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Category: Unwed Parents

I have a family court hearing coming up on the 25th. How do I create a proposed visitation plan to the judges? How will our work schedules play into this? I’m the non-custodial parent.

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Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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Blake v. Smith – 2023 UT App 78 – child custody, child support

Blake v. Smith – 2023 UT App 78

2023 UT App 78

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEJUAN BLAKE,

Appellee,

v.

JILLYN SMITH,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210779-CA

Filed July 20, 2023

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Su Chon

No. 184900112

Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellant

DeJuan Blake, Appellee Pro Se

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY

concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

 

¶1        Jillyn Smith appeals the district court’s order regarding custody and child support for her minor son (Child). Because we determine the court abused its discretion by awarding Smith sole physical and legal custody while requiring joint decision-making between Smith and Child’s father, DeJuan Blake, we vacate that part of the court’s custody award. Furthermore, because we conclude the court made a mathematical error in calculating the amount of child support, and that a further examination of the evidence of Blake’s income is warranted, we reverse the court’s child support award and remand for recalculation as appropriate.

BACKGROUND

¶2        Smith met Blake in 2007 in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the two entered into a relationship. As a result of the relationship, Smith became pregnant with Child in 2009. At the time Smith learned about the pregnancy, she was no longer living in Las Vegas—she had moved to Utah to escape her relationship with Blake.

¶3        After a tumultuous pregnancy, during which Blake continuously asked Smith to have an abortion, Child was born in Utah in October 2009. Blake traveled to Utah to visit Child twice during the first year of Child’s life, with each visit lasting “maybe an hour or two.” The sporadic visits continued over the next few years, with Child and Smith traveling with Blake on short trips together. Although Smith asked Blake for financial support during this time, Blake did not provide support and instead always offered an “excuse.” Eventually, the communications between the couple became too toxic and Smith elected to “take a break from communication” with Blake.

¶4        Thereafter, Smith decided to “give [Blake] a second chance.” Blake and Child had “maybe a few” “infrequent[]” telephone conversations a year, but the conversations were short due to Child’s speech impediment. Blake was not involved in Child’s schooling or scheduling, he never attended Child’s doctor’s appointments, and he “wouldn’t follow through” or offer any explanation as to why he could not help Smith with financial support for Child’s medical care or educational needs.

¶5        Blake traveled to Utah in 2015 to attend Child’s birthday party. Toward the end of the party, Blake and Smith had a verbal altercation regarding Blake’s failure to honor their agreement for Blake to pay Smith child support. Following this visit, Blake returned to Utah once in 2016 to attend Child’s baseball game. That visit also ended in a verbal altercation.

¶6        In January 2018, Blake petitioned the district court for paternity and custody of Child. At the time, Child was eight years old and living with Smith.

¶7        After initiating custody proceedings, Blake filed a series of three financial declarations with the district court. Blake is self-employed and owns a company managing professional and aspiring boxers. Blake’s stated gross income, monthly expenses, and debt listed on each of the three financial declarations differed significantly. In the first declaration, Blake claimed $0 in gross monthly income, $1,875 in monthly expenses, and a debt of $7,240. In the second, Blake claimed $2,000 in gross monthly income, $17,797 in monthly expenses, and no debt. And in the third, Blake claimed $1,686 in gross monthly income, $3,947 in monthly expenses, and no debt. The bank statements filed with each disclosure were incomplete; however, the bank statements that were submitted showed that between August 2017 and January 2019, Blake made deposits into his personal account totaling $456,669.98, and that during that same time, he made withdrawals totaling nearly $50,000 for investments in cryptocurrency, payments to his mother, payments to the mother of one of his other children, and luxury clothing.

¶8        The case proceeded to a bench trial in October 2020. At trial, Smith detailed the relationship between Child and Blake. She explained that Blake had never been actively involved in Child’s life and that Blake had not seen Child at all since May 2016. Smith testified that she and Blake had reached an “original agreement” for child support where Blake would pay her $1,000 per month. She further testified that this agreement did not start until 2015—when Child was already six years old—and that the payments had lasted for only one month. In total, Smith estimated that Blake had contributed $1,600 in support payments “over the entirety of [Child’s] life.”

¶9        Following trial, the district court adjudicated Blake as Child’s father, awarded Smith sole physical and legal custody of Child, and awarded Blake standard relocation parent-time pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-37, which is approximately 17% of the year. In reaching its legal custody determination, the court analyzed the statutory factors outlined in Utah Code sections 30-3-10 and 30-3-10.2 and concluded that the presumption favoring joint legal custody had been rebutted and that joint legal custody was not in Child’s best interest. However, the court ordered a joint decision-making arrangement between the parties, requiring that the parties “discuss with each other decisions that should be made regarding [Child].” The arrangement further provides, “If there is a dispute, the parties should attend mediation and each pay half of the mediation fees. If the dispute remains, then [Smith] will have final say. [Blake] can . . . bring the matter to court if he is unsatisfied with the decision.”

¶10      Regarding child support, the district court primarily calculated Blake’s past child support payments based on his 2018 tax record, where he claimed $45,050 in gross receipts and $34,483 in deductions. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that several of the deductions—totaling $27,530—were unsupported and accordingly struck those deductions. Based on this, the court found that Blake’s “annual income should be $23,790” through March 2020. However, given the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court concluded that “Blake’s income has come to a halt,” and it accordingly found it “appropriate . . . to impute minimum wage income of $1,257/month from March 2020 forward.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11      Smith now appeals the district court’s order regarding custody and child support, raising two issues for our review. First, Smith argues the court abused its discretion when it “issued an internally inconsistent [custody] award” giving Smith “sole legal and physical custody but also order[ing] joint decision-making” between her and Blake. “We review custody determinations under an abuse of discretion standard, giving the district court broad discretion to make custody awards.” K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5, ¶ 24, 414 P.3d 933 (quotation simplified). “But this broad discretion must be guided by the governing law adopted by the Utah Legislature. And on matters of statutory interpretation, we review for correctness.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 155, 459 P.3d 276 (quotation simplified). And “[w]here the court’s findings are internally inconsistent on a material point, reversal and remand are appropriate.” Vandermeide v. Young, 2013 UT App 31, ¶ 21, 296 P.3d 787, cert. denied, 308 P.3d 536 (Utah 2013).[1]

¶12      Second, Smith argues the district court abused its discretion when it calculated Blake’s income for purposes of child support. “We review the district court’s decisions regarding child support . . . under the abuse of discretion standard.” Pankhurst v. Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 36, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 612 (quotation simplified). Where the court’s findings contain mathematical error or conflict with the record, we will remand for recalculation. See Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶¶ 57–60, 496 P.3d 242.

ANALYSIS
I. Custody

¶13      Smith first challenges the district court’s custody award, contending the court abused its discretion in crafting the award because it is “internally inconsistent.” According to Smith, the joint decision-making arrangement “undermines” her award of sole physical and legal custody because it “allows [Blake] to force mediation and litigation whenever he disagrees with a decision made by [Smith], even though she has sole legal and physical custody.” We agree.

¶14      As an initial matter, the Utah Code does not define “sole physical custody” or “sole legal custody.” But in Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9, 270 P.3d 531, our supreme court provided guidance as to the meaning of those terms. In Hansen, the father and the mother were awarded joint custody of their daughter following their divorce. Id. ¶ 2. The mother was awarded sole physical custody and the father was ordered to pay child support to the mother. Id. Sometime later, the daughter entered a private youth homeless shelter, where she lived through her eighteenth birthday. Id. While the daughter was living at the shelter, the father filed a petition with the district court seeking to redirect his child support payments from the mother to the homeless shelter. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The court denied the motion, which denial was ultimately upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 30.

¶15      The supreme court’s decision centered on the meaning of custody. Although the daughter had been residing at the shelter, the court determined that the daughter’s physical custody had not changed; rather, the mother still retained physical custody. Id. ¶¶ 15–19, 28. The court explained,

Family law treatises consistently define custody as a bundle of constituent rights and obligations to a child’s possession, care, and control, and explain that the essence of custody is control over all aspects of the child’s life coupled with responsibility for the child’s welfare. Standard dictionary definitions of custody are to the same effect.

Custody is often divided into two subsets: legal and physical custody. Both encompass a duty of control and supervision. While legal custody carries the power and duty to make the most significant decisions about a child’s life and welfare, physical custody involves the right, obligation, and authority to make necessary day-to-day decisions concerning the child’s welfare. Although the latter is limited to the right to control the child’s daily activities, it still involves a right of control. This grant of authority is necessary so that the custodian can control and discipline the child or make emergency medical or surgical decisions for the child.

Id. ¶¶ 16–17 (quotation simplified). Put differently, “the legal duty of control or supervision [is] the essential hallmark of custody.” Id. ¶ 18 (quotation simplified). Legal custody encompasses the ability to make major decisions in a child’s life, while physical custody encompasses the ability to make day-to-day decisions in a child’s life.

¶16      Although the Utah Code does not define sole physical or legal custody, it does define “joint legal custody” and “joint physical custody.”[2] Under the current statutory scheme, a parent may be awarded “joint legal custody,” which is defined as “the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both parents.” Utah Code § 30-3-10.1(2)(a) (emphasis added). As this court has long recognized, the purpose of joint legal custody is to allow “both parents [to] share the authority and responsibility to make basic decisions regarding their child’s welfare.” See Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 429–30 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

¶17      Taken together, it follows that an award of “sole” legal custody does not involve sharing the “rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent.” See Utah Code § 30-3-10.1(2)(a). Accordingly, when the district court awarded sole legal and physical custody to Smith, it also awarded her alone the “rights and obligations to [Child’s] possession, care, and control,” see Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified), including the sole authority to “make the most significant decisions about [Child’s] life and welfare,” see id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified), and the “authority to make necessary day-to-day decisions concerning [Child’s] welfare,” see id. (quotation simplified). It therefore was inconsistent to simultaneously order a joint decision-making arrangement.

¶18       Moreover, the joint decision-making arrangement is at odds with the district court’s own findings regarding Child’s best interest. “In making a custody determination, a [district] court’s primary focus is what custody arrangement would be in the best interest[] of the child.” Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 2010 UT App 261, ¶ 4, 241 P.3d 365. Utah law presumes that joint legal custody is in a child’s best interest, but that presumption may be rebutted by showing “by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not in the best interest of the child.” Utah Code § 30-3-10(3)–(4). And under Utah law, there is “neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint physical custody or sole physical custody.” Id. § 30­3-10(8).

¶19      “In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both, the court shall consider” a number of statutory factors. See id. § 30-3-10.2(2). Here, the court analyzed the statutory factors and determined that awarding Smith sole legal and physical custody of Child was in Child’s best interest. In particular, the court found that there was “very little evidence provided that either parent could function appropriately with co-parenting skills,” that it was “unclear” whether the parties could work together to reach shared decisions in Child’s best interest, and that there was “very little evidence” the parties “actually discussed and made decisions together.” In light of these findings, it is unclear how the joint decision-making arrangement—which is not limited to major decisions but instead encompasses all decisions—could be properly viewed as advancing Child’s best interest. It does not follow from the evidence of the parties’ ongoing issues making decisions relating to Child that such an arrangement would lead to success in the future. Rather, precisely because of the court’s findings, it seems likely that such an arrangement would cause ongoing issues, result in costly mediation and additional court involvement, and be detrimental to Child’s best interest, which is exactly what Utah law seeks to avoid.

¶20      In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Smith sole physical and legal custody while also ordering a joint decision-making arrangement between Smith and Blake. Although Utah law does not prohibit a joint decision-making arrangement in cases involving an award of joint physical and legal custody, an examination of the underlying statutory scheme reveals that such an arrangement is not compatible with an award of sole physical and legal custody. Furthermore, these competing provisions belie the court’s own findings regarding Child’s best interest as relates to custody. As such, we vacate the portion of the court’s custody award ordering the joint decision-making arrangement.

II. Child Support

¶21      Smith next argues the district court erred in calculating child support. Specifically, Smith takes issue with the court’s calculation of Blake’s income for purposes of child support, contending the court’s calculation (1) contains a mathematical error and (2) is inconsistent with the evidence in the record. We agree.

¶22      The Utah Child Support Act outlines the process by which a district court must evaluate the income of a parent when calculating child support. See generally Utah Code § 78B-12-202. To begin, the court must consider the “gross income” of a parent, which the Utah Code defines broadly as including

prospective income from any source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from “nonmeans-tested” government programs.

Id. § 78B-12-203(1). And when a parent is self-employed—as is the case with Blake—the statute directs how gross income should be handled. It provides that “[g]ross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. . . . Gross income . . . may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax purposes.” Id. § 78B-12-203(4).

¶23      The district court determined that Blake’s income had been impacted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and accordingly evaluated his income for purposes of child support based on what he had earned pre-pandemic and what he was earning during the pandemic. On the record before us, we see two errors in the court’s calculations. First, the court made a discrete mathematical error in calculating Blake’s pre-pandemic income. Second, and more broadly, the court did not consider all the evidence of Blake’s finances when calculating Blake’s income, both pre-pandemic and at the time of trial.

¶24      First, the district court calculated Blake’s past child support payments using his 2018 tax record. On that record, Blake claimed $45,050 in gross receipts. From that, Blake deducted $34,483 as follows: $5,270 for “materials and supplies,” $3,605 for “advertising,” $360 for “legal and professional services,” $500 for “office expense,” $21,760 for “other business property,” and $2,988 for “utilities.” After viewing the evidence, the court found that Blake had failed to adequately explain why he should be entitled to deductions for “materials and supplies” ($5,270), “other business property” ($21,760), or “office expense” ($500), and it accordingly struck those deductions, totaling $27,530. As a result, the court should have concluded that Blake’s income was $38,097, or $3,175 per month rounded. But it did not. Instead, it concluded that Blake’s income was $23,790, or $1,983 per month. This value is mathematically incorrect.

¶25      Second, notwithstanding the mathematical error in the court’s calculation of Blake’s income, the value imputed by the court is inconsistent with the evidence in the record. Utah law is clear that “in contested cases,” a judge is entitled to impute income to a parent so long as the judge “enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” See id. § 78B-12­203(8)(a). “The purpose of such imputation is to prevent parents from reducing their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment.” Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 836 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, when imputing income, “the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings considering,” among other things, “employment opportunities,” “work history,” and “occupation qualifications.” Utah Code § 78B-12­203(8)(b).

¶26      As explained above, the court calculated Blake’s income at $1,983 per month up until the time that the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020. And at trial, which was held in October 2020, the court concluded that due to the pandemic, “Blake’s income has come to a halt” and therefore determined it was “appropriate . . . to impute minimum wage income of $1,257/month from March 2020 forward.” But the financial documents submitted by Blake do not support the low amount of income the court chose to impute.

¶27      Blake’s bank records—which were all filed with the court—show that Blake made deposits into his personal account totaling $456,669.98 between August 2017 and January 2019. These deposits included a check for $200,000, which Blake testified “was for my services that was rendered” in connection with a high-publicity boxing match. And in addition to the deposits, Blake’s bank records show significant withdrawals. For example, the records indicate that Blake had regularly invested in cryptocurrency, had transferred over $15,000 to his mother, had transferred over $9,000 to the mother of one of his other children,[3] and had spent over $10,000 on luxury clothing.

¶28      Despite the evidence of Blake’s spending, Blake did not demonstrate how he was funding his lifestyle, and he claimed only one debt of $7,240 in the first of his three financial disclosures. In light of the foregoing, the district court’s determination that Blake was making no money and therefore should be imputed minimum wage is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the evidence suggests that Blake was less than forthcoming with the court as to the actual amount of his income. As such, on remand the court should reevaluate evidence of Blake’s finances, his earning capacity, and whether he is voluntarily underemployed and should make a further determination as to whether greater income should be imputed to him.[4] In so doing, the court should take special care to ensure that the final award is void of mathematical error.

CONCLUSION

¶29      The district court abused its discretion when it awarded Smith sole physical and legal custody of Child while also ordering a joint decision-making arrangement with Blake. We therefore vacate the court’s custody ruling as it relates to the joint decision-making arrangement. The court also abused its discretion when calculating child support. The current award contains a mathematical error and is not supported by record evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s award of child support and remand with instructions that the court reexamine the evidence to determine whether greater income should be imputed to Blake.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277


[1] Blake did not file a brief or otherwise appear in this appeal. Although “an appellee’s failure to file a brief does not amount to an automatic default and consequent reversal of the lower court,” our supreme court has recently recognized that such failure does impact the “typical burden of persuasion on appeal.” See AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp., 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified). Because an appellee’s failure to raise any argument leaves the appellant’s claims “unrebutted,” see Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC, 2012 UT 17, ¶¶ 18–21, 279 P.3d 391, “when an appellee fails to present us with any argument, an appellant need only establish a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal,” AL-IN Partners, 2021 UT 42, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified). We question whether the standard articulated in AL-IN Partners should apply the same way in cases such as this where the standard of review on appeal is deferential to the discretionary decisions of the district court. But because this issue was not briefed and our decision on both arguments presented ultimately involves the conclusion that the district court did abuse its discretion and committed other errors, we need not decide the issue today. However, we note the question does warrant additional consideration in a case where it is squarely before the court.

