Before terminating a parent’s rights, the court must find that termination is “strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest.” This analysis must be undertaken from the child’s point of view. Utah lawprovides that termination is strictly necessary only when, after exploring possible placements for the child, the juvenile court concludes that no other feasible options exist that could address the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights. If the child can be equally protected and benefited by an option other than termination (such as permanent custody and guardianship awarded to someone other than the parent or parents), termination is thus not strictly necessary. The strictly necessary analysis is designed to ensure that the court pause long enough to thoughtfully consider the range of available options that could promote the child’s welfare and best interest. If a court has complied with its statutory obligations, its resultant best interest determination is entitled to deference by an appellate court. Long-term guardianship arrangements are typically only in a child’s best interest where the guardians and the parent have a working, relatively healthy relationship in which they are both willing to work together to preserve the parent-child relationship and where the child has a healthy relationship with both the guardian and the parent. Thus, when a parent and potential guardian have little to no relationship, the particular circumstances of the case may indicate that permanent custody and guardianship will not meet the children’s needs as well as termination of parental rights. This post is a summary of the law as stated in the recent Utah Court of Appeals opinion in the case of In re K.R. – 2023 UT App 75 (filed July 13, 2023).
First, does a parent have the unilateral power simply to “give up” his or her parental rights (and accompanying obligations)? No. The only way to terminate a parent’s parental rights and obligations is by court order after a petition to terminate that parent’s parental rights has been filed and granted.
Can a parent have his/her parental rights terminated? Yes. By court order after a petition to terminate that parent’s parental rights has been filed (either by that parent himself or herself) and granted by the court.
Does the termination of parental rights (not to be confused with merely the desire or intent to have one’s parental rights terminated) also terminate a parent’s obligations to support that child? Yes.
Because divorce is not about a spouse (man or woman) getting “half of everything”.
Depending upon whether a state is a “community property” state or an “equitable distribution” state, here is how property is divided between spouses in a divorce:
A community-property state is state in which spouses hold property that is acquired during marriage (other than property acquired by one spouse by inheritance, devise, or gift) as community property. Otherwise stated, all property that is acquired during the marriage by either spouse (other than property acquired by one spouse by inheritance, devise, or gift) or by both spouses together is jointly and equally owned and will be presumed to be divided in divorce equally between the divorcing spouses. Nine states are community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
An equitable distribution state seeks to divide property in divorce in a fair, but not necessarily equal, manner. An equitable property state court can divide property between the spouses regardless of who holds title to the property. The courts consider many factors in awarding property, including (but not limited to) a spouse’s monetary contributions, nonmonetary assistance to a spouse’s career or earning potential, the efforts of each spouse during the marriage, the length of the marriage, whether the property was acquired before or after marriage, and whether the property acquired by one spouse by inheritance, devise, or gift. The court may take into account the relative earning capacity of the spouses and the fault of either spouse (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th ed.). Equitable distribution is applied in the non-community property states.
So, does a spouse “get half of everything” in divorce? Possibly, but not always, and now you know why.
The answer is different for each person confronted with the choice.
For some, separation is preferable to divorce. For others, just the opposite is true.
Separation can be appealing for those who believe that a period of separation may be needed or helpful in the couple’s efforts to reconcile their differences, heal wounds, and salvage their marriage. Some may separate instead of divorcing to obtain some of the benefits of divorce (living separately, having responsibility for marital debts and obligations apportioned between spouses by court order, spousal and child support, etc. without actually dissolving the marriage. Such people may be against divorce because of their religious beliefs, because they want to spare their children the pain and stigma of divorce, or because they need certain benefits they received only through marriage (such as insurance coverage or qualifying to receive trust fund disbursements).
Divorce can be appealing (to the extent is ever appealing) because it enables one to be as free from entanglements with one’s (now ex-) spouse and enables one to remarry and relieves one of the obligations of spouse (although alimony may leave one obligated to provide one’s spouse with financial support for a period of time).
