT App 172, ¶ 18, 479 P.3d 1126. But because the bindover decision here turned on a question of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness. See State v. Thompson, 2020 UT App 148, ¶ 13, 476 P.3d 1017.

¶11 Rather than defending the magistrate’s decision on its merits, Redden contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s appeal, asserting that the State was not entitled to appeal from a dismissal order entered at its own request. “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we decide in the first instance.” State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶ 12, 343 P.3d 709 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

  1. The State’s Argument on Appeal

¶12     The State argues that the magistrate erred in determining that the domestic violence enhancement statute did not apply to the eight additional counts that it raised in the amended information. According to the State, it could enhance those charges from class A misdemeanors to third degree felonies so long as Redden is ultimately convicted on the charges within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. Thus, the State argues, “until and unless the State fails to convict Redden of the new domestic violence charges before January 22, 2030, the [statute] allows the State to prosecute the new charges as third-degree felonies.” We agree.

¶13 When we interpret a statute, “we look first to the best evidence of a statute’s meaning, the plain language of the act, and we do not look beyond a statute’s plain language unless it is ambiguous.” State v. Thompson, 2020 UT App 148, ¶ 33, 476 P.3d 1017 (cleaned up). “Wherever possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, avoiding any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.” State v. Stewart, 2018 UT 24, ¶ 12, 438 P.3d 515 (cleaned up).

¶14 The crime that Redden is alleged to have committed— violating a protective order—is a class A misdemeanor but is subject to increased penalties in accordance with the domestic violence enhancement statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). That enhancement statute states, in relevant part,

(2) An individual who is convicted of a domestic violence offense is: . . .

(c) guilty of a felony of the third degree if:

(i) the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) is designated by law as a class A misdemeanor; and

(ii)(A) the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) is committed within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense that is not a criminal mischief offense; or

(B) the individual is convicted of the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense that is not a criminal mischief offense.

Id. § 77-36-1.1 (emphases added). As we read this plain language, section 77-36-1.1(2)(c) allows the State to enhance a class A misdemeanor charge to a third degree felony when a defendant either “commit[s]” or “is convicted of” the current crime “within 10 years after” the defendant “is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense.” Id. Thus, we agree with the State’s reading of the statute. Redden, tellingly, has not offered an alternative interpretation.

¶15 Further, we agree with the State’s application of the statute to this case. The parties do not dispute that Redden’s January 2020 convictions constitute “a qualifying domestic violence offense” under the statute.[5] Because it is still possible that Redden could be “convicted of” the eight current charges “within 10 years” after he was convicted of qualifying domestic offenses in January 2020, section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) permits the State to enhance the eight counts to third degree felonies. The magistrate erred in concluding otherwise. The magistrate appears to have reasoned that subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) applies only if the defendant’s current charges stem from conduct that occurred after the defendant was convicted of the qualifying domestic offense. But this interpretation would render subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(A) superfluous because that subsection expressly addresses such circumstances—when the current offense “is committed” after the conviction on the qualifying domestic offense. We will not read the statute in a way that would conflate both subsections and make one subsection inoperative. See Stewart, 2018 UT 24, ¶ 12.

¶16 In sum, we conclude that for the enhancement under subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) to apply, the State has until January 22, 2030, to obtain a conviction against Redden for the eight counts. We therefore reverse the magistrate’s decision binding Redden over on these counts as class A misdemeanors and direct that Redden be bound over on them as third degree felonies.

  1. Redden’s Procedural Arguments

¶17 While Redden concedes that the State’s reading of the enhancement statute is appropriate, he nevertheless argues that the State’s appeal is improper, given that the State itself moved for the order of dismissal. In Redden’s view, the State could have petitioned for interlocutory review of the magistrate’s second bindover decision, but it was not allowed to “circumvent the appellate court’s discretion to grant or deny petitions for review by requesting a dismissal and then relying on the statutory provision granting [the] prosecution an appeal of right from a final judgment of dismissal.”[6] Redden thus asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal.