[2] In relevant part, the statute defines “joint physical custody” as when “the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year.” Utah Code § 30-3-10.1(3)(a). This particular provision is not applicable here because Blake was awarded standard relocation parent-time which falls below the 30% threshold. See id. § 30-3-37. Nevertheless, Utah law is clear that “[e]ach parent may make decisions regarding the day-to-day care and control of the child while the child is residing with that parent.” Id. § 30-3-10.9(6). Thus, by statute Smith has sole decision-making authority over day-to-day decisions when Child is in her care. Likewise, Blake has decision-making authority over day-to-day decisions when Child is in his care.

[3] This amount does not include child support payments awarded to the mother, which were $1,000 per month. Those support payments were made directly to Nevada’s State Collection and Disbursement Unit.

[4] Smith filed a post-trial motion pursuant to rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to amend, among other things, the court’s child support award. The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying the motion. In analyzing the child support issue, the court stated that “[g]ifts are not generally considered income.” This is legally incorrect. As explained above, the Utah Code explicitly defines “gross income” as including “gifts from anyone.” See Utah Code § 78B-12-203(1). To the extent Blake was gifted items, the court must include the value of those gifts when calculating his income.

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When an Order of Protection Gets Dismissed, Then Legally, There’s Nothing in Place Stating How We Will Share Our Son. What Do I Do Now?

Generally speaking (you will need to confer with an attorney who knows the law governing this question in the jurisdiction where you, the other parent, and the child reside), if there are no other court orders in place that govern the custodial rights of you and the other parent, then:

  • You and the other parent have co-equal custodial rights to the child, but that does not mean that there is any “default” custody schedule or custody sharing schedule that takes effect if you and the other parent cannot agree upon a schedule.
  • That means that (unless a law on the books in your jurisdiction provides otherwise) a parent can withhold contact with the child from the other parent without that constituting any kind of crime. Otherwise stated, it’s legal for a parent to do so. It’s not kind. It’s not fair, but it’s not illegal. You could call the police (as many people do) and tell them (honestly), “The other parent is refusing to let me spend any time with our child” and there is nothing that the police could do for you. Many parents are stunned to learn this when they call the police requesting and expecting help with obtaining time with their children.

o    If you and the other parent are married: you can file for a separation order or for a decree of divorce to request child custody and parent-time orders.

o    If you and the other parent are not married: you can file a child custody action or a paternity (also known as a “parentage”) action to request child custody and parent-time orders, and once the court issues those orders, you and the other parent are bound to comply with them. Failure or refusal to comply can result in A) being held in contempt of court and sanctioned for that contempt and/or B) criminal charges for custodial interference, even child kidnapping.

  • Once the court issues those orders, you and the other parent are bound to comply with them. Failure or refusal to comply can result in A) being held in contempt of court and sanctioned for that contempt and/or B) criminal charges for custodial interference, even child kidnapping.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/When-an-order-of-protection-gets-dismissed-then-legally-theres-nothing-in-place-stating-how-we-will-share-our-son-What-do-I-do

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In Re J.E. 2023 UT App 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity

2023 UT App 3

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.E.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

D.E., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20210921-CA

Filed January 20, 2023

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Annette Jan No. 1198329

D.E., Appellant Pro Se

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Julie J. Nelson, Debra M. Nelson, Alexandra

Mareschal, and Kirstin Norman, Attorneys for

Amicus Curiae Utah Indigent Appellate Defense Division

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 D.E. (Father) obtained—at least for a while—parental rights regarding J.E. (Child) when he and Child’s mother (Mother) duly signed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity (the VDP). Later, however, genetic testing revealed that Father is not Child’s biological father. Based on those test results, the guardian ad litem (the GAL) appointed to represent Child raised a challenge to the VDP, which the juvenile court sustained, later issuing an order invalidating the VDP and declaring it “void.”

¶2 Father now challenges that order, asserting that the GAL (on behalf of Child) had no right under applicable law to challenge the VDP. We first determine that we have jurisdiction to consider Father’s appeal. And on the merits, we conclude that the juvenile court correctly determined that, under the circumstances presented here, Child has statutory standing to challenge the VDP. On that basis, we affirm the court’s decision to reach the merits of Child’s challenge and to sustain that challenge. But the court should not have declared the VDP “void,” and we remand for correction of the language used in the court’s order and for such other proceedings as might be appropriate.

BACKGROUND[1]

¶3 In 2021, Father and Mother were residing together—but not married—with three children: then-one-year-old Child and his two older siblings. All three children are Mother’s biological children, and Father’s paternity had been established as to the older two children. At the time, both Mother and Father were uncertain whether Father was the biological father of Child, because they were both aware that Mother had engaged in sexual activity with both Father and another man in 2019, around the time Child had been conceived. But neither Father nor any other man had established paternity with regard to Child.

¶4 In early 2021, Father was arrested and charged with aggravated assault involving domestic violence, as well as commission of domestic violence in front of a child, related to an incident in which Mother accused him of attempting to smother her with a pillow in front of the children. The charging document labeled Father a “habitual violent offender,” explaining that he had previously been convicted of domestic violence against Mother in connection with a 2019 incident. Father remained incarcerated on these new charges for several weeks. Mother also obtained a civil protective order against Father, which remained in effect for several months, until she asked for it to be dismissed.

¶5 A few weeks after Father’s arrest, Mother was arrested and incarcerated on charges of drug possession. Mother later admitted that she had been using methamphetamine. At that point, the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition seeking custody of the children, and the court granted that request at a subsequent shelter hearing.

¶6 A month later, in May 2021, Mother remained incarcerated—she was eventually released in August—but Father had been released from jail after the criminal charges against him were dismissed. The record before us does not disclose the reasons for the dismissal of the criminal case, but the dismissal occurred on the date set for preliminary hearing, and it was entered without prejudice. Neither the State nor the juvenile court viewed the dismissal of the criminal charges as an exoneration of Father; indeed, the court eventually scheduled an evidentiary hearing to consider whether Father had committed domestic violence against Mother and, at the conclusion of that hearing, found that all three children were “neglected by” Father.

¶7 After his release from jail, Father requested that the children be returned to his custody. The court denied that request, but did order that Father be allowed supervised visitation with at least some of the children.

¶8 At another hearing a couple of weeks later, the GAL first raised the issue of Child’s paternity, and asked that the court order genetic testing to determine whether Father was indeed Child’s biological father. Neither Father nor Mother opposed this request, and the court therefore ordered that genetic testing take place, an order that necessarily required that Father, Mother, and Child all separately submit to genetic testing.

¶9 On August 5, 2021, Father submitted a biological sample for genetic testing. Mother and Child, however, did not submit biological samples until August 19. On August 18, the day before Mother and Child submitted their samples, Father and Mother signed and filed the VDP. On that form, they both swore that they “believe[d]” that Father was Child’s biological father. And Father answered “no” to a question asking whether “the birth mother, child, and biological father” had “submitted to genetic testing.” The Utah Office of Vital Records and Statistics accepted the VDP as valid, and that same day issued an amended birth certificate for Child, listing Father as Child’s father.

¶10 Following the filing of the VDP, Father (through counsel) filed a motion seeking visitation with Child, alleging that DCFS had been “not allowing” him to have visitation because the GAL “is opposed to the visits.” The GAL filed a response that asked the court to postpone its decision on visitation with Child until the results of the genetic testing were known. In that same opposition memorandum, the GAL raised a challenge to the VDP, specifically invoking sections 78B-15-302 and -307 of the Utah Code. In particular, the GAL asserted that Father had fraudulently answered some of the questions on the VDP, and asserted that, if the pending genetic testing excluded Father as Child’s biological father, the VDP could also be challenged on the ground that there had been a material mistake of fact. In reply, Father asserted that the VDP, which had been accepted by the Office of Vital Records and Statistics, gave him parental rights as Child’s father, and that he was therefore entitled to visitation. He also requested a hearing regarding the GAL’s challenge to the VDP.

¶11 In late September 2021, while Father’s motion for visitation was pending, the genetic test results came back and demonstrated that Father is not Child’s biological father.

¶12 Eventually, the court held an evidentiary hearing to consider Father’s motion for visitation. At that hearing, the court heard brief testimony, under oath, from both Father and Mother. After their testimony, the GAL asserted that Father should be denied visitation because, among other reasons, Father was not Child’s biological father. In connection with that argument, the GAL pressed the challenge to the VDP that she had raised in her opposition brief and asked for the VDP to “be declared void and be rescinded,” specifically asking for that relief to be “entered pursuant to [section] 78B-15-623” of the Utah Code (referred to herein as “Section 623”), a statutory provision the GAL had not mentioned in her opposition brief. Section 623 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] child is not bound by a determination of parentage” unless “the determination was based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the declaration is consistent with the results of genetic testing.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-623 (LexisNexis 2018). The GAL asserted that the VDP was subject to a challenge by Child because the results of the genetic testing indicated that Father was not Child’s biological father. In addition, the GAL pressed the arguments that had been raised in her brief, asserting that the VDP was fraudulent because Father had allegedly been less than candid when he stated that he “believe[d]” that he was Child’s father and when he answered “no” to the question on the form about genetic testing.

¶13 At the conclusion of the hearing, and after a brief recess, the court in an oral ruling granted the GAL’s request to invalidate the VDP, relying on Section 623 and on the fact that the genetic testing had conclusively determined that there was no biological relationship between Father and Child. Addressing Father, the court stated, “[Y]ou are not the father of [Child] at this point.” And the court declined Father’s invitation to order that he receive visitation with Child but, given Father’s established biological relationship with the other two children and given the fact that Father was “probably the only parental figure on the male side that [Child] has know[n],” the court nevertheless left the door open for DCFS to “allow” Father to have visitation with Child if DCFS believed that visitation would serve Child’s best interest. The court later signed a minute entry reflecting its oral ruling, therein declaring that the VDP “is void.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶14 Father appeals the juvenile court’s decision to invalidate the VDP and to declare it void. At the center of Father’s challenge is his assertion that Child, by and through the GAL, does not possess statutory standing to challenge the VDP. This question is one of statutory interpretation, and on such matters we afford no deference to trial courts’ decisions. See State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, ¶ 5, 408 P.3d 334 (“We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the [trial] court’s legal conclusions.” (quotation simplified)).

¶15 But before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to adjudicate it.[2]

“Questions about appellate jurisdiction are questions of law” that, by definition, arise for the first time in the appellate setting. See Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC, 2020 UT App 167,

¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 (quotation simplified); see also Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 799 (“The question of whether an order is final and appealable is a question of law.” (quotation simplified)).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

¶16 Before we may reach the merits of Father’s appeal, we must first assess whether we have jurisdiction to adjudicate it. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that we do.

¶17 “As a general rule, an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless the appeal is taken from a final order or judgment that ends the controversy between the litigants.” Copper Hills Custom Homes LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2018 UT 56, ¶ 10, 428 P.3d 1133 (quotation simplified); see also Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1986) (noting that one of the “traditional principles of appellate review” is “the final judgment rule,” which generally (subject to a few exceptions) prevents appellate courts from reviewing an appeal unless it comes “from a final judgment concluding all of the issues in the case”). The final judgment rule promotes efficiency by preventing the piecemeal litigation and seriatim appeals that would result if litigants were permitted, by right, to immediately appeal any adverse ruling by a trial court.

¶18 Conceptually, “the finality of an order in juvenile proceedings is determined the same way as the finality of an order in other courts.” In re A.F.,2007 UT 69, ¶ 3, 167 P.3d 1070 (quotation simplified). Indeed, in juvenile courts, as in other courts, a “final order is one that ends the current . . . proceedings, leaving no question open for further judicial action.” Id. (quotation simplified). Certainly, an order in a juvenile court case that completely resolved all matters as to all parties would be a final order, just as a similar order would be in a district court case.

¶19 But it is fair to say that, in appeals from juvenile court, finality is viewed somewhat more flexibly than in the district court context. “In the child welfare arena, the determining factor in deciding if an order is final and appealable is whether it effects a change in the permanent status of the child.” Id. Because a child’s status can change more than once, and because a “juvenile court frequently retains jurisdiction over cases [even] after some of the issues have been finally resolved,” see In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 36, 201 P.3d 985 (quotation simplified), “in child welfare proceedings, unlike traditional civil cases, appeals may be heard from more than one final judgment,” In re A.F.,2006 UT App 200, ¶ 8, 138 P.3d 65, aff’d, 2007 UT 69, 167 P.3d 1070 (quotation simplified). Therefore, a determination of whether a juvenile court order is final and appealable “requires pragmatic analysis of the order itself.” Id. ¶ 9.

¶20 Under this “pragmatic analysis,” “it is the substance, not the form, of the . . . order that matters . . . because the determination whether an order is final and appealable turns on the substance and effect of the order.” Id. (quotation simplified). Any order that effects a “permanent change in the child’s status vis-à-vis the child’s parent” is considered final. See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 36. Particular types of orders that are considered final include those “entered upon disposition of an adjudicated petition of abuse, neglect, or dependency” and those “terminating parental rights,” see id. (quotation simplified), as well as “orders that otherwise relieve a party from further litigation,” see In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 10. On the other hand, shelter orders and orders that “merely terminate reunification services and change the child’s permanency goal to adoption” are not considered final because they contemplate “further judicial action” regarding the parent and the child. See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 37.

¶21 Father asserts that the juvenile court’s order declaring the VDP void is final and appealable because it “effectively terminated the parental rights statutorily conferred upon him” through the VDP. We agree with Father, as does the State. From a finality perspective, the court’s order declaring the VDP void is analogous to an order terminating parental rights, because the order canceled theretofore-valid parental rights that Father had (at least temporarily) acquired by virtue of filing a voluntary declaration of paternity that was accepted by the Office of Vital Records and Statistics. See Scott v. Benson, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 22 n.4, 501 P.3d 1148 (“A [voluntary declaration of paternity] is valid and effective if it meets all the basic statutory requirements and is accepted by the Office of Vital Records.”), cert. granted, 509 P.3d 196 (2022). In analogous contexts, we have determined that similar orders are final and appealable. See In re A.S., 2007 UT App 72U, para. 1 (per curiam) (holding that an order dismissing a putative father “from the termination case and denying a motion for genetic testing” was final and appealable because it “dismissed [the putative father] as a party and relieved him from further litigation”); see also In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 10 (stating that “orders that otherwise relieve a party from further litigation” are appealable).

¶22 The fact that litigation regarding Child continues in the juvenile court is not dispositive of the question of appealability of the subject order. See In re E.L.F., 2011 UT App 244, ¶ 5, 262 P.3d 1196 (recognizing that a “juvenile court’s retention of jurisdiction over a child does not necessarily defeat finality”); see also In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 36 (stating that a “juvenile court frequently retains jurisdiction over cases [even] after some of the issues have been finally resolved” (quotation simplified)). The fact that the juvenile court left the visitation door slightly ajar for Father likewise does not defeat finality, under the unique circumstances presented here; the court’s order deprived Father of all parental rights, leaving DCFS with sole discretion to determine whether, and to what extent, Father may visit Child.

¶23 Applying a pragmatic analysis here, we conclude that the subject order, by eliminating all of Father’s claimed parental rights, effected a “permanent change in the child’s status vis-à-vis” Father, see In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 36, and effectively ended Father’s involvement in the case. Under these circumstances, the order from which Father appeals must be considered final, and we therefore have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appellate challenge.

II. The Merits of Father’s Appeal

¶24 We begin our analysis of the merits of Father’s appeal with a discussion of voluntary declarations of paternity, and by explaining how Father did—at least for a time—secure valid parental rights regarding Child. We then list some of the ways in which voluntary declarations of paternity can be challenged, and conclude that Child (through the GAL) had standing to raise one such challenge, and that Child’s challenge has merit. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court correctly sustained Child’s challenge to the VDP, but should not have referred to it as “void.”

A

¶25 There are a number of ways for a parent to establish a legally valid parent-child relationship, many of which are “based on the notion that parents should generally have parental rights regarding their biological children.” See Scott v. Benson, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 18, 501 P.3d 1148, cert. granted, 509 P.3d 196 (2022); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1983) (recognizing “[t]he intangible fibers that connect parent and child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a biological father’s interest “in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,” constitutional protection). “In most cases, parental status is established, based on an assumed biological connection, simply by presumption of circumstance.” Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 19. For example, in the absence of a valid gestational agreement, a mother establishes a parental relationship with any child to whom she gives birth. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-201(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2018).