My name is Stephanie from flingorlove.com and honestly, I usually wouldn’t bother emailing about this, but I researched and gathered as much data and stats as I could about various divorce statistics and put it all together in a massive blog post (84 stats to be precise).
I cannot speak for the law in all jurisdictions governing divorce and separation, but I can tell you what the law is for the jurisdiction where I practice (Utah):
One does not need the consent or agreement of one’s spouse to get a temporary separation order. See Utah Code § 30-3-4.5. (Motion for temporary separation order):
(1) A petitioner may file an action for a temporary separation order without filing a petition for divorce by filing a petition for temporary separation and motion for temporary orders if:
(a) the petitioner is lawfully married to the respondent; and
(b) both parties are residents of the state for at least 90 days prior to the date of filing.
(2) The temporary orders are valid for one year from the date of the hearing, or until one of the following occurs:
(a) a petition for divorce is filed and consolidated with the petition for temporary separation; or
(b) the case is dismissed.
(3) If a petition for divorce is filed and consolidated with the petition for temporary separation, orders entered in the temporary separation shall continue in the consolidated case.
(4) Both parties shall attend the divorce orientation course described in Section 30-3-11.4 within 60 days of the filing of the petition, for petitioner, and within 45 days of being served, for respondent.
(5) Service shall be made upon respondent, together with a 20-day summons, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.
(6) The fee for filing the petition for temporary separation orders is $35. If either party files a petition for divorce within one year from the date of filing the petition for temporary separation, the separation filing fee shall be credited towards the filing fee for the divorce.
But if your spouse does not want to separate and you do, does your marriage appear to be one that has a chance of being salvaged?
Separations rarely help a couple reconcile and stay married. So ask yourself if you want a separation because you really think it’s a good idea or whether you “want” a separation because you’re afraid to pull the trigger on divorce.
I would never discourage anyone from trying a separation if that is a step one feels one needs to take to ensure that every reasonable step to save the marriage was taken, but usually by the time one honestly and seriously considers separation that means the marriage is doomed.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
I cannot speak for the law in all jurisdictions governing divorce and separation, but I can tell you what the law is for the jurisdiction where I practice (Utah):
One does not need the consent or agreement of one’s spouse to get a temporary separation order. See Utah Code § 30-3-4.5. (Motion for temporary separation order):
(1) A petitioner may file an action for a temporary separation order without filing a petition for divorce by filing a petition for temporary separation and motion for temporary orders if:
(a) the petitioner is lawfully married to the respondent; and
(b) both parties are residents of the state for at least 90 days prior to the date of filing.
(2) The temporary orders are valid for one year from the date of the hearing, or until one of the following occurs:
(a) a petition for divorce is filed and consolidated with the petition for temporary separation; or
(b) the case is dismissed.
(3) If a petition for divorce is filed and consolidated with the petition for temporary separation, orders entered in the temporary separation shall continue in the consolidated case.
(4) Both parties shall attend the divorce orientation course described in Section 30-3-11.4 within 60 days of the filing of the petition, for petitioner, and within 45 days of being served, for respondent.
(5) Service shall be made upon respondent, together with a 20-day summons, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.
(6) The fee for filing the petition for temporary separation orders is $35. If either party files a petition for divorce within one year from the date of filing the petition for temporary separation, the separation filing fee shall be credited towards the filing fee for the divorce.
But if your spouse does not want to separate and you do, does your marriage appear to be one that has a chance of being salvaged?
Separations rarely help a couple reconcile and stay married. So ask yourself if you want a separation because you really think it’s a good idea or whether you “want” a separation because you’re afraid to pull the trigger on divorce.
I would never discourage anyone from trying a separation if that is a step one feels one needs to take to ensure that every reasonable step to save the marriage was taken, but usually by the time one honestly and seriously considers separation that means the marriage is doomed.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Why are so many attorneys seemingly against legal separation? I truly feel in my circumstance its best for me/us. Is it because they wont make as much money? We have already started the divorce process. Can it be switched?
