JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
¶1 James and Blanche Cox were married for over 20 years, during which time they had 10 children and acquired a large number of marital assets. In September 2012, Blanche filed for divorce. After 4 years of pretrial litigation and then 14 days of trial, the district court issued a 35-page divorce ruling that settled various issues relating to child custody, child support, alimony, and the division of the marital estate.
¶2 James now appeals, arguing that many of the court’s rulings were not supported by adequate findings. We agree with James with respect to each challenged ruling. We accordingly vacate those rulings and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 James and Blanche Cox were married in 1990. During their marriage, they had 10 children and acquired a large number of assets. In September 2012, Blanche filed for divorce. After 4 years of litigation, the case went to trial, and that trial occurred over the course of 14 days between December 2016 and May 2017. In January 2017 (while the trial was proceeding), the court issued a bifurcated divorce decree granting Blanche’s request for a divorce and reserving other issues for further hearings and determinations.
¶4 In October 2017, the court issued a 35-page Ruling and Memorandum Decision (the Ruling) that entered findings of fact and legal determinations regarding many issues related to child custody, child support, alimony, and the valuation and division of the marital estate. This appeal implicates the court’s findings and determinations regarding essentially three groups of issues: the parties’ marital properties, alimony and child support, and marital debts.
¶5 The court found that James and Blanche “enjoyed the benefit or acquired” five properties during their marriage: (1) the Hildale Home, (2) the Henderson Home, (3) the Eagle Mountain Home, (4) the Rockville Property, and (5) the Cedar Highlands Lots. The court then entered findings and made rulings regarding how to divide the parties’ marital interest in each property.
¶6 The Hildale Home: The court found that James built this home (located, as our reference would suggest, in Hildale, Utah) before his marriage to Blanche. The court found that James, Blanche, and their children lived in this property until 2010, after which they moved to a different residence. The court heard testimony that title to the Hildale Home was held by the United Effort Plan Trust (the Trust). But the court then concluded that no evidence had been presented of the value of James’s interest in the Trust and that “establishing the value of a beneficial interest in property of the [Trust]” would be “practically and legally impossible.” The court acknowledged that Blanche had submitted an appraisal of the Hildale Home at trial (which, according to the record on appeal, estimated its value as being around $200,000), but the court concluded that the appraisal was deficient because it failed to account for costs and fees associated with the Trust ownership. From all this—and without any further explanation— the court then ruled that Blanche was “entitled to an award of $100,000” based on the home’s value.
¶7 The Henderson Home: The court found that this home was purchased by James in 2004 for $420,000. It found that after the parties fell behind on mortgage payments, at which point they still owed around $288,000, the house was “lost in a short sale in 2013 for $225,000.” The court made a finding that the fair market value of the home at the time, according to Zillow, was $323,861.
¶8 But the court also heard competing testimony from the parties about whether the loss of the home could have been avoided. From Blanche, the court heard testimony that the home “could have been rented out” but that James refused to sign papers that would have modified the loan and, theoretically, allowed the parties to avoid losing it. From James, however, the court heard testimony that maintaining or leasing the home wasn’t actually possible for several different reasons.
¶9 From this, the court found that “[t]he parties would likely have had at least $100,000 in equity to split if they had kept” the Henderson Home and “rented it as suggested by [Blanche] numerous times.” The court then ruled that James “should be responsible to, and give [Blanche] credit for, $50,000 in equity representing her share of the lost asset dissipated by him.”
¶10 The Eagle Mountain Home: The court found that James and Blanche bought this home in 2009 and made a $120,000 down payment on it, $80,000 of which was borrowed from James’s mother. The court found that they moved into the home sometime in 2010 and began using it as their primary residence. James testified that he had at one point intended to sell the Eagle Mountain Home in an effort “to cover all the debts” on the parties’ credit cards but that Blanche refused to cooperate with him on the sale. Evidence presented at trial suggested that the home was sold in 2015 by a bankruptcy trustee for $520,000, with the parties still owing $292,000 at that time. Without citing any specific piece of evidence, the court found that if the Eagle Mountain Home had “not been lost to a forced sale, [Blanche] would have been able to receive at least another $25,000 today because of the current market value of $606,000,” and the court then ruled that she was “entitled to that sum.”
¶11 The Rockville Property: The court described this as a “7.5 acre parcel of farm property” located near Rockville, Utah. In its ruling on how to divide the marital interest in this property, the court referred to evidence it had received indicating that the parties were “forced to sell” the property for $270,000 after falling behind on the mortgage payments, as well as evidence showing that the parties still owed around $190,000 on the property when it was sold.
¶12 But the court then referred to several sources of evidence it had received that suggested that this property had a higher value and could have been sold for more. For example, it referred to evidence that a realtor had listed what the court thought was a similar 11.4 acre parcel for $1,195,000 (though the court then acknowledged that it was “debatable” whether this comparison provided an accurate valuation for the Rockville Property). The court also noted testimony that a realtor had valued the property at “approximately $900,000” due to “28 [shares of] water rights [that were] attached to it.” And the court referred to an “analysis from Zillow” that suggested the property’s value was $1,195,000.
¶13 From all this, the court then found that the forced sale of the property for $270,000 was a loss that “cost the parties at least $450,000 each,” and the court awarded Blanche “damages of $450,000 offset by monies she did receive in the amount of $42,000.”
¶14 The Cedar Highlands Lots: The Cedar Highlands Lots were “two lots down by Cedar City,” one of which was around 2 acres and the other around 2.5 acres. The court found that the lots were purchased for $40,000 each sometime in 2003 but that they were later “lost” through a forced sale because of the parties’ ongoing failure to pay various taxes and fees.
¶15 At trial, there was conflicting evidence and argument about the amount of the loss suffered by the parties because of the sale of these lots. James testified that the parties lost $60,000, while Blanche claimed that they lost somewhere between $153,000 and $280,000 (with her estimate being largely based on the lots’ appreciation in value since the time that the parties had purchased them—and, thus, the parties’ loss of potential equity by virtue of the forced sale). The court ultimately found that the parties’ inability to “pay the property taxes and Homeowners Association fees . . . resulted in [an] $80,000 loss to the parties.” The court did not explain how it had arrived at the $80,000 amount, nor did it explain how this loss was to be distributed between the parties.
Alimony and Child Support
¶16 Blanche’s Income: Under an initial subheading of the Ruling that was entitled “The Parties[’] Income,” the court found that Blanche is “an experienced bookkeeper with QuickBooks who has elected to be employed by About Faceology,” but that she was currently a “self employed Uber/Lift driver and has been so since 2015.” Under a subsequent subheading entitled “Income of the Parties,” however, the court then determined that “[f]or child support purposes [Blanche’s] income cannot be imputed at more than [the] minimum wage of $1,257 per month.” Elsewhere in the Ruling, and without explanation for the discrepancy, the court found that Blanche’s imputed minimum wage income was actually $1,260 per month (rather than $1,257). The court included no explanation for its conclusion that Blanche’s income could not be imputed at more than the minimum wage.
¶17 Child Support: At the time of the Ruling, the parties had five minor children. The court initially ordered James to pay $3,781 per month in child support. Elsewhere in the Ruling, however, and again without explanation, the court stated that it was ordering James to pay $3,336 per month in child support.
¶18 Alimony: Turning to alimony, the court noted that under the controlling statute, it should consider a number of factors. One of the factors it considered was Blanche’s “financial condition and needs.” With respect to this factor, the court opined that Blanche’s “needs have been overstated in her financial declarations,” but the court made no ruling about Blanche’s financial condition and what her needs actually were. With respect to Blanche’s earning capacity, the court again noted that Blanche “claim[ed] she earns just a little better than minimum [wage] even though she is an experienced and sophisticated bookkeeper with many years of experience having run, managed, overseen and monitored millions of dollars in income and expenses that ran through the parties[’] businesses.” But the court made no further findings about her particular earning capacity as it related to a potential alimony award. The court also noted that there were “minor children in the home,” five of whom were “younger than eighteen years of age or have not yet graduated from high school with their expected class.” But the court made no findings about how (or how much) these children impacted Blanche’s earning capacity. Finally, with respect to James’s ability to pay alimony, the court found that James was a “voluntarily under employed” electrician, and it then opined that “[t]here is no question that [Blanche] claims that her needs exceed hers and [James’s] monthly incomes.” Considering these factors together, the court then ordered James to pay $8,286 per month in alimony.
¶19 Finally, the court made certain findings concerning the “business debt” that was “incurred” by the parties during the marriage. While the divorce proceedings were pending, James filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In the Ruling, the court found that, after the bankruptcy proceedings had begun, James incurred $30,000 in debt while purchasing stock in his business and business-related property from the bankruptcy trustee. Since the court determined that Blanche was “entitled to 50% of [the] value” of the business, the court then concluded that she was entitled to an award of $15,000 as a result of this debt.
¶20 The court also noted that Blanche had “received financial compensation from the sale of assets and the conversion of assets into cash.” But the court opined that it was “difficult, if not impossible, to decipher whether each expenditure was personal, business related, or partially business-related.” From this, and without further explanation, the court awarded Blanche “judgment against [James] in the amount of $50,000.”
Motions for Clarification
¶21 James and Blanche were both dissatisfied with the Ruling, and in January 2018, they each filed a motion requesting clarification. Each motion raised a host of issues regarding alleged errors.
¶22 Of note here, in her motion, Blanche asked for clarification “as to whether or not” she was entitled to $25,000 for the Eagle Mountain Home or, instead, “another amount.” She argued that an award of $25,000 “seem[ed] incorrect mathematically” because if the fair market value of the Eagle Mountain Home was $606,000, and the home sold for $520,000, the “resulting equity would have been $86,000, which if divided equally would result in [Blanche] receiving judgment for $43,000,” as opposed to $25,000. Blanche also requested clarification as to the court’s determination “that the loss to the parties” concerning the Cedar Highlands Lots was $80,000. She argued that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the loss was $280,000. Blanche also requested clarification regarding the court’s determination of marital debts, specifically, whether the $15,000 was “to be added to the $50,000 for a total of $65,000” or whether “there [was] another number the court considered.” Finally, Blanche requested clarification of the court’s order regarding child support, given that in one portion of its Ruling the court ordered James to pay child support in the amount of $3,781 per month, and in another portion it altered that amount to $3,336 per month.
¶23 In his motion, James likewise requested clarification of various aspects of the Ruling. Among other things, he asked the court to “enter supplemental, amended, and or additional findings” regarding its ruling that Blanche was “entitled to $100,000” concerning the Hildale Home, explaining that he was “unaware of any evidence upon which the [court] could have relied in finding the $100,000 in equity the [court] awarded” Blanche. James also asked for clarification on the court’s findings concerning the Henderson Home, Eagle Mountain Home, and Rockville Property, asserting that the court had not “identified the facts upon which it relied” in making its calculations. Regarding the Henderson Home, James alleged that the court’s finding that “the parties would likely have had at least $100,000 in equity if the home had been rented” for the years 2013 through 2017 “fail[ed] to account for the costs of managing a rental property from a long distance, the likelihood of vacancies, the cost of utilities, maintenance, repairs, property taxes” and other related fees. Regarding the Eagle Mountain Home, James argued that the Ruling did not “accurately account for the additional $25,000” that Blanche received from the bankruptcy trustee “in addition to the $102,486.28 she received” from the sale. Regarding the Rockville Property, James requested clarification as to what facts the court relied upon to conclude that “the parties owned 28 shares of water,” given that the evidence “actually showed,” in his view, that they owned only 19 shares of water. Additionally, James requested clarification as to the court’s comparison of the Rockville Property to a parcel of “11.4 acre[s] of land with Virgin River frontage that was listed for $1,195,000.” Finally, with respect to the marital debts, James asked the court to “enter supplemental, amended and or additional findings” that would “identify the facts upon which [the court] relied in awarding [Blanche] $15,000 representing [the business’s] hypothetical equity or value.”
¶24 In the meantime, the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) intervened in the case based on its obligation to provide child support enforcement services. ORS filed a memo in response to Blanche’s motion for clarification in which it likewise requested clarification of the child support amount. After recounting its view of the evidence, ORS recommended that if Blanche’s income was imputed at minimum wage, and if James’s income was imputed at $18,500 per month, James should be ordered to pay $3,236 per month for the five minor children.
¶25 In August 2018, the court issued a ruling on James’s and Blanche’s motions. With respect to the child support amount, the court now ordered that James’s monthly obligation be $3,236 per month, thus apparently adopting ORS’s recommendation. With respect to the properties, the court now ruled—without explanation—that Blanche was entitled to $25,000 in relation to the Eagle Mountain Home and $40,000 for the Cedar Highland Lots. And with respect to the marital debts, the court found— again without explanation—that “[t]he $15,000 amount awarded is to be added to the $50,000 amount awarded for a total of $65,000” to be awarded to Blanche.
¶26 The court ordered Blanche’s counsel to prepare the final findings of fact and conclusions of law. In a November 2018 filing, however, Blanche alleged that she was unable to do so without “additional findings” regarding, among others, the marital debts. In May 2019, the court heard additional oral arguments. After the parties filed additional objections and motions, the case was reassigned from Judge Lynn Davis—who had heard the trial testimony and had issued both the Ruling and the rulings on the motions for clarification—to Judge Robert Lunnen. Judge Lunnen then heard oral arguments on the parties’ objections and outstanding motions.
The Supplemental Decree
¶27 In April 2021, the court (through Judge Lunnen) issued a “Supplemental Decree of Divorce” (the Supplemental Decree).
¶28 The Supplemental Decree reiterated and incorporated many of the findings and determinations from the Ruling. As in the Ruling, for example, the court awarded Blanche $100,000 for the Hildale Home, $50,000 for the Henderson Home, and the (clarified) amount of $40,000 for the Cedar Highlands Lots. But without explanation, the court altered the order regarding the Eagle Mountain Home, awarding Blanche $43,000 as opposed to the $25,000 that was previously ordered. Also without explanation, the court altered the order regarding the Rockville Property, first concluding that Blanche’s offset should be $38,000, not $42,000, and now awarding Blanche $412,000 from this property as opposed to the $408,000 that had previously been awarded.
¶29 The court also determined that Blanche’s income should be imputed at minimum wage for a total of $1,260 per month. Based on its findings about the parties’ incomes, it then ordered James to pay $3,236 per month in child support, and it again ordered him to pay $8,286 per month in alimony.
¶30 Finally, the court awarded Blanche $65,000 relating to the marital debts. The court explained that $15,000 of that amount “represent[ed] her interest” in various purchases made by James from the bankruptcy trustee and that the remaining $50,000 represented “her interest in other assets, business and otherwise.”
¶31 James timely appealed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶32 James argues that the district court issued “inadequate” fact findings to explain its rulings regarding the marital properties, child support and alimony, and marital debts. “We review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of law.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 4, 427 P.3d 1221 (quotation simplified); see also Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161, ¶ 5, 353 P.3d 1262 (“We review the legal sufficiency of factual findings—that is, whether the trial court’s factual findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions—under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court.” (quotation simplified)).
¶33 A district court’s “[f]indings of fact are adequate . . . only when they are sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the district court reached its ultimate conclusion on each issue.” Oldroyd v. Oldroyd, 2017 UT App 45, ¶ 5, 397 P.3d 645. When assessing a challenge to the adequacy of a district court’s findings, we look to whether the court “adequately disclosed the analytic steps” it took in reaching its conclusions. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 21, 235 P.3d 782. In this sense, the court’s findings of fact must show that its “judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). “This obligation facilitates meaningful appellate review and ensures the parties are informed of the trial court’s reasoning.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d 258; see also Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882 (explaining that findings “are adequate when they contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally based”). While “unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual determination it made,” Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22 (quotation simplified), we “will not imply any missing finding where there is a matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court’s actual findings,” Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025–26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified).
¶34 James argues that a number of the court’s findings were inadequate. His arguments address three groups of findings— namely, findings regarding (I) marital properties, (II) child support and alimony, and (III) marital debts. We address each group in turn.
¶35 James first challenges the adequacy of the findings that supported the rulings about how to value and distribute the parties’ marital properties. We recognize at the outset that district courts “have considerable discretion in determining property distribution in divorce cases.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 11, 440 P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). But while a district court “does not have to accept [a party’s] proposed valuation” of an item in the marital estate, the court “does have to make findings sufficient to allow us to review and determine whether an equitable property award has been made.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 53, 379 P.3d 890. In ruling on such a claim, we will uphold a district court’s “valuation of marital assets” if “the value is within the range of values established by all the testimony, and as long as the court’s findings are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 64, 507 P.3d 385 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022).
The Hildale Home
¶36 James first argues that the court’s findings regarding the Hildale Home were inadequate. In James’s view, the court “simply concluded that $100,000 was an appropriate amount of an award without providing factual findings” supporting “the appropriateness” of that award. We agree.
¶37 The court’s discussion of the Hildale Home spans roughly two pages of the Ruling. Much of the discussion concerns the ownership of the home. The court found that the home’s title is held by the Trust, that James’s interest in the home is that “of a beneficiary” to the Trust, and that Blanche, by contrast, is “not a legal beneficiary” of the Trust. But the court then found that “[n]o evidence was presented to the court of the value [of] [James’s] beneficial interest” in the Trust and that “establishing the value of a beneficial interest in property of the [Trust] is practically and legally impossible[,]” in part, because “the Trust is not receptive to, nor responsive to, legal inquiries.” The court also recognized that Blanche submitted an appraisal of the home, but it then concluded that the appraisal was not an adequate mechanism for establishing the home’s value because the appraisal failed to account for “title to the home being in the [Trust], the costs of getting the [Hildale Home] conveyed from the [Trust], or the thousands of dollars owed to the [court] appointed Trustee of the [Trust] which the Trustee is owed for administering the [Trust’s] assets.” After discounting its ability to rely on either James’s interest in the Trust or Blanche’s appraisal, the court ruled that the property was “a marital asset” to some “narrow extent.” Without further explanation, it then ruled that while it couldn’t grant title to Blanche, she was “entitled to an award of $100,000.”
¶38 We recognize the difficulties that the court faced with this trial in general—as should be clear by now, this was a very complicated divorce with a lot of things to decide and divide. And as evidenced by the preceding paragraph, the nature of parties’ apparent interest in the Hildale Home made the question of how to divide that interest particularly complicated. But even so, we see nothing in the Ruling that “adequately disclosed the analytic steps” the court took, Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 21, when deciding that Blanche was entitled to $100,000. The court clearly explained what it thought it couldn’t rely on, but it didn’t explain what it thought it could rely on or how it arrived at this particular amount. Without such an explanation, James has no meaningful way to challenge that $100,000 award, nor do we have any meaningful way to assess whether it was legally warranted in light of the “matrix of possible factual findings” on this issue that are apparent from the record. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (quotation simplified). We accordingly vacate this determination.
The Henderson Home
¶39 James next argues that the court “did not provide any analysis” as to how it determined there was $100,000 in equity in the Henderson Home and that, as a result, the $50,000 award to Blanche was based on inadequate findings. We agree.
¶40 The court found that the home was purchased by James in 2004 for $420,000. It explained that by August 2012, James and Blanche were “months behind in their [mortgage] payment” and that they owed $288,000 when the home was “lost in a short sale in 2013 for $225,000.” The court made a finding that the fair market value of the home at the time—according to Zillow—was $323,861. The court found that James and Blanche “would likely have had at least $100,000 in equity to split if they had” managed to keep the home, but because James “ignored” Blanche’s suggestions to rent the home out, which in theory would have prevented them from losing it, it then ruled that James “should be responsible to, and give [Blanche] credit for, $50,000 in equity representing her share of the lost asset dissipated by him.” It appears the court thus based the $50,000 award on its finding that “the parties could likely have rented and made money as shown or just maintained [the Henderson Home] and sold it for profit presently.”
¶41 James’s initial argument here is that it’s unclear how the court arrived at the $100,000 in equity that it then divided. In response, Blanche suggests that this amount could have been derived from the court’s apparent acceptance of the home’s fair market value as being $323,861 (a value derived from Zillow— which, again, neither party has challenged on appeal as being improper), an amount that is approximately (though, we note, not precisely) $100,000 more than the parties received in the short sale. We have some concern that Blanche is asking us to do too much inferential work on our own, and we could vacate on this basis alone. But in any event, the court’s division of the apparent equity also seems to have been based on a dissipation (or, perhaps, a waste) determination stemming from James’s conduct. Assuming this was so, the court’s findings about James’s conduct, whether the home could actually have been rented out, what the parties could have received in rent, and whether this unspoken amount would actually have prevented them from losing the home were all either missing or decidedly cursory. We’ve previously held, however, held that when a court rules that a party “should be held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets,” the court must support the ruling with “sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court’s basis” for that ruling, and we’ve also laid out a number of factors that “may be relevant to” and could support such a ruling. Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶¶ 19–21, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified). While that list is not mandatory or exhaustive, we still have an inadequate findings-based foundation here from which we could review what seems to have been an implicit dissipation determination. When coupled with the lack of explanatory findings about the basis for the equity determination, we conclude that the findings about this home are, as a whole, legally inadequate to support meaningful appellate review of this ruling. We accordingly vacate them.
The Eagle Mountain Home
¶42 James argues that the court’s findings regarding the Eagle Mountain Home were legally inadequate. We agree.
¶43 In the Ruling, the court (through Judge Davis) initially awarded Blanche $25,000 for this home. But the court failed to explain the analytic steps it took to arrive at that amount. The court did enter a few findings about this home—namely, that the parties made a $120,000 down payment when they purchased the home in 2009 ($80,000 of which was borrowed from James’s mother), that they were forced to sell it in 2015 in conjunction with James’s bankruptcy, and that, as a result of that sale, Blanche received “one half” of its equity. But the court made no findings about the sale price or how much equity the parties had in the home at the time of the sale. And then, without any explanation, the court opined that “[h]ad it not been lost to a forced sale,” Blanche “would have been able to receive at least another $25,000 today” because of the home’s “current market value.” The court provided no basis for the $25,000 amount, and we see no reasonable basis in its findings for inferring one.
¶44 Of note, the court (through Judge Lunnen) then changed the awarded amount in the Supplemental Decree, now awarding Blanche $43,000 for it. But the court didn’t explain why it increased this award from the award that had previously been entered in the Ruling. And while Blanche suggests on appeal that the court had now accepted a new valuation of the home that she offered in her motion for clarification, the court never said that it was doing so, nor did it provide any other explanation for why it increased this award at all, let alone by this particular amount.
¶45 In light of this procedural history, it’s unclear to us what analytic steps led the court to first award Blanche $25,000 for this home and what caused the court to later change that award to $43,000. As a result, the findings with respect to this home are legally inadequate and are therefore vacated.
The Rockville Property
¶46 James argues that the court’s findings about the Rockville Property are legally inadequate because it’s “not clear” how the court “reached its valuation of the Rockville Property” or how it divided that value as part of its division of the marital estate. We agree.
¶47 In the Ruling, the court explained that the Rockville Property was a “7.5 acre parcel of farm property” owned by James and Blanche near Rockville, Utah. As for its value and how to determine that value, the court pointed to three options: (1) it noted that a realtor had listed a similar 11.4 acre parcel for $1,195,000, though the court opined that this valuation was “debatable”; (2) the court noted that Blanche “discussed” its value with a realtor who “indicated back then” (which, though unsaid by the court, seems from context to have been in 2013) that the “lot was worth approximately $900,000, due to the 28 water rights attached to it”; and (3) the court pointed to a “[c]urrent market value analysis from Zillow” that “estimate[d]” the property’s value at $1,195,000. The court then found that the parties were “forced to sell” the property in December 2013 for $270,000 due to financial troubles. And the court apparently faulted James for this, determining that at the time of the forced sale, the parties “only owed approximately $190,000” on the property, that it could have been refinanced, and that it was James’s fault that they did not do so. From this, the court found that the forced sale “cost the parties at least $450,000 each,” and it accordingly awarded Blanche “damages of $450,000 offset by monies she did receive in the amount of $42,000.”
¶48 From an adequacy-of-the-findings perspective, the initial problem here is that the court never stated whether it was accepting $1,195,000 or $900,000 as the property’s value. Given that the property’s value would be the numerator for any division of it as a marital asset, this omission is, of course, significant. And while Blanche invites us to engage in some loose math that would account for both possibilities and arrive at the same endpoint, the difference between the two initial valuations might matter if James wished to mount a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Moreover, to the extent that the court’s determination about how to divide the property’s value turned on an implicit dissipation determination, we again note that the court failed to support such a determination with adequate findings. And finally, while the court offset the award to Blanche by “monies she did receive in the amount of $42,000,” an amount that it later changed to $38,000 in the Supplemental Decree, the court didn’t explain the basis for either amount in either ruling.
¶49 Given the unanswered questions about how the court valued both this property and the offset, we have no basis for conducting a meaningful review of this award. We accordingly vacate it.
The Cedar Highlands Lots
¶50 James’s final property-related challenge is to the findings regarding the Cedar Highlands Lots. In James’s view, the court improperly failed to “indicate . . . how the $80,000 was calculated.” We again agree.
¶51 In the Ruling, the court found that James and a business partner had purchased the two lots for $40,000 each, that Blanche had “controlled the book-keeping for the marital businesses,” and that the lots “were lost when the parties were unable or could not pay the property taxes and Home Owners Association fees,” thus “result[ing] in [an] $80,000 loss to the parties.” In a subsequent ruling, the court determined that this loss should now result in an award of $40,000 to Blanche, and that award was later confirmed in the Supplemental Decree.
¶52 From the court’s findings, it’s unclear why the court determined that there was an $80,000 loss. The court seems to have assumed that the lots were completely lost with no return in value, but the court never said so. And more importantly, even assuming that this was the implicit finding, the court never explained why it concluded that Blanche should receive an award of $40,000 as the result of this particular loss to the marital estate of $80,000. Without such an explanation, we have no meaningful basis for reviewing the ruling. As a result, we vacate it.
Child Support and Alimony
¶53 James challenges the adequacy of the findings relating to child support and alimony. James’s challenges here fall into two groups: first, he challenges the adequacy of the findings relating to Blanche’s income (which, as explained below, matter to both child support and alimony); and second, with respect to the alimony determination, he challenges the adequacy of the court’s findings relating to Blanche’s financial condition and needs.
¶54 James argues that the court’s findings regarding Blanche’s income were inadequate because they failed to “provide any reasoning for disregarding [Blanche’s] earning capacity.” We agree.
¶55 A party’s income matters to a determination of both child support and alimony. First, with respect to child support, a “noncustodial parent’s child support obligation is calculated using each parent’s adjusted gross income.” Twitchell v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 34, 509 P.3d 806 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code §§ 78B-12-202, -301 (establishing guidelines for child support awards). Importantly, the court “is required to enter detailed and specific findings on all material issues which must be considered when making a child support award.” Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quotation simplified). But “so long as the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached are apparent, a trial court may make findings, credibility determinations, or other assessments without detailing its justification for finding particular evidence more credible or persuasive than other evidence supporting a different outcome.” Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 6 (quotation simplified). Second, with respect to alimony, a court must examine, among other factors, “the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income.” Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 16, 496 P.3d 242 (quotation simplified). And a court must in “all cases . . . support its alimony determinations with adequate findings . . . on all material issues,” and “failure to do so constitutes reversible error, unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified).
¶56 Of note, when “there is insufficient evidence of one of the statutory alimony factors, courts may impute figures.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 98, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation simplified). For example, a “court may impute income to a former spouse for purposes of calculating alimony after finding that the former spouse is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed.” Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 15. And it “is not unusual for courts to impute income to a spouse who has not worked during the marriage (or who has not worked for a number of years preceding the divorce) but who is nevertheless capable of producing income.” Petrzelka v. Goodwin, 2020 UT App 34, ¶ 26, 461 P.3d 1134 (emphasis in original). But when a court imputes income, the “imputation cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise assessment requiring detailed findings.” Christensen v. Christensen, 2017 UT App 120, ¶ 22, 400 P.3d 1219 (quotation simplified); see also Reller v. Argenziano, 2015 UT App 241, ¶ 33, 360 P.3d 768 (“Before imputing income to a parent, the trial court must enter findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” (quotation simplified)).
¶57 Income can likewise be imputed as part of a child support determination. See Utah Code § 78B-12-203(8). But, as with an alimony award, a court must support such an imputation with adequate findings. See id. § 78B-12-203(8)(a) (explaining that in contested cases, “[i]ncome may not be imputed to a parent unless,” after an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the court “enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis or the imputation”); id. § 78B-12-203(8)(b) (detailing the evidentiary bases upon which a court may impute income for child support purposes); see also Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 10 (“Imputation cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise assessment requiring detailed findings.” (quotation simplified)).
¶58 Here, the court determined that although Blanche was currently working as a “self employed Uber/Lift driver,” her “income cannot be imputed at more than minimum wage of $1,257 per month.” In a different portion of the Ruling, however, the court found that Blanche’s “gross income” should actually be imputed at “$1,260 per month.”
¶59 On appeal, James doesn’t focus on this three-dollar discrepancy. Rather, James argues that the court erred by failing to explain why Blanche’s income should be imputed at minimum wage at all. As James points out, the court elsewhere found that Blanche is “an experienced bookkeeper with QuickBooks who has elected to be employed by About Faceology,” and it further found that she was “an experienced and sophisticated bookkeeper with many years of experience having run, managed, overseen and monitored millions of dollars in income and expenses that ran through the parties[’] businesses.”
¶60 Having reviewed the Ruling, we see no explanation for the court’s determination that, although Blanche is an experienced bookkeeper with the skill set to manage millions of dollars in income for a company, her income should still be imputed at minimum wage. In an attempt to justify this on appeal, Blanche points to a passing statement from the alimony portion of the ruling in which the court noted that the parties “have ten children, five of which are younger than eighteen years of age or have not yet graduated from high school with their expected class.” But as James points out in response, the parties had even more minor children at home during the years in which Blanche was working as a bookkeeper with responsibilities for “millions of dollars in income.” And while it’s possible that the court believed that something had now changed that would prevent Blanche from still doing this work (such as her new status as a post-divorce single parent), the court never said this or entered any findings to support such a determination, it never explained why it was implicitly determining that Blanche could work as an Uber/Lyft driver but not as a bookkeeper, and it entered no findings to explain why her current employment as an Uber/Lyft driver would result in an income imputation of minimum wage.
¶61 To be clear: as with the other issues in this appeal, we express no opinion about the proper resolution of any of these questions. But without an explanation from the district court, James has no basis for properly challenging the decision about Blanche’s income, nor do we have an adequate basis for reviewing it. Given the importance of Blanche’s income to both child support and alimony, we accordingly vacate those rulings.
Blanche’s Financial Condition and Needs
¶62 As part of its alimony determination, the court was also required to consider Blanche’s “financial condition and needs.” Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified). James argues that the court failed to enter adequate findings to support this assessment. We agree.
¶63 In the Ruling, the court noted that Blanche had claimed that she had “monthly needs of $18,565,” but it then concluded that these needs were “overstated.” And while Blanche had also suggested that she needed the alimony award to account for “over $200,000 in credit card and business debts,” the court suggested that this debt was either accounted for by other portions of its ruling or had “been discharged in the bankruptcy case.”
¶64 But even so, while the court then concluded that James “simply does not make sufficient money to satisfy all of [Blanche’s] claims” about what “she reasonably needs to support herself,” the court did not make any determination about what Blanche’s needs actually are. As James correctly points out, the absence of such an explanation prevents us from conducting a meaningful review of how this factor should weigh into the court’s alimony award, a problem that is compounded by the failure discussed above to adequately explain its determination about Blanche’s income.
¶65 We accordingly vacate the alimony award to allow the court to enter more detailed findings and, “if necessary, recalculat[e] . . . appropriate alimony.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 2005 UT App 67U, para. 6 (quotation simplified); see also Eberhard v. Eberhard, 2019 UT App 114, ¶¶ 39–40, 449 P.3d 202 (faulting a district court for not “spelling out” “how much more [the petitioner] actually needs each month to pay down her debt and elevate herself to the marital standard of living,” thus leaving the appellate court “unable to discern whether the alimony award, in fact, exceeds her needs”).
III. Marital Debts
¶66 Finally, James challenges the adequacy of the court’s findings with respect to the parties’ marital debts. We agree that these findings are inadequate.
¶67 “In issuing a divorce decree, a trial court must include an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage.” Fox v. Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 32, 515 P.3d 481 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1263 (Utah 2022); see also Utah Code § 30-3-5(3)(c)(i). Utah law “requires only a fair and equitable, not an equal, division of the marital debts.” Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 32 (quotation simplified). A district court is in the “best position to weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions”; as a result, a district court’s division of marital debts is “entitled to a presumption of validity.” Mullins v. Mullins, 2016 UT App 77, ¶ 20, 370 P.3d 1283 (quotation simplified). But, again, the district court must enter findings of fact that are “sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which [it] reached its ultimate conclusion on each issue.” Oldroyd, 2017 UT App 45, ¶ 5.
¶68 Here, the court found that the “parties incurred business debt while married.” James challenges the adequacy of the findings with respect to two of those debts.
¶69 First, the court found that as a result of James’s bankruptcy, James took on $30,000 in debt to finance the purchase of his business’s stock and other business-related property. In the court’s view, Blanche was “entitled to 50% of [the] value” of the business, which meant, in its view, that she was also entitled to $15,000. But the court never explained why it concluded that Blanche was entitled to this amount. While it’s possible, as Blanche now suggests, that the court thought that James had drawn the $30,000 from marital assets—and, thus, that $15,000 of it belonged to Blanche—the court didn’t say this, and its reference to this as “$30,000” in “debt” that James had incurred is somewhat at odds with this inference. In the absence of any explanation, we vacate this ruling.
¶70 Second, at the close of the “Marital Debts” section of its ruling, the court found that Blanche had “received financial compensation from the sale of assets and the conversion of assets into cash.” But it then opined that it was “difficult, if not impossible, to decipher whether each expenditure was personal, business related, or partially business-related.” Without any further explanation, the court then held that Blanche
was “awarded judgment against [James] in the amount of $50,000.”