¶26 Some fathers also obtain parental rights by presumption of circumstance. For instance, a father-child relationship is established when a man “and the mother of the child are married to each other” when the child is born. Id. §§ 78B-15-201(2)(a), -204(1)(a). But a father who is not married to the mother of the child must take additional steps to establish his paternity.

¶27 One avenue open to unmarried biological fathers is to establish paternity by declaration, an option that—crucially— requires the written consent of the child’s mother. See id. §§ 78B15-301, -302. A successful declaration of paternity, “duly signed and filed, has the same effect as a judicial determination of paternity.” In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 309. To be effective, both the mother and declarant father must sign the declaration “in the presence of two witnesses” and make several statements “under penalty of perjury.” See Utah Code Ann§ 78B15-302(1). Of particular relevance here, the parties must also attest that the child “whose paternity is being declared” does not have a presumed, adjudicated, or declarant father, and they must “state whether there has been genetic testing and, if so, that the declarant man’s paternity is consistent with the results of the testing.” See id. § 78B-15-302(1)(d), (e). “A declaration of paternity shall be considered effective when filed and entered into a database established and maintained by the Office of Vital Records.” Id. § 78B-15-302(9).

¶28 Father chose this avenue; he and Mother jointly signed and filed the VDP on August 18, 2021, after answering several written questions under penalty of perjury. As already noted, they both averred that they “believe[d]” Father to be Child’s biological father, and Father answered “no” to a question asking whether “the birth mother, child, and biological father [had] submitted to genetic testing.” The Office of Vital Records and Statistics accepted the VDP as valid, and that same day issued an amended birth certificate for Child, listing Father as Child’s father. At that point, Father’s parental rights regarding Child were definitively established. See id. § 78B-15-305(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that “a valid declaration of paternity filed with the Office of Vital Records is equivalent to a legal finding of paternity of a child and confers upon the declarant father all of the rights and duties of a parent”); see also Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 22 n.4 (“A declaration is valid and effective if it meets all the basic statutory requirements and is accepted by the Office of Vital Records.”); In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15 (stating that a declaration of paternity “duly signed and filed, has the same effect as a judicial determination of paternity”).

B

¶29 Declarations can, however, be challenged after they have been accepted by the Office of Vital Records and Statistics. See Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 23 (“Voluntary declarations of paternity are, however, subject to challenge.”). Applicable statutes permit several different types of challenges to validly filed declarations. For example, a declaration may be challenged as “void” if it fails to meet certain threshold criteria regarding the existence of another potential father. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B15-302(3) (referred to herein as “Section 302”). Alternatively, a “signatory” of a declaration may rescind it within sixty days, without specifying any reason. Id. § 78B-15-306(1) (referred to herein as “Section 306”). Further, after the rescission period has expired, a declaration may be challenged by certain parties “on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.” See id. § 78B-15-307 (referred to herein as “Section 307”). And as relevant here, Section 623 provides that “[a] child is not bound by a determination of parentage . . . unless . . . the determination was based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the declaration is consistent with genetic testing.” See id. § 78B-15-623(2).

¶30 Before the juvenile court, the GAL raised a challenge to the VDP and, by the time of the hearing, had elected to ground that challenge largely in Section 623.[3] The court accepted the GAL’s Section 623 argument, and Father challenges that decision here on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the juvenile court correctly found merit in the GAL’s Section 623 challenge.

¶31 Section 623 begins by stating that “a determination of parentage is binding on . . . all signatories to a declaration . . . of paternity . . . and . . . all parties to an adjudication [of parentage] by a tribunal.” Id. § 78B-15-623(1). The next section of the statute provides as follows:

(2) A child is not bound by a determination of parentage under this chapter unless:

(a) the determination was based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the declaration is consistent with the results of genetic testing;

(b) the adjudication of parentage was based on a finding consistent with the results of genetic testing and the consistency is declared in the determination or is otherwise shown; or

(c) the child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining parentage by a guardian ad litem.

Id. § 78B-15-623(2). The precise question presented is whether Section 623 gives a child the right to challenge a putative father’s duly filed declaration of paternity on the basis that the declaration is inconsistent with genetic testing results. We hold that it does.

¶32 The question before us is, at root, one of statutory interpretation. “When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the best evidence of which is the plain language of the statute itself.” Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 UT 35, ¶ 28, 517 P.3d 380 (quotation simplified). In examining the language of a statute, “we do not view individual words and subsections in isolation; instead, our statutory interpretation requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 984 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Bess, 2019 UT 70, ¶ 25, 473 P.3d 157 (“We read the plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.” (quotation simplified)). And if this exercise “provides a workable result, we need not resort to other interpretive tools, and our analysis ends.” Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 216 (quotation simplified). In accordance with these principles, we begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant statute’s structure.

¶33 The statute in question is the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (the Act), codified at Title 78B, Chapter 15 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-101 to -902 (LexisNexis 2018). Section 623’s reference to “a determination of parentage under this chapter,” then, refers to any determination of parentage made under any of the various parts of the Act. See id. § 78B-15-623(2) (emphasis added). Part 3 of the Act governs voluntary declarations of paternity, see id. §§ 78B-15-301 to -313, and Part 6 of the Act governs judicial adjudications of parentage, see id. §§ 78B-15-601 to -623. Indeed, the term “determination of parentage,” as used in Section 623, has a specific statutory definition: our legislature has provided that a “determination of parentage” means either (a) “the establishment of the parent-child relationship by the signing of a valid declaration of paternity under Part 3,” or (b) “adjudication [of parentage] by a tribunal” under Part 6. See id. § 78B-15-102(9).

¶34 In this case, any parental rights claimed by Father are derived not from any judicial adjudication of paternity but, rather, from the VDP. Indeed, the Act is clear with regard to the effect of a properly filed declaration of paternity: “a valid declaration of paternity filed with the Office of Vital Records is equivalent to a legal finding of paternity of a child and confers upon the declarant father all of the rights and duties of a parent,” without the necessity of initiating judicial proceedings or obtaining a court order. See id. § 78B-15-305(1); see also In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15 (stating that a declaration of paternity “duly signed and filed, has the same effect as a judicial determination of paternity”). Phrased in the language of Section 623, then, the “determination of parentage” at issue here took place pursuant to Part 3, not Part 6, and it occurred not in any courtroom but at the front counter (or its metaphorical online equivalent) at the Office of Vital Records and Statistics.

¶35 As noted, Section 623 provides that “[a] child is not bound by a determination of parentage” unless at least one of three criteria are met. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-623(2). With regard to the specific “determination of parentage” at issue here, none of the three listed criteria are met.

¶36 First, the “determination of parentage” at issue in this case was not “based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity” that is “consistent with genetic testing.” See id. § 78B-15-623(2)(a). To be sure, the determination of parentage here was based on an “unrescinded declaration of paternity”; after all, Father’s only claim to paternity was made through the VDP, and neither Father nor Mother had exercised any rights they had, pursuant to Section 306, to rescind the VDP within sixty days of signing it. See id. § 78B-15-306. But the unrescinded VDP at the heart of Father’s paternity claim turned out to be entirely inconsistent with the genetic test results that came back in September 2021. For this reason, the “determination of parentage” at issue here was not based on a declaration of paternity that was “consistent with the results of genetic testing.” Id. § 78B-15-623(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the first criterion is inapplicable.

¶37 The second criterion is likewise inapplicable, for two reasons. First, this criterion applies only to an “adjudication of parentage,” see id. § 78B-15-623(2)(b), and no such adjudication occurred here, where Father’s parental rights, if any, are derived under Part 3, from the VDP, rather than through a judicial process. And second, this criterion also depends upon “genetic testing” being “consistent with” the adjudication of parentage and, as already noted, the genetic testing in this case excluded Father from any biological relationship with Child. See id.

¶38     Finally, the third criterion has no application either. That criterion applies if “the child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining parentage by a guardian ad litem.” Id. § 78B-15-623(2)(c). To be sure, Child was represented by the GAL in the proceedings before the juvenile court, and is represented by the GAL in this appeal. But Child was not involved, in any way, in the “proceeding determining parentage” at issue here. Again, that “proceeding” occurred on August 18, 2021, when Father and Mother appeared at the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to fill out the VDP, and when that office accepted the VDP they filed. That proceeding took place entirely outside of court, and Child had no voice or representation therein. Accordingly, the third criterion is likewise inapplicable.

¶39 Because none of the three exceptional criteria apply here, Section 623 provides that Child is “not bound by [the] determination of parentage” in this case. See id. § 78B-15-623(2) (emphasis added). In our view, this language must necessarily mean that Child has the right to challenge the VDP.[4]

¶40 The words “not bound by” are not defined in the Act. In such a situation, we “interpret the statutory language according to the plain meaning of its text.” See O’Hearon v. Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 24, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). And in doing so, we give the words the meaning they are given in ordinary daily usage. See State v. Rincon, 2012 UT App 372, ¶ 10, 293 P.3d 1142 (“When construing a statute, words that are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage.” (quotation simplified)).

¶41 In our view, the words “not bound by” must include a right to challenge the determination of parentage. A child who has no right to challenge the determination in question, even in a case where none of the three statutory criteria applied, would effectively be bound by it. Stated another way, in order to be “not bound by” something, there must exist a way to get out from under its obligations. After all, the words “not bound by” would be deprived of all effective meaning if a child had no right to challenge the determination of parentage at issue. Even Father and the amicus curiae both acknowledge, in recently filed briefs, that Child has statutory standing to challenge the VDP under Part 6. For these reasons, we conclude that Section 623 provides Child the right to challenge the VDP—an unrescinded declaration of paternity upon which Father’s claim to paternity is based—on the ground that the declaration is inconsistent with “the results of genetic testing.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-623(2)(a).

¶42 Once it is established that Child has the right to mount a challenge to the VDP, we must turn to the merits of that challenge. And Father, here on appeal, does not seriously contest the merits of Child’s attack on the VDP. Father instead acknowledges, as he must, that the genetic testing excluded him as Child’s biological father, and that the genetic testing is, therefore, inconsistent with his claims to paternity under the VDP. Accordingly, the juvenile court correctly determined that Child’s Section 623 challenge to the VDP was meritorious.

¶43 But while the juvenile court’s ruling is correct on its merits, the court used incorrect nomenclature to describe the effect of its ruling. The court ruled that the VDP “is void,” thereby apparently purporting to invalidate it ab initio and render it without force or effect from the date it was filed. This was incorrect. A challenge to a declaration of paternity based on inconsistency with genetic testing is a challenge alleging “a material mistake of fact.” See id. § 78B-15-307(5) (stating that “genetic test results that exclude a declarant father . . . constitute a material mistake of fact”). And as we explained in Scott, the effect of a successful challenge on this basis—as opposed to a challenge grounded in Section 302 or Section 306—is “not that the declaration of paternity is rendered void from its inception” but, instead, that the “declaration will be set aside, on a going-forward basis.” See 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 40.

¶44 In our view, a challenge brought by a child under Section 623 alleging that genetic testing is inconsistent with a declarant father’s declaration is substantively similar to the type of challenge we examined in Scott. Neither challenge is grounded in Sections 302 or 306, statutory provisions that expressly provide that voidness will result from a successful challenge. And both challenges arise from the same set of circumstances, namely, genetic testing that does not match a putative father’s claims to paternity. We therefore hold that, where a child makes a successful Section 623 challenge to a declaration of paternity, the result is that the declaration “will be set aside, on a going-forward basis,” and will not be declared void from the date of its inception. See id. As applied to this case, these principles dictate that Father had legal parental rights for some three months, from August 18 through November 16, 2021, but that his parental rights ended, prospectively, with entry of the court’s order sustaining Child’s Section 623 challenge.

¶45 Finally, both Father and the amicus curiae—in recently filed supplemental briefs—raise the potential applicability of section 78B-15-608 of the Utah Code (referred to herein as “Section 608”), a statutory section that allows a court, under certain conditions, to “disregard genetic test results that exclude the . . . declarant father.” Father asserts, for the first time in his supplemental brief, that he should be entitled to a hearing to determine whether the genetic test results eliminating him as Child’s biological father should be “disregarded” pursuant to Section 608. But Father makes this request for the first time in this recent brief; he did not raise a Section 608 defense to the GAL’s challenge before the juvenile court, nor did he mention Section 608 in either his opening or reply brief on appeal. Under these circumstances, Father has raised this legal theory far too late for us to consider it in the context of this appeal. Cf. Viertel v. Body Firm Aerobics LLC, 2022 UT App 96, ¶ 11, 516 P.3d 791 (“Appellants are not permitted to raise matters for the first time in a reply brief.” (quotation simplified)).

¶46 The amicus curiae, for its part, asserts that it was “mandatory” for the juvenile court to have conducted a Section 608 inquiry, including a “best interest of the child” analysis, even in the absence of a request by Father for it to do so; in this vein, the amicus curiae argues that the juvenile court committed plain error by not engaging in that analysis sua sponte. In particular, the amicus curiae rests its argument on statutory language stating that the court “shall consider the best interest of the child.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-608(2) (emphasis added). But in our view, the amicus curiae overreads the statute.

¶47 As we interpret it, Section 608 does not compel a juvenile court, in every instance in which any challenge to a VDP is sustained, to undertake a Section 608 analysis even if none of the parties request it. Litigants are entitled to select the specific defenses they raise to an opponent’s claim. The general rule, applicable in both district and juvenile courts, is that parties must request specific relief in order for a court to award it. Our judicial process ordinarily does not require courts to step in and examine legal theories that the parties have not themselves raised. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 14, 416 P.3d 443 (“Under our adversarial system, the parties have the duty to identify legal issues and bring arguments before an impartial tribunal to adjudicate their respective rights and obligations.”). In this case, Father—who was represented by counsel at the time—elected to defend against the GAL’s challenge to the VDP by calling into question the GAL’s (or

Child’s) right to even mount the challenge. Father did not raise Section 608 as a possible defense, and he did not ask the juvenile court—in the event it concluded that the GAL had standing to challenge the VDP—to disregard the results of the genetic testing pursuant to Section 608.

¶48 We take the amicus curiae’s point that, whenever a party does specifically invoke Section 608 and ask a court to disregard genetic test results, that court must “consider the best interest of the child” in determining whether to do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-608(2). But courts do not have an obligation to sua sponte raise Section 608, and undertake its concomitant best-interest analysis, in every case in which they are asked to consider a challenge to a VDP.[5] See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, 2019 UT 7, ¶ 41, 439 P.3d 593 (stating that “judges are neutral arbiters—not advocates,” and that judges “keep [themselves] out of the business of second-guessing the pleading decisions of the parties”); cf. Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 43 (noting that the lower court, in that case, turned to a Section 608 analysis only at the “request” of one of the parties). If a putative parent wants a court to take the rather drastic and unusual step of disregarding the results of genetic testing, it will ordinarily be the parent’s responsibility to raise the issue.

¶49 And even assuming, for the purposes of the discussion, that plain error review is available here, see Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 42 n.10, 507 P.3d 357 (suggesting that plain error review may be available in certain types of civil cases, including termination of parental rights cases), we reject the amicus curiae’s assertion that, on the record before us, the juvenile court committed plain error by not invoking Section 608 sua sponte. Plain error occurs only when a court commits an obvious prejudicial error. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 20. Here, the juvenile court committed no obvious error. Nothing in Section 608 indicates that it is to be applied in every case, even sua sponte, regardless of whether any party ever invokes it. And the amicus curiae cites no appellate court case that so indicates. Where the law is not clear, a court does not commit obvious error. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 276 (“To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [a litigant] must show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made.”).

¶50 For these reasons, the juvenile court did not plainly err by not sua sponte undertaking an analysis pursuant to Section 608. And because Father did not raise that issue either before the juvenile court or in his initial brief, we decline to address Father’s argument that the court should have conducted such an analysis. We offer no opinion, however, regarding whether the issue could properly be raised after remand, especially given the fact that the juvenile court left the door open to Father’s involvement in the case going forward.

CONCLUSION

¶51 We have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Father’s appeal, because the juvenile court’s order canceled the parental rights that Father had temporarily acquired by filing the VDP and thereby effected a permanent change in Child’s status regarding Father. But on the merits of that appeal, we conclude that the juvenile court correctly sustained the GAL’s Section 623 challenge to the VDP, even if the court should not have used the word “void” to describe the result of its ruling. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s decision to sustain the GAL’s challenge to the VDP, but remand with instructions for the court to modify its order to indicate that it has prospective effect only, and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate.

 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

[1] “We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the juvenile court findings.” In re K.J., 2013 UT App 237, ¶ 2 n.2, 327 P.3d 1203 (quotation simplified).

[2] After recognizing this jurisdictional question, we issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition, explaining that this appeal was being considered for summary disposition “on the basis that this court lacks jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final, appealable order.” We then ordered the parties to submit briefing on the jurisdictional question, which they did. Later, we also provided the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefing on the statutory standing question. Father and the GAL submitted supplemental briefs, and an amicus curiae submitted a brief on this topic as well. We appreciate the assistance of the parties and the amicus curiae in submitting supplemental briefing.