I can’t speak for all divorce attorneys, and I am not an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois (I practice divorce and family law in Utah), but I can tell you why I personally don’t like going the temporary separation route.
Too many people divorce needlessly. Too many people divorce only to discover that their spouses and marriages weren’t their problem and/or that divorce wasn’t the solution. I support desires and efforts to save marriage. While legal separation may sound to some like a good way to “get some space” to contemplate whether one should stay married or should divorce, I’ve found that:
□ legal separation tends to damage a marriage far more than fostering its survival; and
□ by the time one wants a legal separation, he or she really wants a divorce and is only postponing divorce out of fear or laziness or for the sake of appeasing the other spouse or “letter him/her down easy”.
While I am sure there are people out there whose legal separation proved that “absence makes the hear grow fonder” and helped them “wake up” and realize that their marriage is worth saving, I know no such people.
If I recall correctly, I’ve seen one legal separation end with the couple later reconciling. In every other legal separation situation, the couple has eventually divorced. So you can see where this is going: why go to the additional trouble, expense, and emotional ordeal of obtaining a legal separation order if you’re going to end up divorcing anyway and having to go through more of the same kind of effort, wait, expense, and pain again?
I understand the desire to give the marriage every last reasonable opportunity to survive. I understand the desire to take every reasonable effort to save it. But at the same time, I don’t see the point in pouring time, effort, care, and money into what is for most a hopeless cause. **That stated,** I would much rather “waste” time, effort, care, and money on taking every reasonable effort to save my marriage if it meant having the peace of mind that I gave saving my marriage everything I could in an effort to save it before deciding that it was not worth saving or that I alone could not save it and concluding that divorce was the only remaining option.
Are there divorce lawyers who discourage legal separation because they make (or believe they make) less money working on a legal separation instead of a divorce? I’m sure there are. But not all of us are out to take the client for all he or she is worth (you’d be wise to ensure you don’t hire a greedy lawyer, but there are some among us who are decent, caring, trustworthy professionals worth seeking out). In my experience, if one wants to do all he or she can to save his or her marriage, then working to improve yourself as a spouse, making changes in your family environment, and giving your best efforts to some good marriage counseling are certainly worthwhile. Legal separation rarely, if ever, helps improve a marriage. It tends to weaken and destroy a marriage.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
GARY LEE FISCHER, Appellant, v. MELISSA KAY FISCHER, Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20200557-CA
Filed December 30, 2021
Seventh District Court, Moab Department
The Honorable Don Torgerson
No. 184700047
Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall, Attorneys for Appellant
Andrew Fitzgerald, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES JILL M. POHLMAN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1Gary Lee Fischer challenges the district court’s division of the marital estate in the parties’ divorce decree, which awarded Melissa Kay Fischer the marital home, a vehicle, and profits from a business that Gary operated.1 Gary also challenges the court’s denial of his post-trial motion for a new trial regarding the division of a savings account Melissa first disclosed at trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND2
¶2Following a nearly 29-year marriage, Gary and Melissa separated on April 8, 2018. Gary filed for divorce approximately two months later. The case proceeded to trial in June 2019. The main issues at trial involved the division of various bank accounts, personal property, vehicles, the marital home, and an insurance business Gary had started during the marriage with Melissa’s help.
¶3At trial, the parties testified regarding their assets. During cross-examination of Melissa, Gary learned for the first time that Melissa had an American Express bank account with a balance of $50,000. Melissa testified that she set up the account in “early” 2019, long after the parties had separated. She explained that the account was started with money from her share of various accounts she co-owned with Gary and that she was able to get the balance to $50,000 because she “worked so hard to save” money after they separated. Gary did not then inquire further regarding this account.