¶71 It’s entirely unclear to us what the basis for this $50,000
award was. So far as we can tell, the court seems to have concluded that Blanche had already received some prior distributions from marital assets and that she should now receive $50,000 more. But there’s no explanation for how the court arrived at this particular amount, what the amount was linked to, or why it would be listed alongside an analysis of “Marital Debts.” Without any such explanation, we vacate this award.
¶72 We agree with James’s assertion that the challenged findings were not legally adequate and that these inadequacies impaired both his ability to challenge the court’s various rulings and our ability to review them. We accordingly vacate the above rulings and remand the case with instructions for the court to enter more detailed findings and then alter any of its rulings as may be necessary.
 Because the parties share the same last name, we’ll follow our normal practice and refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
 In this Background, we’ll recount the main findings regarding each ruling at issue on appeal, but in some instances, additional relevant findings will be discussed in the Analysis below.
 With respect to some (though not all) of the dollar amounts included in the rulings at issue, the court added “.00” signifiers. For readability, those have been omitted throughout this opinion.
 As noted above, the court had previously entered a bifurcated divorce decree while the trial on the parties’ assets and the like was still ongoing.
 As evidenced by the passages quoted above, there’s something of a disconnect in how we’ve referred to this kind of argument in past cases. In some cases, we’ve described it as an argument about the “legal adequacy” of the district court’s findings, see, e.g., Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 20, 427 P.3d 1221, but in others, we’ve described it as an argument about the “legal sufficiency” of the findings, see, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161, ¶ 5, 353 P.3d 1262. For consistency’s sake, it might be better if bench and bar alike settled on a single usage. And on reflection, we suggest that such an argument should be described in adequacy terms.
The reason for this is to reduce the potential for confusing this kind of argument with the similar sounding but substantively distinct “sufficiency of the evidence” argument. At the risk of over-simplification: a sufficiency of the evidence argument asserts that there was insufficient evidentiary support for a particular factual finding. As detailed more fully below, however, the argument at issue here—a challenge to the adequacy of the findings—asserts that the court’s findings did not adequately explain the basis for the court’s rulings, thereby impairing our ability to review those rulings (for sufficiency of the evidence or anything else).
Two notes are warranted at the outset—one about our usage patterns regarding the rulings at issue, and one about a threshold argument made by Blanche.
First, as discussed above, there are two decisions that largely drive the various arguments in this case: the Ruling and the Supplemental Decree. The Ruling was issued by Judge Davis, who heard the trial evidence, while the Supplemental Decree was issued by Judge Lunnen, who was assigned to the case after the Ruling was issued. At one of the hearings in the intervening period, Judge Lunnen responded to a party’s argument by stating that “[t]he findings, they’re set in stone. So all this is . . . a result of the findings.” As noted, however, Judge Lunnen did alter a few of the Ruling’s legal determinations in the Supplemental Decree. In consequence of how this all played out, the Supplemental Decree recites many of the findings that were issued in the Ruling, though not with the same level of detail. It instead essentially incorporates the bulk of the Ruling by implicit reference. For this reason, the parties’ arguments on appeal have largely focused on whether the findings from the Ruling were adequate, and we’ll follow suit. To avoid redundancy, we won’t repeatedly mention whether we think the findings from the Supplemental Decree were likewise inadequate (even if they were reiterated in the Supplemental Decree); instead, we’ll discuss the Supplemental Decree only in those instances where it differs in some meaningful way from the Ruling (usually because of an altered legal determination).
Second, in her opening brief, Blanche argues that James did “not comply with Utah’s marshaling requirement” in his briefing on appeal. But the marshaling requirement applies when a party “seeks to prevail in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a factual finding or a verdict on appeal.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 40, 326 P.3d 645; see also State v. Wall, 2020 UT App 36, ¶ 53, 460 P.3d 1058; Wilson v. Sanders, 2019 UT App 126, ¶ 17, 447 P.3d 1240. As noted, however, James is not arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support any particular finding. Rather, James is arguing that the findings were inadequate to explain the court’s various rulings. As we’ve explained, an argument about the adequacy of the findings presents a legal question. Because of this, “marshaling is not required.” Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ¶ 8 n.3, 203 P.3d 1020; see also Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477–78 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. . . . Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court’s findings as framed.”).
 While a topic at oral argument, neither party raised on appeal the issue of whether the district court could appropriately rely on Zillow for its valuation of the property, as opposed to evidence submitted at trial. For this reason, we do not address the issue here.
 It seems possible (if not probable) that this offset was intended to reflect a determination that the parties received $80,000 in equity when they sold the property for $270,000 while still owing $190,000 on it. But if this was the determination, (1) the court didn’t say so, and (2) it also didn’t explain the basis for initially deviating upward by $2,000 to arrive at $42,000, nor did it explain the basis for subsequently deviating downward by $2,000 to arrive at $38,000.
Whether my recollection is true or not, I remember being taught in law school that tithing and other regular charitable giving cannot be treated as a personal expense deduction in bankruptcy. It appears that is no longer true (if ever it was). I was taught as a divorce lawyer by people who should have known better that tithing or regular charitable giving could not be considered a personal expense when analyzing need and ability to pay in the context of the alimony award. I don’t know if that was ever true, but I know it’s not true now. In the Utah Court of Appeals decision in the case of Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, 509 P.3d 265, the trial court refused to include tithing expenditures as part of the alimony calculation because it was “not a necessary living expense.” The Utah Court of Appeals reversed that decision, explaining that it “ignored the requirement that [trial courts] assess the expense based on how the parties chose to spend and allocatetheir money while married.” the Utah Court of Appeals decision in the case of Mintz v. Mintz – 2023 UT App 17, at ¶24 , the Utah Court of Appeals opined that “the marital standard of living analysis is not merely a question about what the parties spent their money on or whether they spent it at all. Rather, in terms of alimony, the marital standard of living analysis is about whether the parties’ proposed points of calculation are consistent with the parties’ manner of living and financial decisions (i.e., the historical allocation of their resources). Something may contribute to the marital standard of living even though it may not result in a direct benefit or detriment to the marital estate’s net worth.”
CANDI WADSWORTH, Appellant, v. GUY L. WADSWORTH, Appellee.
Opinion No. 20190106-CA No. 20200430-CA Filed January 13, 2022
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Su Chon
Michael D. Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Julie J. Nelson, Attorneys for Appellant
Clark W. Sessions, T. Mickell Jimenez, Marcy G. Glenn, and Kristina R. Van Bockern, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEYconcurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1This appeal arises from the divorce and division of the marital estate belonging to H. Candi Wadsworth and Guy L. Wadsworth. Candi1 challenges various aspects of the district court’s marital property valuation, its decision to defer the payment of her share of the marital estate, its award of alimony, and various other findings and orders. Guy cross-appeals, raising challenges relating to terms of the deferred payment and the alimony award. In a separate appeal, Candi also challenges the district court’s decision not to grant her a security interest in her portion of the marital estate, which she will not receive in full until December 31, 2024. Because that issue is intertwined with various issues raised in the first appeal, we address both appeals in this consolidated opinion.
¶2We remand for the district court to add certain notes receivable to the value of the marital estate, to adjust its alimony award to account for Candi’s tax burden, to clarify its decision on whether security is required for the alimony award, and to grant Candi a security interest in her portion of the marital estate. We otherwise affirm the district court’s decision.
¶3Candi and Guy married in 1979. Guy started Wadsworth Brothers Construction (WBC) in 1991, and over the years, it grew into a multimillion-dollar company. The parties also have interests in numerous other business entities, including two restaurants, a hotel, and various real estate holdings.
¶4In 2009, Candi filed for divorce, suspecting that Guy was involved in an extramarital affair. Guy denied the infidelity, and the couple reconciled. However, a year later, Guy confessed to an affair, and Candi again filed for divorce.
Pre-Divorce Proceedings and Temporary Orders
¶5During the period between these two divorce filings, Guy purchased two restaurants, a plane, a cabin, and a yacht. He did not discuss any of these purchases with Candi, and she learned about them from other people. The yacht cost $2,502,800, but by the time of trial, the yacht was under water—Guy still owed $1,175,399, but the yacht was worth only $790,500.
¶6Without consulting Candi, Guy also assigned fractional shares of various marital entities to the Wadsworth Children’s 2007 Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) in 2009. Although the parties had created the Trust two years before, they had originally funded it with only $10. By the time of trial in 2017, the fractional shares held by the Trust were worth approximately $4 million.
¶7While the divorce was pending, Guy maintained control of the marital estate, apart from $1 million and two interest-generating accounts that he transferred to Candi early in the proceedings. In February 2012, the district court adopted the parties’ stipulation regarding temporary orders (the Stipulation) stating that, on a temporary basis, Guy “shall pay all of the children’s expenses as he has in the past as well as all of [Candi’s] expenses as he has in the past.” Because Guy was paying these expenses, he was not ordered to pay temporary child support or alimony at that time. The Stipulation also addressed the use of marital assets during the pendency of the divorce proceedings:
Based upon the parties’ stipulation, [Guy] shall maintain, in the regular course of business, the management and control of [WBC], as he has in the past.
Based upon the parties’ stipulation, neither party shall sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete or dispose of marital assets other than in the course of their normal living expenditures, ordinary and necessary business expenses and to pay divorce attorneys and expert fees and costs. [Guy] shall have the right to conduct the business hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets.
¶8During the divorce proceedings, Candi asked the court to hold Guy in contempt based on alleged violations of the Stipulation. She asserted that he made numerous financial transactions that violated the Stipulation, including selling his home, buying a new home, selling a hotel, creating a new business entity and loaning it money, investing money in a property development company (FDFM), purchasing a jet to “flip,” and making an “undisclosed sale” of $697,448.72. The court accepted Guy’s and his estate planning attorney’s testimonies that “Guy had a history of setting up different corporate entities for liability protection purposes” and that he “did not create any entity or transfer any asset with the intention of hiding it from Candi.” The court found that “the transactions Candi complains of were consistent with Guy’s historical practice of transferring assets from one entity to another or from one form into another” and that those actions fell within the Stipulation’s condition permitting Guy “to conduct the business hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets.” The court also found that “[t]here is no indication that these transactions were out of the ordinary or done with the intent to hide assets.”
¶9In September 2014, Guy sought to modify the Stipulation, explaining that the parties’ last child had reached majority, that he had paid off the mortgage on Candi’s house, and that he had purchased Candi a new vehicle, thereby eliminating many of her expenses. Guy asked the court to modify its order to require him to pay Candi $20,000 per month rather than all her expenses without limit. Following a hearing in January 2015, the court ordered that Guy pay Candi $20,000 per month in temporary alimony. It also ordered that Candi “keep an accounting of how the money is spent if she desires more funds.” During the first month following the order, Candi exceeded the $20,000 budget and “she had to repay Guy for amounts she had previously spent as well as cancel planned travel with the children.” In April 2015, the court issued a written order in which it clarified that Guy should “reimburse” Candi “as to any payments beyond the $20,000” unless he could show it was “an inappropriate or excessive expense.” Candi never requested additional funds from Guy after the court issued the written April 2015 order. She claims this was because she elected to curtail her spending rather than ask Guy for extra money; she maintains that she did not believe he would comply with her requests and she did not want to incur more attorney fees to collect the money. During this period, Guy was spending approximately $60,000 per month.
¶10 Guy represented that Candi continued to have access to the parties’ boats and planes, a cabin, free dining at the restaurants, and a country club and other exclusive resorts for which Guy continued to pay the membership fees. However, to use the planes and boats, Guy expected Candi to pay for the cost of the pilot, captain, and other expenses out of her $20,000 monthly funds. Candi did not do so because she understood the cost to be between $5,000 and $10,000 per trip. Candi also alleged that Guy refused a number of requests she made to use the parties’ shared assets.
Procedural History of the Divorce
¶11 The parties spent more than six years conducting discovery and other pretrial litigation before the matter finally came before the district court for an eight-day bench trial in February 2017. The court held a second four-day trial in May 2017 concerning Candi’s attempt to revoke the Trust. See infra ¶ 25.
¶12 The court issued a Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in September 2017 (the 2017 Findings). Subsequently, Candi filed a Motion to Clarify, and both parties also filed Motions to Amend. The court issued an order addressing those motions in May 2018 (the May 2018 Order). In response to that order, both parties filed additional Motions to Amend, which the district court ruled on in a Memorandum Decision and Order in October 2018 (the October 2018 Order). The court then directed Guy to prepare supplemental findings of fact to incorporate the various rulings encapsulated in the May 2018 Order and the October 2018 Order.
¶13 Following the October 2018 Order, Guy filed an Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Entry of Decree of Divorce. Guy pointed out that new federal tax law would change how alimony was taxed for any divorce decrees entered on or after January 1, 2019. Instead of alimony being taxable to the payee spouse and deductible to the payor spouse, alimony would become taxable to the payor and deductible to the payee. Since the trial had occurred and the 2017 Findings had been entered over a year before, “predicated on the application of the existing divorce laws,” Guy asserted that it would be inequitable to enter the divorce decree after December 31, 2018. Although the court indicated that it believed “both parties are to blame” for the delays in finalizing the decree, it ultimately did enter Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 2018 Supplemental Findings), as well as the Decree of Divorce, on December 31, 2018.
¶14 The parties then filed a third set of cross-motions to amend the findings and conclusions, and the court held a hearing on those motions in early 2019. The court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order in May 2019, which it subsequently amended in June 2019 (the 2019 Order). The court directed Candi to prepare corrected Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce. The court entered the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 2019 Supplemental Findings) and the Amended Decree of Divorce on October 30, 2019.
Expert Valuation of Marital Property
¶15 Both parties hired experts to value the various business entities. Three aspects of that valuation and the district court’s findings are relevant on appeal: notes receivable, WBC’s backlog, and WBC’s equipment.
¶16The balance sheets for three of the entities owned by Guy included in their accounting of liabilities loans that they owed to Guy—Immobiliare II, Ltd. owed Guy $252,861; Five Diamond Hospitality, Inc. owed Guy $706,605; and FDFM owed Guy $100,000. These liabilities were considered in the court’s final calculation of these entities’ value. However, the notes receivable on these loans—which belonged to Guy—were not counted as marital assets.
¶17The court made no mention of the notes receivable in its 2017 Findings. Candi raised this matter in her Motion to Clarify. Candi asked the court to add the value of the notes receivable to the value of the estate. In response, Guy did not assert that the notes had been included but nevertheless resisted their inclusion as part of the marital estate, arguing that Candi had not made the “request at trial and did not enter evidence of where the funds remain and in which entities or whether the funds are being used for business purposes.” The court found that “[t]he parties agree that the Court did not consider the three notes receivable” but observed that “[n]either party points to the record regarding this issue.” The court did not adjust its valuation of the estate based on the notes.
¶18Subsequently, Candi filed her second motion to amend, in which she again raised the matter of the notes receivable, among other things. In the October 2018 Order, the court found that Candi “does not show that those notes were not considered in the company valuations” and that it had “already addressed her argument” in the previous order. Guy was then asked to prepare supplemental findings based on the court’s order, and that version of the findings stated that “all Notes Receivable were included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the parties’ experts.”
¶19 As of June 30, 2016, WBC had a backlog of work— construction contracts that had been signed but for which the work had yet to be completed—amounting to an estimated value of approximately $75 million. Guy testified that WBC’s profit margin on such projects was typically between 5% and 7%. Candi’s expert estimated the projected net profit on the backlog to be $3,441,733. Guy’s expert estimated that the projects would realize a gross profit of $4,676,347, but he also opined that the backlog ultimately had “no value” because “the backlog in its current state” was not sufficient to sustain the company and could therefore be expected to start “absorb[ing] cash flow.” Guy also testified that WBC had struggled to make a profit since the recession and had to lay off workers and use capital to continue operating. He testified that WBC had failed to get some large contracts it was hoping for and that its backlog was less than in past years. Another witness, who advises large companies on marketing and selling their businesses, testified that “marketability” and “valuation methodologies” are “all centered around current backlog.” He explained that “in a construction company, they’re only as good as the backlog in front of them.”
¶20 The court found that “the value of the projected backlog profit is $4 million.” However, the court adopted Guy’s expert’s valuation of WBC, which had assigned the backlog no independent value. The parties addressed the inconsistency in their motions to amend. Candi asked the court to adjust the overall valuation of WBC upward by $4 million to reflect its finding that the backlog profit was worth $4 million. Guy asked the court to change its finding that the backlog was worth $4 million to conform to its adoption of his expert’s valuation of the company, which assigned the backlog no value. In its May 2018 Order, the court found that Guy’s expert had “testified the backlog had no value to a potential buyer, and the Court adopted his valuation of WBC.” It also found that the other witness had testified that “any potential purchaser would not purchase the company based on a backlog.” Finally, it found that “Candi did not provide counter-testimony to” the “statements of no value in the backlog.” Accordingly, it concluded that “[t]he evidence supports that the backlog has no value in the valuation of the company” and amended its decision to state that “the backlog has no value.” These amended findings were incorporated into the 2018 Supplemental Findings.
¶21 Both parties hired experts to assess the value of WBC’s equipment. Guy’s expert had worked in the construction industry for twenty-five years and had been an appraiser for Ritchie Brothers Auctioneers for four years. To value the equipment, the expert used “internal standards that [Ritchie Brothers] has developed over time and experience” based on “historical auctions, personal experiences of appraisers, and knowledge of the world’s economic conditions.” Guy’s expert testified that Ritchie Brothers’ “business is derived primarily from stable operators exchanging equipment and updating equipment inventories in the normal course of business,” rather than wholesalers trying to resell and make additional profit, and that “80 percent of [their] sales . . . represent fair market value.” Guy’s expert and his team “personally inspected nearly all the pieces of equipment at issue”; “[t]hey turned on the machines, checked the miles and hours and verified the [vehicle identification numbers].” They appraised 569 items and estimated that “the entire package of equipment . . . would sell at unreserved public auction in the range of $13,890,300.”
¶22 Candi’s expert is a member of the American Society of Appraisers and is an Accredited Senior Appraiser. He conducts appraisals based on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). He testified that “he evaluated the equipment at the fair market value of a ‘going concern’ business” and that he believed using “auction values” was more appropriate for a business that was trying to liquidate its inventory. Candi’s expert received a list of approximately 400 pieces of equipment with the make, model, description, and serial number. He “did not closely inspect each piece of equipment,” “did not start any of the equipment, did not look at the mileage or hours logged, and did not consider the condition of each piece.” He “took photos of the equipment and researched the values by contacting manufacturers, contractors, and dealers; consulting other sales [online]; and considering his prior appraisals and experience.” Ultimately, Candi’s expert valued the equipment at $22,499,255.
¶23 The court found that the method used by Guy’s expert was “more accurate” and that his team was “more thorough in assessing the individual pieces of equipment.” The court rejected Candi’s assertion that selling equipment at “an auction house has the same connotation as a fire sale,” relying on the expert’s testimony that end users regularly buy heavy construction equipment at auction. It therefore adopted Guy’s expert’s $13,890,300 valuation of the equipment.
¶24Candi argued to the district court that Guy had dissipated marital assets in anticipation of divorce, including spending money on his girlfriend; purchasing the yacht, a jet, and a wine collection; paying attorney fees for the Trust; and transferring money out of the estate into the Trust. Except as to $814,000 Guy spent on his girlfriend, for which it compensated Candi out of the marital estate, the court found that “Guy did not dissipate marital assets.” Although the court found that the legal fees spent on the Trust were not dissipation, it nevertheless allocated half of that value to Candi as part of the marital estate. As to the purchase of the yacht, jet, and wine, the court reasoned that Guy did not dissipate assets by purchasing these items because the items were still in the marital estate, and Candi was awarded half their value. The court also found that “[i]t was Guy’s historical practice to buy planes and boats” and that “[s]ome depreciation of” such assets “is to be expected.” The court rejected Candi’s argument that purchasing a depreciating asset should, as a rule, be considered dissipation. However, the court assigned the negative value on the yacht entirely to Guy, reasoning that he “unilaterally purchased this boat” and limited Candi’s access.
¶25 The parties engaged in extensive litigation regarding the Trust, even going through a separate trial to address the validity of the transfers and to consider Candi’s attempt to revoke the Trust. However, the court ultimately determined that “the Trust was validly created,” that the parties intended for it to be irrevocable, that the creation and funding of the Trust was “in line with the parties’ history of gifting assets to the children as part of their wealth management and estate planning strategy,” that “there is no evidence that Guy was motivated by a desire to divest Candi of marital assets,” and that the transfers were completed before Candi filed for divorce so that the Trust property was not part of the marital estate or subject to division. Accordingly, the court rejected Candi’s argument that Guy’s transfer of assets into the Trust constituted dissipation.
¶26Candi also took issue with Guy’s investment in FDFM, an entity “created to develop land in [North] Dakota when the oil rush was booming.” Although Guy’s interest in FDFM by the time of trial was worth only $734,000, he had invested $1,129,000 into it. Candi asserted that the higher value should be used because Guy did not disclose the investment to her. The district court rejected this argument, explaining that Guy “never consulted with Candi on any business decisions that he made” throughout the marriage, so making business decisions without disclosing them to her was “well within the scope of his historical practices.”
¶27 Candi also complained that Guy had used marital funds to pay his attorney fees and that his spending on fees had not been credited to the marital estate. In examining the funds each party had already received, the court recognized that Candi had received $1,277,500 in marital funds to pay her attorney and expert fees and costs. The court also estimated, based on Guy’s testimony, that Guy had spent approximately $800,000 in attorney and expert fees and costs. The court equalized these amounts in calculating the value of the marital estate.
Division of the Estate and Equalization Payment
¶28The district court found that the total value of the marital estate was $43,886,329.85 and that each party should receive half of that value ($21,943,164.93). The court awarded Candi various liquid assets, real property, vehicles, retirement plans, investments, and other property totaling just over $4.7 million. It awarded the remainder of the marital property, including all interest in the parties’ various businesses, to Guy and ordered Guy to pay Candi $17,238,018.02 to compensate her for the value of her portion of the estate. The court explained that “because of the overlapping entities and the numerous assets placed in various entities, it would be more appropriate to award Candi a sum of money constituting her share of the marital estate.” The court found that “shared ownership of the companies” was not an option because “Candi does not have the business acumen necessary to know how to run these companies” and that it would be “a bad idea” for the parties to continue their relationship by operating the companies together, “especially given Candi’s distrust of Guy.” It also found that “[a] forced sale of marital business assets is not in the best interest of either party” because both parties benefit from “Guy’s continued work for WBC and other businesses.”
¶29Although Candi had argued to the district court that she should be given ownership of the two restaurants to help offset the portion of the estate owed to her, the court rejected that request because it found that “her limited business experience would not help her in increasing the value of the business.” In its May 2018 Order, the court further explained its refusal to award the restaurants to Candi by observing that the restaurants had only just begun to be profitable due to Guy’s careful management and that the restaurants were partially owned by a third party.
¶30 In the initial 2017 Findings, the court did not outline a method for Candi to receive her share of the marital estate. Candi proposed several options, including appointing a special master to oversee the distribution, transferring some of the assets to her directly, sharing ownership of the companies, or forcing a sale of some of the assets. The court rejected each of these proposals. Instead, in the 2018 Supplemental Findings, the court ordered Guy to pay the amount owed to Candi “in such equal monthly installments as he shall determine.” Any remaining amount was to be paid in a balloon payment five years from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which made the final payment to Candi due December 31, 2023. The court also ordered that Guy pay 10% annual interest on the amount owed to Candi. Although Guy contested the high interest rate, the court justified it because the court had given him “substantial leeway in setting the payment schedule over the next five years.” Because Guy would have “exclusive and full access to the marital assets,” the court reasoned that the high interest rate would give him a necessary incentive to make the payments more quickly.
¶31 In subsequent motions, the parties continued to dispute the court’s equalization order. Thus, in its 2019 Supplemental Findings, the court again modified the payment schedule. Guy was to pay Candi (1) $30,000 per month, to be applied first toward interest; (2) $500,000 per year, to be applied first toward interest; and (3) a balloon payment of the outstanding principal and interest by December 31, 2024.2 The court also modified the interest rate to 5% per year. The court explained that the 10% interest rate “was appropriate” when the court had “deferred to Guy to come up with an appropriate payment plan” but that it was excessive once the court “determined the payment plan.” Instead, the court set the interest rate at 5% and explained that rate was intended “to provide Guy with an incentive to pay the Equalizing Balance quickly.”
¶32 After the court issued its ruling, Candi filed a motion asking the court to secure her unpaid share of the marital estate. She explained that security was necessary to “protect her from dissipation, economic uncertainties, or Guy’s death.” She also asked for an injunction ordering Guy “not to alienate, waste, dissipate, or diminish his share, ownership interest, or the value of the entities” without “Candi’s express, prior, written permission.” Candi proposed several methods for securing her interest, including attaching a UCC-1 lien to the assets of WBC or other marital entities or imposing other “conditions and covenants” on Guy and WBC. But she also explained that “there are a lot of different ways” to give her an effective security interest, including placing a lien on the restaurants, WBC’s equipment, or Guy’s interest in the businesses.
¶33 The court refused to grant Candi any security, reasoning that it could not award a lien against the businesses because “[t]he businesses were not parties to this suit,” that the equalization payments were not subject to the Uniform Commercial Code because the division of the marital estate is not a commercial transaction, and that Guy was unable to obtain adequate life insurance to secure her interest due to his age and health. The court did not provide any further rationale for its determination that no security was warranted or explain why other options for securing Candi’s unpaid interest in the marital estate, such as a lien on Guy’s personal interest in the businesses, could not be employed.
¶34 In its 2017 Findings, the district court found that Candi testified “she had more than $20,000 in reasonable monthly expenses.” However, the court found that Candi “could not testify as to specific details” and “did not prepare a financial declaration.” Nevertheless, the court examined standard financial declaration items, Guy’s financial declaration, a standard of living analysis of the parties’ pre-separation spending prepared by one of Candi’s experts, and Guy’s record of the expenses he paid on Candi’s behalf while the divorce was pending to reach a determination regarding Candi’s monthly need. The court included numerous categories of expenses in its needs calculation and determined Candi’s reasonable monthly expenses to be $27,693.90. However, the court did not include taxes in its assessment of Candi’s needs, because Candi “failed to provide evidence of her tax liability at trial.” The court imputed minimum wage income to Candi at $1,257 per month. The court subtracted the imputed income from Candi’s reasonable monthly expenses to determine that her monthly need is $26,436.90.
¶35 The court found that Guy had a net income of $141,143 per month and reasonable monthly expenses of $50,138. Accordingly, it found that Guy easily had the ability to pay alimony in the amount of $26,436.90 per month to Candi. It ordered Guy to pay that amount of alimony for a length of time equal to the length of the marriage, effective as of the date of the 2017 Findings. Alimony was to terminate upon “the death of either party” or “remarriage or cohabitation by” Candi. The court also indicated that “Guy should provide a life insurance policy for Candi to cover alimony for a period of time sufficient to cover his obligation should he unexpectedly pass away.”
¶36 While the parties’ various motions were pending following the entry of the 2017 Findings, Guy represented that he was unable to get life insurance due to a health condition and asked the court to remove that requirement. The court denied Guy’s request and found in the May 2018 Order,
Although there was information regarding Guy’s health, there was no information whether or not he could or could not obtain a life insurance policy. The Court wants to ensure that Candi will receive the money awarded should he pass unexpectedly. The parties may also work toward a mutually agreeable solution that will protect Candi and her ability to receive said money.
However, the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy, stated simply that “there was no information as to whether or not Guy could or could not obtain a life insurance policy for such purpose nor the cost thereof.” Candi urged the court to be more specific by making its life insurance order mandatory and requiring Guy to provide an alternative means of security if he could not get life insurance. However, the court declined to do so, stating that “[t]he Court’s ruling in the [May 2018 Order] is sufficient.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶37 On appeal, Candi argues (1) that the operative dates of the Decree of Divorce should be adjusted or, alternatively, that the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023; (2) that she received unequal access to the marital estate while the divorce was pending and should be compensated for the inequality; (3) that the court erred in its valuation of the marital estate, namely, by failing to take into account the value of the notes receivable, undervaluing WBC’s backlog and equipment, and not crediting the estate for Guy’s alleged dissipation of assets; (4) that the court erred in setting the terms of the marital estate division and refusing to grant her a security; (5) that the court should have included her tax burden in its calculation of her need for alimony purposes and required Guy to secure his alimony obligation with life insurance or by some other means; and (6) that the court exceeded its discretion by not holding Guy in contempt for violating the Stipulation.
¶38 For his part, Guy argues, on cross-appeal, (1) that the court set too high an interest rate on the balloon payment, (2) that the court should have required Candi to share in transaction costs that may be incurred if and when Guy liquidates assets to make the balloon payment, and (3) that the court should not have awarded any alimony to Candi at all.
¶39The court’s valuation of the marital property, the manner in which it distributed that property, and its alimony determination are all subject to the same standard of review. “In divorce actions, a district court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation simplified). “We can properly find abuse [of the district court’s discretion] only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [district] court.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).
Accordingly, we will reverse only if (1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the factual findings upon which the award was based are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party challenging the award shows that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).
¶40The court’s decision whether to hold Guy in contempt is also entitled to deference. “The decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion.” Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 13 (quotation simplified).
¶41 Candi first argues that the court should make the entire divorce decree effective on October 30, 2019, rather than December 31, 2018, since that was the date the court entered the final Amended Decree of Divorce. Alternatively, she asserts that the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023, consistent with the terms of the initial Decree of Divorce. However, Candi has not presented us with any substantive arguments in support of this contention. Her argument is essentially that it was unfair to put the Decree of Divorce into effect before the tax laws changed and yet delay the equalization payments until after the Amended Decree of Divorce was entered because both results “favored Guy.” But the fact that a ruling favors one party or the other does not, by itself, make that ruling an abuse of the court’s discretion. In fact, we cannot see any meaningful link between these two rulings—one concerns the effective date of the entire Decree, whereas one concerns the commencement of the payment plan.
¶42 Moreover, the district court had good reason for both decisions. As Guy pointed out in his Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Entry of Decree of Divorce, “[t]he trial of this matter, and the evidence submitted at trial and considered by the Court, were all predicated on the application of the existing divorce laws.” Thus, entering the Decree of Divorce after the first of the year would have, no doubt, spurred even more objections and additional hearings regarding alimony. Entering the Decree before the law changed was consistent with the parties’ expectations throughout the divorce proceedings.
¶43 With respect to the equalization payments, the court’s 2019 Supplemental Findings were drastically different from its 2018 Supplemental Findings. The 2018 Supplemental Findings left the equalization payment schedule in Guy’s hands, whereas the 2019 Supplemental Findings required him to pay a specified monthly amount. Leaving the effective date for those payments on December 31, 2023, as outlined in the 2018 Supplemental Findings, would have required Guy to come up with the entire first year’s payments all at once, as he was not required to make monthly or yearly payments under the 2018 Supplemental Findings. The court found it appropriate for the equalization payments to commence at the same time it issued its 2019 Supplemental Findings because it could not “determine who has delayed the payment plan” and it “believe[d] that both parties share the responsibility for the delay in this matter.” Candi has not demonstrated that this was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
Access to Marital Estate
¶44 Candi next asserts that the district court should have compensated her for “inequities [that] resulted from Guy’s use of the marital estate” while the divorce was pending. Candi raises three arguments concerning the allegedly unequal access to the marital estate: (1) that Guy was ordered to pay her only $20,000 per month in temporary alimony while he continued to spend around $60,000 per month, (2) that she did not have equal access to the parties’ tangible assets and funds while the divorce was pending, and (3) that Guy spent more on attorney fees out of the marital estate than the $800,000 found by the district court.
¶45 First, Candi contends that it was unfair for the district court to grant her only $20,000 in temporary alimony while Guy had an income of more than $141,000 per month and was spending over $60,000 per month.
¶46 “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d 276; accord Brown v. Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 23, 476 P.3d 554. “For this reason, it is improper to allow one spouse access to marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the same access.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126.
¶47But this principle does not require that the parties account for every dollar spent out of the marital funds and reimburse one another for any disparity. Rather, it requires that each party have equal access to use marital funds and assets “to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is pending.” Id. For this reason, Dahl and Brown are distinguishable from the case at hand. In Dahl, the district court had ordered the wife to repay $162,000 she had received from the husband to pay for her living expenses while the divorce was pending without requiring the husband to repay the marital funds he spent during that time. Id. ¶ 125. The supreme court held that this was an abuse of discretion because it “had the effect of allowing one spouse to use marital funds to pay for living expenses during the pendency of the divorce, while denying such use to the other spouse.” Id. ¶ 129. In Brown, the district court ordered the husband to pay for the wife’s “expenses insofar as they exceeded the income she earned plus amounts [he] advanced while the divorce was pending.” Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 24. This court found that order to be appropriate because it gave the wife “the benefit of the marital estate to help cover [her] living expenses . . . up until the divorce decree was entered.” Id. ¶¶ 27– 28.
¶48Here, the district court ordered Guy to “reimburse” Candi for reasonable monthly expenses “beyond $20,000” unless they were “inappropriate or excessive.” And although Candi indicated that she voluntarily curtailed her spending to avoid fighting for reimbursement, she did not present any evidence that she incurred expenses in excess of the $20,000 Guy provided each month. Since the court ordered Guy to pay for reasonable expenses beyond $20,000, it established a mechanism for Candi to have continued access to the marital estate to pay for her living expenses. The fact that Candi found it too burdensome to request additional funds and was skeptical about Guy honoring her request does not mean she lacked meaningful access to the marital estate.3 And the fact that Guy spent more each month than Candi does not, by itself, indicate that Candi lacked equal access to marital funds while the divorce was pending. Access is not the same as use. And we are aware of no principle requiring that district courts equalize the parties’ use of marital assets during the pendency of a divorce as opposed to reimbursing a party for expenses they incurred as a result of unequal access.
