Tag: court proceedings

Can I Request to Have My Son’s Grandmother Removed From the Courtroom During My Custody Case Proceedings?

Are the court proceedings in your kind of case open to the public? If so, then the grandmother, being a member of the public, may have a right to be in the courtroom during the proceedings, as long as 1) there is no law that allows her to be excluded and 2) she is not disrupting the proceedings by being present during the proceedings.

Juvenile court proceedings are closed to the public in Utah.

District court proceedings are open to the public in Utah. That stated, it’s very easy for a Utah district court to exclude members of the public from the courtroom in certain kinds of cases because of Utah Code § 78A-2-208(4):

§ 78A-2-208.  Sittings of courts — To be public — Notice to public of recording — Right to exclude in certain cases.

(1) The sittings of every court of justice are public, except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4).

(2) The Judicial Council shall require that notice be given to the public that the proceedings are being recorded when an electronic or digital recording system is being used during court proceedings.

(3) The court may, in its discretion, during the examination of a witness exclude any and all other witnesses in the proceedings.

(4) In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, abortion, rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude all persons who do not have a direct interest in the proceedings, except jurors, witnesses and officers of the court.

(emphasis added)

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

What Good Parents Need to Know About Child Custody Disputes with an Evil Parent

You hear and read on attorney websites stuff like, “Navigating child custody arrangements during divorce can be challenging.” That’s not the half of it. Child custody disputes with an evil parent are nastier and harder (and orders of magnitude more expensive) than most parents expect or can even imagine. I’m not exaggerating. I am really not exaggerating. Really, I am not exaggerating. Here are some crucial tips to consider for a smoother process.

  • If there is no valid child custody order issued by a court, the police cannot help you “enforce” your “child custody rights”. This is because you have no right to control what the other parent does with the children when it comes to exercising custody. The other parent can deny your requests to spend time with the children. He/she can even deny your requests to call the children on the phone or chat with them over video.


o   Even if there is a court order that clearly identifies the child custody and parent-time orders, it’s only as good as the will of the courts and the police to enforce it. Many police departments will either outright refuse to assist you in enforcing the order or will act as if “I can’t understand what the order means, so I can’t help you.”

  • Defend your reputation, your good name, and your parental fitness with everything you have.

o   Courts are afraid of making a mistake when they issue child custody and parent-time orders. Evil parents exploit this fear by accusing innocent, loving parents of terrible traits and acts, so that the court will “protect” the children from them by awarding custody to the other parent and/or restricting parent-time. Mere accusations—if they’re scary enough and skillfully spun—can be enough to force a court’s hand.

o   What kinds of accusations? Abuse! Abuse! Abuse! Physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and substance abuse are the most “successful”.

o   If you are accused wrongfully, defend yourself with everything you have. Point out the dearth of support for the allegations. If you can, get overwhelming amounts of proof in your favor. Live as perfect life as you possibly can. Be as perfect a parent as you can. Sure, it’s unfair unrealistic, but don’t expect the court to be sympathetic with you (especially if you’re a father). Don’t give the court any way to take the path of least resistance, to act “out of an abundance of caution,” or to indulge “better safe than sorry” thinking.

  • Document everything pertaining to the child custody and parent-time awards. Gather as much proof as you possibly can in support of your parental fitness, of your efforts to be there for your children, to spend time with them, to take care of them (feed them, bathe and clothe them, help with homework, play with them, exemplify good morals and values, etc.), so that the court cannot deny your requests without looking biased, ignorant, and/or incompetent.

o   Know what factors the court must consider when making the child custody and parent-time awards, then ensure you satisfy every single one of them beautifully (and if you cannot satisfy them all, explain why, and why that should not disqualify you from being awarded as much custody and parent-time as is in the best interest of the children

  • Here are the factors considered in Utah:
  • In a nutshell: the child’s needs and the parent’s ability to meet them
  • In total:

Utah Code § 30-3-10

–          evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, the parent, or a household member of the parent;

–          the parent’s demonstrated understanding of, responsiveness to, and ability to meet the developmental needs of the child, including the child’s:

–          physical needs;

–          emotional needs;

–          educational needs;

–          medical needs; and

–          any special needs;

–          the parent’s capacity and willingness to function as a parent, including:

–          parenting skills;

–          co-parenting skills, including:

(A) ability to appropriately communicate with the other parent;

(B) ability to encourage the sharing of love and affection; and

(C) willingness to allow frequent and continuous contact between the child and the other parent, except that, if the court determines that the parent is acting to protect the child from domestic violence, neglect, or abuse, the parent’s protective actions may be taken into consideration; and

–          ability to provide personal care rather than surrogate care;

–          in accordance with Subsection (10), the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent;

–          the emotional stability of the parent;

–          the parent’s inability to function as a parent because of drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other causes;

–          whether the parent has intentionally exposed the child to pornography or material harmful to minors, as “material” and “harmful to minors” are defined in Section 76-10-1201;

–          the parent’s reasons for having relinquished custody or parent-time in the past;

–          duration and depth of desire for custody or parent-time;

–          the parent’s religious compatibility with the child;

–          the parent’s financial responsibility;

–          the child’s interaction and relationship with step-parents, extended family members of other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;

–          who has been the primary caretaker of the child;

–          previous parenting arrangements in which the child has been happy and well-adjusted in the home, school, and community;

–          the relative benefit of keeping siblings together;

–          the stated wishes and concerns of the child, taking into consideration the child’s cognitive ability and emotional maturity;

–          the relative strength of the child’s bond with the parent, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the relationship between the parent and the child; and

–          any other factor the court finds relevant.