¶4After hearing all the relevant testimony, the court made an oral ruling from the bench, determining that Gary’s business was established using marital funds. It ruled, however, that because the business “is the equivalent of a professional degree, what you would expect to see with a solo practitioner, attorney or accountant, or a doctor in solo practice,” it had “to value this asset minus any goodwill component.”3 The court then explained that
the balance of the [business] bank account as of today is $5,000. [Melissa] is entitled to one-half of that amount. Additionally, it is apparent from the tax returns that the business has made a profit in excess of its expenses and [Gary’s] salary. Net profit has been $2,144 per month consistently through 2017, and [Gary] testified that it’s been constant since then. Accordingly, that profit is a profit of this asset, and so 14 months worth of that profit, [Melissa’s] share is $15,008.
So the asset is marital in the sense that it was established during the marriage and it was an asset to be considered in dividing, but the Court finds that there’s no future equity share that is divisible, and so other than those monetary amounts, the Court awards the interest in the LLC to [Gary] 100 percent, and I certainly understand that it’s frustrating. We help our spouses be successful, and they take our great ideas and they incorporate them into their business, and we give input to their endeavors, but in the end, I’m bound by the existing law, which says that this isn’t a marketable asset unless he’s running it, and . . . so that’s the basis for that finding.
¶5Regarding the tangible marital assets, the court found that there was $292,285 equity in the home, resulting in a share of $146,142.50 for each party. The court nevertheless awarded the home to Melissa, explaining that Gary’s share of the equity would be “used to offset the other property awards in this case.” The court also allocated a vehicle worth $25,000 to Melissa. The court awarded Gary four vehicles and a trailer. The first three vehicles were valued at $29,600, $17,833, $51,450. The fourth vehicle, which still had money owing on it, had $4,000 in equity. The trailer was valued at $8,000. The court additionally distributed to Gary jewelry, art, and other personal property having a combined value of $57,590. The court valued all these assets “as of the date of divorce.”
¶6With respect to the parties’ joint bank accounts, the court decided that it would be more appropriate to divide these accounts as they stood at the time of the parties’ separation rather than at the time of divorce. The court stated that it did this
because it was the clearest picture of what the parties’ asset actually was. Since then, they’ve each gone on to either save money [or spend money]. She saved money. It appears he spent money. So that seemed to be the fairest division of the cash accounts . . . given how long the separation has been, over a year.
¶7The court also ordered that Melissa’s retirement accounts, valued as of the date of divorce, be split equally between the parties. The court determined that the American Express account was not divisible in the divorce because it was Melissa’s separate property. The court then concluded that “if my math is correct, that should leave a wash on all of the property.”
¶8In response to this ruling, Gary filed a post-trial motion, in which he argued that the court’s division of marital assets was “not equal.” He asserted that the court awarded a total of $396,793 in marital assets to Melissa, which included (1) the home at $292,285, (2) half the business account at $2,500, (3) half the profits from the business from the time of separation to the time of divorce at $15,008, (4) a vehicle at $25,000, (5) half the balance in two bank accounts existing at the time of separation at $12,000, and (7) the American Express account at $50,000.4 Gary then argued that the court awarded him only $197,981 in marital assets consisting, of (1) half the business account at $2,500, (2) half the profits from the business from the time of separation to the time of divorce at $15,008, (3) the four vehicles valued at a total of $102,883, (4) the trailer at $8,000, (5) the personal property items at $57,590, and (6) half of the two bank accounts at $12,000. Gary asserted that, as a result, Melissa received $198,812 more than he did—$148,812 once the $50,000 American Express Account is subtracted from Gary’s calculation. See supra note 4. In essence, Gary’s position was that the court’s math was in fact quite wrong when it mused that, “if my math is correct, that should leave a wash on all of the property.”
¶9 The court subsequently issued a written order memorializing its findings and rulings at trial. In that order, regarding the award of the marital home to Melissa, the court conceded that
[a]lthough the Court endeavored to equally divide the assets in the case, with [Gary] receiving the majority of high-value personal property to offset his share of equity in the home, the final division of property does not equally divide the value in the marital home. Nevertheless, the Court believes the division is equitable, based on all circumstances in the case.