¶49 Our analysis of Candi’s challenge to the unequal use of the parties’ tangible assets is similar to our analysis of her unequal use of funds: she has not demonstrated that she had unequal access to the assets, as opposed to unequal use. It was certainly easier for Guy to use the assets, since they were in his control. And it is undisputed that Guy told Candi she would have to pay the expensive costs associated with using the planes and boats. However, Candi never attempted to use the yacht or plane due to her concerns regarding the expense. Had she done so, she could have requested that Guy reimburse her for these costs in accordance with the court’s temporary alimony award. Since Guy was using the marital assets to pay for the costs of the yacht and plane in addition to meeting his monthly needs, such a request would not have been “inappropriate or excessive.” It is unfortunate that Candi was deterred from taking advantage of this option by the conditions Guy placed on the use of these assets. However, since she did not actually incur the expenses or seek reimbursement for extra expenses from Guy, Candi does not persuade us that the district court should have ordered an increase in her alimony or awarded her more of the maritalestate under Dahl or Brown to make up for the disparity in access to the tangible assets. C.Attorney Fees
¶50 Candi next contends that the district court improperly assessed the attorney fees Guy paid out of the marital estate at only $800,000. This number was taken from Guy’s testimony at trial that he had paid between $700,000 and $800,000 in attorney fees at that point. Candi argues that this estimate was made before Guy paid for the twelve days of trial and post-trial litigation and that “[t]he court should have ordered Guy to disclose all his attorney fees and attributed the full amount to his side.”
¶51 However, although the Decree of Divorce did not go into effect until the end of 2018, the court valued the parties’ marital estate based on the information before it at trial in 2017. Because this was the “snapshot in time,” see Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 24, 440 P.3d 757, on which the valuation of the marital estate was based, spending that occurred after that date could not have reduced the overall value of the estate. This means that any funds Guy expended on attorney fees following trial were necessarily post-division expenses. Even assuming that Guy spent more than $800,000 on attorney fees in total— which he likely did, given that the $800,000 accounted only for what he had incurred as of trial—that does not necessarily mean that he paid for those fees out of the marital estate as it existed at the time of trial. He was obligated to pay Candi her share of the estate’s value calculated based on the value proven at trial, regardless of any later spending.
III. Valuation of the Marital Estate ¶52 Candi argues that the district court made several errors in assessing the overall value of the marital estate. Specifically, she asserts that it failed to account for the value of the notes receivable and that it used the wrong method to assess the value of WBC’s backlog and equipment. She also asserts that Guy dissipated assets and that the estate should have been credited for the dissipation.
¶53 The account ledgers for three of the parties’ entities included line items for loans owed to Guy, totaling $1,059,466. The district court deducted these amounts from the value of those entities in calculating the overall value of the marital estate. However, the notes receivable, owed to Guy, were not counted as an asset of the marital estate. When Candi brought the matter to the court’s attention, it found that “[t]he parties agree that the Court did not consider the three notes receivable” but rejected Candi’s argument on the ground that “[n]either party points to the record regarding this issue.” However, when the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy, addressed the matter, the court’s finding evolved to “all Notes Receivable were included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the parties’ experts.”
¶54 Candi asserts that the court’s findings are clearly erroneous and that the court therefore erred in refusing to include the notes receivable in the valuation of the marital estate. We agree with Candi that the trial evidence memorializing the accounts payable to Guy constituted record evidence of Guy’s notes receivable with respect to those entities. Thus, the court erred in finding that Candi had not “point[ed] to the record regarding this issue.” Moreover, its finding in the 2018 Supplemental Findings that “all Notes Receivable were included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the parties’ experts” is not supported by the evidence.4 We are aware of nothing in the record indicating that any experts added the notes receivable to the valuation of the marital estate.
¶55It was unreasonable for the court to include the accounts payable in its calculation of the other entities’ liabilities without also crediting the notes receivable to Guy as an asset. The only evidence before the court concerning the notes receivable is that contained in the owing entities’ ledgers—that Guy was entitled to receive the funds. Thus, it is necessary for the district court to adjust the value of the marital estate to include the $1,059,466 owing to Guy from the other entities.
¶56Candi next asserts that the district court erred in assessing the value of WBC’s backlog. She asserts that because WBC is a “viable business,” the court should have recognized that it “has future work lined up and future work yet to come.” Specifically, Candi takes issue with two of the court’s findings relating to the backlog: (1) that “Candi did not provide counter-testimony to” Guy’s witnesses’ “statements of no value in the backlog” and (2) that one of Guy’s witness had “testified that any potential purchaser would not purchase the company based on a backlog.”
¶57Candi points to the testimony of her own expert that the backlog would generate a net profit of $3,441,733. She further argues that Guy’s expert’s assertion that the profit would be
eaten up with administrative costs and capital expenditures relies on a misguided “assumption that WBC would obtain no new work.”5 She points out that such an assumption was faulty, as “WBC had only one negative year in the . . . five-and-a-half years” prior to trial.
¶58But Guy’s expert’s opinion that the backlog lacked value did not rely on the assumption that WBC would never get new work, as Candi asserts. Rather, it was based on his assessment that the backlog was not large enough to keep up with administrative expenses the company would need to incur, such as equipment costs, salaries, insurance, etc. Guy’s expert explained that in assessing the value of the backlog, he examined “the general and administrative expenses in the current environment that both a buyer and seller would look at when they’re examining whether or not this backlog has any value.” Based on this examination, he concluded that “the backlog in its current state would start to absorb cash flow from a negative performance during the next eleven months”—in other words, although WBC could expect to earn a gross profit from the backlog, it would have to dip into that profit to make up for its negative cash flow and would therefore not earn a net profit. This concept was further addressed by Guy in his testimony, where he explained that although WBC had a backlog, at the time of the evaluation it did not have as many contracts as it needed, had to lay off workers, and had to rely on capital to continue operating.
¶59 While Candi’s expert testified that the backlog would generate a net profit of $3,441,733, he did not address the details about anticipated administrative costs or the state of the industry that Guy and his expert addressed in their testimonies, and this seems to be the absent “counter-testimony” to which the court was referring in its finding. Indeed, the court was clearly aware of and considered Candi’s expert’s testimony and valuation, as it included that information in its findings. But it nevertheless concluded that “Candi presented no other evidence or expert testimony in that industry regarding the backlog.” Thus, the court’s finding was not in error. And in any event, it was the court’s prerogative to credit the testimony of Guy’s expert over the testimony of Candi’s expert. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 837 (“It is within the province of the trial court, as the finder of fact, to resolve issues of credibility.”); see also Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 994 (“Courts are not bound to accept the testimony of an expert and are free to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility and its persuasive influence in light of all of the other evidence in the case.” (quotation simplified)).
¶60 As to the court’s finding regarding Guy’s witness’s testimony about a potential buyer, while that finding could have been more precise—the witness actually testified that a buyer cares only about a “sustainable backlog” and that a buyer would rely on “the backlog in front” of the company rather than its historic backlog—the imprecision ultimately does not convince us that the court relied on an erroneous assumption. The witness did not testify specifically regarding WBC’s backlog, and his actual statement ultimately supports the district court’s finding regarding the value of the backlog. If the court applied the principle stated by the witness—that only the backlog in front of WBC was relevant—to the testimony it relied on that the backlog would not generate a net profit, the testimony was not inconsistent with the court’s finding that the backlog lacked value.
¶61Ultimately, it was within the court’s discretion to accord each party’s expert testimony the weight it deemed proper. And the testimonial evidence presented by Guy and his expert and witness supports the court’s conclusion that the backlog lacked value. Even assuming that WBC was a viable company that would continue to generate contracts, the evidence supported a determination that its current contracts were not sufficient for the company to expect to generate a net profit.
¶62 Next, Candi challenges the district court’s valuation of WBC’s equipment. Her argument rests primarily on her assertion that the court erroneously used “liquidation value” to calculate the value of the equipment rather than valuing WBC as a “going concern.”6
¶63First, we agree with Guy that Utah law does not support Candi’s contention that the court was required to evaluate WBC as a going concern. In fact, our case law is clear that courts have broad discretion in determining the proper method for calculating the value of marital property. See DeAvila v. DeAvila, 2017 UT App 146, ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 184 (“District courts generally have considerable discretion concerning property distribution and valuation in a divorce proceeding and their determinations enjoy a presumption of validity.” (quotation simplified)); cf. Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 19, 985 P.2d 255 (“[T]rial courts have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate method of assessing a spouse’s income and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”). Moreover, courts may even reject all valuation methods presented by experts and elect to simply split the difference between multiple appraisals. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278–79 (Utah 1987) (upholding a court’s decision to fix the value of a marital home by splitting the difference between the values presented by two experts); Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 12–13, 169 P.3d 754 (upholding a district court’s decision to average the value of stock on nine different relevant dates to reach the fair value of stock in the marital estate); Barber v. Barber, No. 961783-CA, 1998 WL 1758305, at *1 & n.1 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1998) (holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it valuated a business by averaging four appraisals provided by expert witnesses).
¶64 Generally, we will uphold a district court’s valuation of marital assets as long as the value is “within the range of values established by all the testimony,” and as long as the court’s findings are “sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 691–92 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quotation simplified); see also Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a court’s election not to apply a marketability discount to the value of stock in a closely held corporation, despite several experts recommending that such a discount be applied, because the value the court found was “within the range of values established by all the testimony”).7
¶65 Thus, even assuming that Guy’s expert’s valuation was “liquidation value,” it would have been within the court’s discretion to use that valuation, which was “within the range of values established by all the testimony,” so long as the court adequately supported its decision with factual findings explaining its decision. See Morgan, 795 P.2d at 691–92. Here, not only did the court support its determination with detailed factual findings, but those factual findings make clear that it considered the auction value to represent the fair market value of the equipment, not the liquidation value.
¶66In accepting Guy’s expert’s valuation over that of Candi’s expert, the court explained that Guy’s expert was more thorough because he examined each individual piece of equipment and took into account its condition, mileage, and hours. Additionally, the court found it relevant that 80% of Ritchie Brothers’ “sales are directly to end users” and credited the expert’s testimony that their appraisal was based on fair market value, specifically rejecting Candi’s assertion that auction value was equivalent to the value in a “fire sale.” The court also pointed out that even Candi’s expert had used some sales data from auction houses to assess values. Based on this evidence, the court found that “[t]here is no indication that [Guy’s expert’s] evaluation does not reflect the actual marketplace price the parties could expect to receive upon sale” and adopted the $13,890,300 value provided by Guy’s expert. We will not disturb the court’s well-supported decision on this issue.8
¶67Candi next contends that “Guy dissipated assets at a time he understood that divorce was likely” and that the district court should have included the value of additional allegedly dissipated assets—over and above the money Guy spent on his girlfriend, which the court considered dissipation and accounted for as such—in its valuation of the marital estate.
¶68 “Where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some time other than the time the decree is entered . . . .” Goggin v.Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified). In other words, “when a court finds that a spouse has dissipated marital assets, the court should calculate the value of the marital property as though the assets remained” and give “the other spouse . . . a credit for his or her share of the assets that were dissipated.” Id.
¶69 A number of factors may be relevant to this inquiry, including
(1) how the money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses; (2) the parties’ historical practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4) the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and divorce; and (5) any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets.
Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 33, 440 P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). Candi’s dissipation argument concerns three transactions: (1) Guy’s purchase of the yacht, (2) Guy’s investment in FDFM, and (3) Guy’s transfer of assets into the Trust.
¶70 Candi first argues that the district court erred in concluding that the purchase of the yacht was not dissipation. Candi asserts that although the yacht itself remained in the estate, its rapid depreciation meant that it was “cash going out the door for no benefit.” She also argues that because Guy used the yacht and she did not, any benefit from the use of the yacht was individual to Guy rather than to the marital estate.
¶71Candi acknowledges that Utah law has not held that the purchase of a depreciating asset constitutes dissipation. But she nevertheless urges us to adopt such a rule, relying on case law from Illinois. However, even if we were inclined to find these cases persuasive, most of them appear to be distinguishable from the case at hand. For example, in In re Marriage of Thomas, 608 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court held that the devaluation of the parties’ business constituted dissipation not simply because it had decreased in value but because the husband had directly undermined the business through “inattention” and “his failure to solicit additional clients or through his outright stealing of clients for his new business.” Id. at 587. In In re Marriage of Schneeweis, 2016 IL App (2d) 140147, 55 N.E.3d 1280, the court upheld a finding of dissipation where the husband had begun making “secretive, risky and progressively more destructive” financial decisions that were “inconsistent with the parties’ prior practices.” Id. ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in In re Marriage of Block, 441 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), where the husband had purchased a racing boat that was financially under water, the court held that it could be considered “a debt in dissipation” but clarified that “there would be no net effect on the marital estate” if “the value of the boat is approximately the same as the amount of indebtedness.” Id. at 1288–89.9
¶72Here, the court found that the purchase of the yacht was consistent with “Guy’s historical practice” of buying “planes and boats” and that there was no evidence “that Guy caused excessive diminution in value.” Additionally, the court assigned to Guy all responsibility for the outstanding debt on the yacht, so any “debt in dissipation” caused by the yacht’s purchase was resolved, see id. at 1288. While the yacht was used primarily by Guy, he did make it available to Candi, and he never transferred it out of the marital estate. We agree with Guy that the depreciated value of the yacht, alone, does not mandate a finding of dissipation, particularly where its purchase was consistent with purchases made during the marriage and there is no indication that Guy’s actions contributed to the depreciation.10
North Dakota Investment
¶73 Candi next claims that the district court should have valued FDFM based on the $1,129,000 Guy invested in it rather than its $734,000 value at the time of trial. She asserts that “had Guy not unilaterally made that poor investment, more money would have remained in the estate.” According to Candi, because Guy did not consult her regarding the investment, he “acted obstructively” and should therefore be held accountable for the diminished value of the asset. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).
¶76 While we agree with Candi that the court could have compensated her for the marital assets put into the Trust had it found dissipation, we do not agree that the court exceeded its discretion in finding that the transfers did not constitute dissipation. The court found that the transfers did not amount to dissipation because Candi had participated in creating the Trust, even though it had not initially been funded; transferring assets to their children was consistent with the parties’ practices during the marriage, beginning as early as 1993; and Candi had deferred to Guy to “run the parties’ finances and estate” throughout the marriage. The court found “no evidence that Guy attempted to withhold information or cut Candi out from the estate planning process.” And while the timing of the transfers could provide circumstantial evidence of dissipation, the parties’ historical practices and the lack of additional evidence suggesting obstructive intent on Guy’s part support the court’s determination that the transfers were not dissipation.
Division of the Estate and Equalization Payments
¶77 The parties raise various challenges to the district court’s division of the estate and its order regarding the equalization payments. First, Candi asserts that the court erred by not awarding her a greater share of the marital estate directly. Second, she argues that the court erred by refusing to grant her security to help ensure that she actually receives her unpaid share of the estate. Third, both parties challenge the 5% interest rate set by the district court. Finally, Guy argues that the court should have ordered Candi to share in any transaction costs that may be incurred should he be required to liquidate assets to make the equalization payment.
¶78 Candi argues that the district court abused its discretion by—at least temporarily—awarding Guy the bulk of the estate and giving him five years to pay Candi her share. She argues that instead, the court should have done one or more of the following: (1) ordered Guy to pay Candi her share immediately;
awarded her a greater share of cash and retirement accounts;
awarded her the restaurants; (4) ordered Guy to liquidate investments, yachts, planes or spare equipment to pay Candi more cash up front; or (5) ordered larger annual payments in implementing the equalization payment schedule.
¶79 “When the district court assigns a value to an item of marital property, the court must equitably distribute it with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her separate life.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 440 P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). In situations where the marital estate consists primarily of a single large asset, such as a business or stock, a common acceptable approach for the court to take is to award the asset to one party and make a cash award to the other party. See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 56, 379 P.3d 890; Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984). This avoids the necessity for the parties “to be in a close economic relationship which has every potential for further contention, friction, and litigation.” Argyle, 688 P.2d at 471 (quotation simplified).
¶80 In fashioning this type of marital property division, “a court has the ability to make equitable provisions for deferred compensation”—the keyword being “equitable.” Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 60. One way to assess the equitability of the provisions is to examine whether the award affords one party “significantly more latitude to go forward with his [or her] separate life” than the other. Id. ¶ 61 (quotation simplified). It is also relevant whether the party required to pay the deferred compensation will be able to use the property to their unfair advantage at the expense of the person to whom the compensation is owed. Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
¶81 We agree with Guy that the specific division scheme selected by the district court—Guy receiving, on a temporary basis, a larger share of the estate, but with the obligation to make equalization payments to Candi—is not inequitable, so long as adequate security for the unpaid equalization payments is included. See infra Part IV.B. While the court may have been within its discretion to employ one or more of the other methods recommended by Candi, its numerous factual findings support its ultimate determination, and the deferred payment provisions, coupled with security, are sufficiently equitable to fall within its discretion.11
¶82Candi asserts that the court’s distribution of marital assets and its use of the equalization payment plan impermissibly gives Guy disproportionate access to the estate. She compares the facts of this case to those in Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 P.3d 890, in which this court determined that a deferred payment plan that gave the husband discretion to dictate the amount of monthly installments over ten years at a 2.13% interest rate was not equitable. See id. ¶¶ 59–60. Candi argues that just like in Taft, “the overall dynamics of the court’s award more readily allow [Guy], with his immediate ability to use and enjoy the property awarded to him[,] . . . significantly more latitude to go forward with his separate life than [Candi] is afforded.” See id. ¶ 61 (quotation simplified).
¶83But Taft is distinguishable from the case at hand. First, the husband in Taft was permitted to decide the amount of the monthly payments to his ex-wife over the course of ten years between the time of the divorce decree and the time the balloon payment was due. See id. ¶ 59. His discretion was so absolute that the court observed he “could conceivably make . . . equal monthly payments of $1 for nine years and eleven months before making the final balloon payment . . . , thereby forcing [his wife] to wait ten years before realizing any real benefit from her property award.” Id. Here, on the other hand, the district court set the terms of the payment plan, ultimately requiring Guy to pay Candi $30,000 per month plus an additional $500,000 per year. Although the court certainly could have ordered Guy to pay more, we are not convinced that the amount ordered was so inequitable as to fall outside the bounds of the court’s discretion. Unlike the wife in Taft, Candi will not have to wait until the balloon payment is due to realize any benefit from her property award. Rather, she will receive $860,000 each year in addition to the $4.7 million she has already received. While this leaves Guy in control of a substantial portion of Candi’s property, she is at least able to benefit from her property award in the meantime.
¶84Second, the interest applied to the property distribution in Taft was only 2.13%, an amount this court observed “provides very little incentive for [the husband] to substantially pay it prior to the expiration of the ten-year period, much less for him to pay [the wife] sizeable monthly installments.” Id. ¶ 60. In fact, the low interest rate “would almost certainly allow [the husband] to invest [the wife’s] money elsewhere and reap the benefit of any additional increment of interest—a benefit that in fairness should accrue to [the wife].” Id. In this case, on the other hand, the district court applied a 5% interest rate, which it acknowledged was higher than the statutory postjudgment interest rate, to incentivize Guy to pay Candi sooner. See supra ¶ 31; see also infra Part IV.C. By setting interest at a rate calculated to discourage any delays in paying Candi, the court avoided the type of inequitable deferred payment plan at issue in Taft.
¶85 We acknowledge that granting Guy a five-year period in which to continue using the bulk of Candi’s property award to grow his business does afford him a benefit that may, to some degree, come at Candi’s expense. But we are convinced that it is not inequitable in light of the entire landscape of the marital estate and property division. First, the size of the parties’ estate and the fact that the bulk of it is wrapped up in WBC means that gathering the liquid funds to pay Candi’s property award is not something that can be accomplished overnight, at least not without substantially decreasing the overall value of the marital estate. Thus, it was reasonable for the court to allow Guy some period of time to gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. Second, this time period may allow Guy to keep his larger businesses intact and find other ways to pay Candi. Keeping the businesses intact will ultimately benefit both parties, as it will allow Guy to maintain his income and continue paying alimony to Candi. Finally, we take Guy’s point that he may incur substantial transaction costs if he ultimately does need to liquidate assets to pay Candi. See infra Part IV.D. Thus, it seems to us that the hypothetical benefit Guy may incur by using Candi’s share of the property to increase the value of the estate will be offset by the hypothetical detriment he could incur if he has to liquidate the assets. Since the court did not order Candi to share in any of these transaction costs, the court’s decision to give Guy the use of Candi’s portion of the property during the five-year forbearance period does not strike us as inequitable, at least so long as adequate security is afforded to Candi.12
¶86 And this brings us to Candi’s next argument: that the district court abused its discretion by imposing this specific deferred-payment arrangement without requiring Guy to provide adequate security. Candi asserts that the court’s arrangement put her in the position—involuntarily—of an unsecured creditor and posits that no lender would agree to make a $15 million loan without some sort of security interest. Without any type of security, Candi argues, she stands to lose her ability to collect her share of the marital estate in the event Guy passes away before the balloon payment is due or he moves his assets into irrevocable trusts. We agree with Candi and emphasize that the district court’s chosen arrangement passes discretionary muster only if it comes accompanied by an adequate security mechanism.
¶87The court’s only justification for declining to grant Candi any type of security was its determination that it could not award a lien against the businesses, that the Uniform Commercial Code did not apply, and that life insurance was not an option due to Guy’s health. But the court did not explain why these limitations prevented it from granting Candi any type of security. Candi’s request was broad: she asserted that “there needs to be some kind of order or security or lien or whatever form it takes . . . that will ensure that those former marital assets are there at the time that . . . the balloon payment needs to be made.” “So all we’re asking for is some kind of order to ensure that there’s going to be payment down the road.”
¶88 Guy maintains that no security is necessary because he has shown himself to be reliable in making payments and does not have a history of hiding assets. But we agree with Candi that, regardless of Guy’s history, character, or intentions, she should not be required to rely solely on Guy’s continued health and goodwill to ensure her ability to collect what she is owed. Whether Candi’s mistrust of Guy is warranted or not, it was unreasonable for the court not to grant her any type of security in her half of the marital estate.
¶89 Moreover, Candi has even greater cause for concern in light of Guy’s age and poor health. In fact, Guy expressed concern that he might pass away before the divorce decree was finalized and relied on that possibility to argue that the divorce action should be bifurcated. Should Guy pass away before the balloon payment is due, Candi would no longer have even the benefit of Guy’s goodwill. Instead, she would have to further litigate with his heirs (including her own children) to fight for her share of the marital estate. It is hard to reconcile why the district court considered this to be an adequate legal remedy. Candi should not have to take her chances as an unsecured creditor should Guy pass away before she can receive her share of the marital estate. No reasonable creditor would agree to a forbearance on such terms, and it was therefore inequitable to impose such terms on Candi.
¶90Accordingly, we remand this case for the court to fashion an equitable security interest that will adequately protect Candi’s ability to collect her remaining share of the marital estate at the end of the five-year forbearance period.
¶91 Both Guy and Candi take issue with the 5% interest rate the district court imposed on the equalization payments. Guy asserts that the interest rate should have been set at the statutory postjudgment interest rate, which was 4.58% at the time the court entered the 2019 Supplemental Findings. Candi argues that the court should have imposed the 10% interest rate originally set in its 2018 Supplemental Findings. We reject both parties’ arguments and affirm the district court’s imposition of the 5% interest rate.
¶92 Guy asserts that the court was bound by the postjudgment interest rate established by section 15-1-4 of the Utah Code, which provides that “final civil . . . judgments of the district court . . . shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.” Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). Section 15-1-4 does apply to orders in a divorce case “in relation to the children, property and parties.” See Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984) (current version at id. (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (stating that the district court “may include in the decree of divorce equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties”))). However, section 15-1-4 provides the “minimum interest allowable.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute “does not preclude a District Court, under [section 30-3-5] from imposing an interest rate of more than [the statutory postjudgment rate] where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and equitable.” Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 754 (Utah 1978)). And, in fact, setting equalization payments at the postjudgment interest rate, rather than a higher rate, may be an abuse of discretion if doing so is inequitable under the circumstances. See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶¶ 56, 60, 379 P.3d 890 (finding a 2.13% interest rate, which was the rate provided by Utah Code section 15-1-4 at the time, to be insufficient where the husband was granted discretion to determine the amount of payments over the course of ten years because it incentivized the husband to invest the wife’s money elsewhere rather than paying her sooner). Thus, we find no merit to Guy’s contention that the court was bound to apply the default postjudgment interest rate to the equalization payments.
¶93 Candi argues that an interest rate higher than the 5% ordered by the court is necessary to “compensate Candi for her unwilling forbearance to Guy and incentivize Guy to pay quicker.” She argues that 10% is an appropriate interest rate because it is consistent with the Utah Code’s default interest rate for a “forbearance of any money, goods, or services.” Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). However, Candi has not provided us with any authority suggesting that the court was required to impose this specific interest rate.
¶94 The court’s decision to impose the 5% interest rate was reasoned and supported by sufficient factual findings. The court explained that it had considered the 10% interest rate to be “appropriate” when the court had “deferred to Guy to come up with an appropriate payment plan.” The court opined that had Guy been permitted to set the payment schedule, as the husband in Taft was, the 10% interest rate would have been needed to avoid giving Guy “an incentive to invest the money and reap the return instead of paying off” Candi. The court explained that once it set the payment plan, rather than leaving it to Guy’s discretion, it did not believe the 10% interest would be valid under Taft. Nevertheless, it also explained that the interest rate was not a postjudgment rate because the deferred payment was more akin to a forbearance, and it still wanted to give Guy “an incentive to pay the Equalizing Balance quickly.”
¶95 Our case law is clear that as with other aspects of property division, equitability is the standard for evaluating the appropriateness of an interest rate set by the district court for deferred payments in a divorce. See Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶ 25, 169 P.3d 765 (“The overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable . . . .” (quotation simplified)). We are not convinced that the 5% interest rate fell outside the reasonable range of equitable interest rates the court could have selected. Moreover, the court clearly explained its reasoning. Thus, we will not disturb the 5% interest rate the court set.
¶96 Finally, Guy asserts that the district court should have required Candi to share in any transaction costs that he may incur in the event he needs to liquidate assets to pay off Candi’s share of the marital estate. He points out that taxes and other transaction costs associated with liquidating the businesses or any other large assets could be significant and that if the court does not require Candi to pay her portion of those transaction costs, it could substantially eat into his portion of the marital estate.
¶97 We do not disagree with Guy that if he is forced to liquidate assets, doing so may result in significant taxes and transaction costs to him. But it is by no means certain that such costs will be incurred. We do not generally expect courts to “speculate about hypothetical future [tax] consequences.” See Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987) (refusing to reduce the value of a “stock-price-tied profit-sharing plan to account for tax liability” because the imposition of taxes was not certain); see also Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 173 (holding that the district court was not required to consider potential tax obligations associated with a retirement account because the tax consequences were “speculative” and assumed “massive withdrawals” from the account); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213–14 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the district court “did not err in refusing to adjust property distribution because of . . . theoretical [tax] consequences” of selling a second home). The valuation of marital property “is necessarily a snapshot in time,” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 24, 440 P.3d 757, and such a moment does not consider “the myriad situations in which the value of [the parties’] property might be positively or negatively affected in the future,” Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 7.
¶98Moreover, excessive transaction costs were the very thing the equalization payments were intended to prevent. The court acknowledged that forcing the parties to immediately liquidate assets would significantly cut into the pie that would be available to divide between both parties. That is why the court awarded the bulk of the estate to Guy and gave him five years to pay Candi her portion. The court gave him unfettered discretion to determine how to gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. In doing so, it gave Guy free rein over the bulk of Candi’s share of the estate, which he may use to continue building his businesses and wealth over the next five years. The benefit he may derive from using Candi’s share of the estate may very well amount to much more than the interest Candi will receive at the 5% rate, which is all she will have access to until the balloon payment is due, yet she will not share in that benefit any more than she will share in any transaction costs Guy may incur.13 See supra ¶ 85. The entire principal of Candi’s portion will remain in Guy’s control until he makes the balloon payment at the end of 2024.
Furthermore, because the assets are in Guy’s control, Candi will have no role in deciding how to liquidate the assets or which transaction costs to incur.14
¶99 Given the speculative nature of the potential taxes and transaction costs, as well as the full discretion Guy was given to determine whether and how to liquidate assets, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court not to order that Candi share in those costs.
¶100 The next set of challenges the parties raise concerns the district court’s award of alimony to Candi. Guy asserts that the court exceeded its discretion in awarding any alimony whatsoever. Candi, on the other hand, asserts that the court should have increased the alimony award to account for her tax burden. She also argues that the court should have required Guy to either obtain life insurance or provide some other security to ensure that she would receive her alimony payments if he were to pass away.
¶101 Guy argues that the district court should not have awarded alimony to Candi because (1) she did not provide the court with sufficient evidence from which it could calculate her monthly needs and (2) Candi’s property settlement was sufficient to allow her to support herself. In support of both arguments, Guy primarily relies on our supreme court’s holding in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276. But Dahl neither automatically requires a court to deny a request for alimony in the absence of documentation nor prevents the court from awarding alimony to a spouse who receives a large property settlement.
¶102 With respect to documentation of need, the Dahl court held only that the district court “acted within its discretion in denying” the wife’s alimony request when she failed to provide evidence supporting her claimed need, not that the district court was required to deny her request. Id. ¶ 117. In fact, the court explicitly acknowledged that “the district court could have . . . imputed a figure to determine [the wife’s] financial need based either on [the husband’s] records of the parties’ predivorce expenses or a reasonable estimate of [the wife’s] needs.” Id. ¶ 116 (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have previously considered and rejected the “assertion that failure to file financial documentation automatically precludes an award of alimony.” Munoz-Madrid v. Carlos-Moran, 2018 UT App 95, ¶¶ 8–9, 427 P.3d 420. “[A]lthough [Candi’s] expenses may have been difficult to discern because she failed to provide supporting documentation . . . , there was not a complete lack of evidence to support their existence.” See id. ¶ 10. Indeed, the court explained that it relied on the list of items in the standard financial declaration, Guy’s financial declaration, evidence concerning the parties’ spending during the marriage, and evidence of Candi’s expenses during the pendency of the divorce to calculate Candi’s reasonable monthly needs.
¶103 Dahl also does not stand for the proposition that alimony should never be awarded to those who receive a large property settlement. Rather, Dahl merely states that receiving “a sufficiently large property award to support a comfortable standard of living” prevented “any serious inequity” from arising due to the court’s decision not to impute the wife’s need in the face of her lack of evidence. See 2015 UT 79, ¶ 116 (quotation simplified). We acknowledge that if the payee spouse has income-producing property, the income from that property “may properly be considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by that spouse.” Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); see also Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 827 (holding that the evaluation of a payee spouse’s ability to meet his or her own needs “properly takes into account the result of the property division, particularly any income-generating property [the payee spouse] is awarded”); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that courts should distribute property before fashioning an alimony award, so they can take into account income generated from property interests). Nevertheless, the court in this case did not abuse its discretion by awarding alimony despite Candi’s large property settlement.
¶104 Although Candi was entitled to receive a large settlement eventually, Guy continued to control the bulk of the parties’ marital estate and would do so for the next five years. The court noted this in its determination regarding alimony, observing that “alimony was needed” because “Guy was unable to pay Candi the full value of the marital estate at this time.” The court refused to take into account income Candi may derive from her portion of the marital assets in the future because that analysis was “too speculative for the Court to consider.”15 However, it observed that “at such time as . . . Candi . . . receives income or other assets from her share of the marital estate, or from other sources, the Court will evaluate the amount, if any, by which those amounts may reduce her unmet financial needs and thereby reduce or eliminate Guy’s alimony obligation.” Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Candi alimony, and any income she derives from the property settlement may be considered when she actually has control of that property.
¶105 On the other hand, Candi argues that the district court should have included her tax liability on alimony in its calculation of her needs. In calculating both a payor spouse’s ability to pay and a payee spouse’s needs, courts are generally expected to consider the person’s tax liability. See McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 14, 265 P.3d 839; Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 17–18, 169 P.3d 754. In particular, it is plain error for a court to consider the tax consequences for one party in assessing their income and expenses but not for the other party. Vanderzon v. Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶¶ 45, 58, 402 P.3d 219.
¶106 In its findings, the court used Guy’s net income to assess his ability to pay alimony. However, because Candi did not present evidence of her tax burden on any alimony award, the court did not consider her tax burden in assessing her need. We acknowledge that the court’s ability to estimate Candi’s taxes was hampered by Candi’s failure to provide evidence of her anticipated tax liability. Nevertheless, it is certain that she will incur some tax burden, particularly in light of the fact that she will be taxed on any alimony payments she receives.16 And we agree with Candi that it was inequitable for the court to consider Guy’s tax burden when calculating his ability to pay without considering Candi’s tax burden in assessing her needs. Thus, we remand the court’s alimony award for the limited purpose of having the court make findings as to Candi’s projected tax burden and adjust the alimony award accordingly.
¶107 Next, Candi asserts that the district court should require Guy to either obtain life insurance or provide a substitute for life insurance to secure his alimony payments. She points out that the court initially stated in its 2017 Findings that “Guy should provide a life insurance policy for Candi to cover alimony for a period of time sufficient to cover his obligation should he unexpectedly pass away.” Although the court initially rejected Guy’s argument that he should be required only to “use his best efforts to obtain life insurance,” the court ultimately adopted Guy’s proposed language in its 2018 Supplemental Findings stating that “there was no information as to whether or not Guy could or could not obtain a life insurance policy for such purpose nor the cost thereof.” Candi asked the court to reconsider that finding and make the life insurance requirement mandatory. However, the court rejected that request and stated that its finding in the May 2018 Order was “sufficient.” But while that finding indicated the court’s intent “to ensure that Candi will receive the money awarded should [Guy] pass unexpectedly,” it did not definitively decide the issue of whether Guy was required to obtain life insurance to secure his alimony obligation or if he was able to demonstrate an inability to comply with the court’s direction. We are left wondering whether the court did, or did not, order Guy to obtain life insurance and are unable to ascertain the answer to this question from the court’s rulings. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the district court to clarify its order.17
¶108 Finally, Candi argues that the district court erred in declining to hold Guy in contempt for violating the Stipulation, which the parties reached early on in the proceedings, that they would not “sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete or dispose of marital assets” but that Guy could continue to manage WBC and conduct business “as he has in the past, which may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets.” “As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). In a civil contempt proceeding, these elements must be proven “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
¶109 Candi asserts that the Stipulation’s language allowed Guy to engage in business transactions only insofar as those transactions related to WBC. She argues that the “business hereinabove identified” language in the Stipulation is limited to “the management and control of” WBC and that the court therefore misread the Stipulation by not holding Guy in contempt for any transactions that were not directly related to WBC. But as Guy observes, the Stipulation also allowed the parties to engage in transactions “in the course of their normal living expenditures, ordinary and necessary business expenses and to pay divorce attorneys and expert fees and costs.”