[3] As noted already, the GAL’s pre-hearing briefing before the juvenile court invoked Sections 302 and 307, but not Section 623. In their briefing on appeal, the parties include some discussion of other potential avenues for challenge. No party invokes Section 306, and both the State and the GAL appear to concede that the GAL—apparently because Child is not a “signatory” to the VDP—does not have statutory standing to challenge the VDP under Section 307. But the State does appear to invoke Section 302 in connection with its argument that the VDP was “fraudulently executed,” and on that basis appears to ask us to affirm the juvenile court’s ruling on this alternative ground. We have serious doubts about the merits of this argument, primarily because none of the three criteria for voidness set forth in Section 302 are present here, but also because any evidence of fraud on the part of Father or Mother is thin at best: they were not sure whether Father was Child’s biological parent, but had a basis to “believe” that he was, and Father’s answer about the state of genetic testing was technically correct, because on August 18 neither Mother nor Child had yet submitted samples for genetic testing. But we need not delve deeper into the State’s alternative argument, because we affirm the substance of the court’s ruling under Section 623.

[4] After all, Part 6 of the Act expressly provides that “the child” may maintain “a proceeding to adjudicate parentage,” and thereby challenge a parent’s paternity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-602(1). All parties to this appeal agree that a child has statutory standing under Part 6 to challenge a parent’s paternity.

[5] The amicus curiae runs into the same problem with its other best-interest related argument. It points out that guardians ad litem have authority created by statute, and that they are appointed “to represent the best interest of a minor.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-803(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). It asserts that the GAL in this case, by challenging Father’s paternity, acted outside Child’s best interest, pointing out that Child has no other father figure in his life, and offering its view that “it is difficult to see how it can be in a child’s best interest to challenge the paternity of the only father figure participating in the case.” We acknowledge this argument, and agree with the amicus curiae that guardians ad litem have a statutory obligation to carefully consider whether the actions they take on a child’s behalf are in the child’s best interest. But ordinarily any challenge to a guardian ad litem’s actions as being outside a child’s best interest must come from one of the parties rather than from a court sua sponte, and must be raised in the first instance in the district or juvenile court. No such challenge was levied here by any party before the juvenile court, rendering the merits of any such challenge inappropriate for appellate review.

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Widdison v. Widdison – 2022 UT App 46 – custody modification

Widdison v. Widdison – 2022 UT App 46
 

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 

NICOLE WIDDISON,
Appellant, 

LEON BRYANT WIDDISON, 

Appellee. 

Opinion 

No. 20200484-CA 

Filed April 7, 2022 

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department 

The Honorable Robert P. Faust 

No. 144906018 

Julie J. Nelson and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys
for Appellant 

Todd R. Sheeran, Attorney for Appellee 

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and DIANA HAGEN concurred. 

TENNEY, Judge: 

¶1 By statute, a district court must ordinarily find that a material and substantial change in circumstances occurred before modifying the custody provisions in a divorce decree. In this appeal, we’re asked to answer two main questions about this statute. 

¶2 First, if a decree is silent about whether one of the parents has legal custody of a child, is the district court later required to find that there was a material and substantial change in circumstances before determining whether that parent has legal custody in the first instance? We conclude that a material and substantial change in circumstances is not required in such a scenario. 

¶3 Second, in situations where the custody modification statute is applicable, can a custodial parent’s attempt to sever a years-long relationship between the noncustodial parent and a child legally qualify as a material and substantial change? We conclude that it can. 

¶4 Based on these two conclusions, we affirm the modifications at issue. 

BACKGROUND [10]
The Divorce Decree 

¶5 Nicole and Bryant Widdison were married in June 2004. They had two children during their marriage, Daughter and Son. Bryant is Daughter’s biological father, but Nicole conceived Son with another man during a brief separation from Bryant. Nicole and Bryant reconciled before Son’s birth, however, and Bryant was in the delivery room when Nicole gave birth to Son. Bryant is listed on Son’s birth certificate, and Son bears Bryant’s surname. 

¶6 Nicole and Bryant divorced in July 2015. Daughter was ten years old at the time, and Son was about three and a half. The divorce decree (the Decree) was largely based on a stipulation between Nicole and Bryant. 

¶7 In the portions relevant to this appeal, the Decree provided: 

  1. Physical Custody: Nicole shall have physical custody of both said minor children. Bryant will remain on Son’s birth certificate unless or until he is challenged by some other legitimate party who prevails in a court of law.

. . . . 

  1. Legal Custody: The parties shall have “joint legal custody” of Daughter.

. . . . 

  1. Parent-Time/Visitation: Bryant shall be entitled to reasonable parent-time with Daughter. Reasonable parent-time shall be defined as the parties may agree. However, if the parties are not able to agree, Bryant shall be entitled to the following parent-time:

. . . . 

2) . . . Bryant may have two (2) overnights each week to coincide with the days that he is off work with the parties’ oldest child, Daughter[,] during the school year. . . . During the Summer months Bryant may have three overnights every other week and two overnights on the alternating weeks. . . . As for the youngest child, Son, parent-time will be at Nicole’s sole discretion . . . . 

3) Bryant shall also be entitled to holidays and summer parent-time as articulated in U.C.A. § 30-335 . . . . 

. . . . 

  1. Child Support: . . . Based on [the parties’] incomes, and a sole custody worksheet (even though the parties have a different parent-time arrangement and with the benefit and consent of counsel after being informed and involved), Bryant shall pay Nicole child support in the amount of $450.00 each month for the one female child (Daughter). . . . Any reference to a financial obligation[] or child support in this document shall be interpreted as applying only to the older child (Daughter).

(Emphases added.) 

¶8 As noted, the Decree gave Nicole “sole discretion” over whether Bryant could spend parent-time with Son. During the first three years after the divorce, Nicole “regularly and consistently allowed Son to exercise time with Bryant.” Her usual practice was to allow Son to accompany Daughter whenever Daughter visited Bryant. Since the Decree entitled Bryant to spend a little over 30 percent of the time with Daughter, this meant that Bryant spent a little over 30 percent of the time with Son during those years too. 

The Modification Petitions 

¶9 In November 2016, the State filed a petition to modify the Decree to require Bryant to pay child support for Son. The State’s petition noted that Son was born during Nicole and Bryant’s marriage, and it asserted that Bryant was Son’s presumptive legal father under Utah Code § 78B-15-204(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018)11, which states that a “man is presumed to be the father of a child if,” among others, “he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.” The State noted that “[n]o child support has been ordered for this child.” It accordingly asked the court to “find[] Bryant to be the legal father of Son” and order him to pay child support for Son. 

¶10 In his answer to the State’s petition, Bryant agreed that he “is the presumptive father” of Son and expressed his “desire[]” to “be treated as the natural father of Son” “for all intents and purposes.” Bryant also asked the court for an order granting him joint legal and physical custody of Son, as well as a “clarification of his rights and duties, namely parent-time with Son.”12  

¶11 In September 2018, Bryant filed his own petition to modify the Decree. There, Bryant asserted that he “has been the only father figure that Son has known,” and he argued that he “should be presumed and considered the legal father of Son.” Bryant also argued that “[t]here has been a significant, substantial and material change in circumstances that has occurred since the parties’ Decree of Divorce concerning custody, parent-time, and child support, such that modification of the Decree of Divorce is in the best interests of the minor children.”13  

Motion for Temporary Relief 

¶12 About two months after Bryant filed his petition to modify, Nicole suddenly cut off Bryant’s parent-time with Son. After she did, Bryant filed a motion for temporary relief, asking the court to award him “his historical/status quo parent time with both the minor children” until his petition to modify was resolved. 

¶13 The matter went before a court commissioner, and a hearing was held in which Bryant and Nicole and their respective attorneys were present. During the hearing, the commissioner heard how often Son accompanied Daughter during her visits with Bryant. At the close of the hearing, the commissioner ordered Nicole to “immediately resume Bryant’s historical/status quo parent time with both minor children” and to “allow Son to follow the parent-time schedule of Daughter, consistent with the historical parent-time exercised by Bryant.” 

¶14 Nicole objected to the commissioner’s recommendation, but the district court overruled that objection. The court instead agreed to temporarily “modify the stipulation to reflect what the parties themselves were actually doing regarding parent time.” The court surmised that “reducing the visitation the parties themselves were doing” might “be harmful to the child.” The court continued that it “could also be argued that such visitation is helpful and beneficial to the child, especially since both children will be doing visitation together and parents have the right of visitation with their children.” Nicole was thus ordered to give Bryant “the same parent-time with Son, consistent with Bryant’s parent time with Daughter,” while Bryant’s petition to modify was pending. 

The Relocation Proceedings 

¶15 A short time later, Nicole requested an expedited phone conference with the court, explaining that the company she worked for was requiring her to relocate to California. After a hearing, the commissioner recommended that “[t]he children . . . remain in Utah until the Court changes the Order regarding custody and parent time.” 

¶16 During the hearing, the commissioner further noted that “[c]onspicuously absent from Nicole’s argument [was] anything—from this Court’s perspective—showing she’s considering the child’s perspective.” In particular, the commissioner explained that 

Son has shared time with the older sibling going to Bryant’s home. Nicole has regularly and consistently allowed this child to exercise time with Bryant. In [November] of 2018, Nicole disagreed. And I agree, she does have the discretion to make decisions with regard to Son. From the child’s perspective, however, one child goes with Dad and the other doesn’t, because Bryant stepped on Nicole’s toes. She says, I’m establishing boundaries; you don’t get to see this child. That’s fine if this child is a car or a refrigerator. Son [is] a person who has Bryant’s surname, who has been exercising time—from what I can see—[a] full seven years. 

The commissioner further explained that “there’s been enough of a change, enough consistency for this younger child, that he has followed the older child, has the same surname [as Bryant], [Bryant’s] name’s on the birth certificate that has not been changed, to follow [Daughter’s parent-time] schedule.” 

¶17 Nicole did not object to the commissioner’s recommendation, and she hasn’t relocated in the meantime. 

The District Court’s Ruling on Bryant’s Petition to Modify 

¶18 A bench trial was held in November 2019 to settle the issues raised in Bryant’s petition to modify and Nicole’s request to relocate. The district court later entered an order titled “Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Petitioner’s Relocation Request,” which addressed both the relocation request and the broader issues regarding Bryant’s legal and physical custody. 

¶19 In its order, the court first concluded that the petition to modify was “appropriate in that there have been material changes in circumstances warranting modification of the parties’ Decree in the children’s best interests, which have not previously been adjudicated.” The court did not, however, more specifically identify what those “changes in circumstances” were. 

¶20 Second, the court concluded that Nicole had “failed to rebut the presumption of paternity that exists in this case.” In the court’s view, Nicole had not shown by a “preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interest of Son to disestablish the parent-child relationship that has been created and substantiated by both of the parties over many years.” The court then “enter[ed] an adjudication that Bryant is the father of Son” and modified the Decree to “impose as to Son parental obligations” on Bryant, “including the obligation to pay child support for Son.” 

¶21 Third, the court “award[ed] Bryant joint legal custody of Son on the same terms as the Decree provide[d] for Daughter.” 

¶22 And finally, the court ruled that Nicole was “free to relocate.” If she did, the court awarded Bryant parent-time with both children under the terms set forth in Utah Code section 303-37(6) (Supp. 2021). If Nicole stayed in Utah, however, the court awarded Bryant “parent time with Son on the same terms as was occurring with Daughter.” 

¶23 That same day, the court issued a separate “Order Modifying Decree of Divorce.” This order reiterated that Bryant is “adjudicated to be the legal father of both Daughter and Son,” that Bryant now bore “all parental obligations in accordance with Utah law,” including the “obligation to pay child support” for both children, and that Bryant had “joint legal custody of both children on the same terms set forth in the [original] Decree with respect to Daughter.” The court further repeated the parent-time schedule that was set forth in its ruling on the relocation request—i.e., it awarded Bryant parent-time with Son on the same terms that he had with Daughter. It then declared that, “[e]xcept as modified by this Order, the parties’ Decree remains in full force and effect.” 

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

¶24 Nicole challenges the district court’s decisions to give Bryant (1) legal custody of Son and (2) parent-time with Son. We review a district court’s decision to modify a divorce decree, as well as a court’s parent-time determination and custody award, for abuse of discretion. See Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196, ¶¶ 20–21, 437 P.3d 445; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App 136, ¶ 7, 402 P.3d 178. 

¶25 As discussed below, we regard one portion of the ruling in question as a determination of custody in the first instance. “A district court’s award of custody is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Taylor v. Elison, 2011 UT App 272, ¶ 8, 263 P.3d 448. As also discussed below, another portion of Nicole’s argument turns on whether the circumstances at issue can legally qualify as a change in circumstances. We review that decision for correctness. See Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]n this case, we are presented with a question of law regarding what constitutes a substantial change of circumstances, which is reviewed for correctness.”). 

ANALYSIS 

¶26 “While there are several tools that can generally be used to modify final judgments, one tool that is specific to family law cases is the petition to modify.” McFarland v. McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 25, 493 P.3d 1146 (quotation simplified); see also Ross v. Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶ 11, 447 P.3d 104 (“[R]ule 106 establishes a general rule . . . that any changes to divorce decrees must be brought about by the filing of a petition to modify.”). “Parties in family law cases may use this tool, in accordance with applicable statutes and rules, to seek modification of various provisions of decrees.” McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 25. 

¶27 “On the petition of one or both of the parents,” the governing statute allows a court to “modify or terminate an order that established joint legal custody or joint physical custody” if “the circumstances of the child or one or both parents . . . have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified” and the modification “would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(1) (LexisNexis 2019). This is a “bifurcated procedure,” Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 1982), and Utah courts have consistently referred to it as a “two-step” process, Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ¶ 24, 258 P.3d 553. See also Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610–11 (Utah 1984). Notably, it’s also a sequential process, in that a court cannot “reopen[] the custody question until it has first made a threshold finding of substantially changed circumstances.” Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified).14  

¶28 As explained above, the district court made a number of changes to the Decree, and Nicole now challenges two of them on appeal: the decision to award Bryant legal custody of Son and the decision to grant Bryant parent-time with Son. We address each in turn.

I. Legal Custody

¶29 Nicole first challenges the district court’s decision to award Bryant joint legal custody of Son. Nicole claims that, “[u]nder the decree, [she] had sole . . . legal custody of Son,” and she then argues that under the two-step process described above, the district court erred by granting legal custody to Bryant without first providing any “analysis regarding a change in circumstances.” In her view, “[t]he district court disregarded the custody . . . arrangements from the decree and awarded joint [legal] custody of Son as if the decree had never been entered.” 

¶30 Nicole’s argument, however, is based on a false premise— namely, that the Decree had awarded her sole legal custody of Son. But it hadn’t. The Decree had a separately enumerated “Legal Custody” subsection. That subsection stated that “[t]he parties shall have ‘joint legal custody’ of Daughter.” (Emphasis added.) This provision said nothing about Son, and no other provision in the Decree purported to establish whether Nicole had legal custody of Son (let alone sole legal custody), or instead whether Bryant did (or didn’t) have any form of legal custody of Son himself. Instead, on this, the Decree was silent.15  

¶31 But the court was legally required to make a legal custody determination for Son. The Utah Code states that courts “shall enter . . . an order of custody”—both legal and physical—when a “married couple’s marriage is declared void or dissolved.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1) (2019) (emphasis added). The term “shall,” of course, has long been regarded as a command. See, e.g., Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 1221.16  

¶32 The Decree’s silence impacts how we view Nicole’s arguments on appeal. Again, the Decree is silent about whether Bryant (or any other putative father) had legal custody of Son, and it likewise said nothing about whether Nicole (or any other mother) had legal custody of Son. So the question here is whether the court could correct this oversight without having to first determine that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification. 

¶33 We conclude that a change in circumstances was not required for the court to correct the Decree in this manner. As noted, the change-in-circumstances requirement is set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-10.4. This requirement “serves multiple interests.” Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ¶ 25. “First, because a custody decree is predicated on a particular set of facts, that decree is res judicata,” so “the changed-circumstances requirement prevents an unnecessary drain on judicial resources by repetitive litigation of the same issue when the result would not be altered.” Miller v. Miller, 2020 UT App 171, ¶ 17, 480 P.3d 341 (quotation simplified). “Second, the changed-circumstances requirement protects the custodial parent from harassment by repeated litigation.” Id. (quotation simplified). And third, “the requirement protects the child from ‘ping-pong’ custody awards,” id. (quotation simplified), thus emphasizing “the importance of a stable and secure homelife for children who are shifted from one parent figure to another” and ensuring that custody issues are not frivolously or infinitely “reopen[ed],” Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53–54 (quotation simplified). 