[Gary] would like the home sold, with the cash divided equally. But the costs of sale would likely deplete most of the difference in the equity division. Neither party would benefit from those lost funds and [Melissa] would be left without a home. Additionally, although the Court awards [the business to Gary], it is apparent that [Melissa] significantly contributed to making [the business] a success. Her contribution to the business is not quantifiable. But the overall division of property and assets in this case is equitable, when the business is considered.
The court also determined that the American Express account would be awarded to Melissa as her separate property because it had been initially funded with her share of sums from marital accounts, then enhanced with post-separation deposits. The court also reiterated that it valued “the cash accounts as of the date of separation” because “[a]fter separation, [Gary] spent significant money and incurred substantial debt” and “[g]iven the length of separation, the value at the time of separation provides for the most equitable division of the cash accounts.” The court then reaffirmed its oral ruling regarding the remainder of its award.
¶10 Gary subsequently filed another motion, this time requesting a new trial under rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the American Express account issue. He asserted that Melissa had “disclosed at trial and not before that she had a $50,000 American Express savings account” and that he “was genuinely surprised by this trial disclosure.” He claimed that he “should have had the opportunity to investigate this account and trace its origin to determine whether [Melissa’s] representations about it were accurate.”
¶11The district court denied Gary’s motion in another written order. It stated that “with reasonable diligence, [Gary] could have discovered the account before trial but did not utilize the discovery process to his advantage.” It additionally stated that “[Gary] did not object at trial to the introduction of the information related to the account and [Melissa] testified that the account was created after separation.”
¶12Gary appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 Gary raises three issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court erred in determining that the American Express account was Melissa’s separate property and in denying his motion for a new trial on that issue. This issue implicates two standards of review. First, “whether property is marital or separate is a question of law, which we review for correctness.” See Brown v. Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 13, 476 P.3d 554 (quotation simplified). Second, “we review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ¶ 8, 994 P.2d 1237.
¶14 Next, Gary challenges the court’s award to Melissa of $15,008 of the business’s profits accrued during the fourteen months from the time of the couple’s separation until trial. We review the district court’s ruling on this issue for an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985).5
¶15 Finally, Gary asserts that the court abused its discretion when it awarded Melissa a disproportionate share of the marital estate without providing findings that justify the unequal division.6 “In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are equitable. The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
American Express Account
¶16 Gary asserts that the district court erred in determining the American Express account was Melissa’s separate property and in denying his motion for a new trial on that issue. Although the marital estate is generally valued “at the time of the divorce,” see Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), a district court, in its discretion, may determine that property acquired post-separation, but before entry of a final divorce decree, is separate property so long as this decision is “supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court’s basis for such deviation,” see Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2013 UT App 84, ¶¶ 41, 45, 301 P.3d 6 (quotation simplified). See also Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432–33 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).7
¶17 Here, the court’s decision to categorize the American Express account as Melissa’s separate property flowed logically from its ruling on the parties’ joint bank accounts. In that ruling, the court made specific findings supporting its decision to adjudicate the bank accounts as of the date of separation rather than at the time of divorce. It stated that it was doing so because it “seemed to be the fairest division” due to the fact that, “[a]fter separation, [Gary] spent significant money and incurred substantial debt,” while Melissa saved money. Moreover, the court relied on the length of the separation—some fourteen months—during which both parties lived independently of one another.8 Thus, given that the court decided to adjudicate the parties’ joint accounts as of the time of separation rather than at the time of divorce, the general rule that all assets obtained during the marriage are marital property did not apply, by extension of this same logic, to the American Express account.
¶18 The district court therefore did not err when it determined that the American Express account was Melissa’s separate property.9 It follows, then, that the court likewise didnot abuse its discretion in denying Gary’s motion for a new trial on this issue. See State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ¶ 8, 994 P.2d 1237.
Business Profits
¶19 Gary next contends that “the district court abused its discretion when it determined that Melissa should be awarded half of the ‘profits’ accrued by the business in the 14 months prior to trial.” “In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse.” Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d 765. “The primary purpose of a property division . . . is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.” Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, ¶ 27, 138 P.3d 84 (quotation simplified).