¶110 “We interpret language in judicial documents in the same way we interpret contract language,” that is, “we look to the language of the [document] to determine its meaning.” Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 24, 464 P.3d 541 (quotation simplified). We consider Guy’s reading of the Stipulation to be more consistent with the plain language of that document. The provision giving Guy “the right to conduct the business hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets,” properly refers to both the operation of WBC and normal living and business expenses.
¶111 Moreover, because contempt requires that the party knew what was required and intentionally refused to comply, see Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172, “for a violation of an order to justify sanctions, the order must be sufficiently specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning,” Cook, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). Even were we inclined to agree with Candi’s more limited interpretation, we could not say that the language is so clearly limited to WBC that there could be “no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning.” See id. (quotation simplified).
¶112 The Stipulation allowed Guy to continue conducting normal transactions as he had in the past, and the district court found that “the transactions Candi complains of were consistent with Guy’s historical practice of transferring assets from one entity to another or from one form into another” and that there was “no indication that [they] . . . were out of the ordinary.” Candi does not challenge this finding. Thus, we conclude that the court did not exceed its discretion in declining to find Guy in contempt.
¶113 We conclude that the district court erred in failing to credit the value of the notes receivable to the marital estate. We also conclude that it erred in refusing to grant Candi a security interest to protect her right to receive her unpaid share of the marital estate. However, we affirm the district court’s property valuation and distribution in all other respects.
¶114 As to the alimony award, we conclude that the district court erred in failing to account for Candi’s tax obligation in its calculation of her need and remand for clarification of whether the court intended to order Guy to obtain security on Candi’s alimony award. We affirm the alimony award in all other respects.
¶115 We also affirm the remaining orders and findings challenged on appeal, including the operative date of the Decree of Divorce, the equalization payment schedule, the court’s finding that Guy did not dissipate marital assets apart from the money he spent on his girlfriend, and its decision not to hold him in contempt.
¶116 Consistent with our discussion in this opinion, we remand to the district court to adjust the marital property valuation, to make findings regarding Candi’s tax liability and adjust the alimony award, to clarify whether Guy is must obtain security on Candi’s alimony award, and to enter orders necessary to adequately secure Candi’s interest in her unpaid share of the marital estate.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Law from a legal assistant’s point of view, week 18: Financial Declarations and Initial Disclosures
By Quinton Lister, legal assistant
My minimal exposure to the legal profession as a legal assistant to a divorce attorney has given me the opportunity to learn about financial declarations and initial disclosures. These forms are necessary for any party going through the process of litigation for a divorce, and they are straightforward as to what they require.
The financial declaration is a statement of income, expenses, debts, assets, and financial accounts for each party to a divorce action.
One’s initial disclosures form identifies people with information relevant to the case, the potential witnesses, and documents and other physical evidence a party asserts supports his/her case.
Completing the financial declaration and initial disclosures forms completely and correctly, along with gathering all the necessary supporting documentation, is a time-consuming process. With rare exception, divorce litigants do not want to prepare these forms. I know this because anyone I have tried to help through this process always fails to complete the forms and/or complains about the work that needs to be done on these forms. I get it, but what the clients often don’t seem to get is that your financial declaration and initial disclosures are not optional. Court rule require both you and your spouse to fill them out, fill them out correctly, and fill them out fully. Failing to do so can result in the court penalizing you and/or making erroneous rulings based upon incorrect and/or incomplete forms.
I am not a lawyer and thus cannot give any legal advice, but as someone who has taken part in the process of helping clients prepare their financial declarations and initial disclosures, I can see that preparing these forms completely, accurately, and on time greatly benefits you and your lawyer, saving you both time and frustration, as well as sparing you grief, on the back end.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
BRUCE RAY MCFARLAND, Appellant and Cross-appellee, v. NICOLE S. MCFARLAND, Appellee and Cross-appellant.
No. 20190541-CA Filed June 4, 2021
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable David J. Williams
Jacob K. Cowdin and A. Douglas Anderson, Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-appellee
Angilee K. Dakic and Ryan C. Gregerson Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-appellant
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
¶1Bruce Ray McFarland (Bruce) and Nicole S. McFarland (Nicole)1 divorced in 2009 pursuant to a stipulated divorce decree, but soon thereafter began to ignore many of the decree’s important provisions. However, neither party brought any matter to the attention of the district court for some eight years, until Bruce filed a petition to modify in 2017, and Nicole followed up with a request that the court hold Bruce in contempt. Both parties now appeal the court’s ruling on those requests and, for the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND The Divorce Decree
¶2In 2008, after almost sixteen years of marriage, Bruce and Nicole separated, and Bruce filed a petition for divorce. Soon thereafter, the parties negotiated a resolution to the divorce proceedings, and filed papers memorializing their agreement. In February 2009, the court entered a decree of divorce (the Decree) that incorporated the parties’ stipulated agreement. With regard to alimony and the house in which they lived while they were married (the Home), the parties’ agreement was straightforward: Bruce was ordered to pay $1,700 per month in alimony to Nicole, beginning in November 2008 and continuing until Nicole “remarries, cohabits, dies, for a term equal to their marriage, or further order of the Court,” and Nicole was awarded the Home, including the obligation to make the mortgage payments.
¶3But the parties’ agreement regarding custody and child support was unusual. Bruce was to have overnight custody of the parties’ four children every week from Sunday evening until Friday morning, with the parties each enjoying weekend overnight custody on an alternating basis. During the modification proceedings at issue here, Nicole acknowledged that the arrangement entitled her to fewer than 30% of the overnights; indeed, the district court found that this arrangement resulted in Bruce having “24 overnights per month with the children,” leaving Nicole with just six, and neither party takes issue with that finding. But despite the fact that Bruce was awarded more than 70% of the overnights, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (defining “joint physical custody” as any arrangement in which “the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year”), the parties labeled their arrangement “joint . . . physical custody,” perhaps because the arrangement contemplated that Nicole would pick the children up from school every day and care for them until eight o’clock p.m., at which point Bruce was to retrieve the children so that they could “stay with him overnight.”
¶4With regard to child support, the parties agreed to calculate the amount using the sole custody worksheet, even though they labeled their arrangement as joint custody, and agreed that Bruce—and not Nicole, notwithstanding the fact that Bruce had the lion’s share of the overnights—would be considered the “Obligor Parent” on the worksheet. Using these parameters, the parties agreed that Bruce would pay Nicole monthly child support equating to one-half of what the worksheet said Bruce would owe if he were the Obligor Parent, an amount the parties computed to be $739.73 per month at the time the Decree was entered, when all four children were still minors.2
Post-Divorce Events and Conduct
¶5Soon after the court entered the Decree, both parties began to ignore many of its provisions. For instance, Nicole made no mortgage payments on the Home. And Bruce made only one alimony payment (in January 2009) and three child support payments (in December 2008, and January and February 2009), but after that made no payments of either kind.
¶6In addition, with Nicole’s permission, Bruce moved back into the Home in April 2009. After that point, although Bruce made no payments denominated as alimony or child support, he did resume paying the mortgage on the Home, a payment that happened to be $1,728 per month, only slightly more than Bruce’s alimony obligation. When Bruce first moved back in, he and Nicole lived separately for a time, but beginning in September 2009, and lasting until April 2010, Bruce and Nicole resumed cohabiting as a couple, which included sharing familial expenses and reinitiating sexual relations. It is not a matter of dispute in this case that, during that seven-month period, the parties were cohabiting, as that term is used in relevant statutes and case law. See Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 806 (identifying the “hallmarks of cohabitation, including participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife and the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of the household” (quotation simplified)); see generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2017) (stating that alimony “terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person”).
¶7In April 2010, Nicole enlisted in the military, and left Utah for basic training. Over the next seven years, Bruce resided in the Home with the children, and provided all necessary childcare and financial support, including making the monthly mortgage payments on the Home. Nicole served two tours of duty overseas with the military, and visited the children or took them on vacation periodically while on leave. But other than these short visits, Nicole exercised no custody or parent-time, and provided no significant financial support to the children. Eventually, in 2015, Nicole remarried.
¶8For the seven years following Nicole’s enlistment, both parties seemed content with their arrangement and, even though both were materially violating the terms of the Decree, neither filed so much as a single document with the court. In particular, neither party sought to modify the terms of the Decree, and neither party sought contempt sanctions against the other.
The Post-Divorce Filings
¶9The parties’ tacit arrangement came to an end in 2017 when Bruce sought to refinance the Home. Because Nicole had been awarded the Home in the Decree, Bruce asked Nicole to deed him the Home to facilitate the refinance. Nicole refused to authorize the refinance unless Bruce paid her half the equity, asserting that she owned the Home and that any mortgage payments made by Bruce constituted “either rent or alimony payments” that he owed her. Then, in June 2017, Bruce filed a petition to modify, followed by a motion for temporary orders in February 2018, bringing three separate provisions of the Decree to the court’s attention. First, Bruce requested that alimony be terminated, dating back to 2009. Second, Bruce asked the court to modify the Decree to award him sole physical and legal custody of the two remaining minor children, and asked that he be awarded child support payments from Nicole going forward. And finally, Bruce asked the court to modify the Decree to award him the Home, alleging that he assumed the mortgage to avoid foreclosure because Nicole had “abandoned the property when she joined the military.” While the petition and motion for temporary orders were pending, Bruce completed a refinance of the Home, apparently finding a way to close the transaction without Nicole’s authorization.
¶10 Nicole responded by filing two orders to show cause, asking the court to hold Bruce in contempt in three respects:
(1) for failing to make alimony payments; (2) for failing to make child support payments; and (3) for occupying the Home and for refinancing it without her authorization. Nicole asked the court to enter judgment in her favor for alimony and child support arrears, as well as for “the amount that [Bruce] cashed out when he refinanced” the Home, and asked the court to order that she obtain immediate “use and possession” of the Home.
¶11 After a hearing, a domestic relations commissioner certified a number of issues as ripe for an evidentiary hearing before the district court, including the following: (1) whether Bruce should be held in contempt for failing to pay alimony and, if so, the amount of arrears at issue; (2) whether Bruce should be held in contempt for failing to pay child support and, if so, the amount of arrears at issue; (3) whether Bruce should be held in contempt for refinancing the Home without Nicole’s consent; and (4) whether Bruce should be held in contempt for occupying and refusing to vacate the Home. All of the issues certified by the commissioner were framed as contempt or temporary order issues; the commissioner apparently did not envision that the hearing would be a final dispositive hearing on Bruce’s petition to modify.
¶12 In anticipation of the evidentiary hearing before the district court, both parties filed papers outlining their positions. Citing section 30-3-5(10) of the then-applicable Utah Code, Bruce argued that he did not owe any alimony arrears because his obligation to pay alimony terminated in 2009 due to “the cohabitation relationship” that the two established when they moved back into the Home together. Citing Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, ¶¶ 10, 26–27, 26 n.7, 423 P.3d 1275, Nicole argued in response that, under the applicable statute as interpreted by our supreme court, a party attempting to terminate alimony for cohabitation must file a motion or petition “during [the] alleged co-habitation.”
¶13 Regarding child support, Bruce asserted that he should not be required to pay Nicole for any point after 2009, because the children had been almost entirely in his care since then. In particular, Bruce argued for the applicability of section 78B-12108 of the Utah Code, which provides that child support payments generally “follow the child,” and that changes in child support obligations can, under certain circumstances, occur “without the need to modify” the governing decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-108(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2017). Bruce’s arguments in the pretrial briefing were entirely defensive—that is, he asserted that he should not be required to make child support payments to Nicole after 2009, but at no point did he assert an entitlement to child support arrears from Nicole regarding any time period prior to the filing of his petition to modify.
The Hearing and Subsequent Ruling
¶14 At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, the court heard live testimony from Bruce, Nicole, Bruce’s father, and the parties’ adult daughter. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court took the matter under advisement, and asked the parties to submit written closing arguments in the form of post-trial briefs.
¶15 In her closing brief, Nicole attempted to rebut Bruce’s cohabitation claim with two arguments. First, Nicole asserted that the governing statute, as interpreted in Scott, required Bruce to have requested termination of alimony during the period of cohabitation. Second, Nicole argued that, even if Bruce’s request was timely, no cohabitation occurred because Bruce, the payor spouse, did not qualify as “another person” within the meaning of the governing statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2017) (stating that alimony terminates if “the former spouse is cohabitating with another person”). For his part, while he attempted to rebut all of Nicole’s claims, Bruce again made no affirmative claim to child support arrears running in his direction.
¶16A few weeks later, the court issued a written ruling. With regard to alimony, the court found Bruce in contempt for failing to make payments. First, the court concluded that the mortgage payments Bruce made were just that—mortgage payments on a house Bruce lived in—and could not be considered alimony, and it found that Bruce had not paid any alimony since 2009. Second, the court determined that, even if all of the hallmarks of cohabitation were present between September 2009 and April 2010, cohabitation had not occurred because “‘cohabitation’ does not include meeting the elements of cohabitation with the ex-spouse.” Accordingly, the court concluded that Bruce’s alimony obligation had not terminated in 2009 when the parties moved back in together, and that Bruce was in contempt for not paying alimony between 2009 and Nicole’s remarriage in 2015. Based on those findings, the court computed the alimony arrearage amount to be “$150,744.50 plus post-judgment interest,” and ordered Bruce to pay that amount.
¶17 With regard to child support, the court found that Bruce was not in contempt. The court accepted Bruce’s argument that, pursuant to section 78B-12-108 of the Utah Code, the child support obligation was to follow the children, and concluded that, pursuant to subsection (2) of that statute, which the court found applicable, Bruce was relieved of his child support obligation dating back to 2009, even though he did not file a petition to modify until 2017. In addition, the court offered its view that, even if section 78B-12-108 were inapplicable, “it would not be equitable to require” Bruce to pay child support to Nicole for time periods in which he cared for the children. On those bases, the court determined that Bruce had no obligation to pay child support to Nicole after 2009. But the court did “not find that [Nicole] was required to pay child support payments to [Bruce] after leaving for military service,” noting that, in its view, Bruce had not made any such affirmative claim, and instead had raised only defensive claims regarding any obligations he might have to Nicole.
¶18With regard to the Home, the court declined to find Bruce in contempt for not vacating the Home, refusing to quitclaim it to Nicole, or refinancing it. However, the court made no ruling on altering the Decree’s provision that originally awarded the Home to Nicole, stating simply that Bruce “shall be allowed, on a temporary basis, to remain” in the Home “until the matter is brought forth and certified” by the commissioner as ripe for an evidentiary hearing.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶19 Both parties appeal the district court’s ruling, raising two main issues for our review. First, Bruce challenges the court’s determination that his alimony obligation was not terminated by cohabitation. In advancing this argument, Bruce relies entirely on Utah’s alimony statute, and asserts that the court’s interpretation of that statute was incorrect. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2017) (stating that a payor spouse’s obligation “terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person”).3 “The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for correctness . . . .” Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified).
¶20 Next, both parties challenge the court’s child support rulings. Nicole takes issue with the court’s determination that Bruce did not owe her child support payments, pursuant to the terms of the Decree, after 2009. And Bruce asserts that the court erred by declining to order Nicole to pay child support arrears to him. Because the parties’ arguments center on interpretation and application of section 78B-12-108 of the Utah Code (Section 108), we review the district court’s decision for correctness. See Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 7.4
ANALYSIS I. Alimony
¶21We first address Bruce’s claim that his alimony obligation terminated by operation of statute when the parties cohabited in 2009 and 2010. Because Bruce’s position is directly foreclosed by our supreme court’s decision in Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, 423 P.3d 1275, we reject his challenge to the district court’s ruling.
¶22 At all relevant times during the events precipitating this appeal, Utah’s alimony statute provided that alimony obligations “to a former spouse terminate upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2017) (emphasis added).5 In Scott, our supreme court was asked to interpret the same version of this statute. See 2017 UT 66, ¶ 3. After noting the statute’s use of present tense language—“is cohabitating”—the court interpreted the statute as requiring “the paying spouse to establish that the former spouse is cohabiting at the time the paying spouse files the motion to terminate alimony.” See id. ¶¶ 23, 33. While the Scott opinion was not published until 2017, the statutory language the court was interpreting in that case had been in effect at all times relevant to this case. See supra note 5. That is, Scott did not introduce a new rule that was effective only prospectively; rather, it provided an interpretation of statutory text that had already been in effect for several years. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 56 (2015) (“[J]udicial construction of a statute ordinarily applies retroactively.”); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (stating that “the principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student” (quotation simplified)).
¶23 Under the circumstances presented in this case, any cohabitation between Bruce and Nicole ceased sometime in early 2010. But Bruce did not file his petition to modify until 2017. It is therefore undisputed that the cohabitation to which Bruce points had long since ceased by the time he filed his petition to modify. Thus, under the statute then in effect (as interpreted by Scott), that petition was filed some seven years too late. Accordingly, Bruce cannot now complain that his alimony obligation should be terminated, by operation of statute, due to the parties’ long-since-concluded cohabitation. Bruce has therefore not carried his burden of demonstrating error in the district court’s ruling that Bruce’s alimony obligation lasted until Nicole’s 2015 remarriage,6 or in the court’s rulings holding Bruce in contempt for failing to pay alimony from 2009 through 2015 and ordering him to pay past-due alimony.7
¶24 Next, we address the parties’ respective challenges to the district court’s child support rulings. As noted, Nicole takes issue with the court’s ruling that Bruce’s child support obligations to her, as set forth in the Decree, ended in 2009, and that therefore Bruce could not be held in contempt for not meeting those obligations. Building on that same ruling, Bruce takes issue with the court’s reluctance to go a step further and order Nicole to pay him child support arrearages dating to 2009. We begin our analysis by discussing some of the broad overarching principles governing modification of child support orders, including a discussion of Section 108 in particular. We then address the parties’ respective challenges, in turn, beginning with Nicole’s.
¶25In general, decrees in domestic relations cases are binding final judgments that may be modified “only under certain conditions.” Kielkowski v. Kielkowski, 2015 UT App 59, ¶ 21, 346 P.3d 690; see also Robertson v. Stevens, 2020 UT App 29, ¶¶ 6–7, 461 P.3d 323 (explaining that once “judgment is entered” in a divorce case, “the court’s power to modify the judgment is limited” (quotation simplified)). While there are several tools that can generally be used to modify final judgments, see, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), one tool that is specific to family law cases is the petition to modify, see id. R. 106(a) (stating that, in most cases, “proceedings to modify a divorce decree . . . shall be commenced by filing a petition to modify”); see also Ross v. Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶ 11, 447 P.3d 104 (“[R]ule 106 establishes a general rule . . . that any changes to divorce decrees must be brought about by the filing of a petition to modify.”). Parties in family law cases may use this tool, in accordance with applicable statutes and rules, to seek modification of various provisions of decrees, including child support provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(9)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“A parent . . . may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.”); see also id. § 30-3-5(3) (“The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of a child and the child’s support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.”); id. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) (“The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances . . . .”).
¶26 But in general, modifications to a decree’s provisions regarding child support payments may date back only to “the month following service” of the petition to modify “on the parent whose support is affected.” See id. § 78B-12-112(4); see also McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 17, 265 P.3d 839 (stating that “the statute does limit the time period during which retroactive modification is available”). That is, as concerns child support provisions, parties are generally barred from obtaining modifications that date back further than the first day of the month after the month in which the petition to modify was served on the opposing party.
¶27 One potential exception to this general rule appears in Section 108, a statutory provision entitled “Support Follows the Child.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-108 (LexisNexis 2017). That section, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use and benefit of the child and shall follow the child.
Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 78B-12-102, when physical custody changes from that assumed in the original order, the parent without physical custody of a child shall be required to pay the amount of support determined in accordance with [calculation guidelines found in other code sections] without the need to modify the order for . . . the parent who has physical custody of the child.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Section 108 contains an overarching mandate that child support payments “shall follow the child,” and provides that, under certain limited circumstances, child support obligations can change “without the need to modify” the child support provisions in the governing decree. Id.; see also Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 13, 270 P.3d 531 (stating that, under certain circumstances, Section 108 “allows redirection of child support [payments] without modification of the support order”). In this way, Section 108 constitutes an exception to the general rule that modifications to child support provisions may date back only to the month following service of the petition to modify on the opposing party: where Section 108 applies, it may allow modification of child support awards even further back in time.
¶28 But this exception comes with distinct statutory limits. Indeed, our supreme court has noted that Section 108 “contains two provisions: (1) a general statement that support shall follow the child and (2) a specific provision providing guidelines for redirection of child support to a new physical custodian.” Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 7. And the court has already foreclosed any argument that subsection (1)’s general statement—that child support “shall follow the child”—operates by itself “to redirect support payments any time anyone provides any shelter or sustenance to a child.” See id. ¶ 10. Instead, the specific requirements of subsection (2) operate to “modif[y] the general statement in subsection (1),” and those specific requirements serve as the prerequisites for entitlement to a retroactive change in child support that dates back further than the date of a duly served petition to modify. See id. ¶ 11.
¶29 Under the provisions of subsection (2), a litigant can obtain a change in a child support provision even “without the need to modify the order” itself, but only if two conditions are met: (a) there must be a change in “physical custody . . . from that assumed in the original order,” and (b) the case must not be one involving “joint physical custody.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-108(2).
¶30 Bruce asserts that Section 108 applies here, and allows him to obtain retroactive modification, dating all the way back to 2009, of the Decree’s child support provisions, even though he did not seek modification of either the custody provisions or the child support provisions until 2017. The district court agreed with Bruce’s interpretation of Section 108, and determined that Bruce was not in contempt for failure to pay Nicole child support between 2009 and 2017 because he had been caring for the children during that time and because child support should “follow the children.” (Citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-108.)
¶31Nicole challenges the court’s interpretation of Section 108. We agree with Nicole because, for two independent reasons, Section 108 is inapplicable here. First, this is not a case in which physical custody ever legally changed “from that assumed in the original order.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-108(2) (LexisNexis 2017). And second, even assuming that some sort of de facto change of parent-time occurred in 2010 when Nicole joined the military, that change did not constitute a change in physical custody under the operative definition of that term. See id. §§ 30-3-10.1(3)(a), 78B-12-102(15) (each defining “joint physical custody” for its respective chapter).
¶32In order for Section 108’s exception to apply, the situation must involve a change in “physical custody . . . from that assumed in the original order.” See id. § 78B-12-108(2). The term “physical custody,” as used in this statute, is a “legal term of art” that “involve[s] much more than actual possession and care of a child.” See Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶¶ 12, 15, 19. “A physical custodian also has a legal responsibility to provide supervision and control.” Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
¶33 Given this definition, a change in “physical custody” cannot occur without some sort of “formal legal process.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 24. In most cases, this occurs by court order following the filing of a petition to modify. See id. ¶¶ 21, 25. In other “rare circumstances,” this can occur “by statute without the need for a hearing or court order.” Id. ¶ 25. But in any event,
child support should be redirected only to those persons or entities who acquire the rights and responsibilities of the child’s new “physical custodian” under the law. Usually that will happen only after adjudication and a formal order, but in all cases it requires fulfillment of the statutory procedures and standards for a change in physical custody. The actual provision of sustenance and support is insufficient.
¶34 In this case, no one disputes that Bruce assumed all responsibility for “sustenance and support” of the children after April 2010. See id. But in this context, provision of additional sustenance and support to the children beyond that anticipated in the Decree is not enough to effectuate an actual, legal change in physical custody. See id. Bruce took no steps—at least not until 2017—to follow the “formal legal processes” typically used to effectuate an actual change of physical custody. See id. ¶ 24. And Bruce makes no argument that this case presents any “rare circumstances” in which custody can change by operation of statute, even in the absence of a petition to modify. See id.
¶35Thus, no change in “physical custody”—in an actual legal sense, as required by the “term of art” definition of the statutory phrase, see id. ¶ 12 (quotation simplified)—occurred in April 2010, or at any time prior to the filing of Bruce’s petition to modify. Because physical custody did not change, Section 108’s narrow exception to the usual retroactivity rules governing modification of child support orders does not apply here, and therefore it does not enable Bruce to seek changes to the Decree’s child support obligations dating any further back than 2017.
¶36 Moreover, even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that a change in “physical custody” could theoretically be effectuated merely by a parent’s provision of additional sustenance and support beyond that required by the governing child support order, no such change occurred on the facts of this case. We have previously stated that “[c]ustody and parent-time are conceptually distinct.” See Ross v. Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶ 14 n.3, 447 P.3d 104. By statutory definition, there are two kinds of physical custody—sole physical custody and joint physical custody—with the dividing line based on the number of overnight visits enjoyed by each parent. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10.1(3)(a), 78B-12-102(15) (both stating that “joint physical custody means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support” (quotation simplified)). Because either parent, in any given case, could be awarded sole physical custody— defined as having at least 70% of the overnights—there are three possible physical custody arrangements: (a) Parent 1 has sole custody; (b) Parent 2 has sole custody; and (c) the parents share joint custody. When a change occurs that causes one parent to obtain enough additional overnights to move from one category to another (e.g., from 25% of overnights to 35%, or from 65% to 75%), there has been a change in physical custody. See Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶¶ 16–17, 17 n.5. But when a change occurs in which one parent obtains a few additional overnights but not enough to move from one category to another, the change constitutes only a change in parent-time, and not a change in physical custody, as that term is statutorily defined. See id. ¶ 16 (noting that, in relocation cases, a parent need not file a petition to modify if scheduling changes necessitated by the proposed relocation would not change the statutory custody designation, and would change only parent-time).
¶37 In this case, the parties started out with an arrangement, under the Decree, in which Bruce had twenty-four overnights each month and Nicole had only six. Although the parties described that arrangement, in the Decree, as a joint custody arrangement, the label the parties assigned to the arrangement is inconsequential. See Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196, ¶ 29, 437 P.3d 445 (stating that the “designation of ‘joint physical custody’ or ‘sole physical custody’” used in a decree “is not as important as whether the custody arrangement [actually] exceeds the statutory threshold for joint physical custody” (quotation simplified)). And here, despite the parties’ label, their arrangement was actually a sole custody arrangement. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15). As noted, the district court made a specific (and unchallenged) finding on this point, and correctly concluded that, because the Decree awarded Nicole only “approximately 20% of the overnights,” it described a sole custody arrangement.
¶38 Thus, the more recent arrangement, following Nicole’s departure into the military, did not result in a change of custody. After Nicole left, Bruce went from about 80% of the overnights to nearly 100% of the overnights. Thus, Bruce had sole physical custody of the children under the original arrangement, and he maintained sole physical custody of the children after Nicole left. See id. In this situation, while Nicole’s departure did result in practical (if not official) changes to the parties’ division of parent-time, it did not effectuate any change in physical custody, under the statutory definition of that term.
¶39 Section 108 applies only in instances where “physical custody changes.” See id. § 78B-12-108(2). For both of the reasons just discussed, no change in physical custody occurred here, and therefore Section 108 cannot provide Bruce an escape from the usual rule that modifications to a domestic decree’s child support provisions cannot date back any further than the month following service of the petition to modify. See id. § 78B-12112(4). We therefore sustain Nicole’s challenge to the district court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes.
¶40 The district court’s ruling also included an alternative basis for declining Nicole’s request that Bruce pay child support arrearages. Specifically, the court stated as follows:
Finally, and regardless [of] whether [Section 108] applies here, it would not be equitable to require [Bruce] to pay child support arrearages to [Nicole] in this case. Even if that statute does not apply directly, subsection (1) is instructive of the legislature’s intent that child support “is for the use and benefit of the children.” . . . It would not be equitable to acknowledge that [Bruce] was the sole provider after moving back into the [Home] and especially after [Nicole] entered the military, acknowledge that [Nicole] provided very little, if any, support to the children since that time, but nonetheless require [Bruce] to pay the alleged child support arrearages requested by [Nicole].
¶41We do not necessarily disagree with the court’s sentiment (although we note that, in a big-picture sense at least, there are equities on the other side of the equation too: we can see wisdom in a bright-line rule requiring parties to file petitions to modify child support provisions, and in limiting parties’ ability to obtain changes to decrees that date back any further than the month following service of the relevant petition to modify). Looking just at the facts of this case, there does seem to be something intuitively inequitable about requiring Bruce to pay child support arrearages to Nicole. And we acknowledge that district courts are often given wide discretion to apply equitable principles in family law cases. See Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1971) (“In order to carry out the important responsibility of safeguarding the interests and welfare of children, it has always been deemed that the courts have broad equitable powers.”).
¶42 But our legislature has enacted a number of statutes that govern certain aspects of family law cases, and we are aware of no principle of law that allows courts to override statutes, in particular cases, simply out of generalized equitable concerns. See Martin v. Kristensen, 2021 UT 17, ¶ 53 (stating that courts have “no equitable power to override” statutory mandates due to generalized concerns of “public policy and equity”). At a minimum, the district court has not adequately explained how its equitable concerns, in this situation, allow it to supersede statutory mandates or interpretations of those statutes by our supreme court. For instance, the district court’s reliance on subsection (1) of Section 108 as being “instructive of the legislature’s intent” that child support obligations shall “follow the child[ren]” appears misplaced, given our supreme court’s explanation, in Hansen v. Hansen, that “[s]ubsection (1)’s general directive cannot possibly be interpreted unqualifiedly . . . to redirect support payments any time anyone provides any shelter or sustenance to a child,” and that subsection (1) is “modifie[d]” by the “specific limitation[s]” found in subsection (2). See 2012 UT 9, ¶¶ 10–11, 270 P.3d 531. And as we have noted, supra ¶¶ 30–39, the prerequisites of subsection (2) are not satisfied here. Apart from the language in subsection (1), the court does not otherwise explain how generalized equitable considerations, no matter how weighty, can justify modification of a child support order back beyond the month following service of the petition to modify, given our legislature’s clear directive that such orders may be modified “only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12112(4).
¶43 We observe that there may well be specific doctrines of equity or discretion that could apply in this situation to temper Nicole’s requests. Nicole presented her request in the context of an order to show cause seeking contempt, a legal doctrine that has its own elements and requirements, see Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) (setting forth the required showing for a contempt finding), in which courts are afforded discretion in selecting an appropriate sanction once contempt is found, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-310(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that, “[i]f the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine” or other punishment (emphasis added)); id. § 78B-6-311(1) (stating that a court “may order” the contemnor to pay the aggrieved party “a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved party’s costs and expenses” (emphasis added)). Alternatively, various equitable doctrines may apply in situations like this, depending on the circumstances. See, e.g., Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 857 P.2d 935, 939–40 (Utah 1993) (discussing the doctrine of waiver and its elements); Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 16, 339 P.3d 131 (discussing the doctrine of laches and its elements); Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, ¶ 6, 211 P.3d 987 (discussing the doctrine of equitable estoppel and its elements). We express no opinion as to the applicability of any such doctrine to the facts of this case. But the district court did not ground its child support ruling—that Bruce should not be required to make child support payments—in its post-contempt sentencing discretion or in any specific equitable doctrine; instead, as we interpret its order, it concluded that, due to unspecified equitable considerations, Bruce should be relieved from any obligation to make payments in the first place. In our view, the court has not adequately explained how equitable considerations can override statutory commands in this case.
¶44Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s determination that Bruce was not “required to pay child support payments to [Nicole] after [Nicole left] for military service,” and we remand the matter for further proceedings on Nicole’s request that Bruce be held in contempt for failing to make child support payments.
¶45Finally, given our conclusion regarding Nicole’s challenge to the district court’s child support ruling, we can readily dispose of Bruce’s challenge to that same ruling. As an initial matter, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Bruce made no affirmative claim, before the district court, to any child support arrears dating back further than the service of his petition to modify. On that basis alone, the district court was justified in not awarding him any. But more substantively, for the reasons already explained, we find no merit in Bruce’s argument that Section 108 operates to allow him to look all the way back to 2009 for modification of the Decree’s child support provisions.
¶46 The district court correctly determined that Bruce’s alimony obligation was not terminated—at least not under the alimony statute—by the parties’ cohabitation in 2009 and 2010, because the statute required Bruce to file a petition seeking termination while the cohabitation was still occurring, and he did not do so. Accordingly, the district court did not err by holding Bruce in contempt for failing to pay alimony after 2009, and in ordering Bruce to pay past-due alimony through 2015, and we affirm those orders.
¶47 However, the district court erred in its interpretation of Section 108, and erred in concluding that Section 108 operated to relieve Bruce of his obligation, under the Decree, to continue to pay Nicole child support after 2010. In this case, neither Section 108, nor generalized equitable concerns, operates to relieve Bruce of that obligation, and neither allows Bruce to obtain a modification of his child support obligations dating back any further than the month following service of his petition to modify. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s determination to the contrary, and remand the case for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion, on Nicole’s request for contempt relating to child support and on Bruce’s petition to modify.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Do courts make awards in divorce to “punish” adultery? Great question.
Adultery is considered a fault-based ground for divorce and a factor that can be considered when the trial court decides matters of alimony, property division, and child custody.
I will answer this question according to what Utah statutory and case law provides.
Utah Code § 30-3-5(9)(b) provides, “The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms of the alimony.”
Utah Code § 30-3-5(9)(c) states that “‘Fault’ includes engaging in sexual relations with an individual other than the party’s spouse, if such wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the breakup of the marriage relationship.
Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court discussed this very question in the divorce case of Gardner v. Gardner (Volume 425 Pacific Reporter 3rd, page 1134, decided in 2019. In that decision the Supreme Court stated:
[C]ourts should keep in mind that the ultimate purpose of any property division or alimony award is to “achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.” For this reason, courts should consider fault only in an attempt to balance the equities between the parties. In other words, where one party’s fault has harmed the other party, the court may attempt to re-balance the equities by adjusting the alimony award in favor of the party who was harmed by that fault.[footnote 56]
Footnote 56 states:
We note that some Utah courts have struggled to articulate an appropriate role of fault in alimony determinations in light of our case law suggesting that the purpose of alimony is not to punish. See Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, ¶ 17, 223 P.3d 476 (“[I]f a trial court uses its broad statutory discretion to consider fault in fashioning an alimony award and then, taking that fault into consideration, adjusts the alimony award upward or downward, it simply cannot be said that fault was not used to punish or reward either spouse by altering the award as a consequence of fault.”). But other Utah courts have concluded that fault may be considered without constituting punishment if it is used only to rectify the inequity caused by the fault. See Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2003 UT App 348, 2003 WL 22361312 at *2 (“Fault may correctly be considered by the trial court without penalizing the party found to be at fault.”); see also [Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (1956)], 296 P.2d at 980 (explaining that equitable factors often cause courts to impose permanent alimony on “erring” spouses); [Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)], 2006 UT App 214, ¶ 24, 138 P.3d 84 (affirming the district court’s consideration of a husband’s fault as an important “factor in fairness to [Wife]” (alteration in original)). As this latter line of cases suggests, fault may be considered as long as it is used as a basis to prevent or rectify an inequity to the not-at-fault spouse. So in reviewing an alimony determination involving fault, Utah appellate courts should focus on whether a fault-based modification of an alimony award helped “achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties” rather than on whether it was punitive in nature. [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 168, ––– P.3d ––––], 2015 UT 79, ¶ 25, ––– P.3d –––– (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With this in mind, could a court (a court, not all courts) award more alimony, divide marital property unevenly, or restrict custody or parent-time due to one of the spouse’s adultery to punish adultery? Yes, of course, even if the court went to great pains (sincerely or not) to articulate the alimony decision as not being punitive in nature.
Some judges (some, not all) allow their personal antipathy for an adulterous spouse their impartiality and justify disregarding the law in favor of doing what the judge “feels is right” instead. And yes, it can happen to you.
Bottom line: If you are in adulterer, and a serial and/or un repentant adulterer at that, it should come as no surprise to you that your adultery will do you no favors when it comes to the way the court can and may treat you in a divorce action. Fair or not, that is the nature of the way many people (and judges are people) view and treat adulterers. Does this mean that if you are in adulterer you should expect to be treated unfairly by a court? I think your odds are about 50-50, in my professional opinion. Do those odds mean that you should lie about adultery, if you believe you can get away with it? No, and for two reasons: 1) it is wrong to lie; and 2) if you commit adultery, then compound the problem by lying about it and get caught, you only increase your odds of being mistreated by the court. And odds are that if you lie about adultery you will be caught.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
This is an interesting question because if you have been financially independent of your spouse during your five year separation that implies that you don’t need financial support from your spouse.
Contrastingly, if for the past five years you have been destitute, have made requests of your spouse for financial support that your spouse has rejected, and have run up debts and other liabilities to meet your reasonable living expenses, then you would likely have a very strong basis for seeking alimony.
If, however, you have been separated from your spouse for five years and counting without having to rely for your financial support on a source other than your own income or other earnings in all that time, it is hard to imagine how you could make a compelling argument for deserving and alimony award.
One exceptional situation needs to be mentioned: if you have been self-supporting, but at a greatly reduced/lesser lifestyle, (i.e., you went from living at a certain level with your spouse because of your spouse’s affluence and ability to afford such a lifestyle to living more modestly on a modest income), then it may be possible for you to argue that you are entitled to alimony so that you can reach, or at least get as close as reasonably possible to, the lifestyle to which he became accustomed while married. One counter argument you could encounter (and I believe this argument would have merit) is that you have been self-supporting for so long — albeit at a lower level of income than you enjoyed before separation — that one can reasonably conclude that your change in lifestyle is no longer involuntary imposed upon you but a matter of your own personal choice.
And let’s and on a note of adding insult to injury: imagine that you had no choice but to pull yourself up by your own bootstraps after separation because your spouse refused to provide any financial support for you. Could you make some kind of argument that but for your spouse’s greedy neglect, you would have never needed to become self-supporting? In my legal opinion, the answer is: probably not. The court would not be looking to how or why you became self-supporting, and whether the circumstances under which you became self-supporting were “fair,” but only that you are now currently self-supporting.
Bottom line: if you have been living financially independent of your spouse for the past five years and counting, and if you are not living hand to mouth, it is unlikely that you will succeed in seeking and alimony award.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Yes, and for good reason. First, let me be unusually but sincerely candid: many judges and many of the actions that judges take disappoint me. There are some excellent judges on the bench who are clearly skilled in the law and know how to apply it accurately, justly, and equitably. Would that all judges lived up to this standard. But not all judges do. I mention this so that the context of my answer to your question is clear.
Being a judge is, in my opinion, mostly a thankless job. Sure, there are some obvious perks to being a judge, including, but not limited to, a good salary, state and federal holidays off, most judges receive a generous pension when they retire, the prestige of being called “Your Honor,” but the burdens of being a judge are in some ways unimaginable. Can you conceive of sentencing someone to life in prison or death? Or even sentencing someone to 5 to 10 years in prison when you’re not certain of his or her guilt? Can you imagine what it must be like to spend your work week, week after week, hearing hundreds of stories of lying, cheating, robbing, destroying property, assaulting, raping and murdering? It all takes an inevitable toll on even the strongest of people. Those judges who do the best they can and do the job well day after day, year-over-year deserve not only our respect, but our sympathy, our thanks, and support.
All that stated, there are clearly some judges who are not cut out for the job and need to quit. Some need to quit because they are not competent as judges. Some need to quit because, while they might have been up to the demands of the job in the beginning, they aren’t anymore. Some need to quit before they become so jaded that they cannot give the job and the people who come before them the attention both the job–and the cases they hear and decide–deserve.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
That is an interesting question. Before I answer it, know this: anyone who is motivated to marry on a “what’s in it for me?” basis and who stays married motivated by a “what’s in it for me?” basis is likely to be unhappy in his/her marriage and likely will end up divorced. Marriage success and happiness depends upon the couple’s mutual devotion to each other, to the family they make together, and placing the interests of their marriage and family ahead of their own, individual self-interest.
Here is what I believe would happen if there were no more alimony or splitting of assets in divorce proceedings when a married couple has no children:
the desire for certain women to marry would plummet. Why? It’s politically incorrect to state the following, but it is no less true: many women (not all) marry so that their husbands (and now, in the case of lesbian couples, their wives) will provide for them (and only for them, not for children the couple may have) financially. If this kind of woman (i.e., a woman who relied on her spouse financially) knew that she would get no alimony upon divorce and wouldn’t get half of the funds the spouse saved and half of the retirement funds the spouse accrued during the marriage, there is a certain kind of woman who would not marry.
Do not misunderstand me: a woman (or man) who foregoes pursuing a career so that the couple can have children and rear a family together in the best possible conditions, with one parent staying home to care for the children instead of working outside the home, is a spouse who, if she/he has lived up to that commitment, deserves alimony if the marriage ends in divorce. The traditional family, i.e., where the children have a stay at home parent, is the optimal way to rear children who will be themselves physically and mental healthy, decent, productive adults. Some families cannot afford to have a parent stay at home. There is no shame in that. But when both spouses work even though they both don’t need to work, and where such spouses have children and warehouse those kids in daycare, they are doing themselves and their children a disservice that cannot be compensated for.
the desire for a percentage of heterosexual men to marry would increase. Many such men have seen their fellow male friends and family members financially ruined by alimony and by losing so much of what they worked so hard for in divorce. This causes many men to fear and avoid marriage to a woman out of concern that divorce will ruin them. Many husbands of childless couples who knew that their wives would not profit from divorce would not fear divorce nearly as much as they do now.
Do not misunderstand me: there are many men who are devoted to their wives and children. Their wives and family are a labor of love for whom them willingly and gladly sacrifice their time, effort, and income. There are many decent men, however, whose wives are not themselves decent people who are equally devoted to their husbands and families. Men who marry gold diggers are justifiably upset when the gold diggers try to profit from divorce.
Now if, after you read this answer in its entirety, you conclude that “marriage is for suckers,” you have missed the point completely.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
If an ex uses illness to stop working, can she get more alimony?
Can being debilitated by illness be a reason for a spouse receiving alimony or more alimony than he/she would have received in the absence of the debilitating illness? Of course.
Merely being ill does not mean one will receive or receive more alimony than would have been received in the absence of the illness. Plenty of people have health troubles but hold full-time employment. One’s illness(es) must render one unable to support himself/herself, either fully or partially, before illness will result in more alimony being awarded, and even then, only if the spouse who would be paying alimony has the ability to pay the alimony and still meet his/her living expenses as closely to the standard living/lifestyle to which the parties were accustomed during the marriage.
And merely being able to prove “I am sick” or “I have X disease” won’t presumptively entitle you to alimony or “condition”-related alimony. The disease has to be debilitating despite your best efforts.
If you believe that you can fake an illness to get alimony or more alimony, that’s extremely difficult in today’s world. Amazing ways to verify or refute one’s claims to being disabled have been invented and are only getting more accurate.
If an ex uses illness to stop working, can she get more alimony?
Can being debilitated by illness be a reason for a spouse receiving alimony or more alimony than he/she would have received in the absence of the debilitating illness? Of course.
Merely being ill does not mean one will receive or receive more alimony than would have been received in the absence of the illness. Plenty of people have health troubles but hold full-time employment. One’s illness(es) must render one unable to support himself/herself, either fully or partially, before illness will result in more alimony being awarded, and even then, only if the spouse who would be paying alimony has the ability to pay the alimony and still meet his/her living expenses as closely to the standard living/lifestyle to which the parties were accustomed during the marriage.
And merely being able to prove “I am sick” or “I have X disease” won’t presumptively entitle you to alimony or “condition”-related alimony. The disease has to be debilitating despite your best efforts.
If you believe that you can fake an illness to get alimony or more alimony, that’s extremely difficult in today’s world. Amazing ways to verify or refute one’s claims to being disabled have been invented and are only getting more accurate.
2021 UT App 20
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REBECCA ELLEN ALLEN, Appellee,
KENT DARIUS ALLEN,Appellant.
Filed February 25, 2021
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Amber M. Mettler
Sara Pfrommer and Kathleen McConkie, Attorneys for Appellant
Russell Yauney, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
¶1 Kent Darius Allen appeals the district court’s supplemental divorce decree in his divorce from Rebecca Ellen Allen. Kent contends that the court erred in finding him in contempt and in its determinations regarding alimony, child support, and child custody. We reject his arguments and affirm.
¶2 Kent and Rebecca were married in 2004 and have five minor children. They separated in September 2014, when Rebecca moved to Utah with the children and Kent stayed in Texas. During this time, Rebecca worked part-time and provided full-time care for the children, while Kent did not work but received disability payments based on a 100% disability rating from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
¶3 Rebecca filed for divorce in Utah in October 2015. Kent moved to Utah in the spring of 2016. Early in the litigation, in July 2016, Rebecca moved for an award of half of retroactive benefits Kent received from the VA. Rebecca claimed she was entitled to $56,171 of those benefits as rehabilitative spousal support. In responding to the motion, Kent filed a declaration in which he did not dispute receipt of the VA benefits. And in his August 2016 financial declaration, Kent acknowledged receiving around $89,900 as a “VA Disability Settlement minus attorney fees.”
¶4 A domestic relations commissioner conducted a hearing in August 2016. The commissioner recommended, among other things, that Kent and Rebecca have temporary joint legal custody of their children and that Rebecca have temporary physical custody. The commissioner also recommended that Kent pay Rebecca $44,500 from the VA benefits and around $1,200 in monthly child support. These recommendations were memorialized in a temporary order entered and counter-signed by the district court in October 2016 (the Temporary Order).
¶5 Kent objected to the Temporary Order. The district court held a hearing on November 3, 2016, in which it overruled the objection and adopted the commissioner’s recommendation. It also ordered Kent to pay Rebecca her share of the VA benefits “within 30 days.”
¶6 On December 9, 2016, Rebecca moved for an order to show cause, asserting, among other things, that Kent was in contempt for not complying with the court’s order to pay her portion of the VA benefits. Rebecca thus asked for a judgment against Kent in the amount of $44,500. After a hearing, the commissioner entered an order certifying the issue of contempt for Kent’s “failure to pay the spousal support award of [$44,500]” as required by the Temporary Order. The commissioner’s order also stated that a “judgment in the amount of [$44,500] for spousal support arrears shall enter for the period of October 28, 2016, through March 2, 2017” (the Judgment). The district court counter-signed the Judgment.
¶7 In May 2017, Rebecca filed another motion for an order to show cause, asserting that Kent should be held in contempt for failing to pay child support between December 2016 and April 2017. Kent responded that he had already paid $11,294 of his social security benefits to Rebecca and that those funds covered his child support obligation for the time period at issue as well as for four additional months. After hearing argument, the commissioner certified the issue of Kent’s alleged contempt. The commissioner also ordered entry of judgment against Kent for $4,792 in past-due child support from December 2016 through May 2017. The court counter-signed the order entering judgment for $4,792.
¶8 Rebecca filed yet another motion for an order to show cause in October 2017, this time asserting that Kent had not paid child support from June to September 2017. After a hearing, the commissioner certified the contempt issue and awarded judgment to Rebecca for $4,722 in past-due child support for the months of June through November 2017. The court countersigned this order. Consequently, Kent had accumulated judgments against him totaling $54,014 for unpaid child support and retroactive spousal support.
¶9 Meanwhile, Kent filed various motions in which he argued that the division of his VA benefits, as ordered in the Temporary Order, was impermissible under federal law and that the $44,500 Judgment should be vacated. The commissioner had certified the issue for trial, but before trial, the district court concluded that the VA benefits can be used for spousal support and, therefore, there was no basis to vacate the Judgment.
¶10 The court entered a bifurcated divorce decree in August 2017. The issues of child support, custody, and contempt were tried to the bench in 2018. Additionally, at trial, Kent once again argued that the Judgment should be vacated. He proposed “two ways to fight that judgment.” First, he renewed his argument that his VA benefits were beyond the court’s reach under federal law. Second, he objected to characterizing the $44,500 award in the Judgment as spousal support because “the court has engaged in none of the analysis required to determine a reasonable amount for spousal support or to make such [an] award.” As for Rebecca, she clarified that she was not asking for “future spousal support” but that she “expected that judgment to be enforced.”
¶11 Rebecca and Kent each testified at trial. Notably, the court found Rebecca “to be highly credible,” while it found Kent “not to be credible” based on his “testimony, conduct, and a series of inconsistencies.”
¶12 With regard to the Judgment, the court disagreed with Kent’s argument that it was erroneous for $44,500 in spousal support to remain in effect unless the court conducted an analysis of Rebecca’s needs and his ability to pay. It explained,
There was a court order requiring [Kent] to pay [Rebecca] $44,500. [Kent] did not do so. Judgment was, therefore, appropriately entered against [Kent]. This Court need not undergo any sort of analysis concerning the parties’ current financial needs or [Kent’s] ability to pay in order to permit the judgment to remain in effect.
The court also decided, in the alternative, that “[e]ven if . . . such an analysis was required,” Kent “had the ability to pay and that the needs analysis at the time of the hearing on the [motion] for temporary orders supported the $44,500 award to [Rebecca] and subsequent judgment against [Kent].” The court thus proceeded to compare, albeit briefly, Kent’s and Rebecca’s incomes and assets.
¶13 The court evaluated Rebecca’s assertion that Kent was in contempt for not paying the $44,500 from the VA benefits and not paying child support from December 2016 through September 2017. As an initial matter, the court determined that the Temporary Order requiring those payments was lawful. Then, in evaluating contempt, the court first found that Kent had the ability to comply with the Temporary Order at the time it was entered and had the present ability to comply with it. In support of this finding, the court rejected Kent’s assertion that he had spent all the VA benefits (nearly $90,000). The court also found that despite Kent’s “disability rating and the fact that he has not held a regular job in a number of years, the evidence at trial showed that [Kent] is physically and mentally able to work, yet he chooses not to.” The court further found that Kent had “access to significant financial support from his family which support could be used to help” Kent obtain employment or pay the outstanding amounts he owed. Second, the court found that Kent undisputedly “had knowledge of all the Court’s orders requiring him to pay [Rebecca] $44,500 from his VA past-due benefits and to pay child support.” Third, the court found that Kent had “deliberately chose[n] not to comply” with the orders when he “personally disagree[d]” with them but was “aware—at all times—of the Court’s orders and [its] repeated rejections of his arguments.”
¶14 The court thus held Kent in contempt, finding “beyond a reasonable doubt that, at all times, [Kent] knew what was required of him, had the ability to comply, and intentionally refused to do so.” Indeed, the court found that his “disregard of the Court’s orders—including the multiple times the Court has rejected [his] arguments—was willful, deliberate, and intentional.”
¶15 As a sanction for his contempt, the court ordered Kent jailed for ten days, which sentence could be purged if Kent made certain payments toward child support and spousal support within sixty days and continued to make specified monthly payments thereafter. Additionally, the court ordered Kent to pay Rebecca’s attorney fees incurred “in prosecuting the request for entry of judgment and motions for contempt.”
¶16 The district court also awarded Rebecca sole physical and legal custody of the minor children, while Kent was awarded parent-time. In making this decision, the court considered several factors bearing on the best interests of the children. First, it found that the parties’ past conduct and moral standards favored Rebecca. It reasoned that Kent “testified untruthfully” and had “shown contemptuous disregard of the Court’s orders,” demonstrating that he was “willing to and ha[d] willfully disobeyed the law.” In the court’s view, this “type of conduct suggest[ed] questionable parenting, at best.” The court also reasoned that Kent’s “refusal—for years—to pay the spousal support award or the child support previously ordered . . . while [Rebecca] was struggling to provide for herself and the [children] demonstrate[d] a substantial indifference towards” the children. Although Kent claimed that he took care of the children “in other ways—not just financially, but physically, emotionally, and spiritually,” the court discredited his testimony on this point.
¶17 Next, the court factored in which parent was the primary caretaker and concluded that this factor also favored Rebecca, especially given that she undisputedly had been the children’s primary caretaker since the couple separated in September 2014. In considering this factor, the court found that Kent had “no in-person contact at all with the children” for over a year after they moved to Utah despite his financial ability to see the children in person. The court further found that the children were “well-cared for” and “flourishing with [Rebecca] as their primary caretaker” and that even after Kent moved to Utah, he had displayed “remarkably limited involvement” in the children’s lives. Next, the court considered the factor of the children’s bond with the parents. While the court did not find Kent’s testimony that he had “active involvement and participation” in the children’s lives to be credible, the court found that the evidence concerning Rebecca’s “strong relationship with the [children] was credible and overwhelming.” The court then weighed the factor of which parent was most likely to act in the children’s best interests in favor of Rebecca. The court based this determination on its findings that Rebecca “went out of her way not to speak negatively about” Kent at trial but that Kent made “accusations and insinuations” that Rebecca was an inattentive parent.
¶18 The court considered additional factors, including that the parties “have generally been able to cooperate with each other” even though Kent was “often unreliable.” It found that Kent was “less emotionally stable” than Rebecca and that “[Kent]—despite not being employed or in school—[had] knowingly and intentionally declined to take a more active role in the [children’s] lives.” Indeed, the court reiterated that Kent could have taken “a more active role” in their lives “but he [chose] not to.” Considering all these factors together, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that awarding sole legal and physical custody to Rebecca, subject to Kent’s right to parent-time, was in the children’s best interests.
¶19 As for child support, the court found that Kent did not owe any child support arrearages before the Temporary Order was entered—the time period from September 2014 until July 2016. The court based this finding on the fact that Rebecca expressly disclaimed entitlement to child support arrearages prior to the Temporary Order. It also relied on the evidence at trial indicating that Kent “did make some payments . . . during this time period, although the amounts were inconsistent and disputed.”
¶20 But the court did determine that “for the period of August 2016 to March 2019,” Kent owed $18,732 in child support arrearages. Using the sole custody worksheet, the court calculated this amount using Kent’s $4,630.62 monthly income and Rebecca’s imputed $1,257 monthly income. In making its calculation, the court credited Kent with the $405 monthly amounts Rebecca received on behalf of the children from social security beginning in August 2016. While entering judgment of $18,732 in favor of Rebecca, the court simultaneously vacated the earlier judgments for overdue child support.
¶21 The court rejected Kent’s argument that he should be given credit for payments he made to Rebecca prior to the Temporary Order—payments he asserted would eliminate any alleged arrearages. The court reasoned that it would be “inappropriate to give [Kent] ‘credit’ for any supposed ‘overpayments’ given that (until now) there has not been a final Court order regarding child support.” It further reasoned that Kent had “an obligation to support his children and that obligation is ongoing and continuous” and that “[t]he presumption, therefore, should not be that [Kent] ‘overpaid,’ but that [Kent] paid whatever he could or desired to, given his ongoing obligation.”
¶22 On the matter of attorney fees, the court had already concluded that under Utah Code section 78B-6-311(1), as “an additional sanction for nonpayment,” Kent would have to pay Rebecca’s attorney fees incurred “in prosecuting the request for entry of judgment and motions for contempt.” The court declined to address whether to award attorney fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3 because the parties had stipulated to paying their own remaining fees.
¶23 The court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as a supplemental divorce decree. Kent appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶24 Kent raises four issues on appeal. First, he contends that the district court erroneously awarded a lump sum to Rebecca as alimony without conducting the required alimony analysis. We ultimately do not reach the merits of this issue because Kent does not adequately challenge an independent alternative basis for the court’s decision. See Kendall v. Olsen, 2017 UT 38, ¶ 12, 424 P.3d 12.
¶25 Second, Kent contends that the district court should have given him credit toward his child support obligation. Because district courts have “broad discretion” in awarding child support and “in determining the financial interests of divorced parties,” we “will not disturb such decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ¶¶ 7–8, 335 P.3d 378 (cleaned up).
¶26 Third, Kent contends that the district court erred in finding him in contempt of court for failing to pay child support and the lump sum to Rebecca. When reviewing a district court’s decision finding a party in contempt, “we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations for correctness.” LD III LLC v. Davis, 2016 UT App 206, ¶ 12, 385 P.3d 689 (cleaned up).
¶27 Fourth, Kent contends that the district court erred in granting sole legal and physical custody of the children to Rebecca. “In custody matters, appellate courts generally give the district court considerable discretion because the district court’s proximity to the evidence places it in a better position than an appellate court to choose the best custody arrangement.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 155, 459 P.3d 276 (cleaned up). This broad discretion, however, “must be guided by the governing law adopted by the Utah Legislature.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶28 To the extent any of Kent’s contentions involve challenges to the district court’s factual findings, our “review of such findings is highly deferential, and we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 149. “We give this deference to the district court because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses’ recollections.” Id. ¶ 173 (cleaned up). A district court’s factual findings “are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if the court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 16, 379 P.3d 890 (cleaned up).
I. Lump Sum as Alimony
¶29 Kent first challenges the district court’s award of $44,500 in spousal support to Rebecca. In particular, Kent contends that the court abused its discretion by entering this award without “conduct[ing] the analysis required under Utah law to determine whether, and how much, spousal support should be” awarded.
¶30 Kent is correct that Utah law requires district courts to consider several factors, known as the Jones factors, when determining alimony. Those factors include “the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse,” “the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income,” and “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)(a)(i)–(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020); see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (listing these three factors now codified in Utah Code section 30-3-5). Further, the “court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each statutory factor.” Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ¶ 33, 351 P.3d 90 (cleaned up).
¶31 The problem for Kent, however, is that the district court rejected his argument about the Jones analysis based on two independent grounds. And we “will not reverse a ruling of the district court that rests on independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of those grounds.” Kendall v. Olsen, 2017 UT 38, ¶ 12, 424 P.3d 12 (cleaned up).
¶32 Here, the district court first decided that because “[t]here was a court order requiring [Kent] to pay [Rebecca] $44,500” and he “did not do so,” the Judgment was “appropriately entered against [Kent]” and, as a result, the court “need not undergo any sort of analysis concerning the parties’ current financial needs or [Kent’s] ability to pay in order to permit the judgment to remain in effect.” Second, the court decided that even if such an analysis was required, Kent “had the ability to pay and that the needs analysis at the time of the hearing on . . . [the Temporary Order] supported the $44,500 award to [Rebecca] and subsequent judgment against [Kent].”
¶33 Although the district court rejected his argument on these two independent grounds, Kent’s appeal focuses only on the latter basis by arguing that the court inadequately analyzed the Jones factors at trial. His challenge to the former ground—that the Judgment requiring him to pay $44,500 was already appropriately entered against him—is limited to an assertion that the district court engaged in “circular reasoning” by concluding that “because Kent was ordered to pay before, there is no need to conduct the Jones analysis now.” But Kent has the burden to “identify and brief” his reasons for reversal, see id., and this terse assertion does not sufficiently address the effect of an order that had already been reduced to a judgment, nor does it show error in the court’s treatment of the Judgment, see generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (setting forth the appellant’s burden to “explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal”). Consequently, Kent effectively has challenged only one of the court’s independent grounds for its ruling, and we therefore are in no position to reverse the district court. See Kendall, 2017 UT 38, ¶ 12. Accordingly, we reject Kent’s challenge to the $44,500 award of spousal support without reaching the merits of the district court’s decision.
II. Child Support
¶34 Next, Kent contends that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he is “more than $18,000 in arrears” with respect to child support for the period of August 2016 to March 2019. While acknowledging that he did not make any child support payments between November 2016 and December 2017, Kent argues that the court should have credited him with payments he made between December 2014 and July 2016, and with $11,294 paid to Rebecca in November 2016.
¶35 The district court declined to give Kent “credit” for any payments he made before the Temporary Order’s entry. In particular, the court deemed it “inappropriate” to give any credits when there had not yet been a final court order regarding child support. It explained that Kent had an “ongoing and continuous” obligation to support his children and that “[t]he presumption, therefore, should not be that [Kent] ‘overpaid,’ but that [Kent] paid whatever he could or desired to, given his ongoing obligation.” On appeal, Kent has not grappled with the court’s rationale, and because he has left the court’s basis for its decision unaddressed, we again conclude that he has not carried his burden to show error in that decision. See Sandusky v. Sandusky, 2018 UT App 34, ¶ 26, 417 P.3d 634 (rejecting an argument where the appellant did not address the basis for the district court’s decision).
¶36 As for the $11,294 paid to Rebecca in November 2016, Kent now contends that these funds were a social security benefit that should have been credited against his child support obligation. In support, he cites Utah Code section 78B-12-203, which states that “[s]ocial security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(9)(b) (LexisNexis 2018).
¶37 But Kent has not shown, as he must, that he preserved this issue for appeal. To preserve an issue, it “must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 35, 379 P.3d 890 (cleaned up). Thus, “the issue must be specifically raised by the party asserting error, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal authority.” Warrick v. Property Reserve Inc., 2018 UT App 197, ¶ 12, 437 P.3d 439 (cleaned up). “Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived.” Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ¶ 3, 330 P.3d 762 (cleaned up). Further, an appellant’s brief must contain “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review” or “a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B).
¶38 To demonstrate that he preserved the issue regarding the $11,294 and section 78B-12-203, Kent cites one page of his response to one of Rebecca’s motions for an order to show cause. There, Kent quoted the statute and stated that the social security benefits Rebecca received from his employment “is all to be credited as child support payments.” But this document was filed over a year and a half before trial, and Kent did not again address section 78B-12-203 in his trial brief or in his supplemental trial brief—even when discussing the $11,294 payment. As a result, and despite an earlier attempt to raise the issue, Kent did not raise the issue in a timely manner such that the district court had an opportunity to consider it at the time the court was resolving the child support issues at trial. Kent thus did not preserve this issue regarding section 78B-12-203 and we do not consider it further.
¶39 Kent also complains that the court used the sole custody worksheet in calculating child support arrearages. He claims this calculation was erroneous because he had “joint custody” under the Temporary Order. Although the Temporary Order gave “joint legal custody” to both parties, it gave “temporary physical custody” to Rebecca. In other words, the Temporary Order gave Rebecca sole physical custody of the children. Because the custody worksheet for purposes of child support is based on physical, not legal, custody, we perceive no error in the court’s use of the sole custody worksheet. Cf. Burggraaf v. Burggraaf, 2019 UT App 195, ¶¶ 34–35, 455 P.3d 1071 (seeing no error in the court’s use of the sole custody worksheet where the mother had sole physical custody in practice).
¶40 For the foregoing reasons, Kent has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in holding him accountable for $18,732 in child support arrearages.
¶41 Kent contends that the district court erred in finding him in contempt based on his failure to comply with the orders to pay child support and $44,500 to Rebecca. “A finding of contempt is proper only when the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” LD III LLC v. Davis, 2016 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 385 P.3d 689 (cleaned up).
¶42 Kent’s contention on appeal centers on only one of the relevant factors: his ability to comply with the court’s orders. More specifically, he focuses on the court’s findings regarding his ability to pay. In so arguing, he maintains that “he cannot give Rebecca the ordered $44,500 because he does not have it; he used it for his own needs with respect to housing and other related items when he moved.” He also argues that the court erred in finding that he had the ability to work despite his 100% disability rating.
¶43 Kent testified that he had spent all the VA benefits (nearly $90,000) by the time of the hearing on the Temporary Order. But the district court found that this claim was “false” and contrary to Kent’s representations to the commissioner. The court also found that Kent’s “claim that he needed to spend all $90,000 on furnishing his new residence and other household expenses in Utah is simply not credible.” Kent asserts that the court’s credibility determination in this regard is “based on no evidence at all” when Rebecca introduced “no evidence to counter Kent’s testimony that he had spent” all the VA benefits. But the court was “not required to believe [Kent] simply because he presented more evidence than [Rebecca] or because [she] did not directly contradict his . . . testimony.” See Sauer v. Sauer, 2017 UT App 114, ¶ 6, 400 P.3d 1204. Indeed, “we give great deference to a trial court’s determinations of credibility based on the presumption that the trial judge, having personally observed the quality of the evidence, the tenor of the proceedings, and the demeanor of the parties, is in a better position to perceive the subtleties at issue than we can looking only at the cold record.” Id. (cleaned up). Kent has not shown that we should deviate from the considerable deference we owe to the district court’s factual findings.
¶44 Kent also claimed in the district court that he is unable to work based on his 100% disability rating. But the court rejected this claim, finding that Kent presented “no corroborating evidence other than” hearsay statements. It also found that despite Kent’s “disability rating and the fact that he has not held a regular job in a number of years, the evidence at trial showed that [Kent] is physically and mentally able to work, yet he chooses not to.” The court based this finding on testimony that Kent, “whatever his limitations might be, leads an active lifestyle,” including swimming, hiking, and taking jiu-jitsu classes. In Kent’s view, the court relied on “random incidents” and had no evidence that he “was able to work any kind of job.” But Kent’s cursory argument does not show how the court’s factual findings were “in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence” and does not convince us that “a mistake has been made.” See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 16, 379 P.3d 890 (cleaned up).
¶45 Kent also suggests that his 100% disability rating precluded the district court from finding him able to work, and he implies that the court’s finding might jeopardize his disability benefits. But because he provides little legal authority and analysis to support these suggestions, he has not carried his burden to establish error. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”). For these reasons, we conclude that Kent has not shown error in the district court’s decision finding him in contempt.
IV. Child Custody
¶46 Kent next contends that the district court erred in granting sole legal and physical custody of the children to Rebecca. In so arguing, Kent stresses that the court based its decision “in large part” on its belief and “misplaced anger” that “Kent exhibited poor moral character by failing to pay child support” as ordered. He also maintains that he overpaid on child support.
¶47 In determining custody, the court “shall consider the best interest of the child” and, in doing so, may consider any factors it deems relevant. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020). The Utah Code identifies a number of potentially relevant factors, including but not limited to “the parent’s capacity and willingness to function as a parent,” “the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent,” the “emotional stability of the parent,” the “parent’s financial responsibility,” “who has been the primary caretaker of the child,” and the “relative strength of the child’s bond with the parent, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the relationship between the parent and the child.” Id.; see also id. § 30-3-10.2 (2019) (setting forth similar factors for consideration in determining whether the child’s best interest would be served by ordering joint legal custody or joint physical custody).
¶48 In this case, Kent overlooks that the district court conducted a detailed analysis of many of the custody factors. See supra ¶¶ 16–18. On appeal he does not assail the majority of that analysis; instead, as stated, he limits his challenge to the court’s inclusion of his history of nonpayment of child support. And he has not persuaded us that the court was wrong to consider his failure to pay child support in its analysis. Moreover, while Kent believes that the court’s custody decision was driven by its consideration of his nonpayment, he has not established that this factor overwhelmed the rest of the custody factors. Simply put, nothing in the court’s analysis or Kent’s argument persuades us that the court erred in making its custody decision.
V. Attorney Fees on Appeal
¶49 Finally, Rebecca requests that this court award her attorney fees on appeal on two grounds. First, Rebecca asserts that the district court awarded her attorney fees related to Kent’s contempt with respect to the $44,500 and child support and that she is thus entitled to attorney fees on appeal for defending the appeal on that issue. Second, Rebecca asks this court to remand for the district court to make findings under Utah Code section 30-3-3 to support an award of attorney fees to her for all issues on appeal.
¶50 Generally, “attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract.” Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Utah Transit Auth., 2020 UT App 144, ¶ 55, 477 P.3d 472 (cleaned up). This court ordinarily will award appellate attorney fees “when a party was awarded fees and costs below and then prevails on appeal.” Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶ 48, 337 P.3d 296. Because the district court awarded Rebecca attorney fees related to her “request for entry of judgment and motions for contempt” pursuant to statute under Utah Code section 78B-6-311(1) and because she has prevailed on that issue on appeal, see supra ¶¶ 41–45, we grant her request for appellate fees related to that one issue. See Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶ 48; cf. Telegraph Tower LLC v. Century Mortgage LLC, 2016 UT App 102, ¶ 52, 376 P.3d 333 (awarding appellate attorney fees on the single issue on which appellees prevailed below and successfully defended on appeal); Macris v. Sevea Int’l, Inc., 2013 UT App 176, ¶ 53, 307 P.3d 625 (awarding partial attorney fees on appeal for the issues on which the appellee was successful on appeal). We thus remand this case to the district court to calculate Rebecca’s reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending that issue on appeal.