¶18     Redden’s argument is foreclosed by precedent. In State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986), the trial court agreed with the defendant that the charges should be reduced to a lesser offense. Id. at 748. In response, the State refused to amend the information to conform to the court’s ruling and instead urged the court to dismiss the information. Id. The court then dismissed the information and the State appealed that dismissal. Id. at 748–49. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s threshold argument that the State could not use the order of dismissal, which the State itself requested, as a means of obtaining review of “a decision that would not otherwise be appealable as a matter of right.” Id. at 749. The supreme court explained that “the trial court’s determination that the charges should be reduced to an offense carrying a lesser penalty not charged in the original information prevented the State from proceeding on the original charges.” Id. Importantly, “[t]he effect of the trial court’s ruling was to block prosecution and, in effect, to dismiss the original charges.” Id. The supreme court concluded that, under these circumstances, “the State properly suggested that the trial court formally dismiss the information and then appealed from a final judgment of dismissal.” Id. (cleaned up). This court reached the same conclusion on similar facts in State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, 343 P.3d 709. Id. ¶¶ 15– 17 & n.4 (allowing the State to appeal after it had voluntarily moved for dismissal after the magistrate bound the defendant over on only a lesser and uncharged offense).[7]

¶19 Like Gomez, the magistrate’s decision binding Redden over on eight new misdemeanors rather than the charged eight third-degree felonies had the “effect of . . . block[ing] prosecution and . . . dismiss[ing] the [eight] original charges.” See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 479. The State therefore acted properly in moving to dismiss the information and then appealing from “a final judgment of dismissal.” See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”); see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 479; Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶¶ 15–17. Thus, Redden’s challenge to appellate jurisdiction is unavailing.

¶20     Lastly, in two ways, Redden challenges the fairness of the State’s actions. He first suggests that the State’s filing of the eight new charges against him violated the principles set forth in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). In Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is prohibited from “refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling.” Id. at 647 (emphasis added). Redden’s reliance on Brickey is misplaced, however, because no charges have been refiled against him. Rather, the State amended the information to add eight new charges that had not been addressed at the first preliminary hearing. The rules of criminal procedure allow such amendments “at any time before trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). The court also held a second preliminary hearing to address the eight additional charges. See id. (“If an additional or different offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary hearing on that offense . . . .”). Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a prosecutor’s initial charging decision “should not freeze future conduct” and “does not necessarily define the extent of the legitimate interest in prosecution.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, 382 (1982); accord State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App 282, ¶ 23 n.11, 362 P.3d 926.

¶21 Second, Redden generically complains that he pleaded guilty to the charges in Weber County as “a global resolution of the charges” related to Michelle and that he did not realize the resulting convictions “would later be asserted as a basis for enhancing additional charges” filed in Iron County. Although he suggests that his due process rights have therefore been violated, he has not established his lack of understanding as a factual matter. Nor has he established that he was not actually afforded all the process to which he was entitled under the law.

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, Redden’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

¶23 Having rejected Redden’s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we conclude that the State’s appeal is well taken and that the magistrate erred in binding Redden over on the eight new counts as class A misdemeanors. Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate’s bindover and dismissal orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

[1] “At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.” State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶ 2 n.2, 343 P.3d 709 (cleaned up). Because this appeal arises from a preliminary hearing, we recite the background facts with that standard in mind.

[2] A pseudonym.

[3] The State does not contest this bindover ruling on appeal.

[4] Rule 25(a) states, “In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.” Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a). Rule 7B(c) provides, “If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe the crime charged has been committed or the defendant committed it, the magistrate must dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” Id. R. 7B(c).

[5] As used in the statute, the term “domestic violence offense” includes “commission or attempt to commit” stalking and violating a protective order when committed “by one cohabitant against another.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(4)(j), (l) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). The term “cohabitant” includes, among other things, individuals who “reside[] or [have] resided in the same residence” or who are or were “in a consensual sexual relationship.” Id. § 77-36-1(1); id. § 78B-7-102(2)(f), (g) (2018).

[6] Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the procedure regarding discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. The Utah Code allows the prosecution an appeal, as a matter of right, from a final judgment of dismissal. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”).

[7] Redden relies on State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 (Utah 1985), to support his position. In that case, the trial court granted a defense motion to suppress certain evidence, and the State chose to dismiss the information and attempted to appeal the dismissal in order to challenge the suppression ruling. Id. at 223. The supreme court concluded that the State’s appeal was improper under those facts. Id. at 224. The case at hand, however, is much more like Gomez than Waddoups, and Redden overlooks that the supreme court in Gomez specifically decided that the facts of Waddoups were “quite different” given that Waddoups did not involve the trial court reducing the original charges. See State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986).

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