¶34 None of these concerns are implicated here. To the contrary, since the question of whether Bryant had legal custody of Son was unaddressed in the Decree, there was nothing for the court to “reopen” or change. Id. at 53. Thus, properly understood, Nicole isn’t really challenging a decision to modify a prior determination that Bryant should (or shouldn’t) have legal custody of Son. Rather, what Nicole is actually challenging is a decision that, in effect, decided legal custody in the first instance. Because of this, we conclude that no change in circumstances could reasonably be required. After all, if it were true that a court couldn’t correct an omission of a required determination without pointing to a change in circumstances, divorce decrees like this one would be left indeterminate about key issues such as who had legal custody of a child. And the effect of such omissions would be felt by both the children and the parents, all of whom would be left without the guidance and certainty that custody determinations are intended and required to provide. We decline to create, let alone endorse, such an approach. 

¶35 Our determination thus leaves the remaining question of whether the court exceeded its discretion when it awarded joint legal custody of Son to Bryant in the first instance. We conclude that it didn’t. 

¶36 “Under both the United States Constitution and the constitution of [Utah], a parent possesses a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the parent’s child.” Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-104(1) (Supp. 2021). Because of this, legal custody is linked to the fact of parentage. Our supreme court, for example, has held that a father has “legal custody of [his] [c]hild by virtue of his paternity,” In re adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 81, 417 P.3d 1, and the same would of course be true for mothers by virtue of their maternity. Indeed, by statute, Utah law “presume[s] that a parent automatically enjoys legal custody” of his or her child, and this is so because of “the fundamental liberty interest of a parent concerning the care, custody, and management of the parent’s child.” Id. (quotation simplified). The legislature has also established “a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody” “is in the best interest of the child.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(3) (2019). 

¶37 Here, Son was born during Nicole and Bryant’s marriage, so Bryant was legally “presumed to be” Son’s father. Id. § 78B15-204(1)(a) (2018). And while this presumption of paternity can be overcome, the district court concluded that it was not. Instead, in the same ruling at issue on appeal, the court declared Bryant to be Son’s legal father, and Nicole has not challenged that paternity decision on appeal. 

¶38 As also noted, however, Bryant’s now-established paternity of Son presumptively gave him joint legal custody of Son too, based in part on Bryant’s own constitutional interests in the care and raising of Son, who is his child. See In re adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 81. In her arguments to us, the only reason that Nicole gives for overcoming this presumption is the fact that the initial Decree was silent about whether Bryant had legal custody of Son. But as we’ve explained, that omission was a legal error. And when the district court was alerted to that error, it appropriately fixed it. Once the court did, the result was that Bryant—who was present at Son’s birth, was listed on Son’s birth certificate, and has acted as Son’s father since birth—was now Son’s legal father, which meant that he was presumptively entitled to legal custody of Son too. 

¶39 In short, under these circumstances, no change in circumstances was required, and we see no abuse of discretion in the court awarding legal custody of Son to Bryant in the first instance.

II. Physical Custody

¶40 Nicole next challenges the district court’s decision to modify the Decree’s provisions regarding parent-time with Son. As set forth below, we first clarify (A) the nature of the modification, (B) the district court’s reasons for it, and (C) the standard of review applicable to Nicole’s particular challenge. We then hold that (D) the change in circumstance at issue can legally support a modification of custody. 

A. The Nature of the Modification

¶41 The Decree was silent about legal custody of Son, but it wasn’t silent about physical custody. Instead, it affirmatively gave Nicole “physical custody of both said minor children”—i.e., both Daughter and Son. And while the Decree then set forth a delineated parent-time schedule for Daughter, it left Bryant’s parent-time with Son to “Nicole’s sole discretion.” 

¶42 In the ruling at issue, the district court modified this. The court removed Nicole’s “sole discretion” over parent-time for Son and set forth two alternative parent-time schedules. If Nicole remained in Utah, Bryant would have parent-time with Son “on the same terms as was occurring with Daughter.” If she moved to California, however, Bryant would have one weekend per month with both children as well as additional time with them during the summer. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37(6) (2019). 

¶43 Although this ruling was couched in terms of parent-time, the parties have both suggested in their briefing that this amounted to a modification of physical custody of Son. We agree. 

¶44 Physical custody and parent-time “are conceptually distinct.” Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶ 14 n.3. “Physical custody has long been understood to involve much more than actual possession and care of a child,” instead implicating the right and “legal responsibility to provide supervision and control” of a child. Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 531. By contrast, the term “parent-time” more narrowly refers to the amount of time that a parent is entitled to spend with the child. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-34 to -36 (2019 & Supp. 2021) (setting forth minimum, optional, and equal parent-time schedules as well as parent-time considerations for special circumstances). 

¶45 That said, the terms are intertwined because, “[b]y statutory definition, there are two kinds of physical custody— sole physical custody and joint physical custody,” and “the dividing line” between the two is largely “based on the number of overnight visits enjoyed by each parent.” McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 36. When a child “stays with each” of his or her “parent[s] overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support,” each of the parents has joint physical custody of the child. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(3)(a) (2019). But when a child stays with one parent overnight for less than 30% of the year, the parent who has over 70% of the overnights is considered to have sole physical custody of the child. See id.; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15) (Supp. 2021); McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 36. 

¶46 Here, the Decree did not specifically determine whether Nicole had “sole” or “joint” physical custody of either of the children. But at least with regard to Son, the Decree effectively awarded Nicole sole physical custody because it gave her “sole discretion” whether Son would spend any parent-time with Bryant at all. And, critically for this appeal, the Decree also awarded Bryant what amounted to joint physical custody of Daughter. After all, the dividing line is 30% of the overnights, and 30% of the 365 days in a year is roughly 110. In the proceedings below, the commissioner reviewed the Decree and determined that the parent-time schedule gave Bryant more “than the 110 overnights,” which accordingly meant that Bryant had “joint physical custody” of Daughter. Thus, when the district court later equalized Bryant’s parent-time with Son to match the parent-time he had with Daughter, it in effect modified the Decree to give Bryant joint physical custody of Son too.17  

B. The Basis for the District Court’s Change-in-Circumstance

Determination 

¶47 As noted, the district court determined that “there have been material changes in circumstances warranting modification of the parties’ Decree in the children’s best interests, which have not previously been adjudicated.” But the court did not specifically delineate what those changes were. Because of this, Nicole initially asks us to reverse the modification based on the court’s failure to provide any “analysis as to why a custody modification was justified” under the required change-in-circumstances test. 

¶48 We acknowledge that the district court’s ruling on this could have been more clear. But even so, “a trial court’s failure to make explicit findings supporting its decision does not, alone, warrant reversal so long as the basis for the trial court’s ruling is readily apparent from the record.” In re A.S., 2014 UT App 226, ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 582; cf. State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ¶ 34, 48 P.3d 931 (explaining that “where the record as a whole sufficiently” indicates the basis for the court’s ruling, “an absence of written findings will not invalidate the trial court’s conclusions”). 

¶49 Here, the court expressly concluded that there had been a change in circumstances, so the court was plainly cognizant of the requirement and believed that it had been met. And from our review of the record, we believe that the basis for the court’s determination is sufficiently apparent. In its ruling regarding the temporary orders, the court temporarily “modif[ied] the stipulation to reflect what the parties themselves were actually doing regarding parent time.” The court surmised that “reducing the visitation the parties themselves were doing” might “be harmful to the child” and that “visitation is helpful and beneficial to the child, especially since both children will be doing visitation together and parents have the right of visitation with their children.” It thus ordered Nicole to give Bryant “the same parent-time with Son, consistent with Bryant’s parent time with Daughter,” while Bryant’s petition to modify was pending. This initial decision demonstrated two key things: (1) the court intended to equalize Bryant’s parent-time with Daughter and Son, and (2) it more specifically intended to prevent Nicole from “reducing” Bryant’s parent-time with Son. 

¶50 The court’s ruling on Nicole’s relocation request (which, again, accompanied the modification ruling) was consistent with these goals. There, the court ruled that Bryant should be declared Son’s father—a determination that, again, Nicole has not challenged on appeal. Notably, in doing so, the court expressed its intention to not allow Nicole to “disestablish the parent child relationship” between Bryant and Son “that has been created and substantiated by both of the parties over many years.” 

¶51 Together, these orders reflect the court’s intention to formally recognize and now protect Bryant’s relationship with Son. From all this, we believe it is “readily apparent from the record,” In re A.S., 2014 UT App 226, ¶ 7, that the change in circumstances found by the court to support modification included: (i) the changes in Bryant’s relationship with Son (namely, the three years of additional parent-time bonding, as well as Bryant’s new status as Son’s legally recognized father), and (ii) Nicole’s recent attempts to cut off Bryant’s access to Son. 

C. Standard of Review

¶52 Nicole next argues that Bryant’s further-developed relationship with Son and her decision to cut off parent-time between the two could not legally qualify as a change in circumstances under the custody modification statute. As noted in the Standard of Review section above, supra ¶ 25, we regard this as a legal question that is reviewed for correctness. In light of our past caselaw, this warrants some explanation. 

¶53 This court has previously held that a district court’s “determination regarding whether a substantial change of circumstances has occurred is presumptively valid, and our review is therefore limited to considering whether the [district] court abused its discretion.” Nave-Free v. Free, 2019 UT App 83, ¶ 8, 444 P.3d 3 (quotation simplified); accord Christensen v. Christensen, 2017 UT App 120, ¶ 10, 400 P.3d 1219; Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ¶ 7, 221 P.3d 888, aff’d, 2011 UT 42, 258 P.3d 553. We reaffirm our adherence to this general rule here. 

¶54 On occasion, however, we have held that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a district court’s “ultimate determination regarding the presence or absence of a substantial change in circumstances.” Peeples v. Peeples, 2019 UT App 207, ¶ 11, 456 P.3d 1159 (emphasis added); accord Harper v. Harper, 2021 UT App 5, ¶ 11, 480 P.3d 1097. But when we have been presented with an argument that didn’t challenge the court’s “ultimate determination” of whether certain facts constituted a material and substantial change in circumstances, but instead contended that particular facts or developments simply couldn’t be legally considered as part of the court’s analysis, we have treated those questions as questions of law for which we give the district court’s ruling no appellate deference. 

¶55 Our decision in Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), is illustrative. There, after a divorce had been finalized, federal laws regarding military pensions changed; and if those new laws were applied to the parties’ divorce, they would have allowed the ex-wife a larger share of her ex-husband’s military pension. See id. at 113–14. The ex-wife accordingly filed a petition to modify, asserting that the change in laws amounted to a change in circumstances that justified modification of the divorce decree. Id. We disagreed. See id. at 114. Notably, while reaffirming the rule that a district court’s “modification determination” is reviewed “for an abuse of discretion,” we regarded the particular question before us as being “a question of law regarding what constitutes a substantial change of circumstances, which is reviewed for correctness.” Id. 

¶56 Another case proceeded similarly. In Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 6, 263 P.3d 520, we construed a party’s argument that certain events “could not be used as evidence” in the change-in-circumstances analysis as a legal question that we reviewed for correctness. 

¶57 This distinction, though perhaps subtle, is important, and it accords with how standards of review operate. The “primary function of a standard of review is to apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue.” State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 19, 144 P.3d 1096 (quotation simplified). In this sense, the standard of review determination “allocate[s] discretion between the trial and appellate courts” based on an assessment of “the relative capabilities of each level of the court system.” Id. (quotation simplified). 

¶58 Again, the statute in question here requires a court to determine whether there was a material and substantial change in circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(2)(b)(i) (2019). The evaluation of whether a particular change was material or substantial enough calls for a weighing of facts and circumstances. District courts are in a better position than we are to do such weighing, which is why those ultimate determinations receive discretionary deference. But if a party instead makes a threshold argument that a particular kind of fact or development can’t legally be used in the weighing at all, that argument essentially asks us to establish the permissible boundaries of the district court’s discretionary decision-making authority. Such a question is legal in nature, which is why that aspect of the ruling is reviewed for correctness. 

¶59 In her opening brief, Nicole argues that the change in circumstances identified by the district court “is not the sort of ‘change’ that justifies modification under Utah law.” (Emphasis added.) In her reply brief, Nicole similarly asserts that the district court “did not find[] changed circumstances that qualify under Utah law.” (Emphasis added.) She accordingly asks us to review the district court’s decision for correctness, rather than an abuse of discretion. So viewed, we don’t understand Nicole to be challenging the court’s weighing of the permissible facts. Rather, we understand Nicole to be making a legal argument about whether the court could even consider the change in relationship between Son and Bryant in the intervening years and Nicole’s subsequent, unilateral decision to cut off their parent-time as a material change in circumstances. Because her argument is legal in nature, we review this aspect of the ruling for correctness. 

D. The Change in Circumstances

¶60 Properly understood, the question, then, is whether the change in circumstances identified above can legally qualify as a change in circumstances under Utah law. We conclude that it can.18  

¶61 As noted, the statute requires a determination that “a material and substantial change in circumstance has occurred.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(2)(b)(i) (2019). A chief “goal” of this required determination is to give children “some measure of certainty and stability” after their parents or guardians have separated. In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶ 2, 137 P.3d 809. Indeed, the supreme court has suggested that children are “entitled” to “permanence and stability” moving forward. Id. ¶ 16. 

¶62 For good reason. The “emotional, intellectual, and moral development of a child depends upon a reasonable degree of stability in the child’s relationships to important people and to its environment.” Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989). Both the supreme court and this court have recognized that stability is paramount with respect to “custody arrangements.” Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54; see also Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that “stable custody arrangements are of critical importance to the child’s proper development”); Taylor v. Elison, 2011 UT App 272, ¶ 22, 263 P.3d 448 (recognizing the “general policy of maintaining custodial stability to the extent it is reasonable and wise to do so while [a child’s] parents seek to resolve their differences” and that “it is generally in the best interests of the child to remain with his or her existing custodial parent”). 

¶63 This stability interest is one of the driving forces behind the change-in-circumstances requirement, which “provide[s] stability to children by protecting them from ‘ping-pong’ custody awards.” Chaparro v. Torero, 2018 UT App 181, ¶ 39, 436 P.3d 339 (quotation simplified). “Absent such a requirement, a decree of divorce would be subject to ad infinitum appellate review and readjustment.” Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). Thus, the understood “rationale” for this requirement is “that custody placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the factual basis for them has completely changed.” Kramer, 738 P.2d at 627 (quotation simplified). 

¶64 But this leads to the problem that the district court was confronted with here. Again, the parent-child relationship between Bryant and Son had existed since birth, had solidified in the several-year period after the divorce, and had just now been officially recognized as a matter of law. Despite this, Nicole had recently invoked her authority under the Decree to cut off Bryant’s access to Son entirely, thus amounting to something akin to complete custodial interference. 

¶65 The legislature, however, has recognized that “each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to . . . frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with the parent’s child consistent with the child’s best interest,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-32(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2021) (emphases added), and that, absent evidence of abuse or harm to the child, “it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting the child,” id. § 30-3-32(2)(b)(iii) (emphasis added). True, such relationships can be altered or even severed by operation of law. But here, the Decree was the product of a stipulation, not a court determination, and no court has ever determined that it was not in the best interests of Son to have a relationship with Bryant. 

¶66 Given that Bryant has now been adjudicated to be Son’s father, we believe that the court could legally conclude that this change, coupled with Nicole’s concomitant attempt to undermine their ability to have any relationship at all, warranted a modification of the Decree to protect the father-son relationship moving forward. 

¶67 Nicole, however, resists this conclusion. She argues that her decision “to allow (or not allow) parent-time” is not “the type of change in circumstances that justifies modification under Utah law.” We disagree. 

¶68 As a starting point, we note that Nicole’s argument has no support in the controlling statutory text. Section 30-3-10.4(2)(b)(i) requires a court to find that “a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred.” There is nothing in the text of this statute that creates the limit suggested by Nicole—i.e., the statute doesn’t prevent a district court from concluding that a custodial parent’s efforts to cut off a years-developed relationship between a child and the noncustodial parent qualifies as such a change. 

¶69 Nicole nevertheless points to two cases that, in her view, support her proposed limitation. But we don’t find either case to require a different result here. 

¶70 First, Nicole relies on a passage from Doyle in which the supreme court “adopted a general rule” under which “the asserted change” in circumstances must be related to the “parenting ability or the functioning of the presently existing custodial relationship,” rather than the “parenting of the noncustodial parent.” 2011 UT 42, ¶ 41 (quotation simplified). 

¶71 But while Doyle referred to this as a “general rule,” it never said it was an “exclusive” one. Indeed, in the very next sentence, Doyle recognized “an exception to the general rule” that was based on a prior Utah case. Id. Doyle itself thus shows that this “general rule” is subject to judicially recognized exceptions. 

¶72 Moreover, section 30-3-10.4(1)(a) itself provides that, in a petition to modify, the petition or affidavit must “allege[] that admissible evidence will show that the circumstances of the child or one or both parents . . . have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified.” (Emphasis added.) By allowing a modification to be based on a change in the circumstances of “the child or one or both parents,” the legislature directly contemplated that a change in circumstances of any of the parties—the child or either parent—can provide the basis for a modification. So while Doyle’s statement provides some guidance, we do not understand it to be an inviolable limitation of the sort proposed by Nicole. 