¶51 As for Rebecca’s suggestion that she could be “entitled to attorney fees for the entirety of the appeal” under Utah Code section 30-3-3, we conclude that she is not entitled to such an award. The parties stipulated to paying their own attorney fees incurred during the district court proceedings, and the district court expressly declined to consider whether to award fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3. Because the district court did not award attorney fees based on section 30-3-3 to Rebecca below and because she has not otherwise established that she should be awarded her remaining attorney fees on appeal, see Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶ 48, we decline Rebecca’s invitation to instruct the district court to analyze her general claim for appellate attorney fees.
¶52 Kent has not established error in the district court’s decisions. Accordingly, we affirm the supplemental decree, but we remand to the district court for the limited purpose of calculating Rebecca’s attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal, insofar as they are related to the issue of contempt.
 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to each by their first name, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
 The Judgment was “inadvertently entered in the amount of $45,000 instead of the $44,500 included in the Temporary Order and requested by [Rebecca] in her motion for order to show cause.” The court ultimately modified the Judgment to the correct amount of $44,500.
 Given that the court’s purpose in entering the contempt finding was “to vindicate [its] authority by punishing [Kent] for his willful disobedience of the Court’s previous orders,” the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature and required that Kent’s contempt meet the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the lower civil standard. See Dickman Family Props., Inc. v. White, 2013 UT App 116, ¶ 2, 302 P.3d 833 (“The characterization of a contempt proceeding determines the applicable standard of proof: criminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; civil contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”).
 Because recent statutory amendments since the relevant time are immaterial in this case, we cite the current version of the Utah Code.
 Kent raises other arguments attacking the propriety of the lump sum award to Rebecca. But because Kent has not adequately addressed the earlier Judgment, we need not reach these arguments.
 6. Kent also suggests that Rebecca has received more than $18,000 related to social security disability payments since August 2016 and that the court refused to comply with its obligation to credit those payments against Kent’s child support obligation. The record does not support Kent’s contention. To the contrary, the court’s findings of fact show that the court did reduce Kent’s arrearages by “the amounts received by [Rebecca] on behalf of the [children] in the amount of $405 from social security beginning in August 2016.”
 Kent also argues that he could “not be held in contempt of an order that is void because it was beyond the court’s jurisdiction to issue.” But “the only way a party can successfully attack an order which he is charged with refusing to obey is if the party can show it to be absolutely void.” Iota LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2016 UT App 231, ¶ 20, 391 P.3d 239 (cleaned up). To demonstrate that the district court’s orders were void, Kent would have to show that the court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over him at the time the orders were entered. See id. ¶ 21. Kent has not made that showing. He argues only that the federal law applicable to his VA benefits “implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” But that cursory suggestion does not show that the district court lacked “authority over the general class of cases to which the particular case at issue belongs.” See id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up).
 8. Kent asserts that the “only orders that [he] ever failed to obey were ones that he believed had been issued by the court without jurisdiction, which he promptly and actively challenged.” But, as explained above, see supra note 7, Kent has not shown that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its orders. And “a party may not challenge a court’s order by violating it.” Iota LLC, 2016 UT App 231, ¶ 16 (cleaned up). Rather, “[t]he orderly and expeditious administration of justice . . . requires that ‘an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 459 (1975)). Indeed, the district court here correctly observed that “‘a party is foreclosed from making a private determination that a court’s order need not be obeyed because it is legally incorrect.’” (Quoting id. ¶ 17.) We thus are not persuaded by Kent’s excuse for not complying with the orders.
I was divorced and lied to during my divorce and I am disabled can I take my ex back to court for spousal support?
Can you try? Yes. Will you succeed? Probably not. Unless you can prove (not persuade, but demonstrate by objectively, independently verifiable proof) that your ex-husband defrauded the court, you’re likely stuck with the decree and court orders you’ve got. This is extremely difficult in its own right. This is also extremely expensive and most people don’t have that kind of money.
I was divorced and lied to during my divorce and I am disabled can I take my ex back to court for spousal support?
Can you try? Yes.
Will you succeed? Probably not.
Unless you can prove (not persuade, but demonstrate by objectively, independently verifiable proof) that your ex-husband defrauded the court, you’re likely stuck with the decree and court orders you’ve got. This is extremely difficult in its own right. This is also extremely expensive and most people don’t have that kind of money.
2020 UT App 146
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JERRY V. BROWN, Appellant, v. YVONNE A. BROWN, Appellee.
Filed October 29, 2020
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
Julie J. Nelson, Troy L. Booher, and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant
Ron W. Haycock Jr., S. Spencer Brown, and Scarlet R. Smith, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and DIANA HAGEN concurred.
¶1 Jerry V. Brown appeals the district court’s determination in this divorce proceeding that his dental practice was marital property and that his ex-wife, Yvonne A. Brown, was therefore entitled to half its value. Jerry also appeals the district court’s award of $96,409.72 to cover pre-decree expenses Yvonne incurred over nearly a two-year period while the divorce was pending. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for revision of the divorce decree.
¶2 In 1986, Jerry purchased a dental practice and building. By 1996, he had completely paid off the purchase price. During a portion of this ten-year period, Jerry was married to his first wife, with whom he had four children. After Jerry and his first wife divorced, Jerry and Yvonne married in 1996. Yvonne had also been married previously and brought three children into the marriage. In 1999, Jerry and Yvonne had a child together. They divorced in 2011 but remarried approximately one year later.
¶3 Soon after their first marriage to each other, Yvonne began working at the practice. After about a month, however, Jerry and Yvonne decided that it was not a good fit. They determined that Yvonne should stay home and care for their blended family from then on, but she occasionally filled in at the practice on an emergency basis. Regardless of the hours Yvonne worked, the practice paid her a monthly salary, depositing her paycheck into Jerry and Yvonne’s joint bank account.
¶4 During both his marriages to Yvonne, Jerry kept the practice’s accounts separate from the couple’s joint accounts. Jerry testified that he did not “at any time . . . put personal funds from [his] personal account or [their] marital accounts into [the practice].” And Yvonne testified that Jerry was “controlling with finances” and threatened to fire his employees if they discussed the practice’s finances with her. Yvonne’s sister, who worked at the practice, testified that Jerry kept the finances “quiet” and would not discuss them with Yvonne. She further testified that whenever Yvonne would “come to the office, he’d empty the cashbox and walk across the street and deposit all of the money into the bank.”
¶5 In addition to drawing his regular salary, Jerry paid expenses attributable to the marriage, such as the couple’s mortgage payments, vehicle payments, insurance bills, travel expenses, and other obligations, using funds from the practice’s account. Jerry also deposited $6,000 from the practice’s account into the couple’s joint account each month, which Yvonne used to pay household expenses. But because Yvonne did not have access to any other bank accounts, if she needed extra money, she “had to ask for it, and usually it became very heated because [Jerry] controlled all of [the] finances.”
¶6 In 2002, Jerry and Yvonne built an $860,000 home that came with a $5,722 monthly mortgage obligation. Around this time, Jerry also renovated the practice’s building and financed it solely by a loan secured by the building, which resulted in a $4,000 monthly payment that he paid from the practice’s revenue. Yvonne testified that the practice’s new debt affected the family’s lifestyle, income, activities, and travel. She further explained that they “had to make a lot of sacrifices financially at the time to offset [the] income” that stayed in the practice instead of being used to supplement the available marital funds. And around 2004 or 2005, Jerry attempted to open a second office to expand the practice, which proved unsuccessful. This investment, too, was funded solely by the practice.
¶7 After the couple’s first divorce and their subsequent remarriage in 2012, Yvonne began attending school to become an esthetician and eventually obtained her master’s degree in that field. Jerry paid for her schooling from the practice’s revenue. In 2013, Yvonne opened a spa at the practice, for which Jerry added three rooms to the practice’s building. This new spa company was a separate entity from the practice and had a separate bank account. Jerry testified that he spent “well over $200,000” of the practice’s revenue on spa equipment to help Yvonne get established.
¶8 In June 2015, the couple separated again. Around this time, Yvonne started another spa company in a different location and moved all the equipment that Jerry had purchased with funds from the practice to this new location. After this separation, Jerry and Yvonne continued to engage in financial transactions. Jerry had refinanced the practice’s building in May 2015 and obtained $200,000, which he was solely responsible for repaying, and gave half—$100,000—to Yvonne. For a time, he continued to deposit $6,000 a month into a bank account for Yvonne. Jerry also kept making monthly payments of $2,200 on a laser he had purchased in 2015 for Yvonne’s business until it was paid off in March 2019, even though Yvonne had agreed to make the payments. Jerry also continued to help Yvonne by investing over $120,000 in her new spa company. Jerry testified that he did this because he was “hoping that [they] might be able to work things out because [finances were their] biggest problem,” and he hoped that those issues would be resolved if her business became profitable.
¶9 In June 2017, Jerry and Yvonne realized that reconciliation was no longer a possibility and decided to divorce once again. Jerry made two more deposits of $6,000 in June and July into a personal account for Yvonne, and in August he deposited another $4,500. From September through December he deposited only $2,500 a month, and he did not deposit any money from January through July 2018. The court then ordered Jerry, starting in August 2018, to pay Yvonne temporary alimony in the amount of $1,607 per month, which Jerry paid until trial in April 2019.
¶10 After trial, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, dividing the marital estate and deciding other issues pertinent to the divorce. Only two parts of those findings and conclusions, which were later folded into the divorce decree, are relevant to this appeal. First, the court ruled that “[b]ecause marital funds were expended for the benefit of [the practice, it] was converted from Jerry’s separate property to marital property.” The court based this ruling on its finding that
[o]n two occasions, Jerry decided to use income from [the practice] to reinvest in the practice. First, in 2004 or 2005 Jerry opened a second dental office. . . . Opening that office required capital. Accordingly, through [the practice], Jerry secured a loan. The monthly payment on the loan was $2,000. The . . . office was a failed venture. . . . Jerry used income from [the practice] to pay for this failed expansion, thereby decreasing the funds he routinely pulled from [the practice] to pay marital expenses as he routinely had done.
Second, in 2003 during the first marriage Jerry decided to renovate the [practice’s building]. The renovation required capital. Jerry used available funds from [the practice] as well as a loan to pay for the renovation. . . . The monthly payment was $4,000. This monthly obligation left less money for Jerry to pull from [the practice] to pay for marital expenses as he routinely had done. According to [Yvonne], the renovation debt reduced the family income and [a]ffected “what we did and how we traveled.”
¶11 Second, the court ruled that Yvonne was entitled to $96,409.72 in “pre-decree reasonable monthly expenses.” The court based this amount on the extent to which Yvonne’s reasonable expenses from June 2017 until April 2019—found by the court to be $9,464.45 per month—exceeded her monthly income, i.e., the amounts Jerry made available to her, her own earned income, and the amount she received from the sale of a laser. Specifically, it found that
[Yvonne’s] monthly shortfall—for which she should have had access to marital funds but did not—can be calculated.
For the two months from June and July 2017, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was $8,839.92, her earned income plus the $6,000 Jerry paid to her. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $624.53 each month, for a total shortfall of $1,249.00.
For August 2017, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was $7,339.92, her earned income plus the $4,500 Jerry paid to her. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $2,124.53, the total shortfall for that month.
For the four months from September to December 2017, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was $5,339.92, her earned income plus the $2,500 Jerry paid to her. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $4,124.53 each month, for a total shortfall of $16,489.12.
For the seven months from January to July 2018, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was $2,839.92, her earned income. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $6,624.53 each month, for a total shortfall of $46,371.71.
For the ten months from August 2018 to April 2019, [Yvonne’s] income was $4,446.92, her earned income plus the $1,607 paid to her by Jerry. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $5,017.53 each month, for a total shortfall of $50,175.30.
Prior to the decree, [Yvonne] sold one of the lasers for $10,000.00 and used this money to pay her monthly expenses.
¶12 Jerry appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 Jerry raises two issues. First, he asserts that the district court erred when it determined that the practice had become a marital asset. “[W]hether property is marital or separate is a question of law,” which we review for correctness. Liston v. Liston, 2011 UT App 433, ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 169.
¶14 Second, Jerry contends that the district court erred in ordering him to pay Yvonne $96,409.72 in expenses incurred by her during the pendency of the divorce proceeding that were not covered by her income and marital funds. We review property decisions and alimony awards with considerable deference, reversing only where the district court has exceeded the sound exercise of its discretion. See Hartvigsen v. Hartvigsen, 2018 UT App 238, ¶ 4, 437 P.3d 1257.
¶15 Jerry argues that the district court erred in concluding that the practice—which was unquestionably his separate property at the outset of his marriage to Yvonne—became a marital asset based solely on the fact that practice funds were frequently used to cover family expenses and, at times, the amount of this marital subsidy was reduced to help expand the practice. “The presumption is that marital property will be divided equally while separate property will not be divided at all.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 968. “Married persons have a right to separately own and enjoy property, and that right does not dissipate upon divorce.” Id. “The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property.” Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). “However, separate property is not totally beyond a court’s reach in an equitable property division.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (quotation simplified). Utah law has identified three circumstances that support an award of separate property to the other spouse. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 33. These circumstances are: (1) “when separate property has been commingled” with marital property; (2) “when the other spouse has augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property”—otherwise known as the contribution exception; and (3) “in extraordinary situations when equity so demands.” Id.
¶16 Here, the court did not rule that the practice had been commingled with marital property, or that this was an extraordinary situation. Rather, it concluded that the contribution exception applied. The contribution exception may be satisfied in three ways: (1) “when one spouse brings assets into the marriage and the other spouse’s prudent investment of those assets substantially increases their value”; (2) “when marital funds are expended or marital debt is incurred for the benefit of one spouse’s separate property”; or (3) potentially, “when one spouse works for a business owned by the other spouse but is not paid a wage or salary.” Id. ¶ 35 (quotation simplified).
¶17 Here, the first contribution variant does not apply because it is undisputed that Yvonne did not play a role in investing the practice’s assets to substantially increase their value. The third variant is likewise inapplicable because although Yvonne did work at the practice for a time, she was paid a monthly salary for that work and, indeed, she was paid that salary even when she did not work. Rather, the court relied on the second variation of the contribution exception when it ruled, “Because marital funds were expended for the benefit of [the practice, it] was converted from Jerry’s separate property to marital property.” This determination was erroneous because it is clear from the record that no marital funds were ever used to benefit the practice; the flow of funds was only in the opposite direction.
¶18 To reach its conclusion, the court determined that money that stayed within the practice became marital property simply because Jerry, having previously been more amenable to using money from the practice to pay for family expenses, reduced the amount of those transfers to help fund expansion of the practice. The court reasoned that the practice was converted to a marital asset because funds that were normally diverted from the practice to cover family expenses were instead retained to build the practice. This premise does not satisfy the contribution exception because the practice was at all times a separate asset, and the flow of money went in only one direction: from the practice’s accounts to the personal and joint accounts of Yvonne and Jerry. Once this money left the practice and entered these accounts, that money then became marital property. Cf. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 19, 235 P.3d 782 (“[E]arned income from employment or from rendering professional services during a marriage falls within the usual definition of marital property.”).
¶19 But this one-way flow did not convert the source of that money, i.e., the practice, into a marital asset. The practice therefore never lost its separate character because no money from a marital source was ever used for the benefit of the practice, even though the converse was true. Cf. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that because husband used a marital loan to “maintain and augment” a business asset, that “changed [the asset’s] character from a personal asset to a marital asset”). And this is true even though Jerry at times reduced the amount of money that left the practice to help fund the family’s expenses. Given that Yvonne’s work at the practice was financially compensated—indeed, overcompensated—the only way that the practice in this case could have become a marital asset is if money from Yvonne’s and Jerry’s personal and joint accounts had been regularly used to shore up the practice or the parties took out a marital debt to fund the practice. See Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 35. Cf. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 24 (holding that a husband’s personal and medical practice’s accounts were “inextricably commingled” and both were marital assets because the husband deposited his salary into both accounts and paid for business and personal expenses from both accounts) (quotation simplified). Here, in contrast, the court explicitly found, with our emphasis, that “Jerry decided to use income from [the practice] to reinvest in the practice.” Thus, the practice retained its separate character because the money that became a marital asset after leaving the practice never returned to the practice. Nor were other marital assets used to subsidize the practice.
¶20 Yvonne claims that Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, requires affirmance of the district court’s decision. There, the husband’s income from his medical practice, which income was a marital asset, see id. ¶ 19, “would be deposited along with his separate earnings into his personal account [and] medical practice account . . . [t]hen, both business and personal expenses would be paid from those accounts,” id. ¶ 24. Given this routine, the Keiter court determined that both accounts were marital assets because “they were ‘inextricably commingled’ with both separate and marital income.” Id. Yvonne claims that the same scenario is present here because Jerry “deposited some income into his joint account with [her], some into a personal bank account, and some into [the practice’s] account [and] paid family expenses from each account.” But the critical difference between Keiter and the case at hand is that in Keiter the husband’s salary was deposited into the medical practice’s and the marital account, thus commingling the practice’s account with marital funds, and he then used the funds from both accounts to pay for both business and personal expenses, thereby using marital funds to support and improve his separate property. That is classic commingling, a theory that the district court here correctly avoided. See supra ¶ 16 & note 4.
¶21 Unlike in Keiter, Jerry never deposited his salary—marital income—into the practice’s account, which would have thereby “inextricably commingled” marital funds with separate funds. See Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 24 (quotation simplified). Furthermore, Jerry never used marital funds to pay for business expenses, as was the case in Keiter. Rather, Jerry’s salary left the practice’s account and entered his personal account or a marital account and was never used to cover the practice’s expenses, which the district court specifically found when it stated that only the practice’s own assets were used to expand the practice. And while personal expenses were often covered with additional funds from the practice’s account, this was a one-way flow—no marital funds were ever used to pay for business expenses. The district court therefore erred in treating the practice as a marital asset and awarding Yvonne a portion of the value of the practice.
¶22 Jerry next argues that the district court exceeded its discretion by ordering him to “reimburse [Yvonne] for almost all of her claimed expenses during the twenty-two-month pendency of their separation.”
¶23 “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d 276. “For this reason, it is improper to allow one spouse access to marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the same access.” Id.
¶24 Here, the district court ruled that, “[p]ursuant to the rule articulated in Dahl, [Yvonne]—like Jerry—was entitled to access marital funds to pay her reasonable monthly expenses incurred while the divorce was pending.” The court then ordered Jerry, who effectively had control of the marital funds, to pay Yvonne for her expenses insofar as they exceeded the income she earned plus amounts Jerry advanced while the divorce was pending. The net amount, with a further offset for the value of a laser she sold for $10,000, amounted to $96,409.72.
¶25 Jerry argues that the district court improperly applied our Supreme Court’s holding in Dahl. In that case, the Court held that the district court erred in requiring the wife, who was not living in the marital home and had no access to the marital estate during the pendency of the divorce, to repay her ex-husband money that he had paid her from the marital estate during the course of the divorce proceedings for her living expenses. Id. ¶ 125. The Court ruled that because these funds came from the marital estate and were used to pay the wife’s pre-decree living expenses, she was not obligated to repay the money. Id. ¶¶ 128–129.
¶26 Jerry argues that Dahl does not apply to this case and does not “stand for the proposition that the spouse with access to the marital estate must pay all of the other spouse’s living expenses during the pendency of the divorce.” This argument reflects a misunderstanding of Dahl. The point of Dahl is not that only one spouse may have “access to the marital estate” but that both do, and both are entitled to rely on it to cover their “reasonable and ordinary living expenses” pending entry of the divorce decree.Id. ¶ 126.
¶27 It is true that Dahl is on a slightly different footing than this case. In Dahl, our Supreme Court held that the wife did not have to repay the money she received from the marital estate, rather than, as here, directing that the marital estate would cover the shortfall in her expenses. The Court in Dahl explicitly stated, “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned equally by each party,” and “it is improper to allow one spouse access to marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the same access.” Id. (emphasis added). It further elaborated that “allowing both spouses equal access to marital funds during the pendency of a divorce promotes the goal of a fair, just, and equitable distribution of marital property.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation otherwise simplified). Thus, Dahl stands for the proposition that both spouses are entitled to equal access to the marital estate to fund their reasonable and ordinary living expenses pending the divorce. In accordance with this proposition, the district court appropriately ordered the marital estate to reimburse the shortfall in Yvonne’s pre-decree living expenses with reference to the expense level it deemed reasonable, to the extent those expenses exceeded her earned income, asset sale, and the diminishing amounts Jerry made available to her. At this point, while Jerry might be signing the check, the adjustment is conceptually made from the marital estate—not from funds that are his own separate property. See supra note 8.
¶28 Jerry further argues that the district court’s award should have been offset by the $100,000 he gave Yvonne in May 2015, the value of the equipment he bought for her spa business, the $120,000 he additionally contributed to her business, and other money that he transferred to her from the practice’s accounts. This argument is unavailing. First, the equipment assisted Yvonne in earning an income and paying her bills. That earned income reduced the amount of Yvonne’s monthly shortfall. The cost of that equipment cannot, years later, be used as an offset against Yvonne’s pre-decree living expenses, especially where Yvonne’s earned income already offset those expenses. Second, because the majority of these transactions occurred before the couple’s decision in 2017 to seek a divorce, it was not unreasonable for the court to ignore these transactions when making its award for living expenses after that decision was made, as Yvonne was still entitled to the benefit of the marital estate to help cover those living expenses, as was Jerry, up until the divorce decree was entered.
¶29 The court did, however, make a simple calculating error when it ruled that “[f]or the ten months from August 2018 to April 2019, [Yvonne’s] income was $4,446.92, her earned income plus the $1,607 paid to her by Jerry. Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by $5,017.53 each month, for a total shortfall of $50,175.30.” Both parties agree that the time period actually amounted to nine months, not ten. Thus, the award corresponding to that period should be reduced by $5,017.53. On remand, the district court needs to adjust its pre-decree expense award accordingly.
¶30 The district court erred in concluding that the practice had become a marital asset because no marital funds were used to enhance the practice and the practice had not otherwise lost its character as a separate asset. Beyond a simple calculating error and the apparent oversight detailed in note 10, however, the court did not exceed its discretion in its pre-decree expense ruling that required the marital estate to cover the shortfall in Yvonne’s reasonable living expenses, as found by the court, because Yvonne had an equal right to the marital estate to pay those expenses.
¶31 We remand to the district court to amend its decree to incorporate appropriate changes, in accordance with this opinion.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
 Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
 Following trial, the district court found that this amount was too low “because Jerry had significantly understated his income” and ruled that Jerry’s actual ability to pay was $2,687 per month. The court established this amount as alimony going forward. The court’s alimony determination is not at issue in this appeal.
 In view of the brief hiatus between the parties’ two marriages, corresponding to only one year in a twenty-three-year period when the parties were otherwise married, in adjudicating their second divorce, the district court essentially evaluated their circumstances as though they were parties to a single continuous marriage. In this atypical circumstance and on the facts of this case, this approach seems entirely reasonable, the parties appear to have acquiesced in it during the course of this proceeding, and neither party challenges it on appeal.
 We agree that the practice never became a marital asset under the theory of commingling because Jerry kept the practice’s accounts and the couple’s personal accounts separate at all times. No money ever came back to the practice once it entered the parties’ personal and joint accounts. Thus, it is clear that the practice was never commingled with marital property, even though practice funds were made available, when Jerry saw fit, to subsidize the marital estate.
 The district court considered Jerry’s historical use of business funds to pay marital expenses in calculating alimony.
 Jerry refers to this period as twenty-two months but it is clear that the time frame in question is actually twenty-three months. This is calculated from the time the couple separated in June 2017 up until trial in April 2019. When including June 2017 and April 2019 in the calculation, this is a twenty-three month period.
 Pursuant to Dahl, the marital estate must pay for the “reasonable and ordinary living expenses” of each party during the pendency of their divorce proceedings. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d 276. While Yvonne’s expenses during the relevant period may seem high, Jerry has made no claim that these expenses, as found by the district court, were unreasonable in light of the marital standard of living.
 Jerry characterizes the district court’s order to reimburse Yvonne for her monthly expenses as requiring him to pay it. But Jerry mischaracterizes what the court actually did. Conceptually, it did not order him to pay all her expenses but ordered the marital estate to cover Yvonne’s expenses, an estate in which Yvonne had equal share and to which she should have had equal access. See id. Jerry further argues that he should have to pay only half, at most, of the court’s pre-decree expenses award. This argument is unavailing, however, because Jerry took control of the marital estate to continue to cover his own expenses but deprived Yvonne of that same benefit. Thus, Jerry is required to cover the shortfall in Yvonne’s living expenses from the marital estate, to which he deprived Yvonne access while their divorce was pending.
 As explained above, see supra ¶ 11, once the decision was made to divorce, Jerry initially channeled $6,000 in marital funds per month to Yvonne, leaving a shortfall of only a little over $600 per month. When that allowance dropped to zero for seven months in 2018, the monthly shortfall increased by more than tenfold, to over $6,600.
 There is, however, an expense that Jerry calls to our attention that is on a different footing, namely the $2,200 monthly payment for a laser that he continued to make even after the couple’s June 2017 decision to divorce, and which he continued to pay until March 2019, as specifically found by the district court. It is undisputed that Yvonne agreed to make those payments, but she did not do so. The court did not circle back and deal with these payments when determining its award of pre-decree expenses to Yvonne, even though the court allowed an offset for the $10,000 Yvonne realized upon sale of another laser that Jerry financed, which surely seems analogous. Jerry’s argument that he should have had a further offset for half of the payments made for this laser during the relevant period is persuasive. (As explained above, and as consistent with the district court’s approach, this offset would be only for the payments made between the time the couple decided to divorce in June 2017 and the time Jerry paid off the laser in March 2019.) On remand, the court should deal with this loose end and further adjust the award for Yvonne’s pre-decree expenses as may be appropriate.
HUGH LYNN BJARNSON,
JENNIFER LOU BJARNSON,
Filed October 16, 2020
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
Aaron R. Harris, Attorney for Appellant
Rosemond G. Blakelock and Megan P. Blakelock, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN
¶1 Hugh Lynn Bjarnson and Jennifer Lou Bjarnson were married in 2008. In 2016, Hugh filed for divorce, and the parties separated three months later. Following a bench trial, the district court entered a decree of divorce in 2019. The court’s alimony determination is the sole point of contention on appeal.
¶2 Following the couple’s separation, Jennifer moved in with her ailing mother, with whom she had also lived between the time she separated from a former husband and when she moved in with Hugh. She could not recall how long she had lived with her mother the first time but said that she had done so “briefly.” Her mother’s residence is a fully furnished three-level home, on five acres, in which Jennifer had her own bedroom. When she moved in following her separation from Hugh, she did not pay rent, although she provided care to her mother and testified that she paid her mother’s water assessment. Jennifer asserted at trial that she could not afford to rent an apartment at that time and was “living there because [she had] nowhere else to live.” It was entirely unclear how long she would remain there.
¶3 The court determined that Jennifer was entitled to a monthly alimony award of $1,830, $1,000 of which accounted for her anticipated monthly housing expense, as reflected in her financial declaration. But because she was not obligated to pay rent while living with her mother, the court ordered Hugh to make alimony payments “for the length of the marriage in the amount of $830 per month until . . . Jennifer secures her own housing,” at which time the “alimony will increase to $1,830 per month.” Hugh appeals.
¶4 Hugh’s argument is limited to the prospective aspect of the district court’s alimony award. He does not challenge the $830 monthly obligation currently payable. Instead, he contends that the court exceeded its discretion by ordering a prospective increase in his alimony obligation based upon an uncertain future event. We agree.
¶5 Although “trial courts have broad latitude in determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, and we will not lightly disturb a trial court’s alimony ruling, . . . we will reverse if the court has not exercised its discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set.” Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 11, 402 P.3d 153 (quotation simplified). See also State v. De La Rosa, 2019 UT App 110, ¶ 4, 445 P.3d 955 (“Trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law.”) (quotation simplified). We conclude that it was legal error for the district court to order a prospective increase in alimony based on a possible future event without first finding when—or even whether—such an event will occur. Instead, the court should have reserved the question of a possible change in alimony for a later petition to modify the alimony award should Jennifer’s housing situation change.
¶6 “A prospective change in alimony alters the award to which the recipient spouse would otherwise be entitled based on the trial court’s anticipation of a future event that will materially change the parties’ circumstances.” Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 15, 259 P.3d 1063. But because “the trial court will be better able to make an educated adjustment when and if [a possible future] event actually occurs,” id., “prospective changes to alimony are disfavored,” Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 10, 201 P.3d 942. Indeed, they are appropriate “only as to future events that are ‘certain to occur within a known time frame.’” MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2018 UT 48, ¶ 40, 430 P.3d 612 (quoting Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 10). Thus, in Richardson, a prospective change in alimony was appropriate where it was based on events that were certain to occur on specified dates. See 2008 UT 57, ¶¶ 10–11. In contrast, “a plan to retire, without actually retiring, would be insufficient to justify a prospective alimony reduction.” Id. ¶ 10.
¶7 Here, the district court ordered Hugh to pay a prospective alimony increase of $1,000 per month when “Jennifer secures her own housing.” Other than noting that Jennifer was “residing with her mother rent free right now,” the court made no factual findings regarding her future housing. It did not find that it was “certain” that Jennifer would secure her own independent housing, much less that it would occur “within a known time frame.” See id. Indeed, it could not have so found absent any indication that Jennifer was actively searching for independent housing, that she intended to move out of her mother’s home within a certain timeframe, or that her current living arrangements would be short-lived. The amount of the appropriate increase was also necessarily speculative. The $1,000 may have been a solid estimate based on current conditions, but either high or low depending on when and whither she relocates—if she does. The prospective modification to the alimony award was thus improper under Richardson and its progeny, even though the court’s desire for efficiency is understandable.
¶8 Jennifer argues that “[h]ousing was not considered by the court to be some ‘future’ event.” Rather, she contends the court ordered the alimony increase with the goal of “restor[ing] the parties to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage,” and because an independent living situation had been Jennifer’s standard of living during her marriage, the court properly determined that she was entitled to monthly alimony payments in the amount of $1,830. In support of this argument, she relies on Sauer v. Sauer, 2017 UT App 114, 400 P.3d 1204, in which we affirmed the trial court’s decision to base part of its alimony award on the payee’s future expected housing expenses. See id. ¶ 10. In Sauer, the trial court based its decision on the facts that the payee “live[d] in a trailer on a friend’s property” and that “it [was] unknown how long a person can survive on the good nature of a friend.” Id. (quotation simplified). We noted that the court’s “determination ma[de] conceptual sense” because “[i]n the aftermath of a separation, a party may temporarily return to his or her parents’ home, shelter with friends, or become homeless and thus incur no actual housing expenses.” Id. ¶ 10 n.3. In such situations, “the court may consider what constitutes a reasonable rental or mortgage payment in the relevant area for housing similar to the housing previously shared by the parties.” Id.
¶9 Although the district court in this case would have been entitled to make such a determination if it had found that Jennifer’s living situation with her mother was a temporary byproduct of the divorce, as with the examples mentioned in Sauer, the court took a different course. Instead of ordering Hugh to immediately begin making monthly payments of $1,830—as would have been consistent with the approach taken in Sauer— the court determined that a monthly alimony award of $830 was sufficient to maintain Jennifer’s standard of living while she lived with her mother. The court then made the $1,000 increase in alimony conditional on Jennifer securing her own housing at some later date. The increase was unquestionably a prospective change to its alimony award because it was based “on the trial court’s anticipation of a future event that will materially change the parties’ circumstances,” i.e., a change in Jennifer’s living situation. See Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 15. Thus, the court erred in ordering the prospective increase without first concluding that the material change was “certain to occur within a known time frame.” See Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 10.
¶10 To be sure, the uncertainty of whether or when Jennifer would secure her own independent living arrangement does not undercut her ability to do exactly that at some future date and to seek a corresponding increase in the amount of her alimony. The district court already determined that she would be entitled to an increase in that event. But the proper procedure for seeking an increase in alimony, should she eventually secure other housing, would be for her to file a petition to modify the alimony award. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020). Where an anticipated event is too speculative for the court to consider in its alimony determination at the time of divorce, as is the case here, “the court may . . . delay the determination” by entering “findings indicating that the future [event] has not been considered in making the present award” because material information regarding the future event was unavailable to the court at the time of the divorce decree, thereby avoiding future dismissal of the petition to modify on foreseeability grounds. MacDonald, 2018 UT 48, ¶ 35 (quotation simplified). See id. ¶¶ 34–36, 40–41.
¶11 We therefore vacate the portion of the court’s decree prospectively increasing the alimony award and remand for the court to enter the necessary findings so that the issue is preserved for future resolution and the determination can be made later upon a petition to modify, with any “foreseeability” argument Hugh might otherwise be inclined to make being effectively foreclosed.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
 Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
 Nothing in the record or briefing suggests that Jennifer’s living situation has changed subsequent to entry of the divorce decree.
 Because Hugh prevails on appeal, we deny Jennifer’s request for attorney fees, premised on rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
What would be the legal ramifications if I make my last alimony payment in pennies?
Unless you could prove that the only practicable way you could pay your last alimony payment (which I would imagine would number at least in the hundreds if not the thousands of dollars) in pennies, then if your ex-spouse objected to your attempt to pay your last alimony payment in pennies, the court would likely conclude that your attempt to pay alimony in pennies was primarily for the purpose of inconveniencing and unduly burdening your ex-spouse, would likely require you to pay in cash (in large bills) or check (one check, not a separate check for every dollar you owe), and sanction (fine) you for misconduct.
Paying fines and obligations in pennies was legitimately funny (even if mean-spirited) the first time it was tried. Now it’s just banal, petty, burdensome, silly, and offensive. Forewarned is forearmed. Proceed at your own risk.
Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull, and Benjamin G. Larsen, Attorneys for Appellant
Suzanne Marelius, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
¶1 In April 2018, Brian Joseph Burggraaf and Carol Burggraaf divorced after nearly twenty-two years of marriage. Following a bench trial, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted a decree of divorce. Joseph contends the court erred when it (1) imputed income to him for the purpose of calculating child support and alimony, (2) determined he owed unpaid child support, (3) found the majority of his student loans to be separate debt, and (4) set his budget for the purpose of calculating alimony. Joseph also contends the court’s overall property distribution was inequitable. We affirm in large part but vacate the modest alimony award.
¶2 Joseph and Carol married and had five children. A few years into the marriage, Joseph decided to pursue a medical degree and the family moved to Colorado for his studies. Joseph has a learning disability that hinders his ability to “process new information,” and as a result he struggled academically during medical school. With testing accommodations, he was able to pass the first two medical board exams, but only after attending a tutoring program in Illinois. The parties agree that it cost approximately $4,000 each time Joseph attended the program, but they disagree as to whether the medical school or Joseph’s student loans paid for it, though Joseph offered no evidence to show the medical school had paid for the program. Joseph graduated with a medical degree and approximately $260,000 in student loan debt.
¶3 After graduating from medical school, Joseph did not obtain a full-time residency but was able to secure a temporary position in the state of Washington. He was not offered a permanent position there and was unemployed for one year. Joseph returned to the Illinois tutoring program as a preemptive measure for the third and final board exam, passage of which is required to become a licensed practicing physician. Although he finished the tutoring program, Joseph did not immediately take the exam. Instead, he obtained another temporary residency in Georgia but was fired after thirteen months. Joseph then took the final board exam and failed. He returned to Illinois for the tutoring program but ultimately did not retake the exam because he decided he “would not likely pass.” After considering these facts, the district court determined Joseph “chose to abandon his pursuit of work in the medical field.”
¶4 During Joseph’s medical school and residency pursuits, Carol was “mostly a stay at home mother” who occasionally taught piano lessons to earn extra money. At trial she testified that the family’s frequent moves made it difficult for her to maintain a consistent client base for these lessons. While Joseph was in medical school and residency, the family received government and charitable assistance to make ends meet. At the time of trial, Carol earned approximately $1,100 per month.
¶5 Since deciding to forgo becoming a licensed physician, Joseph’s employment history was sporadic. He was a substitute teacher earning $82 per day for a short time before starting his own business funded by a $16,500 loan from his father. The business failed after a few months; Joseph recouped the investment, but he earned nothing more. He then took seasonal contracting work, earning between $1,863 and $2,900 per month for six months. After that, he sold insurance for a few months; in his “best month” he earned about $900. At the time of trial, Joseph was earning $1,200 per month at a river “tubing” business, working ten-to-twenty hours per week during the off-season and seventy-to-eighty hours per week in the summer. Joseph testified that he also was attending school in pursuit of a master’s degree, which put his student loans in deferment.
¶6 The parties separated following a domestic violence incident, and Carol was granted temporary custody of their five children. Joseph later pled no contest to the criminal charges and was convicted of a class B misdemeanor. Approximately six months later, Joseph began paying Carol $200 per month for child support, which he calculated on his own without a court order.
¶7 The divorce was finalized three years after the date of separation following a four-day bench trial. After hearing evidence from both parties, the court determined Joseph was willfully underemployed and imputed his income for the purposes of calculating child support and alimony, granted Joseph and Carol joint physical and joint legal custody of the children, determined Joseph owed Carol unpaid child support, found the majority of Joseph’s student loans to be separate debt, and awarded Carol alimony. The court also distributed the marital property and debts, accounting for offsets and credits as necessary.
¶8 Both parties asked the district court to impute the other’s income because each claimed the other was willfully underemployed and his or her claimed income did not reflect his or her employment potential.
¶9 The court determined Carol was not willfully underemployed and, using her previous three years’ tax returns, imputed to her a monthly salary of $1,750. But the court found Joseph was willfully underemployed and had “substantially undermined the financial stability” of the family. The court noted Joseph’s history of being secretive about his finances and said he had “lacked candor with [Carol] and the Court.” The court found it significant that Joseph did not “pursue employment associated with his medical degree” and that his “choices of employment [were] significantly different, without believable explanation, depending on if the parties were together or separated.” Further, Joseph did not provide the court with information about “all of his financial accounts” and “ha[d] been untruthful about the true nature of his income and assets.” Joseph also failed to provide evidence of “his current paycheck being deposited.”
¶10 Although Carol asked the court to impute a medical doctor’s salary to Joseph, the court declined to do so, as it was too speculative. Because neither party presented evidence to show what a person in Joseph’s situation—holding a medical degree but not being a licensed physician—could earn in the local area, the court was left to cobble together an average monthly income using Joseph’s earnings when he owned his business and did contracting work as “the most credible evidence of [his] potential income.” The court found it “equitable and just to impute” to Joseph a monthly income of $3,421.
Child Support and Child Custody
¶11 The district court granted Carol and Joseph joint physical and joint legal custody of their five children. In its order, the court gave the two eldest children “broad discretion to exercise parent time in whatever amount they fe[lt was] appropriate with either parent,” although they were “not obligated to exercise said parent time.” The court also recommended the three eldest children “participate in reunification therapy” with Joseph, which they “may attend if they so desire but will not be forced.” With regard to the three youngest children, the court gave Joseph overnight parent-time every other weekend and one weeknight every other week and, during the other weeks, one non-overnight midweek visit. Carol was given “all other regular parent time not awarded to” Joseph, with the parties sharing statutorily prescribed holiday time and summer vacation.
¶12 In determining Joseph’s child support obligation, the court acknowledged the parties stipulated to joint physical custody but noted Carol was in reality the “primary custodial parent” and thus “responsible for all of the day-to-day out-of-pocket expenses for the children while they are with [her].” Joseph also testified he never had more than every other weekend with the two eldest children and Carol testified their middle child “often chose to do other things” than stay with him. Although Joseph calculated his child support obligation on his own to arrive at his $200 monthly figure, he failed to take into account the fact that only the two youngest children were with him for 142 nights, or more than thirty percent of the year. Because of this, the court used the sole custody worksheet to determine Joseph’s child support obligation.
¶13 The court gave Joseph credit for paying $200 per month (a total of $4,847.50) but, because it decided Joseph’s child support obligation was actually $1,138 per month during that period, he owed Carol more than $40,000 in unpaid child support.
¶14 At trial, Joseph argued his student loans, which were “in excess of $260,000,” should be considered a marital debt. He claimed only $59,551.34 of the money was used for medical school tuition and the rest was used for family expenses. He testified that the medical school paid for all books, laboratory coats, and equipment, such as stethoscopes. Carol denied this and testified that not only was the family using government assistance and charitable donations to pay their living expenses, but Joseph kept the money from his student loans in a separate account to which Carol had no access. Evidence also showed Joseph incurred “extra costs” such as “equipment, study aids, tutoring resources and [the Illinois] preparation course based on his perceived need due to his processing/learning disorder that were above and beyond the tuition expenses.” To dispute this, Joseph offered into evidence bank statements from two months showing a total of $3,308 in student loan money was deposited into the couple’s joint account, which was used for “living expenses, to pay the rent . . . utility bills . . . [and] kid expenses.”
¶15 The district court determined Joseph’s student loan debt was his separate obligation, with the exception of the $3,308 deposit into the joint checking account. In making this determination, the court found Joseph was not “credible in his representation that of $260,000 in student loans, only 25% was needed for actual school related costs.” The court noted Joseph “is the only one that may ever receive any benefit of his medical degree if he ever chooses to utilize it” and that he “solely decided to abandon his plans to be a licensed medical doctor.” Because of this, the court concluded “it would be unjust to require” Carol to share in the responsibility for the student loans.
¶16 In preparation for trial, Carol and Joseph each submitted to the court estimated monthly budgets. Joseph’s total monthly budget was $4,706 and included a line item for “education (self)” of $1,500. Carol’s monthly budget was $5,476, including a line item for “extra-curricular activities (children)” of $850.
¶17 Each testified extensively about their monthly expenses. Joseph did not produce documentation to support his contention that he paid $1,500 per month for his current educational pursuits. But he testified that his medical school student loans were in deferment because he was attending school. The parties each testified that, during the marriage, they struggled financially. At one time, they lived with Joseph’s parents, and they often received institutional charity, government aid, and help from their families.
¶18 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court adjusted Carol’s budget and removed anything it found to be “discretionary and not reasonable necessary expenses,” including the children’s extra-curricular activities. The court determined Carol’s reasonable monthly budget to be $2,855, which, after calculating child support and her imputed income, left “her with a shortfall of $86 per month.”
¶19 The court declined to give Joseph a line item for his student loans because they were in deferment and he was not making payments on them. He also did not get a line item for his current educational expenses. The court said it omitted these items from Joseph’s submitted budget as discretionary and unnecessary “[b]ased on the testimony of the parties and the verifying documents presented at trial,” noting “none of [Joseph’s] documents reflect any student-aid, loans[,] or other assistance or expenses related to his current course of study” and Joseph “claimed to be paying approximately $1,500 per month in educational expenses for himself . . . with no documentation.”
¶20 In determining Joseph owed Carol alimony, the court considered:
[T]he financial condition and needs of [Carol], [her] earning capacity or ability to produce income, including the impact of diminished workplace experience resulting from primarily caring for the children, the length of the marriage, whether [she] has custody of the minor children requiring support, and whether [she] directly contributed to any increase in [Joseph’s] skill by enabling [him] to attend school during the marriage.
The court found each factor supported an award of alimony. The court also noted “there was credible evidence that [Joseph] knowingly and intentionally caused physical harm to [Carol] and [Joseph] substantially undermined the financial stability of” the family, which the court said further supported the alimony award. Because the court imputed a monthly income of $3,421 to Joseph, after subtracting what it deemed his reasonable monthly expenses, the court determined he had an excess of $446 per month.
¶21 Using the budgets the court set and the parties’ imputed income, the court determined Joseph had an unpaid alimony obligation of $5,580, to be deducted from his share of the proceeds generated from the sale of their house, a marital asset. The court also determined Joseph’s ongoing alimony obligation to Carol would be $86 per month to account for her shortfall.
¶22 Joseph and Carol had a marital home that they sold before the divorce for $205,374.05, the proceeds of which were kept in a trust account. The district court began the property division by allocating half of the proceeds to each party. It then determined the value of certain items of disputed property and to whom the items should be awarded. As it did this, the court gave the non-receiving party an offset from the recipient’s house proceeds. For example, Carol was awarded a grand piano, valued at $11,907, and Joseph was thus awarded a $5,953.50 offset from Carol’s share of the house proceeds. The court used this same method to divide the marital debts and to reimburse Carol for half of the children’s medical, dental, and orthodontic bills she had incurred on her own. Because the court found Joseph owed Carol unpaid child support and unpaid alimony, those amounts also were deducted from his share of the house proceeds. In addition to his student loan debt, Joseph was deemed solely responsible for the $16,500 loan from his father and $4,000 he had charged on the joint credit card for attorney fees related to his criminal case. The court divided the remaining debts equally.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶23 Joseph raises five issues on appeal. First, he claims the district court’s imputation of his income to calculate his child support and alimony obligations was in error because the court failed to apply the statutory guidelines. “We review the [district] court’s interpretation of statutory requirements for correctness.” Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 7, 272 P.3d 748. The court’s ultimate imputation of income is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶ 41, 443 P.3d 1217.
¶24 Second, Joseph contends the district court erred when it calculated his child support obligation and found he owed unpaid child support. “Because [district] courts have broad discretion to award child support, we will not disturb such decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” Reller v. Argenziano, 2015 UT App 241, ¶ 15, 360 P.3d 768 (quotation simplified).
¶25 Third, Joseph contends the district court erred when it determined the majority of his student loan debt to be his separate obligation. “There is no fixed formula for determining the division of debts in a divorce action. We require only that the district court’s allocation of debt be based on adequate factual findings. And we will not disturb those findings absent an abuse of discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 139 (quotation simplified).
¶26 Fourth, Joseph alleges the district court erred when it set his budget for the alimony calculation. District “courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25, 367 P.3d 1036 (quotation simplified).
¶27 Finally, Joseph claims the district court’s overall distribution of property is inequitable. District courts have “considerable discretion” in this area as well, and we will uphold the district court’s decision concerning property distribution “unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Gerwe v. Gerwe, 2018 UT App 75, ¶ 8, 424 P.3d 1113 (quotation simplified).
I. Income Imputation
¶28 Joseph contends the district court erred when it imputed his income, alleging the court did not follow Utah Code section 78B-12-203 regarding (1) gross annual income, (2) self-employment income, and (3) the factors for imputing income. Income may be imputed to a party if, “in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge . . . enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2018). Because the parties each wanted the other’s income imputed, the district court heard evidence related to their incomes.
A. Gross Annual Income
¶29 Utah Code section 78B-12-203 establishes the method by which district courts may impute gross income. Section 78B-12-203(5)(a) directs courts, “[w]hen possible,” to compute income “on an annual basis and then recalculate to determine the average gross monthly income.” As Joseph points out, “courts frequently average several years of income.” (Citing Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d 890; Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶¶ 8, 28, 337 P.3d 296; Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 2, 294 P.3d 591.) He claims the court erred because it took his “few highest earnings months out of the last several years and made that the imputation number.” (Quotation simplified.) But this does not necessarily constitute error. The statute says courts must compute an annual income “when possible.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(5)(a) (emphasis added). Because Joseph had not held a consistent job and failed to provide “copies of all of his financial accounts,” proof of his current income being deposited, or his tax documents (even after the court requested them), it was well within the court’s discretion, under the circumstances, to impute Joseph’s income as it did, and doing so did not constitute a “misunderstanding or misapplication of the law.” Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 19, 414 P.3d 1069 (quotation simplified); see alsoDole v. Dole, 2018 UT App 195, ¶ 7, 437 P.3d 464 (upholding imputation when “the actual income of [a spouse] is impossible to determine due to [his or her] dishonesty to [the district court], to [his or her] unaccountable income, and to his [or her] failure and refusal to obtain traditional employment” (quotation simplified)). Thus, we do not disturb the court’s imputation of Joseph’s income by averaging his monthly income from owning his own business and performing contracting work.
B. Self-Employment Income
¶30 Joseph next argues the district court failed to follow statutory procedures for imputing income for a self-employed individual. If a party is self-employed or operates his or her own business, Utah law directs courts to “subtract necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(4)(a). Joseph started his own business with a $16,500 loan and operated it for three months, during which time he recouped the investment but earned nothing more. When imputing his income, the district court divided $16,500 by three and determined Joseph was capable of earning $5,500 per month. Joseph argues this was in error because he “earned nothing” during that period after subtracting necessary business expenses, which he identified as a computer, scanner, insurance, and travel. But Joseph did not provide any evidence of business expenses, and the court recognized his history of being “secretive about his finances” and his lack of candor. The court merely used this figure as a “high water mark” as evidence of his “potential income.” In these circumstances, the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
C. Statutory Factors
¶31 Finally, Joseph asserts the district court failed to follow the factors identified in Utah Code section 78B-12-203(8)(b). A court may not impute income to a party in contested cases unless “a hearing is held and the judge . . . enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(a). The court “shall” base the imputation on ten factors, “to the extent known.” Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(b). These factors are “(i) employment opportunities; (ii) work history; (iii) occupation qualifications; (iv) educational attainment; (v) literacy; (vi) age; (vii) health; (viii) criminal record; (ix) other employment barriers and background factors; and (x) prevailing earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.” Id.
¶32 Joseph claims the district court “failed to acknowledge the factors that are most important here,” namely employment opportunities, work history, health, criminal record, other employment barriers and background factors, and prevailing earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds in the community. But the record is clear that the court did consider these factors; the factors simply did not weigh in Joseph’s favor. For instance, Joseph argues the court should have considered his learning disability and criminal record, which it dId. The court found Joseph “still very employable even considering those obstacles” and pointed to Joseph’s own testimony, which “emphasized his ability to work hard, long hours and across many fields of employment.” Joseph did not provide support for his assertion that his class B misdemeanor was the reason he could not obtain more lucrative employment. The court also considered Joseph’s work history. It noted his “choices of employment have been significantly different, without believable explanation, depending on if the parties were together or separated” and found that “his current and historical income during the parties’ separation is a deliberate attempt to minimize his financial obligations.” It also found it incredible that Joseph—an individual with a medical degree—was earning “barely more than minimum wage.” Thus, the record shows the court considered the statutory factors, and the conclusions it drew from its consideration of them were therefore well within its broad discretion.
II. Child Support
¶33 Joseph next argues the district court erred when it (1) used the sole custody worksheet to calculate his child support obligation and (2) determined he owed Carol unpaid child support. For the reasons detailed below, these arguments fail.
A. Sole Custody Worksheet
¶34 In Utah, “child support obligations are generally calculated using a worksheet in cases of joint physical custody. Moreover, for purposes of calculating child support, the designation of ‘joint physical custody’ or ‘sole physical custody’ is not as important as whether the custody arrangement exceeds the statutory threshold for joint physical custody.” Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196, ¶ 29, 437 P.3d 445 (quotation simplified). District courts are given broad discretion in decisions regarding child support. Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 21, 414 P.3d 1069. If a court deviates from the statutory guidelines, it must make a finding that following them “would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child.” Gore v. Grant, 2015 UT App 113, ¶ 13, 349 P.3d 779 (quotation simplified).
¶35 The district court noted Carol and Joseph had agreed upon joint physical custody, but it nevertheless used the sole custody worksheet to determine Joseph’s child support obligation. The court supported its determination by making findings that Carol actually had the three eldest children overnight at her house for more than 70% of the time. Joseph’s own testimony supports this determination: only the two youngest children spent a standard parent time schedule with him. Thus, Carol had sole physical custody—defined in terms of overnights, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15) (LexisNexis 2018)—of three of the children, and the parties shared joint physical custody of two of the children. Under these unique circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to apply the sole custody worksheet.
B. Unpaid Child Support
¶36 Joseph also claims the district court erred when it found he owed thirty-six months’ worth of unpaid child support, based upon his imputed income, dating back to the filing of the divorce petition. He argues the court was without authority to ascribe unpaid support to him retroactively because Carol never asked the district court to enter a temporary order establishing the appropriate amount of child support to be paid during the pendency of the divorce case. But Joseph has not identified any statute or caselaw to support his position. See Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d 1036 (“Where the contentions on appeal are asserted without the support of legal reasoning or authority, this court will not assume the appellant’s burden of argument and research.” (quotation simplified)). Moreover, “child support is a basic and unalienable right vested in the minor,” Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 39 (quotation simplified), and “[e]very child is presumed to be in need of the support of the child’s mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children,” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-105(1) (LexisNexis 2018). Joseph was aware of his duty to support his children, as evidenced by his $200 monthly payments to Carol. Simply because he chose an arbitrary—and low—amount does not absolve him of the responsibility to fully support his five children.
¶37 Because Joseph failed to point us to statutory or other authority to instruct us otherwise, we decline to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Carol unpaid Burggraaf v. Burggraaf 20180405-CA 17 2019 UT App 195 child support, dating back to the date the divorce petition was filed, even in the absence of a temporary order.
III. Student Loans
¶38 Joseph challenges the district court’s determination that the majority of the student loan debt was his separate obligation. “Neither spouse is personally liable for the separate debts, obligations, or liabilities of the other . . . contracted or incurred during the marriage, except family expenses.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-5 (LexisNexis 2018). “There is no fixed formula for determining the division of debts in a divorce action. We require only that the district court’s allocation of debt be based on adequate factual findings. And we will not disturb those findings absent an abuse of discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 139 (quotation simplified).
¶39 We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s finding that, in these unique circumstances, the majority of the student loan debt should be considered Joseph’s separate obligation. The court determined that Joseph alone had made the decision to “abandon his plans to be a licensed medical doctor” and that he should therefore be responsible for repaying the vast majority of the student loans associated with obtaining his medical degree. The court supported its conclusion by reviewing the parties’ testimonies about the loans and determining Carol to be the most credible. “Credibility determinations are within the province of the [district] judge, who is uniquely equipped to make factual findings based exclusively on oral testimony due to his or her opportunity to view the witnesses firsthand, to assess their demeanor and to reconsider their testimonies in the context of the proceeding as a whole.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 34, 321 P.3d 200 (quotation simplified).
¶40 The court did not find Joseph’s testimony about using approximately $200,000 of his student loans for family expenses credible. Joseph provided no evidence to support his claim, other than two bank statements showing $3,308 was deposited into their joint account; the rest was kept in a separate account to which Carol had no access. Conversely, the court found Carol’s testimony “about the resources she utilized from teaching piano lessons, welfare from the parties’ church, family help and government assistance . . . credible and believable.” The court also noted Joseph’s testimony about “the extras that he needed in order to successfully complete medical school course work and the licensing tests,” but indicated Joseph “did not acknowledge any were above and beyond the tuition amount.” In these circumstances, the court’s findings were not an abuse of its broad discretion.
¶41 Joseph argues the budget the district court set for him in calculating his alimony was arbitrarily low, because it (1) failed to give him a line item for either his student loan debt or his current educational expenses, (2) failed to calculate his alimony obligation using the marital standard of living, and (3) supported its alimony award by finding Joseph at fault. District “courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25, 367 P.3d 1036 (quotation simplified). Because we agree with Joseph that the district court should have given him a line item in his budget for either his student loan debt or tuition payments to keep the loan in deferral, we do not address the marital standard of living or fault arguments.
¶42 When deciding whether to award alimony, a district court must consider seven statutory factors, including “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). In determining Joseph’s alimony obligation, the court took each party’s proposed monthly budget and adjusted it to remove discretionary expenses. It did not include a line item for Joseph’s claimed $1,500 in educational expenses for himself. The court also declined to give him a line item for his student loan debt, because it was in deferment and he was not currently making payments on it. Although the court weighed statutory factors such as “the financial condition and needs of [Carol]; [her] earning capacity or ability to produce income, including the impact of diminished workplace experience resulting from primarily caring for the children, the length of the marriage, whether [Carol] ha[d] custody of the minor children requiring support, and whether [she] directly contributed to any increase in [Joseph’s] skill by enabling [him] to attend school during the marriage,” seeId. § 30-3-5(8)(i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vii), the court failed to consider an additional mandatory factor, namely Joseph’s ability to pay, Id. § 30-3-5(8)(iii).
¶43 We conclude the court’s failure to consider Joseph’s ability to pay alimony was a “clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified). Because the district court found the majority of Joseph’s student loan debt to be his sole obligation, it should have included a line item in his budget either for his student loan payments or for tuition payments that would keep the loan repayment in deferral. We acknowledge Joseph is not currently making student loan payments, but because he was found solely responsible for the loan debt and his share of the house proceeds are insufficient to pay off that debt, we cannot see on this record how he would not be entitled to a line item in his budget to account for either student loan payments or tuition payments.
Although Joseph has a $446 excess in his court-determined budget, a line item for even half of his requested educational expenses would eliminate said excess. This would certainly affect his ability to pay the most modest alimony award. We therefore vacate the award of alimony.
V. Property Distribution
¶44 Finally, Joseph argues the district court’s overall property distribution was inequitable. “Generally, district courts have considerable discretion concerning property distribution in a divorce proceeding and their determinations enjoy a presumption of validity. Thus, we will uphold the decision of the district court on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119, (quotation simplified). Joseph contends he received “93% of the total debt [but only] 25% of the liquid assets.” But as he points out, we cannot “consider the property division in a vacuum.” (Quoting Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.1 (Utah 1987).) Because the debt division Joseph cites includes both his student loan debt, the majority of which the court found was not marital debt, and the loan Joseph received from his father, which the court also found to be separate debt, the percentages he cites are artificially inflated. In reality, the court split the marital debts equally and did the same with the house proceeds. This does not constitute “a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119 (quotation simplified).
¶45 Because the district court did not exceed its considerable discretion in imputing Joseph’s income, calculating child support, finding the student loans to be separate debt, and in its overall property distribution, we affirm its decisions on those points. But we vacate the modest alimony award because Joseph does not have the ability to pay it in light of his student loan debt.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
 Because both parties share a last name, we use their given names “with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.” Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985.
 “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard” and “present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, n.1, 321 P.3d 200 (quotation simplified).
 Joseph denies the allegation and claims the conviction prevents him from obtaining meaningful employment.
 “‘Joint physical custody’ means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15) (LexisNexis 2018).
 Our practice is to provide a parallel citation to reported Utah appellate opinions. For reasons unknown, this opinion has not found its way into the Pacific Reporter, third series, in the four years since it was issued.
 Although this statute “addresses imputation for the purposes of child support, it is also relevant to imputation in the alimony context.” Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 14 n.5, 242 P.3d 787. Because the material provisions cited have not changed, we cite the current version of the Utah Code.
 It is theoretically possible that Joseph could be the recipient of a scholarship or other financial aid that would allow him to attend school and thereby keep the student loan debt in deferment without actually making any out-of-pocket payment.
But there was no such evidence presented at trial, and the district court made no findings to this effect. Joseph’s testimony that he paid $1,500 per month to finance his current education stands unrefuted. And such a situation would in any event be relatively temporary; at some point in the near future, Joseph will be compelled to begin making payments on $260,000 of student loan debt that the district court assigned solely to him. Some provision must be made in Joseph’s budget to account for this expense.
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MELVIN C. MCQUARRIE, Appellant and Cross-appellee,
JANETTE COLLEDGE MCQUARRIE, Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Opinion No. 20170956-CA
Filed August 29, 2019
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
James A. McIntyre and Richard R. Golden, Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-appellee
Douglas B. Thayer, Andrew V. Wright, and Cole L. Bingham, Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-appellant
JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
¶1 Melvin C. McQuarrie appeals the district court’s order dismissing his counter-petition to modify a divorce decree (Decree). He argues the court erred in determining that his alimony obligation did not terminate when Janette Colledge McQuarrie remarried. Janette cross-appeals, arguing the court erred in calculating her attorney fees award and in denying portions of her motion for an order to show cause why Melvin should not be held in contempt of court (Show Cause Motion). We affirm the district court’s determination that Melvin’s alimony obligation continued after Janette’s remarriage. We conclude the court abused its discretion in denying portions of the Show Cause Motion but not in calculating Janette’s attorney fees award. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 Janette and Melvin divorced in 2008, and a Decree was entered pursuant to a mediated stipulation for divorce. The Decree named Janette primary caregiver to the parties’ minor child and ordered Melvin to pay $3,000 per month in child support until the child reached “the age of 26 or so long as [the child remained] a college student, whichever occur[red] later.” A child support obligation worksheet was attached to the stipulation. In that worksheet, the parties acknowledged that Janette’s child support award was greater than the amount set by the statutory guidelines and indicated that the reason for the upward deviation was the parties’ “property settlement.”
¶3 The Decree ordered Melvin to pay “$2,000.00 per month as alimony with a cost of living increase up to 3% per annum” while child support continued. After child support terminated, alimony would be “adjusted pursuant to the sum set forth in ‘Exhibit C’ to the [parties’ stipulation], with a cost of living increase of up to 3% per annum.” Exhibit C is a spreadsheet that appears to summarize the payments and assets Janette would receive under the stipulation. It lists yearly payments from 2008 to 2039 (372 months) in each of the following categories: (1) Alimony and Child Support, (2) Taxes on Alimony, (3) Health Insurance, (4) Car Allowance, (5) Utilities and Property Taxes, and (6) House Maintenance. Exhibit C also provides sums labeled “House Value,” “New Furniture,” and “Personal Assets,” as well as a sum labeled “Total Net Present Value.” The alimony and child support category provides for a $5,000 payment in 2008, and the payment increases each year until the final payment of $12,500.40 in 2039. The Decree states that alimony will continue “until the first of any of the following occurrences: [Melvin’s] death; [t]he expiration of 372 months from the signing of the [Decree]; or [Janette’s] death.”
¶4 The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase a $1,000,000 annuity for Janette within “[t]hirty-six months after the signing of the [Decree].” Janette was “to be irrevocably designated as the beneficiary of the annuity during her lifetime with the power to designate any blood relative as the beneficiary of any death benefit provided by the annuity” and was to dictate a “payout duration in excess of fifteen years.” The Decree said it was “anticipated that the annuity [would] provide a stream of income to [Janette] for her lifetime sufficient to supplement what [Melvin] pays as alimony.” In a footnote, the Decree ordered Janette and Melvin to meet every three years “at the Hyatt Regency, or comparable hotel, in San Diego, California” “without spouses or attorneys” “to review their respective standard of living.” To maintain an “equal” standard of living, the footnote also permitted “an upward adjust[ment] of alimony . . . , but never a downward adjustment.”
¶5 Next, the Decree “divided and awarded” the parties’ property and their “marital debts and obligations.” Janette was awarded the parties’ marital house. The Decree ordered Melvin to pay various expenses related to the house, and those payments were listed in sub-paragraphs 18(a)–(g). Sub-paragraph 18(a) ordered Melvin “to satisfy the monthly payments owing on the first deed of trust,” and sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) ordered him to, among other things, pay the “real property taxes and homeowner’s insurance” until the first deed of trust was satisfied. But paragraph 21 provides, “Upon [Melvin’s] purchase of the annuity . . . [his] responsibility for the payments outlined in paragraph 18(b)–(g) is ordered to cease and [his] obligation with respect to those items will be at an end.” The Decree states that “[Melvin’s] payment of the first deed of trust, the real property taxes, and the homeowner’s insurance constitutes a part of the property settlement.” Janette also received an award of “one-half of [Melvin’s] 401(k) retirement benefits accrued during the parties’ marriage.”
¶6 As “part of the property settlement agreed upon by the parties,” the Decree ordered Melvin to permanently “employ [Janette] with one of his companies” and, as a benefit of that employment, the company was required to “pay for [Janette’s] health insurance premiums for as long as [she] require[d] medical insurance.” The Decree also ordered Melvin to “maintain medical insurance for the medical expenses of the [parties’] minor child” and to “pay for the minor child’s out-of-pocket costs” and “uninsured medical expenses.” The Decree ordered that if Janette incurred “medical expenses on behalf of the minor child,” she was to either “provide written verification of the cost and payment of the medical expenses she paid on the minor child’s behalf” to Melvin or make arrangements “so that [Melvin] may be billed directly.” Following the provisions dealing with medical insurance, the Decree states that “[t]he payment of [Janette’s] health insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses constitute a portion of the property settlement.”
¶7 Many of the Decree’s provisions mention Janette’s potential remarriage, and the Decree provides that certain obligations will terminate if she remarries. For example, sub-paragraph 7(a) states that Melvin “shall not be responsible for any medical premium, prescription, out of pocket, or co-pay expense related to [Janette’s] future spouse, or spouse’s children.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 11 allows Janette “to designate any blood relative as the beneficiary of any death benefit provided by the annuity,” but “in the event she remarries, she may not designate her spouse or his children as beneficiaries.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 28 provides, “In the event [Janette was] unmarried, commencing in 2011, and every five years thereafter so long as [Janette] remain[ed] single, [Melvin was] ordered to purchase or lease for [her] . . . a model year 2012 Cadillac Escalade, or equivalent.” (Emphasis added.) Under paragraph 19, “should [Janette] remarry,” Melvin shall “continue to pay the first deed of trust until it is paid in full” but he will be “relieved of any and all obligations to pay and maintain the items in . . . sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g).” (Emphasis added.) Finally, paragraph 29 provides that the parties cannot divest assets to a future spouse, and paragraph 30 prohibits the disclosure of any settlement or of the terms of the Decree to future spouses. The Decree does not contain a separate provision addressing whether Melvin’s alimony obligation would terminate or continue if Janette remarried.
¶8 Janette remarried in 2014. That year, she filed a petition to modify the Decree (Petition to Modify) based on Melvin’s alleged fraud. She claimed Melvin did not disclose certain assets and “misrepresented the value of the marital home . . . for purposes of inducing her to enter into the property settlement.” Janette also filed the Show Cause Motion, asserting Melvin should be held in contempt of court for, among other things, failing to pay a cost of living increase on the alimony award, Janette’s “uncovered” and “out-of-pocket medical expenses,” and “one-half of [his] 401(k),” and for failing to purchase the $1,000,000 annuity.
¶9 Melvin filed a counter-petition to modify (Counter-petition). He asserted Janette’s remarriage constituted “a substantial and material change in the parties’ circumstances” that justified terminating his alimony obligation. Specifically, he argued that alimony terminated as a matter of law upon Janette’s remarriage because the Decree did not “specifically provide otherwise.” See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (“Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.”).
¶10 After a hearing, a court commissioner entered a recommendation on the Petition to Modify, the Show Cause Motion, and the Counter-petition. To start, the commissioner recommended denying Melvin’s request to terminate alimony. The commissioner reasoned, “[A]lthough the decree does not state alimony will not terminate upon remarriage, the Decree is clear on its face considering all the other references to remarriage in the other provisions . . . that the parties intended for alimony to survive remarriage.”
¶11 Next, the commissioner addressed the Show Cause Motion, beginning with the cost of living adjustment to alimony. First, the commissioner concluded that the alimony provisions established “a cost of living increase of up to 3% per annum (and never downward),” but that the actual increase was “to be determined by the Consumer Price Index [(CPI)].” Second, the commissioner concluded “the Decree does not require [Melvin] to pay for [Janette’s] out of pocket medical costs.” Third, the commissioner found “the payment of half of [Melvin’s] 401(k) account ha[d] been satisfied . . . by [Melvin’s] payment to [Janette] in the amount of $8,885.52.” Fourth, because Melvin did not purchase the annuity within thirty-six months of the entry of the Decree, the commissioner recommended that Janette receive “a judgment in an amount sufficient to compensate her for the loss of the stream of income, past and future, from the ordered annuity.” But if Melvin purchased “an annuity which pa[id] $6,728.63 per month for 140 months,” the commissioner concluded “his purchase of the annuity [would] satisfy the judgment entered against him.” The commissioner also concluded that Melvin should receive “credit against the annuity judgment for payments he made . . . (that [Janette] would have otherwise been paying herself out of the stream of income from the annuity) . . . past the date that the annuity should have been purchased.”