¶20 Gary essentially argues that there were no profits from the business because all the money earned was simply his income and any award to Melissa would therefore essentially be alimony, which the district court had already determined neither party needed. But Gary’s attempt to equate the profits with his salary, or with alimony, is unavailing because the court found that the net profits had “been $2,144 per month consistently through 2017, and [Gary] testified that it’s been constant since then.” The court also found, with our emphasis, that “[t]axreturns show that, since separation, the business has made a profit in addition to expenses and [Gary’s] salary.” And Gary has not shown on appeal how these findings underpinning the court’s ruling were erroneous. See State v. Thompson, 2020 UT App 148, ¶ 20, 476 P.3d 1017 (“To successfully challenge a district court’s factual findings on appeal, an appellant must establish a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings, generally by identifying and dealing with supportive evidence through the process of marshaling.”) (quotation simplified). See also State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 40, 326 P.3d 645 (“[A] party who fails to identify and deal with supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse[.]”).
¶21Therefore, because Gary has not meaningfully addressed the supportive evidence behind these findings, which findings adequately explain the court’s ruling, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the business profits as it did.
III. Equitable Distribution of Assets
¶22 Gary’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded nearly $150,000 more of the real and personal property comprising the marital estate to Melissa than it did to him. Specifically, Gary asserts that “the district court abused its discretion in two ways: it did not follow the guideline that marital assets are to be split equally and it did not provide adequate findings to support its departure from the equal division presumption.” We agree.
¶23 In dividing the marital estate in a divorce proceeding, “[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent of the marital property.” Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). “But rather than simply enter such a decree, the court should then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances[.]” Id. Thus, “once a court makes a finding that a specific item is marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise.” Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added). See Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 27, 993 P.2d 887 (“An unequal division of marital property . . . is only justified when the trial court memorializes in . . . detailed findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution.”) (quotation simplified).
¶24 On appeal, both parties expend significant effort in arguing how the court’s award of real and personal property was either equitable or inequitable. We need not endeavor to directly resolve this debate, however, because the court’s ruling lacked adequate findings to support the disparate distribution. Here, Melissa was awarded the entirety of the net value in the home, $292,285, and a car valued at $25,000. In total, Melissa was awarded $317,285. Gary, on the other hand, was awarded four vehicles with a total value of $102,883, the trailer at $8,000, and the other personal property items with a total value of $57,590. Gary was therefore awarded $168,473. This left a $148,812 discrepancy in favor of Melissa.10
¶25 Although the district court “has broad latitude” in equitably distributing the marital estate, see Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 765 (quotation simplified), it cannot unequally divide that estate unless it “memorializes in adequate findings” the “unusual circumstances” that justify doing so, Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022 (emphasis added) (quotation otherwise simplified). Here, the court unequally divided the marital estate but did not enter adequate findings detailing the unusual circumstances that justified such an award. The court’s justification for its disparate award is limited to three observations.
¶26First, the court opined, without pointing to any evidence, that the cost of selling the home would deplete any disparity that might exist between the parties and benefit neither. In the absence of evidence to this effect, this is purely speculative, and we are hard-pressed to see how the commissions and other fees in selling the home would be anywhere near large enough to overcome the substantial discrepancy in the value of the property awarded to each party. The court also rationalized the disparity by concluding that Melissa would otherwise be without a home, but presumably this would have been a momentary event given her assets, her employment, and her share of the sale proceeds. These are simply not the kind of exceptional circumstances that would justify such a disparity. Cf. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 27 (“In this case, the trial court’s only finding justifying the award of the [entire] home to Mr. Bradford was that ‘the house and property is in fact not partitionable as it contains a residence, road and river frontage. If an interest were to be conveyed the house would have to be refinanced or sold.’ This finding is insufficient, by itself, to support an award of the marital home entirely to Mr. Bradford.”) (footnote omitted). Indeed, district courts “often order a sale of marital property and equitably divide the proceeds between the parties” or “allow one spouse to ‘buy out’ the other spouse’s interest in marital property,” and the district court here “made no adequate finding explaining why either of these two remedies was not appropriate for the parties in this case.” See id.