¶73 Second, Nicole claims that in Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), we adopted a rule under which a noncustodial parent’s strengthened relationship with a child cannot qualify as a change in circumstances for purposes of a subsequent modification request. We disagree with Nicole’s interpretation of Crouse. 

¶74 In Crouse, the mother had been given primary physical custody of the children after the divorce, but she had then allowed the children to “spen[d] almost equal time” with their father in the ensuing years. Id. at 837. Based in part on this allowance of extra time, the father later requested a modification of the decree to give him “primary physical custody” over the children. Id. The district court denied his modification request, and we affirmed that decision. Id. at 837, 840. 

¶75 Nicole points to a passage from our affirmance in which we recognized that the “fact that Mrs. Crouse has been generous in sharing physical custody with Mr. Crouse is not a ground to change physical custody; if anything, it supports leaving primary physical custody with Mrs. Crouse, as it shows that she has lived up to the responsibilities of a custodial parent.” Id. at 839. 

¶76 In contrast to Nicole, however, we don’t read this passage as having determined that, as a matter of law, a district court cannot consider such facts in its analysis. It’s significant that we were affirming the district court’s denial of a petition to modify in Crouse. It’s also significant that the same section of the opinion began with a reminder that a “trial court’s decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion,” id. at 838, and that we then referred to the court’s “discretion” three more times in that section, id. at 838– 39. Thus, properly understood, Crouse was not establishing rules about the facts that a court could legally consider. Rather, Crouse was giving deference to the district court’s determination that the facts before it were not enough to satisfy the requisite standard. 

¶77 Moreover, we also note that the district court’s use of its discretion in Crouse was consistent with the understood purpose behind the change-in-circumstances requirement. The mother there had originally been awarded primary physical custody, and after she let the children “spen[d] almost equal time” with their father over a period of a few years, the father asked the court to grant him “primary physical custody” as a result. Id. at 837. In this sense, the father’s request, if granted, would have created instability in the children’s lives by changing their primary caregiver. 

¶78 The opposite is true here. Again, Bryant had acted as Son’s father since birth. After Nicole then allowed Son to continue developing this relationship with Bryant over the course of several post-divorce years, Nicole changed her mind and decided to cut off their relationship, thus essentially leaving Son fatherless. Put simply, the effect of our decision here is consistent with Crouse, not inconsistent with it. There, we affirmed a district court decision that preserved stability in the children’s lives. And here, we’re likewise affirming a district court decision that preserved stability in the affected child’s life. 

¶79 In sum, the statute does not impose the limitation proposed by Nicole, and we think that doing so ourselves would be inconsistent with Utah caselaw, the importance of parent-child relationships, the protections given to those relationships by constitution and statute alike, and the modification statute’s recognized goal of promoting stability in children’s lives. We therefore conclude that a district court can legally determine that a unilateral attempt by a custodial parent to sever a child’s years-developed relationship with his or her noncustodial parent can constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances, thereby allowing the court to proceed to the best interests step of the modification analysis. We accordingly affirm the district court’s conclusion that a change in circumstances occurred here. 

¶80 Having done so, we add two cautionary notes to this decision. First, Nicole suggests that a ruling like this one will essentially penalize a custodial parent for being generous with the noncustodial parent’s ability to exercise parent-time. We’re sensitive to this concern. But again, a district court can’t proceed to the best-interests step of the analysis based on just any change in circumstances. Rather, the court must first determine that the change is “material and substantial.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(2)(b)(i). Whether a particular increase or decrease in parent-time is enough to qualify will be circumstance-dependent, and we have no need to more specifically cabin the district courts’ discretionary authority here. But in light of Nicole’s concern, we do note that the change in question in this case was from something akin to 30% of the time to 0%. We’re simply holding that a court can regard such a dramatic alteration of the existing parent-child relationship to be a material and substantial change in circumstances. 

¶81 Second, we again note that, even when a district court concludes that a change in circumstances has occurred, this does not mean that the court must modify the decree. Again, this is a two-step analysis, and under the second step, a court can only modify a decree if it finds that the modification “would be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child.” Id. § 30-3-10.4(2)(b)(ii). Thus, even in a circumstance like this one, a district court could still determine that modification is not appropriate if it concludes that the proposed modification would not be in the best interests of the child. 

¶82 In this sense, our decision today does not restrict the district courts’ options. Rather, it keeps them open. We simply hold that, in a case like this one, a district court can determine that a material and substantial change in circumstances has occurred—not that it must, and not that it must then make any particular ruling regarding the best interests of the child.19  

CONCLUSION 

¶83 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to give Bryant joint legal and physical custody of [decision ends here inexplicably]. 

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Family Law Legislation 2022 – Part 1

Family Law Legislation 2022 – Part 1

This blog post reviews four bills among new proposed legislation during the 2022 session of the Utah State Legislature that deal with divorce and family law matters.

H.B. 51

Title:  Gestational Agreements

The stated purpose of this bill is that it would “amend the requirement that the intended parents be married for a gestational agreement; and make technical and conforming changes.” From what I can tell after reading H.B. 51, that means: 1) unmarried couples would no longer need to be married to enter into gestational agreements (why? How does this benefit society?); and 2) “she” and “her” would no longer be used in reference to “gestational mother” and so, instead of “she and “her” the term would now be, and only be “gestational mother,” which appears to be intended to make the term “mother” gender neutral. This seems at best like a solution in search of a non-existent problem and at worst like ignorant social engineering.

H.B. 84

Title:  Child Support Statute of Limitations

Purpose: Addresses the statute of limitations for child support removing the 4-year limitation on enforcement of a child support order, or a sum certain judgement entered on or after 5/4/00 and makes other technical changes.

At first, this may seem to some to be a great idea, even perhaps a no-brainer. You might say, “I support HB 84 because it recognizes the public policy of supporting children and removes an obstacle for a parent who had to support the children during their minority from collecting child support based solely on the passage of time.” I do not support H.B. 84 because statutes of limitation are good public policy. To quote § 5 of the American Jurisprudence 2d legal encyclopedia, “The statute of limitations doctrine serves the objectives of finality, certainty, and predictability. Defendants have a right to rely on the certainty the statute of limitations provides. Such statutes embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate activity and punish negligence. Statutes of limitation serve to provide an adequate time for a diligent plaintiff to bring a cause of action, as well as to punish those parties who sit on their rights. Another object of statutes of limitation is to prevent surprise. Statutes of limitation are additionally intended to promote the efficient litigation of claims and further the policy that one must diligently pursue one’s legal rights at the risk of losing them if they are not timely asserted. A statute of limitations is primarily intended to protect the sanctity of the outcome of litigation, not to prevent the burdens associated with participation in litigation. Utah’s current statute of limitation for enforcement of a child support order is 4 years from the child’s 18th birthday or eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a tribunal. The longer period of duration shall apply in every order. See Utah Code § 78B-5-202. That’s more than fair. I see no reason to get rid of the statute of limitations here.

H.B. 86

Title:  Parenting Plan Amendments

Purpose:   This bill prohibits a court from granting a petition to modify a parenting plan until the parties have attended an educational course; provides that a court may waive the educational course requirement for a petition to modify a parenting plan if course attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interests of the parties; creates a mandatory educational course for parties when a petition to modify a parenting plan is filed; and makes technical and conforming changes.

Want to know what this proposed “educational course” would entail? Well, if H.B. 86 is passed, it would mean:

(3) A mandatory educational course shall be designed to educate and sensitize parties about a child’s needs during and after the modification of a parenting plan, including educating and instructing the parties on:

 (a) the definition of a parenting plan under Section 30-3-10.7;

 (b) the process for modifying a parenting plan;

 (c) the objectives of a parenting plan under Section 30-3-10.9;

 (d) how to effectively co-parent after a separation or divorce;

 (e) resources, other than litigation, that are available for resolving custody and child support issues, including alternative dispute resolution or mediation;

 (f) how modification to a parenting plan may impact a child;

 (g) how a parent may help the parent’s child adjust to a modification of a parenting plan; and

 (h) the signs and effects of high-conflict and domestic violence issues on children and family relationships.

We already have way too many laws governing divorce and family law in Utah. We don’t need more. Frankly, we need fewer. We definitely do not need this.

Regardless, the last thing divorced or unwed parents need is a law requiring them to attend another state mandated, state-generated “educational course”. The courses we already require of parents aren’t doing any good, and in fairness they aren’t doing any significant harm, but since when did “it doesn’t hurt” become a compelling reason to pass a law? Laws like H.B. 86 insultingly treat parents like ignorant proles who must not be permitted to do anything without first being “educated” by the government (and paying a fee for it). People aren’t that dumb and in a free society the state doesn’t have that kind of paternalistic power.

H.B. 122

Title:  Marriage Terminology Amendments

This bill seeks to substitute the term “illegitimate” with “legally recognized”. That would result in relationships currently identified as “illegitimate” as “not legally recognized,” which is the definition of . . . illegitimate. Changing accurate terms because they have taken on a negative connotation is a no-win situation. “Bastard” became “illegitimate,” and now someone wants to change illegitimate to “not legally recognized”. Why use one word when three will do, eh? Until enough people feel that term offends.

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After a divorce, should my kids be with me or with the mom?

First, you need to understand that you’re asking the wrong question.

Child custody is not a zero-sum game; otherwise stated, when parents divorce, or when unmarried parents separate, where you get the idea that the children must be in the custody of one parent or the other, but not in the joint custody of both?

Perhaps it has come from the idea you been taught most of your life that children of divorced or separated parents must spend the majority of their time in the custody of one parent. I’m 52 years old at the time I write this, and throughout my youth I was taught that very thing.

Not only were we taught the children should spend most of their time in the custody of just one parent, but we were taught that the parent that should be the “custodial” or primary custodial” parent was the mother. Almost always the mother. The mother, unless it could be proven that the mother was heinously unfit to have custody of the children. It was not uncommon to hear about perfectly good and decent fathers not being awarded custody or not being awarded joint physical custody of their children even when mom had a substance abuse problem or was physically and/or emotionally abusive.

The idea that children could be or should be cared for equally or as near to equally as possible by both parents was in the not so distant past unthinkable. The idea of children being cared for by their fathers was believed to be emotionally and psychologically damaging to children, especially very young children. The more research that is conducted on the subject, however, the more we learn that such thinking is wrong. I’ll be the first to admit that, especially in American culture, it seemed somewhat intuitive to believe that children might need or fare better in the care of their mothers instead of their fathers, but it turns out that’s false.

Unfortunately, the legal profession and the courts have been very slow to accept, let alone embrace, this fact. But things are changing in the legal profession and the courts, and at a comparatively rapid pace.

Now (I write this May 27, 2021), things are different, or I should say they are becoming different. As well they should be. Just as this country realized it made no sense to make the black man or woman sit at the back of the bus and that all citizens deserve fair and equal treatment under the law, it makes no sense to deny children of as much love and care and companionship of both of their loving, fit parents as possible.

To crib from C.S. Lewis a bit, asking which fit parent the children are better off with is like asking which blade of the scissors we’re better off with.

When children have to loving, caring parents who are physically and emotionally and financially capable of providing the minimally necessary levels of care their children require, there is no to deny children the benefits of being reared by both parents equally. Period.

I am a divorce lawyer in Utah. For those of you who are currently facing or who are contemplating a possible divorce or child custody dispute in Utah, you may find these statutory criteria that the courts are supposed to apply when making child custody determinations:

Utah Code:


Section 10
. Custody of a child — Custody factors.

Section 10.1. Definitions — Joint legal custody — Joint physical custody.

Section 10.2. Joint custody order — Factors for court determination — Public assistance.

And these sections are worth reviewing to get an idea of what the definitions of child custody are, whether that be legal custody or physical custody:


Section 33
. Advisory guidelines.

Section 34. Parent-time — Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.

Section 34.5. Supervised parent-time.

Section 35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years old.

Section 35.1. Optional schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age.

Section 35.2. Equal parent-time schedule.

Section 35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of age.

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Good news, for parents deserving of joint equal physical custody

Good news, apparently, for parents deserving of joint equal physical custody of their children but who have, up until now, been fighting an unfair, unnecessarily uphill battle.

The Utah Legislature passed, during the 2021 legislative session, a new Utah Code section. It’s Section 30-3-35.2. Here is a copy of the new code section (see below). Section 30-3-35.2 goes into effect May 5, 2021. Note: this is not a law that will, of itself, constitute a basis for seeking a change of an existing custody award. But if you are in the middle of a custody fight for joint equal custody or expect to be in the future, you will want to know about section 30-3-35.2. § 30-3-35.2.

30-3-35.2.Equal parent-time schedule.
(1) (a) A court may order the equal parent-time schedule described in this section if the court determines that:

(i) the equal parent-time schedule is in the child’s best interest;
(ii) each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life; and
(iii) each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule.

(b) To determine whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court shall consider:

(i) each parent’s demonstrated responsibility in caring for the child;
(ii) each parent’s involvement in child care;
(iii) each parent’s presence or volunteer efforts in the child’s school and at extracurricular activities;
(iv) each parent’s assistance with the child’s homework;
(v) each parent’s involvement in preparation of meals, bath time, and bedtime for the child;
(vi) each parent’s bond with the child; and
(vii) any other factor the court considers relevant.

(c) To determine whether each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule, the court shall consider:

(i) the geographic distance between the residence of each parent and the distance between each residence and the child’s school;
(ii) each parent’s ability to assist with the child’s after school care;
(iii) the health of the child and each parent, consistent with Subsection 30-3-10(6);
(iv) the flexibility of each parent’s employment or other schedule;
(v) each parent’s ability to provide appropriate playtime with the child;
(vi) each parent’s history and ability to implement a flexible schedule for the child;
(vii) physical facilities of each parent’s residence; and
(viii) any other factor the court considers relevant.

(2) (a) If the parties agree to or the court orders the equal parent-time schedule described in this section, a parenting plan in accordance with Sections 30-3-10.7through 30-3-10.10 shall be filed with an order incorporating the equal parent-time schedule.

(b) An order under this section shall result in 182 overnights per year for one parent, and 183 overnights per year for the other parent.

(c) Under the equal parent-time schedule, neither parent is considered to have the child
109     the majority of the time for the purposes of Subsection 30-3-10.3(4) or 30-3-10.9(5)(c)(ii).

(d) Child support for the equal parent-time schedule shall be consistent with Section 78B-12-208.

(e) (i) A court shall determine which parent receives 182 overnights and which parent receives 183 overnights for parent-time.

(ii) For the purpose of calculating child support under Section 78B-12-208, the amount of time to be spent with the parent who has the lower gross monthly income is considered 183 overnights, regardless of whether the parent receives 182 overnights or 183 overnights under Subsection (2)(e)(i).

(3) (a) Unless the parents agree otherwise and subject to a holiday, the equal parent-time schedule is as follows:

(i) one parent shall exercise parent-time starting Monday morning and ending Wednesday morning;
(ii) the other parent shall exercise parent-time starting Wednesday morning and ending Friday morning; and
(iii) each parent shall alternate weeks exercising parent-time starting Friday morning and ending Monday morning.

(b) The child exchange shall take place:

(i) at the time the child’s school begins; or
(ii) if school is not in session, at 9 a.m.

(4) (a) The parents may create a holiday schedule.

(b) If the parents are unable to create a holiday schedule under Subsection (4)(a), the court shall:

(i) order the holiday schedule described in Section 30-3-35; and
(ii) designate which parent shall exercise parent-time for each holiday described in Section 30-3-35.

(5) (a) Each year, a parent may designate two consecutive weeks to exercise uninterrupted parent-time during the summer when school is not in session.

(b) (i) One parent may make a designation at any time and the other parent may make a designation after May 1.

(ii) A parent shall make a designation at least 30 days before the day on which the designated two-week period begins.

(c) The court shall designate which parent may make the earlier designation described in Subsection (5)(b)(i) for an even numbered year with the other parent allowed to make the earlier designation in an odd numbered year.

(d) The two consecutive weeks described in Subsection (5)(a) take precedence over all holidays except for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day.

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S.B. 122 passes, despite opposition from the State Bar Family Law Section.

S.B. 122 passes, despite transparently self-serving and disingenuous opposition from the State Bar Family Law Section.

The Family Law Section’s stated opposition to the first iteration of S.B. 122 and to the general concept of a presumption of joint equal physical custody was and–every time they oppose it–patently insincere. Virtually every ostensible “objection” to a presumption of joint equal custody is easily refuted, as the Section and its members well know.