¶12 Janette filed an objection to the commissioner’s recommendation. First, she claimed the cost of living adjustment to alimony should “be a straight 3% each year,” regardless of the CPI. Second, she asserted Melvin should not receive credits against his annuity obligation for payments listed in subparagraphs 18(b)–(g) of the Decree because those payments “were to continue until [he] purchased the annuity—which he did not do.” She objected to the recommended amount for Melvin’s annuity obligation, claiming the written recommendation differed from what the commissioner orally recommended at the hearing. Third, she argued that Melvin had not paid her half the value of his 401(k) account. Fourth, she asserted Melvin should pay her out-of-pocket medical expenses because “the Decree clearly states that [Melvin’s] payment of [Janette’s] health insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses constitute a portion of the property settlement.”
¶13 After a period of discovery, Janette filed a motion to limit issues for trial. While that motion was pending, Melvin filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his claim that alimony terminated as a matter of law when Janette remarried because the Decree did not “specifically provide otherwise.” The court scheduled a hearing on the motion to limit issues for trial, and the court commissioner scheduled a hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment.
¶14 At the hearing on the motion to limit issues for trial, the district court told the parties it wanted to “simply have a discussion” about the case. It explained that the parties’ stipulation that “made the basis of the [Decree was] going to be followed” and the only issue worth pursuing in the case was “the possibility of the allegation of fraud.” The court determined that alimony did not terminate upon Janette’s remarriage because the Decree “could be fairly read and interpreted that the parties either negotiated away—or clearly understood . . . what those alimony provisions were.” And “[e]ven though they may have been characterized as . . . alimony, when you look at the way they were treated, . . . it clearly looks to be . . . that it was a—in a way, a property settlement agreement.” The court also said “you could interpret [the Decree] to read the parties specified, clearly, the terms of—as it relates to the alimony and waived, knowingly, the statutory benefit that they would have had on the issue of remarriage.”
¶15 The court also expressed skepticism toward the merits of the Petition to Modify. It said, “I don’t have any indications of all the facts or the evidence, but I don’t see any fraud here. Okay? There was negotiation and understanding with respect to what the settlement agreement was.” But “[i]f there really was two or three items left out of this property agreement,” the court explained, “whether they were left out intentionally, on purpose, [or] negligently, . . . fairness and equity would clearly require that they be looked at.” Janette responded that she was “willing to waive that claim altogether” and then said, “that leaves us—there’s nothing else to decide . . . other than the issue of fees.”
¶16 Melvin informed the court that a summary judgment motion on “the issue of remarriage and the fact that the [Decree] does not specifically provide that alimony doesn’t terminate upon remarriage . . . [was] before the commissioner [the following] week.” After acknowledging the commissioner’s order determining that alimony did not terminate upon remarriage—which was signed by the district court—Melvin said he would “like to have [the commissioner] have the opportunity to make a recommendation” with “the benefit of the [new] briefing that’s involved . . . [and] there are several more recent Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases that bear on the issue.” The court responded, “If you want to try to get a second bite at the apple and convince [the commissioner], that’s fine.”
¶17 But the court concluded that it was “ready to issue an order of dismissal” and saw no “need to set trial,” and turned to address Janette’s request for attorney fees. The court determined she was entitled to fees “that relate to the enforcement in the first place and the requirement for [Melvin] to give the annuity and to comply with the other terms and provisions” of the Decree. Specifically, the court found that Janette was the prevailing party on the Show Cause Motion, explaining that “the hearings brought up such quick decisions . . . [b]ecause [Melvin] was not in compliance with the [Decree].” But the court said it would view other fees “with some skepticism” because both parties “lost on [their petitions to modify] with respect to not being able to prove a substantial material change in circumstances.”
¶18 Although the district court dismissed the case, the court commissioner nevertheless held a hearing on Melvin’s motion for partial summary judgment and recommended that the motion be denied. Melvin filed an objection to the commissioner’s recommendation, asserting again that Utah Code section 30-3-5(9) required termination of his alimony obligation. The court rejected Melvin’s objection to the recommendation and entered an order denying his motion for summary judgment.
¶19 The court then entered an order memorializing its verbal dismissal of the Petition to Modify and the Counter-petition. It found “that the Stipulation and Decree between the parties [would] be followed as written.” And after reviewing “all the language in the Decree,” it concluded the alimony provisions “were not something that would be terminated or eliminated based upon the remarriage of [Janette].” That is, it found “that the Decree language specifically provides that the alimony/child support payments would continue beyond remarriage and were structured to provide the appropriate division of the marital assets to [Janette].” The order also stated the court would “award [Janette’s] attorney’s fees regarding her attempts to enforce the Decree’s terms” and requested that Janette “submit the required affidavit on [her] attorney’s fees.”
¶20 After the petitions had been dismissed, Janette filed a request to submit for decision her objection to the commissioner’s recommendation on the Show Cause Motion. The court denied Janette’s objection. It explained, “[T]he recommendation signed by the commissioner and the court is the order that will be complied with by the parties as the court has not found the commissioner erred as a matter of law and the court independently agrees with the decision made by the commissioner.”
¶21 Janette submitted an attorney fees declaration that claimed she incurred $302,602 in attorney fees throughout the case with $275,659 “incurred in [her] efforts to enforce the terms of the [Decree]” and $61,448 relating “to the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion].” Janette then filed a proposed order with an award of $275,659 in attorney fees. The court responded with a notice titled “Not Signed Order (Proposed) Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs.” The notice stated that “the only fees that [would] be awarded [were] those the court already so stated for the [Show Cause Motion].” Janette then filed a second proposed order with an award of $61,448 in attorney fees. Again, the court refused to sign the proposed order and noted, “These fees are not reasonable for an [order to show cause] hearing before the commissioner and then the court. The court will issue a ruling on the amount to be awarded.”
¶22 The court entered an order awarding Janette $9,480 in attorney fees. The order provided, “While both parties prevailed on some issues and were less successful on others, [Janette] was the prevailing party in relation to the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion].” And “having conducted a review of the entries attached to the [attorney fees affidavit],” the court concluded that $9,480 “incurred in fees was reasonable and necessary in relation to the prosecution of the [Show Cause Motion].”
¶23 Melvin appeals; Janette cross-appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶24 Melvin argues the district court erred in determining that his alimony obligation survived Janette’s remarriage. This issue requires us to review the court’s interpretation of the Decree as well as its interpretation and application of Utah Code section 30-3-5(9). “Interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 14, 294 P.3d 600. “The proper interpretation and application of a statute is [also] a question of law which we review for correctness.” Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified).
¶25 Janette cross-appeals, raising two issues. First, she argues “the district court erred in denying portions of [the Show Cause Motion]” by misinterpreting and misapplying the Decree. “An order relating to contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the district court.” Wolferts v. Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶ 8, 315 P.3d 448 (quotation simplified). “In the absence of any action by the [district] court which is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion, we will not overturn the [district] court’s order.” Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, ¶ 6, 977 P.2d 539 (quotation simplified). “We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations for correctness.” LD III LLC v. Davis, 2016 UT App 206, ¶ 12, 385 P.3d 689 (quotation simplified).
¶26 Second, Janette argues the district court erred in awarding her only $9,480 in attorney fees. “We review a [district] court’s decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, ¶ 8, 197 P.3d 117.
¶27 Melvin argues his alimony obligation automatically terminated upon Janette’s remarriage because the Decree did not “specifically provide otherwise.” See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). We disagree.
¶28 “Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse.” Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Utah courts have long recognized this presumption, see, e.g., Austad v. Austad, 269 P.2d 284, 290 (Utah 1954) (“[T]here is implicit in the divorce decree the provision that the alimony continues only so long as the [receiving spouse] remains unmarried.”), and it is now codified in Utah Code section 30-3-5(9). That provision provides, “Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9).
¶29 Here, the Decree was entered by default “pursuant to the terms set forth in” Melvin and Janette’s “mediated stipulation for divorce.” “[I]n the context of a divorce, parties are generally bound by their stipulations.” Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 378 P.3d 1232. “Accordingly, we interpret [the Decree] according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Id. (quotation simplified). “The underlying purpose in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract.” Id. (quotation simplified). To do that, “we look to the plain meaning of the contractual language, and we consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶30 The Decree does not identify Janette’s remarriage as an event that will terminate Melvin’s obligation to pay alimony. Instead, paragraph 10 orders Melvin to make alimony payments “until the first of any of the following occurrences: [Melvin’s] death; [t]he expiration of 372 months from the signing of the [Decree]; or [Janette’s] death.” As Janette notes in her brief, “‘the specification of terms in a contract implies the exclusion of all not expressed.’” (Quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 415.) And absent the statute, we would infer that the parties intended alimony to survive Janette’s remarriage based on their decision to omit remarriage from paragraph 10’s list of terminating events. See Martin v. Rasmussen, 2014 UT App 200, ¶ 18, 334 P.3d 507 (“This court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted.” (quotation simplified)). But our precedent establishes that paragraph 10, without more, does “not provide for an exception to the general rule.” See Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1984) (determining that a divorce decree stating “alimony is to run for a period of three years” did “not provide for an exception to the general rule that alimony terminates upon remarriage”), disavowed on other grounds by Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); see also Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 398–99 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the “frivolous” argument that language in a divorce decree providing “alimony would continue until [the receiving party] reached 65” without referring to “earlier termination upon . . . remarriage” “might be deemed to mean the decree had ‘specifically provided otherwise’ and required alimony to be paid until age 65 regardless of whether [the receiving party] remarried” (quotation simplified)).
¶31 Nevertheless, our analysis must consider paragraph 10 “in relation to” each of the Decree’s other provisions, “with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” See Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). And based on our review of the Decree “as a whole,” we conclude that its language specifically provides that alimony would survive Janette’s remarriage. See id. For example, paragraphs 19 and 28 state that certain payments—the car allowance and various expenses related to the marital house—would terminate upon Janette’s remarriage. These provisions strengthen an inference that the parties intentionally omitted remarriage from paragraph 10.
¶32 We also find it significant that paragraph 10 includes Janette’s death as a terminating event. The statute creates a presumption that alimony “terminates upon the remarriage or death” of the receiving spouse. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (emphasis added). If the parties intended alimony to terminate either upon Janette’s death or remarriage, the reasonable action would have been to allow the statute to govern either event or include them both in paragraph 10. Indeed, listing Janette’s death as a terminating event would have been unnecessary under those circumstances, and it seems the parties’ decision to do so would be rendered meaningless if we were to conclude that alimony also terminated upon Janette’s remarriage. The rules of contract interpretation dictate that we avoid such a result. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2018 UT App 153, ¶ 16, 436 P.3d 123 (“In interpreting a contract, . . . we look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless.” (quotation simplified)).
¶33 Further, footnote 4 orders Melvin and Janette to meet every three years—without spouses—“to review their respective standard of living” and potentially adjust alimony upward to comply with the order that “the standard of living . . . be equal.” (Emphasis added.) The same footnote prohibits Janette and Melvin from “sharing any documentation or making any disclosure regarding the [parties’ stipulation] with future spouses, [or] spouses’ children.” (Emphasis added.) We cannot ignore this provision, which orders the parties to discuss and potentially adjust alimony even after Janette’s potential remarriage.
¶34 Melvin attempts to diminish footnote 4’s significance by claiming our interpretation “requires [us] to assume that one of the spouses would be [Janette’s] spouse.” That is, he asserts “it is equally logical that over a period of more than thirty years [Melvin] might remarry more than once and thus have [multiple] spouses who would be excluded from the meeting or from knowledge of the negotiations.” This argument is not well taken. Although Melvin possibly could have a current spouse as well as multiple former spouses at the time of the triennial review, we do not assume that the parties anticipated Melvin having multiple spouses at the same time. Instead, the only reasonable interpretation of this provision establishes that the spouse of each party who is married at the time of the review is prohibited from attending. And because footnote 4 contemplates the parties discussing alimony during the triennial review, it shows a clear intent that those payments would not terminate upon Janette’s remarriage. Moreover, any other interpretation would render this provision meaningless.
¶35 As outlined above, see supra ¶ 7, the Decree is replete with references to future spouses. The Decree’s provisions delineate obligations, but they expressly exclude a future spouse or that spouse’s children. Janette is allowed to designate a beneficiary for a required annuity, but she expressly may not designate a future spouse or that spouse’s children. The requirement for Melvin to pay off the marital house’s mortgage continues even if Janette remarries. Finally, the Decree prohibits divestiture of assets or the disclosure of the terms of the Decree to a future spouse. These provisions lead us to conclude that the parties considered Janette’s potential remarriage and specifically agreed on how that event would affect their respective rights and obligations under the Decree. Accordingly, the only “reasonable” interpretation of the Decree as a whole is that alimony terminates only as expressly provided in paragraph 10. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d 193 (“[W]e interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract.” (emphasis added)).
¶36 Therefore, we conclude that Melvin’s alimony obligation did not automatically terminate upon Janette’s remarriage, because the Decree “specifically provides otherwise,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9), and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Melvin’s petition to terminate alimony.
Show Cause Motion
¶37 The Show Cause Motion asked the district court to hold Melvin in contempt of court for not complying with various provisions of the Decree. Janette argues the court “erred in denying portions of [the Show Cause Motion] because it failed to interpret and give the terms of the Decree the effect the plain language called for.”
¶38 “Disobedience of any lawful judgment or order of the court is contempt of the authority of the court.” Clarke v. Clarke, 2012 UT App 328, ¶ 24, 292 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) (LexisNexis 2018). To “prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” Clark, 2012 UT App 328, ¶ 24 (quotation simplified). “Once the court finds a person in contempt, it may then elect to impose an appropriate sanction.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 32, 294 P.3d 600. An appropriate sanction may include monetary damages “if an actual loss or injury to a party in an action is caused by the contempt.” In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, ¶ 7, 132 P.3d 684 (quotation simplified).
¶39 “The rule of damages in a contempt case is the same as if the party were being proceeded against directly on the underlying obligation.” Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 532 (Utah 1981). The court’s order should seek to compensate the aggrieved party for the “actual loss or injury” caused by the contempt. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1) (allowing courts to “order the person proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved party’s costs and expenses”); see also Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 37, 299 P.3d 1079 (“Because these awards compensated [the aggrieved party] for the actual loss or injury that [the contempt] caused, they were proper under the Contempt Statute.” (quotation simplified)). Further, the court’s calculation of damages should be supported by evidence of the aggrieved party’s loss. See Valerios Corp. v. Macias, 2015 UT App 4, ¶ 24, 342 P.3d 1127 (explaining that the evidence must “provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages” (quotation simplified)).
¶40 Janette raises four issues regarding the Show Cause Motion. First, she challenges the court’s conclusion that Melvin was not required “to pay [her] out of pocket medical expenses.” Second, she claims the court erred in determining that the yearly cost of living increase to Melvin’s alimony obligation “could be less than 3%.” Third, she contends the court provided Melvin with a “windfall” by not requiring him to purchase an annuity that complied with “the terms of the annuity [he] was obligated to purchase” and by awarding him credit against the annuity judgment to which he was not entitled. Fourth, she argues the court erred in determining “Melvin satisfied his obligation to pay [her] half of his 401(k).” We address each argument in turn.
Out-of-Pocket Medical Costs
¶41 In the Show Cause Motion, Janette moved the district court to hold Melvin in contempt for refusing to “pay for all of [her] uncovered medical expenses.” The court denied her motion after determining the Decree did not require Melvin to make any such payment. Janette argues the court’s decision was “contrary to the Decree’s plain and unambiguous language.” We disagree.
¶42 “We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 18, 973 P.2d 431 (quotation simplified). “The underlying purpose in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract. To ascertain the parties’ intentions, we look to the plain meaning of the contractual language, and we consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others.” Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 378 P.3d 1232 (quotation simplified).
¶43 A review of the Decree “as a whole” leads us to conclude that Melvin was not required to pay for Janette’s personal out-of-pocket medical costs. Paragraph 7 of the Decree orders Melvin to employ Janette with one of his companies and requires that company to “pay for [her] health insurance premiums for so long as [she] requires medical insurance.” Paragraph 7 does not state that Melvin must pay any of Janette’s out-of-pocket costs. In contrast, paragraph 6 orders Melvin to “maintain medical insurance for the medical expenses of the [parties’] minor child . . . through [his] employment” and “pay for the minor child’s out-of-pocket costs of the premium for the child’s portion of the insurance.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 6 also requires Melvin to “pay for the minor child’s reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties’ minor child.” (Emphasis added.) Under sub-paragraph 6(a), Janette must provide Melvin with written verification of any medical expenses “[she] incurs on behalf of the minor child . . . within 30 days of payment” or make arrangements “so that [Melvin] may be billed directly.” Janette’s argument relies on sub-paragraph 7(b), which provides that “[t]he payment of [Janette’s] health insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses constitute a portion of the property settlement.” (Emphasis added.)
¶44 Because the Decree includes the child’s out-of-pocket costs in paragraph 6 and omits Janette’s out-of-pocket costs from paragraph 7, it seems the parties intended that Melvin be responsible only for the out-of-pocket medical expenses incurred for the child’s benefit—not those incurred for the benefit of Janette. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2018 UT App 153, ¶ 16, 436 P.3d 123 (explaining that “we look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless” (quotation simplified)). If the parties intended to require Melvin to pay Janette’s out-of-pocket medical costs, they would have expressed such intent in paragraph 7. Pioneer Builders Co. of Nevada Inc. v. K D A Corp., 2018 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 539 (“The cardinal rule in contract interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as they are expressed in the plain language of the agreement itself.” (quotation simplified)). Sub-paragraph 7(b) does not alter the result. The only “uncovered medical expenses” the Decree orders Melvin to pay are those incurred on behalf of the child. Thus, we see no reason to conclude that Janette’s personal out-of-pocket expenses were meant to be included among the expenses mentioned in sub-paragraph 7(b).
¶45 In sum, we reject Janette’s argument that “the Decree’s plain and unambiguous language” requires Melvin to pay Janette’s own uncovered medical expenses. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Janette’s motion to hold Melvin in contempt for refusing to pay for those costs.
Annual Adjustments to Alimony
¶46 Janette argues the district court erred in determining that the yearly cost of living increase to Melvin’s alimony obligation “could be less than 3%.” We disagree. The Decree orders Melvin to pay alimony, “with a cost of living increase of up to 3% per annum (based upon the CPI, but never to be less than the present amount being paid).” (Emphasis added.) This unambiguous language does not support Janette’s argument that the yearly increase must be at least 3%. See Brady v. Park, 2019 UT 16, ¶ 53, 445 P.3d 395 (“If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language.” (quotation simplified)). That is, stating that the increase will be up to 3% leaves open the possibility that the increase may be lower than 3%. Janette argues that Exhibit C to the parties’ stipulation shows that alimony was to increase at a fixed rate of 3% per year because the yearly payments for “Alimony/Child Support” listed on Exhibit C increase by 3% each year. But the Decree is clear. It sets a flexible standard for the yearly increase to allow the parties to “equalize” their respective standards of living. For example, footnote 4 allows the parties to “include an upward adjustment to alimony beyond the CPI.” Thus, the amounts listed in Exhibit C are merely estimates.
¶47 In short, we see no support for Janette’s contention that the yearly increase to alimony must be at least “a flat 3% per year.” Accordingly, the court’s “interpretation of the [Decree] was [not] erroneous as a matter of law,” and Janette has therefore failed to “convince us that the [district] court committed error.” See Christensen v. Christensen, 2018 UT App 53, ¶ 5, 420 P.3d 106 (quotation simplified).
Melvin’s Annuity Obligation
¶48 The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase Janette a $1,000,000 annuity within thirty-six months of the entry of the Decree. It is undisputed that Melvin did not purchase the annuity within that period. Accordingly, the district court entered a judgment against Melvin “in an amount sufficient to compensate [Janette] for the loss of the stream of income, past and future, from the ordered annuity.” The order allowed Melvin to “satisfy the judgment entered against him” by purchasing “an annuity which pays $6,728.63 per month for 140 months.” The court also awarded Melvin “credit against the annuity judgment for payments he made to [Janette] for [her] benefit (that [she] would have otherwise been paying herself out of the stream of income from the annuity) past the date that the annuity should have been purchased.”
¶49 Janette argues the court abused its discretion by not requiring Melvin to purchase an annuity that complied with “the terms of the annuity [he] was obligated to purchase” and by awarding him credit against the annuity judgment to which he was not entitled. This argument has merit. Because the evidence does not support the district court’s order, see Valerios Corp. v. Macias, 2015 UT App 4, ¶ 24, 342 P.3d 1127 (explaining that the evidence must “provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages” (quotation simplified)), and does not compensate Janette for the “actual loss or injury” that Melvin caused her by failing to timely purchase the annuity, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing courts to “order the person proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved party’s costs and expenses”), we conclude the court’s ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion.
¶50 First, the evidence does not support the court’s decision to award Melvin “credits toward the annuity price” for making the payments listed in sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) “past the date that the annuity should have been purchased.” Sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) ordered Melvin to pay various expenses related to the marital house. But paragraph 21 states, “Upon [Melvin’s] purchase of the annuity . . . , [his] responsibility for the payments outlined in paragraph 18(b)–(g) is ordered to cease.” Thus, Melvin was obligated to make the payments listed in sub-paragraph 18(b)–(g) until he purchased the annuity. Because it is undisputed that Melvin did not timely purchase the annuity, it follows that his obligation to make those payments did not “cease” at the time the annuity should have been purchased. Accordingly, we see no evidentiary basis for the court’s decision to grant Melvin credit against the annuity judgment for payments made under sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) “past the date the annuity should have been purchased.” And we conclude that doing so amounted to an abuse of discretion. See Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 33, 294 P.3d 600 (“[A]ny award of damages must be based on something more than mere speculation.”).
¶51 Second, we agree with Janette that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Melvin to satisfy the judgment against him by purchasing an annuity that (1) did not list Janette as the irrevocable beneficiary, (2) had a term fewer than fifteen years, (3) was less than the face value of the annuity he was obligated to purchase under the Decree, and (4) did not account for the loss in value Janette incurred by Melvin failing to purchase the annuity in a timely fashion. Although the court concluded Janette was entitled to “a judgment in an amount sufficient to compensate her for the loss of the stream of income, past and future, from the ordered annuity,” its order allowed Melvin to satisfy that judgment without compensating Janette for the “actual loss or injury” that resulted from him not fulfilling his obligations under the Decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1).
¶52 The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase an annuity of $1,000,000 and required its “payout duration” to be “in excess of fifteen years.” Further, Janette was to “be irrevocably designated as the beneficiary of the annuity during her lifetime with the power to designate any blood relative as the beneficiary of any death benefit provided by the annuity.” In direct conflict with those terms, the court’s order allowed Melvin to “satisfy the judgment entered against him for the annuity” by purchasing “an annuity which pays $6,728.63 per month for 140 months”—a total of $942,008 paid over a period of less than twelve years. Further, the order did not satisfy the Decree’s requirement that Janette “be irrevocably designated as the beneficiary of the annuity.” Accordingly, we see no evidentiary basis for the court’s order, and we agree with Janette that the court abused its discretion by allowing Melvin a “windfall as a result of his own breach.” See Valerios Corp., 2015 UT App 4, ¶ 24 (explaining that the evidence must “provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages” (quotation simplified)).
¶53 Because we see no evidence supporting the court’s calculation of damages for Melvin’s failure to timely purchase the annuity, we conclude its actions amount to “a clear abuse of discretion.” Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, we reverse its order and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the court should enter a judgment against Melvin that adequately compensates Janette for the “actual loss or injury” caused by Melvin’s failure to purchase the annuity within thirty-six months after the Decree was entered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1).
¶54 Janette argues the district court erred in determining that Melvin had “satisfied his obligation to pay [Janette] half of his 401(k).” We are not persuaded.
¶55 The Decree awarded Janette “one-half of [Melvin’s] 401(k) retirement benefits accrued during the parties’ marriage.” Paragraph 16 provided for an “appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order securing [Janette’s] interest in said retirement plan,” but Melvin was “ordered to try and have the account divided equally without the necessity of a QDRO.” In its recommendation, the court commissioner found that “the payment of half of [Melvin’s] 401(k) account ha[d] been satisfied . . . by [his] payment to [Janette] in the amount of $8,885.52.” The district court approved the commissioner’s determination.
¶56 Janette challenges the court’s decision. She starts by claiming Melvin’s “401(k) had a balance of $37,612.62” when the Decree was entered on November 21, 2008. According to Janette, Melvin “waited until February 20, 2009, to liquidate the account”—about three months after the Decree was entered— when “the account’s balance had allegedly dropped from $37,612.62 to approximately $17,771.04.” Janette then argues that because the Decree ordered Melvin to pay her one-half of the account’s balance when the Decree was entered (which she claims was $18,803.31), she was entitled to “a judgment against [Melvin] in the amount of $9,922.79; i.e., the difference between the amount received and half of the account’s balance when the Decree was entered.”
¶57 Janette has failed “to carry [her] burden of persuasion on appeal.” See Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 (quotation simplified). First, the record does not support Janette’s assertion that the 401(k)’s balance was $37,612.62 when the Decree was entered. Her brief cites an account summary for the period of October 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, that lists a “total value” of $37,612.62 on October 1, 2008, and a “total value” of $28,904.27 on December 31, 2008. But because the Decree was not entered until November 28, 2008, the account summary does not reveal the account’s balance at the time the Decree was entered. The account summary supports the district court’s finding that the balance was declining because “the market had tanked,” and it shows that the “total value” of the 401(k) when the Decree was entered was likely between $37,612.62 (value as of October 1) and $28,904.27 (value as of December 31). Further, the account summary divides the “total value” into two categories: “employee money” and “employer money.” It states that the “employer account balance may not [have been] 100% vested” and “if [Melvin] terminate[d] employment, [he] might not [have] receive[d] all of the money [his] employer [had] contributed to the plan.” The “employee money” was $28,173 on October 1, 2008, and $21,650.32 on December 31, 2008. Accordingly, the record shows that the amount of “employee money” in Melvin’s 401(k) when the Decree was entered was between $21,650.32 and $28,173; not, as Janette claims, $37,612.62.
¶58 Second, Janette has not convinced us that the court abused its discretion in concluding that Melvin satisfied his obligation to pay her half of the 401(k) with the $8,885.52 payment. Below, Melvin argued that “due to the rapidly declining value of the mutual funds in which the 401(k) was invested, the parties agreed to try and divide the account equally without the necessity of a QDRO by liquidating the account.” And he asserted that when the 401(k) was liquidated, “a direct deposit was made into [his] account in the amount of $18,421.13.” He “paid the mandatory 10% penalty of $1,842 which yielded a balance of $8,289.52 each.” Thus, Melvin claimed that he actually “over-paid Janette by $595.95” because she received $8,885.52 when “[her] one-half of the 401(k) was only $8,289.57.”
¶59 The court commissioner accepted Melvin’s argument, finding that Melvin “took the check that he got” for “the reduced value of the 401(k) after the market had tanked, divided that in half, and gave half of the remaining value to [Janette].” The commissioner even found that Melvin paid “some taxes on—on the withdrawal, but those were not taken out of [Janette’s] share.” Based on those findings, the commissioner concluded that Janette had “been made whole by [Melvin] paying her [$8,885.52].” Janette has not shown that this conclusion was in error. As far as we can tell, Melvin complied with the Decree’s order to divide the 401(k) equally between the parties by liquidating the account and paying Janette half of what he received.
¶60 We conclude that the court’s order was not “so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion,” Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, ¶ 6, 977 P.2d 539 (quotation simplified), and we affirm the court’s determination that Melvin satisfied his obligation to pay Janette one-half of his 401(k) benefits accrued during the parties’ marriage.
III. Attorney Fees
¶61 Janette argues “the district court erred by arbitrarily reducing [her] attorney fee award.” We disagree.
¶62 “Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) authorizes an award of costs and attorney fees ‘in any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case’ upon the court’s determination ‘that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.’” Wollsieffer v. Wollsieffer, 2019 UT App 99, ¶ 13 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018)). Fees awarded under section 30-3-3(2) “serve no equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other party’s recalcitrance.” Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 30, 233 P.3d 836. “In other words, when one party refuses to comply with a court order, thereby compelling another party to seek its enforcement, that party risks liability for the fees and costs accrued in the enforcement proceeding.” Wollsieffer, 2019 UT App 99, ¶ 13.
¶63 “Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the [district] court’s sound discretion.” Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 10, 176 P.3d 476 (quotation simplified). But in fixing the amount of reasonable fees, the court should consider (1) the legal work “actually performed,” (2) the amount of work that was “reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter,” (3) whether the attorney’s billing rate is “consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services,” and (4) any “circumstances which require consideration of additional factors.” Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988).
¶64 Here, the district court awarded Janette attorney fees “regarding her attempts to enforce the Decree’s terms” and said, “While both parties prevailed on some issues and were less successful on others, [Janette] was the prevailing party in relation to the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion].” The court explained further that the Show Cause Motion “brought up such quick decisions . . . [b]ecause [Melvin] was not in compliance with the [D]ecree.” We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to award attorney fees to Janette only for her efforts to prosecute the Show Cause Motion. See Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶¶ 70–71, 247 P.3d 380 (explaining that a court’s “decision about who prevailed” should be “based on an approach that [is] flexible and reasoned” and highlighting “the importance of . . . common sense”). In prosecuting that motion, Janette successfully enforced the Decree by showing that Melvin failed to timely purchase the annuity. Thus, it was reasonable for the court to award her attorney fees “accrued in [that] enforcement proceeding.” See Wollsieffer, 2019 UT App 99, ¶ 13.
¶65 Janette submitted an attorney fees affidavit detailing the fees she incurred in the case. The affidavit claimed “$275,659.00 was incurred in [her] efforts to enforce the terms of the [Decree]” and, of that amount, $61,448 was incurred in “the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion].” Based on that affidavit, Janette filed a proposed order with an award of $275,659 in attorney fees. After the court rejected this amount, Janette requested an award of $61,448. But the court determined that those “fees [were] not reasonable for an [order to show cause] hearing before the commissioner and then the court.” After reviewing Janette’s attorney fees affidavit, the court determined $9,480 “incurred in fees was reasonable and necessary in relation to the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion]” and entered an order reflecting that amount.
¶66 The district court’s fees award does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Janette requested $61,448 in fees, but the record reveals that the court concluded such an amount was not “reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute” the Show Cause Motion. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. We cannot say such a conclusion was “beyond the limits of reasonability.” See Strohm v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 52, 308 P.3d 424 (quotation simplified). As the court explained, Janette prevailed on the Show Cause Motion because Melvin simply “was not in compliance with the Decree.” Janette may believe that $9,480 is insufficient for her enforcement efforts, but “the amount itself does not prove that the trial court abused its discretion.” Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 55, 56 P.3d 524. And although Janette argues that “this matter has been heavily contested and aggressively litigated by both parties,” a district court “is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation.” Strohm, 2013 UT 21, ¶ 52 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s award of attorney fees to Janette because we are not convinced that the award amounted to “patent error or clear abuse of discretion.” See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989 (quotation simplified).
¶67 We note, however, that our remand of the annuity issue may affect Janette’s attorney fees award. As the prevailing party on the Show Cause Motion, Janette is entitled to fees on remand reasonably incurred enforcing the Decree’s terms. Further, because Janette received attorney fees for enforcing the Decree below and she has substantially “prevailed on the main issues on appeal,” she is entitled to attorney fees incurred for enforcing the Decree on appeal. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ¶ 32, 147 P.3d 464 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, we direct the court to award Janette her fees incurred for that purpose on appeal and the fees she incurs for that purpose on remand.
¶68 We affirm the district court’s determination that Melvin’s alimony obligation continued after Janette’s remarriage. But we conclude the court abused its discretion by entering a judgment against Melvin that failed to compensate Janette for the actual loss caused by his failure to timely purchase the annuity. And we affirm the court’s award of attorney fees to Janette as the prevailing party on the Show Cause Motion. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court should enter a judgment against Melvin that adequately compensates Janette for Melvin’s failure to timely purchase the annuity. It should also award Janette her attorney fees incurred for enforcing the Decree on appeal and the fees she incurs for that purpose on remand.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
 As is our practice when the parties have the same last name, we refer to them by their first names with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
 We are puzzled by this “dismissal.” What began as a pre-trial hearing appears to have resulted in the court’s dismissal of both petitions to modify. In Janette’s case, this appears to have been because she waived the basis for the Petition to Modify at the hearing on the motion to limit issues; in Melvin’s case, the dismissal ruling was made even though a motion for partial summary judgment was still pending.
 Again, we are puzzled. Our review of the record suggests that there was no show cause hearing before the district court.
 Melvin also argues the district court denied him “the right to adequate notice and a fair hearing on the issues he presented” by dismissing the Counter-petition. This issue was not preserved for appeal. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must specifically and timely raise the issue before the district court and “introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” O’Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 18, 217 P.3d 704 (quotation simplified). A review of the record reveals that Melvin did not present his due process argument to the district court, and therefore the court “did not have the opportunity to give full consideration to the issue at that time.” See id. ¶ 19. Further, Melvin’s principal appellate brief does not assert an exception to the preservation rule, and only in his reply brief does he argue “the [district] court committed plain error and the circumstances are exceptional.” Because Melvin has “not argued an exception to our preservation requirement to persuade us to reach” this issue, we do not consider it further. See True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 22, 427 P.3d 338; see also Marcroft v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT App 174, ¶ 4, 356 P.3d 164 (“[W]e have consistently refused to consider arguments of plain error raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief, even if the plain error argument is in response to a dispute over preservation raised for the first time in the appellee’s brief.” (quotation simplified)).
 “Spouse” is defined as “[o]ne’s husband or wife by lawful marriage.” Spouse, Black’s Law Dictionary 1533 (9th ed. 2009).
 “A qualified domestic relations order [(QDRO)] instructs the trustee of a retirement plan and specifies how distributions should be made, to whom, and when.” Potts v. Potts, 2018 UT App 169, ¶ 1 n.2, 436 P.3d 263 (quotation simplified).