¶27 Second, the court stated that while “the final division of property does not equally divide the values in the marital home,” it was nonetheless “equitable, based on all circumstances in the case.” This is a conclusory statement and not a finding that justifies the unequal distribution of marital assets. General comments about the equitability of an award are simply not enough to overcome the presumption that marital property should be “shared equally.” Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022.
¶28 Finally, the court noted that although it awarded the business to Gary, “it is apparent that [Melissa] significantly contributed to making [the business] a success. Her contribution to the business is not quantifiable. But the overall division of property and assets in this case is equitable, when the business is considered.” Once again, this is not a finding sufficient to explain such a large departure from the presumptively appropriate equal distribution of the marital estate. See Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 27. The court found that the business had no marketable value, and thus it is unclear how it quantified Melissa’s contribution. Further, the court’s observations about Melissa’s contributions do not demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” that justify a nearly $150,000 difference in the property awards to each party. See Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
¶29 Without adequate findings detailing why Melissa should be entitled to such an unequal split of the marital estate, we cannot affirm the court’s award. We therefore remand the case to the district court either (1) to make adequate findings specifically detailing (and quantifying) the exceptional circumstances that would justify the unequal distribution of the marital estate, or (2) if such findings are not appropriate on this record, then to equally distribute the marital estate.11
CONCLUSION
¶30 The district court did not err in determining that the American Express account was Melissa’s separate property or exceed its discretion in awarding to her half of the profits the business accrued from the time of separation until trial. The court did err, however, in unequally dividing the marital estate without entering adequate findings justifying that unequal distribution. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Good news, apparently, for parents deserving of joint equal physical custody of their children but who have, up until now, been fighting an unfair, unnecessarily uphill battle.
The Utah Legislature passed, during the 2021 legislative session, a new Utah Code section. It’s Section 30-3-35.2. Here is a copy of the new code section (see below). Section 30-3-35.2 goes into effect May 5, 2021. Note: this is not a law that will, of itself, constitute a basis for seeking a change of an existing custody award. But if you are in the middle of a custody fight for joint equal custody or expect to be in the future, you will want to know about section 30-3-35.2. § 30-3-35.2.
30-3-35.2.Equal parent-time schedule.
(1) (a) A court may order the equal parent-time schedule described in this section if the court determines that:
(i) the equal parent-time schedule is in the child’s best interest;
(ii) each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life; and
(iii) each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule.
(b) To determine whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court shall consider:
(i) each parent’s demonstrated responsibility in caring for the child;
(ii) each parent’s involvement in child care;
(iii) each parent’s presence or volunteer efforts in the child’s school and at extracurricular activities;
(iv) each parent’s assistance with the child’s homework;
(v) each parent’s involvement in preparation of meals, bath time, and bedtime for the child;
(vi) each parent’s bond with the child; and
(vii) any other factor the court considers relevant.
(c) To determine whether each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule, the court shall consider:
(i) the geographic distance between the residence of each parent and the distance between each residence and the child’s school;
(ii) each parent’s ability to assist with the child’s after school care;
(iii) the health of the child and each parent, consistent with Subsection 30-3-10(6);
(iv) the flexibility of each parent’s employment or other schedule;
(v) each parent’s ability to provide appropriate playtime with the child;
(vi) each parent’s history and ability to implement a flexible schedule for the child;
(vii) physical facilities of each parent’s residence; and
(viii) any other factor the court considers relevant.
(2) (a) If the parties agree to or the court orders the equal parent-time schedule described in this section, a parenting plan in accordance with Sections 30-3-10.7through 30-3-10.10 shall be filed with an order incorporating the equal parent-time schedule.
(b) An order under this section shall result in 182 overnights per year for one parent, and 183 overnights per year for the other parent.