Similar dire (and fake) predictions followed the proposal for Section 30-3-35.1, yet “miraculously” Section 30-3-35.1 hasn’t so much as raised an eyebrow among attorneys, courts, and legislators since its passage. Indeed, 30-3-35.1 not only did no harm but is rapidly becoming (if it is not already) the new “standard” schedule (a definition of “standard” that only a sophist could claim to accept), but only then because the combination of statutes and an undeniable bias against fathers still fail (even with the creation of Section 30-3-35.2) to give 50-50 custody for fit, able fathers and their children a fair chance to prove a success or failure.

Sure, the first draft of S.B. 122 could have done with some revision and refining, but the flaws in the drafting weren’t why the Section opposed S.B. 122. The Section opposed S.B. 122/presumption of equal custody because child custody litigation is lucrative and they fear that a presumption of joint equal physical custody will dramatically reduce child custody litigation from its current levels (and they’re right).

Claims that a presumption of joint equal physical custody would inherently/inexorably harm children and families, deprive courts of their discretion, cause more (not less) litigation, etc., etc. were (and always are), with rare exception, pretextual, and we all know it.

We have seen this kind of opposition from the Section every time it is proposed that child custody need not and should not be a question of which parent is the “custodial parent” and which one is not. We have seen this kind of opposition from the Section every time someone dares to point out the inequity and injustice in depriving either parent of any parental rights merely because of a divorce (even when the divorce complaint makes no allegations of any parental unfitness and neither parent is unfit to continue exercising joint legal and physical custody).

The presumption of joint equal physical custody is not a question of if but when. S.B. 122 4th substitute is a badly drafted but still positive step in the right direction. You can read the laws that S.B. 122 amended and created by clicking here.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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Why does someone need an attorney when they can just defend themselves in court?

Why does someone need an attorney when they can just defend themselves in court (pro se)?

Why does someone need an attorney when they can just defend themselves in court?

It really depends on how you define “need” here.

First, understand that no litigant (except a litigant in certain circumstances who is determined to be mentally incapacitated or disabled, in which case the court may appoint an attorney for such a litigant) is required or can be forced to have be represented by an attorney.

This means you cannot be forced to hire an attorney, you cannot be forced to have an attorney appointed for you in criminal cases, even if you qualify for an attorney to be appointed for you.

So, there is no legal mandate that you be represented by an attorney, no “need” to be represented by an attorney in that sense. You won’t be arrested or fined for not being represented by an attorney.

So, from the foregoing we see that you have the absolute right (with the exception of disability/incapacity) to represent yourself in court (that’s known as proceeding “pro se”, which is Latin for “for oneself”).

If, however, prevailing in the litigation is your sole or primary objective, and if you are not well-versed/skilled/confident regarding the law and court procedures, you may determine that you cannot win without an attorney. In that respect, you may determine that you “need” an attorney. In this sense, most people need an attorney. You may have heard the old saw, “A man who represents himself, has a fool for a client.” Abraham Lincoln is reputed to have put it this way: “He who serves as his own counsel has a fool for a lawyer and a jackass for a client.” The reason this is true is because the legal system is not as simple, as non-dysfunctional (sorry, I know that’s a clunky term, but I cannot think of a clearer way to make my point, or as fair as you believe or want to believe. A lawyer is not only helpful for his/her knowledge of the law and court procedures, but also for his/her experience and ability to guide you down the dark, twisted, uphill, rocky, often counterintuitive and dangerous path that is the legal system.

If the stakes are such that you don’t mind bearing the consequences of losing the case (in other words, you can afford to pay and don’t mind paying the fine(s) and/or don’t mind doing the time in jail/prison), then it’s likely you don’t “need” an attorney; otherwise, a prudent litigant needs an attorney.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Why-does-someone-need-an-attorney-when-they-can-just-defend-themselves-in-court/answer/Eric-Johnson-311?prompt_topic_bio=1

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2019 UT 72 – Utah Supreme Court – Hinkle v. Jacobsen – standing to establish paternity

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter
2019 UT 72 – Utah Supreme Court – Hinkle v. Jacobsen
THERESA I. HINKLE, Appellee,
v.
KOREY D. JACOBSEN, Appellee,
and
JODY RHORER, Intervenor and Appellant.

No. 20180124
Heard February 22, 2019
Filed December 19, 2019

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Andrew H. Stone
No. 124906297

Attorneys:
Theresa I. Hinkle, Salt Lake City, pro se
Colleen K. Coebergh, Salt Lake City, for appellee Korey D. Jacobsen
David Pedrazas, Wade Taylor, Salt Lake City,
for intervenor and appellant

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,
JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Jody Rhorer appeals the district court’s determination that he does not have standing to establish paternity of his biological daughter under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA). But the district court also concluded that Rhorer had abandoned his paternity claim entirely, and Rhorer did not challenge this ruling in his opening brief. He has consequently waived the issue, and we dismiss his appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Theresa Hinkle (Mother) and Korey Jacobsen (Husband) married in 2002 and then separated in 2005. In 2005, Mother and Rhorer engaged in a relationship during which a child was conceived and born. Because Mother and Husband were still married at the time the child was born, Husband is the child’s presumed father under the UUPA. See UTAH CODE § 78B-15-204(1)(a).

¶3 Mother and Husband began divorce proceedings in 2012. Rhorer intervened in the divorce proceedings, alleging that he is the biological father of the child. He filed multiple motions including one to establish himself as the child’s biological father and another for a determination of parentage. He asserted that he could establish his paternity with genetic test results.

¶4 After briefing and proceedings before the commissioner, the commissioner concluded that under the court of appeals’ interpretation of the UUPA in R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084, Rhorer did not have statutory standing to assert his paternity because the child had a presumed father—Husband—and, under such a circumstance, only the mother and presumed father had standing to challenge paternity under the UUPA.

¶5 However, the commissioner noted the court of appeals’ statement in R.P. that

[a]lthough constitutional considerations might require further analysis in cases such as this—where the alleged father has an established relationship with the child—R.P. has not raised a constitutional challenge in the district court or on appeal. Accordingly, we leave for another day the issue of the constitutional implications of the UUPA’s standing limitations where the alleged father has an established relationship with the child.

Id. ¶ 7. In light of this language, the commissioner gave Rhorer the opportunity through a custody evaluation to develop facts relevant to whether the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court adopted the recommendation as a court order. The court order provided that Rhorer had no statutory standing to assert his paternity. Therefore, unless he could show “constitutional standing,” he could not move forward with his petition.

¶6 Rhorer proceeded with the custody evaluation in an attempt to establish “constitutional standing.” However, he never analyzed the results of the evaluation to make a legal argument that the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to him. Rather, he filed a motion in which he asked the court to grant him “standing to pursue a claim for time-sharing with the minor child at time of trial.”

¶7 At a hearing before the commissioner on the custody evaluation and Rhorer’s motion, the commissioner directly requested briefing from Rhorer on any constitutional issues he sought to assert. The commissioner stated, “[I]t’s already the law of this case . . . that [Rhorer] wouldn’t have standing under the statute were it not for concerns about . . . protecting his constitutional rights, and so I’d like to have something that actually states the parties’ positions in writing . . . referring to any facts that are in the file.”

¶8 But Rhorer did not do this. Instead, he filed a reply brief in which he asserted he had already addressed the constitutional issues in other pleadings. But while Rhorer did make reference to the due process clause in some of his pleadings, he did not provide any analysis or argument as to why it required he have standing here.

¶9 The commissioner ultimately concluded that

[i]nasmuch as the issue before the Court . . . is whether the strict application of the [UUPA] is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case . . . the Commissioner cannot conclude that there exists a compelling reason to grant standing to [Rhorer] to assert his claim of parentage contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-607.

¶10 In light of the commissioner’s recommendation, in a December 21, 2016 order, the district court concluded that Rhorer “lacks standing to assert his parentage claim.”

¶11 Rhorer filed a belated objection to the commissioner’s recommendation and also moved to set aside the December 21, 2016 order. At a hearing on the objection before the district court, Rhorer’s counsel stated that Rhorer was not trying to take “this little girl away from [Husband],” but that he was “asking this Court to give him a relationship with the child.” Counsel added, “I’m asking this Court to admittedly break new ground . . . to say ‘[N]o, why can’t you have two fathers?’”

¶12 In a June 1, 2017 memorandum decision denying the motion to set aside, the district court found that Rhorer “asked th[e] Court to craft a remedy whereby he is ultimately granted limited parent-time with [the child], while not actually seeking custody of the child or challenging [Husband’s] status as [the child]’s presumed father.” The district court explained,

Ultimately, while Mr. Rhorer may have had a right at the time the biological mother and [Husband] sought a divorce to assert standing to challenge the child’s paternity and to rebut [Husband’s] paternity (assuming that Mr. Rhorer could mount a constitutional challenge to [Utah Code section 78B-15-607] as applied to him), he has plainly abandoned such a claim at this point.

The court noted that Rhorer had failed to “brief his theories of why Section 607 is unconstitutional as applied to him with adequate specificity to permit intelligent analysis.” Finally, the court concluded that Rhorer had not met his burden to demonstrate the statute’s unconstitutionality and that Rhorer “[did] not seek to rebut [Husband’s] paternity and [did] not seek to establish himself as the legal father” of the child, so he had no standing to challenge Husband’s status as presumed father.

¶13 Rhorer responded to the June 1, 2017 memorandum decision by filing a motion for amended findings and a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, Rhorer’s counsel walked back the request for dual fatherhood and explained that Rhorer still sought to establish paternity and rebut Husband’s status as the child’s presumed father.

¶14 The district court denied the motion in a November 14, 2017 memorandum decision. The court outlined the procedural history of the case and explained that “the only issue” was the “conclusion regarding the constitutional implications of the UUPA’s standing limitations.” The court noted again that “neither Mr. Rhorer’s written briefing nor his counsel’s oral argument focused on th[e] constitutional challenge” and that Rhorer’s counsel at the time “did not mount a constitutional challenge.” The district court then concluded that Rhorer had “accepted [Husband’s] parental rights” and “was merely asking this Court to take judicial notice of the bond he had formed with [the child] and find it sufficient to enter into a ‘multiple relationship’ of fathering.”

¶15 Rhorer then moved to set aside the November 14, 2017 memorandum decision under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this motion, for the first time, he briefed a constitutional argument asserting that section 78B-15-607 of the UUPA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

¶16 In a January 25, 2018 minute entry, the district court denied Rhorer’s motion. The district court reasoned that it seemed as if “Rhorer [wa]s seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief simply to advance an entirely new legal argument, one that could have been raised and preserved during the multiple instances when this Court and the Commissioners considered the issue of who has standing to challenge a presumed father’s paternity under the [UUPA].”

¶17 Rhorer appeals these four district court orders.[1] We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 Standing is generally a mixed question of fact and law “because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particularized set of facts.” Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (citation omitted). However, “the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law.” Kearns— Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). We review the district court’s “factual determinations” with deference. Id. at 373–74. But we give “minimal discretion” to the district court on “determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing.” Id. at 374.

ANALYSIS

¶19 Rhorer’s primary argument on appeal is that the UUPA is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Husband argues that Rhorer did not preserve these arguments in the district court. As the procedural history above makes clear, Husband is correct.

¶20 But in a companion case issued today, Castro v. Lemus, we interpret the UUPA to grant standing to “a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.” 2019 UT 71, ¶ 51, — P.3d —. This statutory interpretation does not implicate Rhorer’s equal protection or due process concerns. Accordingly, Rhorer’s failure to preserve his constitutional arguments is moot because the constitutionality of the UUPA is no longer at issue.

¶21 However, we do need to determine whether Rhorer can benefit from any favorable change in the law as articulated in Castro. This hinges upon whether he waived any challenge to the district court’s determination that he abandoned his paternity claim.

¶22 In its June 1, 2017 memorandum decision, the district court noted that Rhorer had asked it “to craft a remedy whereby he is ultimately granted limited parent-time with [the child], while not actually seeking custody of the child or challenging [Husband’s] status as [the child’s] presumed father.” The court concluded that the “law clearly does not recognize the hybrid role proposed by Mr. Rhorer,” and determined that Rhorer no longer sought to rebut Husband’s paternity or to establish himself as the child’s legal father.

¶23 Further, in its November 14, 2017 memorandum decision, the district court concluded that Rhorer had “accepted [Husband’s] parental rights” and “was merely asking [the] Court to take judicial notice of the bond he had formed with [the child] and find it sufficient to enter into a ‘multiple relationship’ of fathering.”

¶24 In these rulings, the district court concluded that Rhorer had abandoned his pursuit of his constitutional standing argument by never briefing it. Further, the court found that Rhorer had abandoned his paternity claim altogether by instead pursuing dual fatherhood and shared parent-time and stating that he did not want to disrupt the relationship between the child and Husband.

¶25 Rhorer does not address these rulings in his briefing to us, other than making a conclusory statement that he did not abandon his paternity claim.[2] He did respond to [Husband’s] argument regarding waiver in his reply brief. But that is insufficient. “When a party . . . raises [an issue] for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and will typically not be addressed by the appellate court.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 443; see also Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903 (“If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court’s decision.”); Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, ¶ 21, 290 P.3d 930 (“The reply brief, however, is reserved for ‘answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief,’ not for making an argument in the first instance.”).

¶26 Accordingly, we can only hold that Rhorer waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that he had abandoned his paternity petition.

CONCLUSION

¶27 The district court found that Rhorer abandoned his paternity claim, and Rhorer did not challenge that finding on appeal. We therefore conclude that Rhorer waived any claim to challenge Husband’s presumed paternity. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

[1] Specifically, Rhorer challenges (1) the December 21, 2016 order; (2) the June 1, 2017 memorandum decision; (3) the November 14, 2017 memorandum decision; and (4) the January 25, 2018 minute entry.

[2] Specifically, Rhorer stated in his opening brief that he “never abandoned his claim to rebut [Husband’s] paternity in this matter and to seek custody of the minor child.” But this conclusory statement does not constitute a challenge to the district court’s repeated, specific conclusion that he had abandoned his paternity claim.

Rhorer did “technically appeal[]” the orders containing the district court’s conclusions about abandonment, but “technical compliance is not enough.” Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env’t v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49, ¶ 18, 391 P.3d 148.

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If mom’s in jail, and dad never signed the birth certificate, who gets custody?

As a legal matter, whoever the court would deem to serve the best interest of the child. If the biological father could prove to the court that he is the biological father, he should presumptively be preferred as the person to have custody of the child, but he could be passed over for someone else (either another person who petitions the court for custody or the state, if no one else petitions for custody) if the biological father could be shown to be unfit to exercise custody.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/If-the-mom-is-in-jail-and-the-father-never-signed-the-birth-certificate-who-gets-custody-Would-the-grandparents-get-custody-of-the-mom-who-is-in-jail/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

Morality Clause: Can Include One in My Decree of Divorce?

Can I successfully put a morality clause in a custody agreement to prevent my child from a living arrangement where my ex is living with a girlfriend? This practice is against the religious teachings in our faith.

Yes.

In Utah (where I practice divorce and family law), you can include provisions in your decree to set and enforce certain moral standards.

In fact, it’s a common provision divorcing parents include in their divorce decrees. Sadly, such provisions are becoming less common as society’s acceptance of cohabiting grows, but it’s still a common issue and so “morality clauses,” as they are sometimes known, are still a common provision in divorce decrees.

If you and your spouse agree to a morality clause, the judge will almost surely accept it and permit its inclusion in your decree.

If the issue of including a morality clause in the decree were contested and left to the judge to decide, your chances of the judge including a morality clause in the decree would be slimmer, but not zero (some judges feel—for many reasons, some good, most bad—that morality clauses are a bad idea).

In crafting the terms of the morality clause take care to avoid overreaching. What do I mean? You asked whether you could include a morality clause that would prohibit your ex-husband from merely living with his girlfriend. That is the sort of clause the court would probably deny as too restrictive because if ex-husband (or ex-wife) were to cohabit with someone to who he is not married, some judges conclude that that doesn’t set a “bad enough” example to warrant barring cohabitation (I disagree, but it doesn’t matter what I think—you’re asking what the courts actually do, not what they should do).

So what you’re likely to get would be a morality clause that contains provisions like these:

A parent may not allow anyone 1) of the opposite sex, 2) who is not related to that parent by blood, 3) with whom that parent is involved in a romantic relationship, and 4) to whom that parent is not married, to stay with that parent overnight when any of the party’s minor children are in that parent’s care.

If the ex-spouse not heterosexual, the morality clause will need to account for that:

A parent may not allow 1) anyone who is not related to that parent by blood, 2) with whom that parent is involved in a romantic relationship, 3) and to whom that parent is not married, to stay with that parent overnight when any of the party’s minor children are in that parent’s care.

There is no perfect way to craft a morality clause*, but those I’ve provided above are good examples.

But bear in mind that merely having a morality clause in your decree is no guarantee that morality will rule and reign.

Morality clauses are extremely difficult to enforce because it is extremely difficult to prove that a parent is violating it.