(c) Under the equal parent-time schedule, neither parent is considered to have the child
109 the majority of the time for the purposes of Subsection 30-3-10.3(4) or 30-3-10.9(5)(c)(ii).
(d) Child support for the equal parent-time schedule shall be consistent with Section 78B-12-208.
(e) (i) A court shall determine which parent receives 182 overnights and which parent receives 183 overnights for parent-time.
(ii) For the purpose of calculating child support under Section 78B-12-208, the amount of time to be spent with the parent who has the lower gross monthly income is considered 183 overnights, regardless of whether the parent receives 182 overnights or 183 overnights under Subsection (2)(e)(i).
(3) (a) Unless the parents agree otherwise and subject to a holiday, the equal parent-time schedule is as follows:
(i) one parent shall exercise parent-time starting Monday morning and ending Wednesday morning;
(ii) the other parent shall exercise parent-time starting Wednesday morning and ending Friday morning; and
(iii) each parent shall alternate weeks exercising parent-time starting Friday morning and ending Monday morning.
(b) The child exchange shall take place:
(i) at the time the child’s school begins; or
(ii) if school is not in session, at 9 a.m.
(4) (a) The parents may create a holiday schedule.
(b) If the parents are unable to create a holiday schedule under Subsection (4)(a), the court shall:
(i) order the holiday schedule described in Section 30-3-35; and
(ii) designate which parent shall exercise parent-time for each holiday described in Section 30-3-35.
(5) (a) Each year, a parent may designate two consecutive weeks to exercise uninterrupted parent-time during the summer when school is not in session.
(b) (i) One parent may make a designation at any time and the other parent may make a designation after May 1.
(ii) A parent shall make a designation at least 30 days before the day on which the designated two-week period begins.
(c) The court shall designate which parent may make the earlier designation described in Subsection (5)(b)(i) for an even numbered year with the other parent allowed to make the earlier designation in an odd numbered year.
(d) The two consecutive weeks described in Subsection (5)(a) take precedence over all holidays except for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day.
What if you don’t get divorced and just move away?
The risks and dangers in just up and moving away from (abandoning) your spouse are manifold. Here are a few that come to mind:
If you disappear and your spouse files for divorce and you cannot be found to be served with a copy of 1) the summons and 2) complaint for divorce, you could have default judgment entered against you without your knowledge and without you having appeared in the action to defend yourself.
you may lose most or all of the marital assets (even your premarital assets) by having them awarded to your spouse;
you may be ordered to pay most or all of the marital debts and obligations; and
you may be ordered to pay unfair amounts of child and/or spousal support
You are still responsible to care for your spouse, which means (at least in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law) that if your spouse incurs debts and obligations for what are known as “necessaries”:
Morrison v. Federico, 232 P.2d 374 (Utah 1951):
The statute making “expenses of the family” chargeable upon the property of both spouses and permitting them to be sued jointly and separately, places liability upon both parties only where expenses incurred are necessary for the family benefit including expenditures proper to support the family and necessary to promote the well-being of its members and does not include attorney’s fees for legal services performed in a contemplated divorce action where reconciliation occurs.
30-2-9. Family expenses–Joint and several liability:
(1) The expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both spouses or of either of them separately, for which expenses they may be sued jointly or separately.
(2) For the expenses described in Subsection (1), where there is a written agreement signed by either spouse that allows for the recovery of agreed upon amounts, a creditor or an assignee or successor in interest of the creditor is entitled to recover the contractually allowed amounts against both spouses, jointly and severally.
(3) Subsection (2) applies to all contracts and agreements under this section entered into by either spouse during the time the parties are married and living together.
(4) For the purposes of this section, family expenses are considered expenses incurred that benefit and promote the family unit. Items purchased pursuant to a written contract or agreement during the marriage that do not relate to family expenses are not covered by this section.
(5) The provisions of Subsections (2) and (3) do not create a right to attorney’s fees or collection fees as to the nonsigning spouse for purchases of:
(a) food or clothing; or
(b) home improvements or repairs over $5,000.
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Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277