Even if the kids report morality clause violations, the court usually requires more than Mom or Dad coming to court and saying, “Your Honor, the kids tell me. . .” This is because A) telling the courts what the kids allegedly told you is hearsay and generally not admissible evidence; B) little kids caught in the middle of their parents’ divorce aren’t the most credible of witnesses, as they are easily coached, coerced, and bribed to say anything; and C) generally don’t like to involve kids in divorce litigation.

*In one case in which I was involved the ex-husband claimed that the woman with whom he spent overnights when the kids were with him was “in a committed relationship with” him and thus not “unrelated” to him—fortunately, the court did not buy that argument. Other parents try to argue that the morality clause is not violated if the parent and his/her lover are in one room or tent or dwelling and the kids are in a separate room or tent or dwelling during the time the children are in that parent’s custody and care.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Can-I-successfully-put-a-morality-clause-in-a-custody-agreement-to-prevent-my-child-from-a-living-arrangement-where-my-ex-is-living-with-a-girlfriend-This-practice-is-against-the-religious-teachings-in-our-faith/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

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When a couple have children outside wedlock, what happens financially to mom when daddy finds a new girlfriend?

In Utah, where I practice family law, there are no laws governing an unmarried father’s obligations to a child born out of wedlock. So regardless of whether the father has a new girlfriend, there is nothing to force the father to support the child financially without first either filing for an administrative order of child support through the Office of Recovery Services or through the district court.

If the mother wants/needs the father to provide financial support for the child he fathered, and if the father is not providing financial support in the amounts and at the times he should, the mother needs to file either for an administrative order of child support through the Office of Recovery Services or for an order through the district court. Once she obtains the order, she can then garnish the father’s wages and intercept tax refunds to collect child support. She can also require that the father share half of the child’s medical/health care insurance and uninsured health care expenses.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/When-a-couple-have-children-outside-wedlock-what-happens-financially-to-mom-when-daddy-finds-a-new-girlfriend/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

Can a mother take a child from the father just because she chose not to marry him?

How do you feel that a mother can take a child from their father without any legal repercussion just because she chose to string along an engagement and never get married?

I think your question is actually this one:

Can a mother can take a child from his/her father without any legal repercussion just because the mother chose to string along an engagement and never get married?

My response to that question is:

In the jurisdiction where I practice (Utah), a mother (whether married to the father or not) can a mother can pack up and take “her” children with her wherever she likes within the United States. If she is married or divorced and wants to travel internationally, she will need the permission of the father before she can do so. If she had children out of wedlock, she does not need the father’s permission to travel internationally (because we don’t really know who the father is). If she is unmarried and has had the father’s parental rights terminated she does not need the father’s permission to travel internationally (because the father has no parental rights).

Thus, whether the mother broke an engagement to marry the father really doesn’t make any difference legally.

If the father wants to establish enforceable rights to be with his children and have them in his care and custody (whether exclusively or shared with the mother), he has legal recourse, and must avail himself of that legal recourse to get those enforceable rights.

He needs to file a parentage action (also known as a paternity action) in court to establish as a legal matter 1) his paternity of the child in question and 2) his legal rights regarding child custody and visitation (also known as parent-time). Once he has a court order, if the mother tries to deprive him of the court-ordered time he and the children have together, he can go to court to get orders helping him retrieve the children.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/How-do-you-feel-that-a-mother-can-take-a-child-from-their-father-without-any-legal-repercussion-just-because-she-chose-to-string-along-an-engagement-and-never-get-married/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

Unpaid Child Support and the Unmarried Parent: How far back can a claim be made for it?

Unpaid Child Support and the Unmarried Parent: How far back can a claim be made for it?

If you are an unmarried parent and haven’t paid child support for a while, you may wonder how far back a claim for unpaid child support can reach.

In Utah, liability is limited to the period of 4 years preceding the commencement of an action for child support (according to Utah Code §78B-15-109). What does this mean, and how does it work?

This means that no matter how long the period of time is that the child support went unpaid, liability for unpaid child support only goes back 4 years.

For example, if the father of a 16-year-old has not paid child support since the child was 10-years-old, the father would NOT be responsible to repay all missed child support payments for the past ten years. The father would be liable only for the child support which accrued in the last 4 years.

Another example: assume that you are the father of a child and until the child was 6 years old, you paid no support. Let’s assume that’s because you didn’t know you were a parent and didn’t find out until the child was 6 years old. As soon as you found out, you started paying child support every month in full and paid in full every year since then. Assume next that when the child is 12 years old the obligee parent (the one who receives the child support money) wants to sue you for the support you did not pay for the first six years of the child’s life. She can’t. Liability for unpaid support only reaches back 4 years, and you’ve been paying in full for the past 4 years. The obligee cannot go back any further.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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What are the odds of a ballot measure for 50/50 custody?

What are the chances of a ballot measure in CA for a rebuttable presumption that child custody should be 50/50 if both parents wish at least 50%?

Slim.

This isn’t important to enough people to get it on the ballot, and even if it were, the culture isn’t ready to make a presumption of 50/50 custody law.

The day when the presumption will be 50/50 is coming, but not right now.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-chances-of-a-ballot-measure-in-CA-for-a-rebuttable-presumption-that-child-custody-should-be-50-50-if-both-parents-wish-at-least-50

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Christmas Break Parent-time 2017 – how it works

NOTE: this will explain how to calculate Christmas break parent-time for any period, in any year (but we’ll use 2017 as an example).

QUESTION: I’m trying to figure out what day it ends if Christmas break in our child’s school district is 13 days in length this year (2017); school is dismissed for Christmas break the afternoon of December 20th. I don’t know if my ex gets our child until December 25th or 26th.

ANSWER (and special thanks to Heather Vanduker for her help with this): This is the best, most equal way I can interpret the law governing Christmas vacation, so that it is divided as equally as reasonably possible.

It’s not 13 days, it’s 12, and if you and your ex are working under the provisions of Utah Code Section 30-3-35(2), then the non-custodial parent’s half of the Christmas break 2017 period ends December 26th at 7:00 p.m. See below for the explanation.

First, here is how Christmas break is defined in the Utah Code:

Utah Code Section 30-3-32(3):

(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:

*****

(b) Subject to Subsection (5), “Christmas school vacation” means:

(i) for a single child, the time period beginning on the evening the child is released from school for the Christmas or winter school break and ending the evening before the child returns to school; and

(ii) for multiple children when the children’s school schedules differ, the time period beginning on the first evening all children’s schools are released for the Christmas or winter school break and ending the evening before any of the children returns to school.

If you and your ex are working under the provisions of Utah Code Section 30-3-35(2), then these provisions apply in even- and odd-numbered years:

Odd-numbered Years

(f)(viii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) including Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, continuing until 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday period, if there are an odd number of days for the holiday period, or until 7 p.m. if there are an even number of days for the holiday period, so long as the entire holiday period is equally divided.

Even-numbered Years

(g) (viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b), beginning 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday period, if there are an odd number of days for the holiday period, or at 7 p.m. if there are an even number of days for the holiday period, so long as the entire Christmas holiday period is equally divided.

With 2017 being an odd-numbered year, that means that Christmas break parent-time would be shared and exercised as follows (I am assuming that there is either one child or that all children are dismissed on the same day):

First, note that 7:00 p.m. on December 26th is the the mid-point between “the evening” of Dec 20th and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of January 1. So if we treat “the evening of the day the child is released from school” as starting around 7:00 p.m. (even if you actually pick up the kids immediately after school, we can all agree that Day 1 is not a full 24-hour period), then the holiday period is actually 12 days, not 13. Watch, I’ll show you below.

December 20, starts in the evening. Even if you pick up the kids immediately after school, some parents don’t, so for calculation purposes, we’ll start “the evening” at 7:00 p.m. on December 20th.

So if we count days from 7:00 p.m. on Day 1 until 7:00 p.m. on Day 2, and so on, we get:

Day 1, 7:00 p.m., December 20 until 7:00 p.m. December 21: children with the non-custodial parent for at least a full 24-hour period

Day 2, 7:00 p.m., December 21 until 7:00 p.m. December 22: children with the non-custodial parent for a full 24-hour period

Day 3, 7:00 p.m., December 22 until 7:00 p.m. December 23: children with the non-custodial parent for a full 24-hour period

Day 4, 7:00 p.m., December 23 until 7:00 p.m. December 24: children with the non-custodial parent for a full 24-hour period

Day 5, 7:00 p.m., December 24 until 7:00 p.m. December 25: children with the non-custodial parent for a full 24-hour period

Day 6, 7:00 p.m., December 25 until 7:00 p.m. December 26: children with the non-custodial parent for a full 24-hour period

TOTAL periods spent with noncustodial parent to this point = 6 twenty-four-hour periods. At this point we make the exchange at 7:00 p.m. December 26th

Day 7 starts December 26 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. December 27: children with the custodial parent.

Day 8, 7:00 p.m., December 27 until 7:00 p.m. December 28: children with the custodial parent

Day 9, 7:00 p.m., December 28 until 7:00 p.m. December 29: children with the custodial parent

Day 10,  7:00 p.m., December 29 until 7:00 p.m. December 30: children with the custodial parent

Day 11, 7:00 p.m., December 30 until 7:00 p.m. December 31: children with the custodial parent

Day 12, 7:00 p.m., December 31 until 7:00 p.m. January 1: children with the custodial parent, and then the Christmas break ends.

Because the intention of the law is to divide the Christmas Break period equally (“so long as the entire Christmas holiday period is equally divided”), then look at it this way:

From the evening of the day the child is released from school until the evening before the child returns to school, returning the child to the custodial parent at 7:00 p.m. on December 26th is the mid-point between the evening of December 20th and evening of January 1st.

 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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Defending Yourself Against a Protective Order

My friend is a good man. His wife is crazy. She put a protection order against him, to help manipulate the court proceedings. What should he do?

Defend himself with all he has because:

  • (regardless of how much the legal system will deny it) the prevailing presumption is that a man accused of domestic violence is guilty;
  • the unwritten, unseen even unwitting policies of the system are set up to ensure that presumption is affirmed; and
  • many (not all) courts grant protective orders routinely, without really making a considered determination of whether the standard of proof has been met to merit one.

Why?

One, no judge wants to deny a request for protective order, then have the woman wind up hospitalized or dead, and then be blamed for “failing to protect” the victim. So to ensure that never happens judges often grant any request for a protective order. That way they can never be blamed for “failing” to protect victims. The fact that “generous” issuance of protective orders victimizes innocent men just doesn’t get enough attention to give some judges pause.

Two, the job of a judge is very demanding, very difficult, and often thankless. These are the reasons why judges can become jaded and apathetic, especially on the subject of domestic violence.

The tragic results are often:

  • the accused’s reputation is irreparably damaged; and
  • he proceeds at a permanent disadvantage and under a cloud of public shame and loathing, if the “victim” follows the protective order request with a complaint for divorce (and that’s usually exactly what happens)

Your friend needs to:

  • Hire the best lawyer he can find to help defend him. If he tries to defend himself, the legal system can chew him up (strip him of his money, job, home, family, and good name) and spit him out.
  • You may assert, “But if he gets a lawyer, won’t that make him look guilty?” NO!
    • Indeed, I’d contend that not getting a lawyer makes him look like someone who’s so poor and stupid that he’s the kind of arrogant lout who probably beats his wife. Lawyer up.
    • There is plenty of empirical and anecdotal evidence that people who represent themselves in legal proceedings without an attorney get treated worse by the courts than people who hire lawyers. It’s not fair, but it’s reality. Lawyer up. Pay for a good lawyer. You simply can’t afford not to.
    • Although you may believe otherwise, you have no idea how the legal system works, and you will almost surely make numerous serious and irreparable mistakes if you try to navigate the system on your own.
    • Lawyer up. Do it as fast as you can. The legal system does not work the way you think it does. If you believe that all you have to do is go into court and tell your side of the story for a fair shake, you’re mistaken.
    • Don’t get me wrong: there are some judges out there who will care, who do understand the law, and you are not afraid of holding protective order applicants to the proper standards of evidence and burdens of proof. But why leave it to chance?
    • DO NOT speak to the police (without counsel). The police can lie to you and try to misreport or misconstrue your words. They are allowed to do that in the course of their investigations. They will avail themselves of this tool. So if they tell you that “you are not a suspect,” or “we just want to get your side of the story,” or even “this will go a lot easier for you if you cooperate,” they almost never mean a word of it.

When the police want to talk to you in this setting, it’s usually because they want to bury you, not vindicate you. You can’t afford to take the risk.

If you are approached by Child Protective Services, the Division of Family Services, or whatever such an organization is called in your jurisdiction, do not agree to speak with them without your lawyer present, and without you recording the interview from start to finish. You may ask why I do not advise you simply to refuse to speak with these agencies. The reason for this is a little unclear in many people’s minds: while you have a constitutional right to remain silent if you are questioned by the police, in most jurisdictions (although you’ll want to confirm this in your own jurisdiction) you do not have such a right if you are questioned by officials of child welfare agencies. In the course of my career and my dealings with child welfare agencies in the protective order context, this loophole is often exploited, and here’s how:

1) the child welfare agency official invokes the right to question you;

2) (and if you refuse to answer those questions, then the child welfare agency official will report this to the court, and your refusal to answer questions may, and likely will, be construed as evidence of guilt. The problem is that if you speak with the child welfare agency officials, they will frequently misstate and misinterpret your answers. This is why they rarely, if ever, make an audio recording of your interview: that way it becomes a matter of your word against theirs, and since they work for the state, the court typically places more stock in the word of a government agency than in the word of the accused);

3) then the child welfare agency official goes to the police and tells the police a slanted version of what you just told the child welfare agency officials (because you had to answer their questions), and on the basis of what you said to the child welfare agency officials, the police charge you with a crime.

Now you see how important it is for you not to speak with the child welfare agency official before you have lawyered up, submitted to questioning only with your lawyer present, and have made it clear that you will be making an audio recording of the entire interview with the child welfare agency officials.

The majority of the public believes (although this belief is slowly giving way in the face of some highly public rail-roadings) that whenever there is an allegation of domestic violence, it must be true, and it must’ve been the man who was the aggressor. With these stereotypes in mind, many people are falsely/wrongfull charged and convicted. If you don’t know how to defend yourself properly, and if you do not actually defend yourself properly, you will likely be failed and victimized by a system that does not care about you or the truth.

If you are innocent:

  • lawyer up now, now, now;
  • don’t speak to anyone without consulting with a lawyer first. Don’t speak to anyone without your lawyer’s advice, without your lawyer present, and without making a recording of the interview;
  • passionately profess your innocence. Vehemently deny wrongdoing;
  • gather every scrap of exculpatory evidence that you can possibly find. You’re going to need it. All of it. You need so much exculpatory evidence that you can win six ways from Sunday. The playing field is not level. Do everything you can to ensure that you have control over your fate. Do not entrust your fate to the legal system.
  • Prepare and file with the court–with the assistance of a very good lawyer–as soon as you possibly can a document asserting your innocence and the categorical denial of all wrongdoing. Do not wait until you appear in court to state your case.
  • Do not merely defend yourself. Go on the offensive. Don’t simply oppose the request for protective order and ask that it be denied. If your jurisdiction allows, moved to have the protective order action vacated as frivolous and without merit.
  • Make sure your lawyer 1) informs the court of the applicable legal and evidentiary standards and 2) holds the court to them. Don’t allow your judge to issue a protective order against you carelessly or out of bias.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/My-friend-is-a-good-man-His-wife-is-crazy-She-put-a-protection-order-against-him-to-help-manipulate-the-court-proceedings-What-should-he-do

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If unwed parents plan to get married, how can they terminate child support?

QUESTION:

If the mother of my child and I get back together and plan to get married how can we terminate child support?

ANSWER:

In my opinion, the easiest, surest, best way to terminate your child support obligation is to marry, not to “get back together with the intent to marry at some future time,” and then move/petition to terminate the child support withholding and child support order, retroactive to the date you married.

Once you are married, then you should notify the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) of the marriage (I’d send ORS a copy of the marriage certificate) and your wife/child support recipient should make a formal, written request to ORS (using their procedures) to stop collecting child support. I would also move the court (the court may require a petition in lieu of a motion) to order the child support award terminated.

See also Utah Code Section 78B-12-109(3):

78B-12-109. Waiver and estoppel.

(1) Waiver and estoppel shall apply only to the custodial parent when there is no order already established by a tribunal if the custodial parent freely and voluntarily waives support specifically and in writing.

(2) Waiver and estoppel may not be applied against any third party or public entity that may provide support for the child.

(3) A noncustodial parent, or alleged biological father in a paternity action, may not rely on statements made by the custodial parent of the child concerning child support unless the statements are reduced to writing and signed by both parties.

Sincerely,

Eric K. Johnson, Utah Family Law, LC

Office: (801) 466-9277

Mobile: (801) 450-0183

eric@divorceutah.com

divorceutah.com

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