Utah Code § 30-3-10.2 (when seeking a joint custody award, and “joint custody” does not necessarily mean “equal time”; in Utah means that a parent exercises no less than 111 overnights with the children annually)

–          whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child will benefit from joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both;

–          the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared decisions in the child’s best interest;

–          co-parenting skills, including:

–          ability to appropriately communicate with the other parent;

–          ability to encourage the sharing of love and affection; and

–          willingness to allow frequent and continuous contact between the child and the other parent, except that, if the court determines that the parent is acting to protect the child from domestic violence, neglect, or abuse, the parent’s protective actions may be taken into consideration; and

–          whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce;

–          the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents;

–          the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both;

–          the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child from conflict that may arise between the parents;

–          the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make decisions jointly; and

–          any other factor the court finds relevant.


Utah Code Section 30-3-34 (this is for determining parent-time, but the factors are equally relevant to the child custody award)

–          whether parent-time would endanger the child’s physical health or mental health, or significantly impair the child’s emotional development;

–          evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, a parent, or a household member of the parent;

–          the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;

–          a credible allegation of child abuse has been made;

–          the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child’s well-being during parent-time;

–          the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child during periods of parent-time;

–          the preference of the child if the court determines the child is of sufficient maturity;

–          the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility;

–          shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;

–          the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or other related activities of the child;

–          the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;

–          a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled parent-time;

–          the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents’ relationship before the conception of the child;

–          the parent-time schedule of siblings;

–          the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and

–          any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.

Utah Code Section 30-3-35.2 (when seeking an award of equal physical custody)

–          A court may order the equal parent-time schedule described in this section if the court determines that:

–          the equal parent-time schedule is in the child’s best interest;

–          each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life; and

–          each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule.

–          To determine whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court shall consider:

–          each parent’s demonstrated responsibility in caring for the child;

–          each parent’s involvement in child care;

–          each parent’s presence or volunteer efforts in the child’s school and at extracurricular activities;

–          each parent’s assistance with the child’s homework;

–          each parent’s involvement in preparation of meals, bath time, and bedtime for the child;

–          each parent’s bond with the child; and

–          any other factor the court considers relevant.

–          To determine whether each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule, the court shall consider:

–          the geographic distance between the residence of each parent and the distance between each residence and the child’s school;

–          each parent’s ability to assist with the child’s after school care;

–          the health of the child and each parent, consistent with Subsection 30-3-10(6);

–          the flexibility of each parent’s employment or other schedule;

–          each parent’s ability to provide appropriate playtime with the child;

–          each parent’s history and ability to implement a flexible schedule for the child;

–          physical facilities of each parent’s residence; and

–          any other factor the court considers relevant.

o   Be a class act at all times in your dealings with the other parent, no matter how much mud is slung and no matter how uncooperative antagonistic the other parent is. All the goodwill you’ve built up over a lifetime can be discounted and dismissed in an instant with just one angry outburst (no matter how much the other parent had it coming)

o   You do not build yourself up as a parent by tearing or trying to tear the other parent down. Be as honestly complimentary of the other parent as you can. No, don’t deny serious defects and faults, but unless the other parent is truly a monster, don’t try to paint the other parent as one—it’s not only evil, but it can backfire.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Have cameras in a courtroom ever resulted in one of the attorneys or judge asking for the equivalent of an “instant replay in football”?

Yes, in a manner of speaking.  

There are many examples of court room camera footage being referred to help establish facts that can only be verified based upon the visual record and not the audio record of what occurred in court. I personally viewed videos of courtroom proceedings where an opposing attorney or police officer is accused of stealing a file or a document off of the table in the courtroom. Sometimes the question arises as to whether someone in the courtroom made obscene or threatening gestures.  

And so while these questions may not be answered by an immediate “instant replay” kind of review, video recordings of courtroom proceedings can be and are used to resolve various issues of visual or viewable fact that may arise in a court case or in the court proceedings themselves. 

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277  

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,

State v. Mason – 2021 UT App 41

State v. Mason – 2021 UT App 41


STATE OF UTAH, Appellee,


VON DEL MASON JR., Appellant.


No. 20190618-CA

Filed April 8, 2021

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department

The Honorable Matthew L. Bell

No. 190500085

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, and Cherise Bacalski,
Attorneys for Appellant

Brent M. Johnson, Attorney for Appellee



¶1 Von Del Mason Jr. appeals the district court’s order finding him in contempt. We affirm.


¶2 Mason and his ex-wife, who were embroiled in contentious post-divorce proceedings, attended a hearing regarding the ex-wife’s relocation to Arizona. Before the judge ruled, he told the parties, “I don’t want any talking to each other. I’m not open for any debate. . . . I’ll give you my ruling and we can all leave, whatever your opinion is about it.” After the judge

made his ruling, which was adverse to Mason, he announced, “[W]e are adjourned.” Immediately thereafter Mason proclaimed to the judge, “You are a disingenuous, intellectual liar.” Following that statement, the court recording was turned off for approximately one minute. However, in a written order entered that same day, the judge recited that during that break “[s]everal times the court suggested that Mr. Mason should stop talking” and later “instructed Mr. Mason to stop talking, but he continued with similar accusations and disrespectful comments.” When the recording was turned back on, the following exchange took place:

Mr. Mason: That’s the truth, sir. And I have every right to tell you that.

The Court: Mr. Mason, you are in contempt.

Mr. Mason: Go figure.

The Court: I don’t appreciate—

Mr. Mason: I don’t appreciate you. You’re not— you’re dishonest.

. . . .

The Court: —you’re trying to make this personal.

Mr. Mason: No, you’ve made it personal, sir. You said this was your courtroom. This is not your courtroom, sir. You have a job. You were an antitrust lawyer.

The Court: I told you repeatedly to stop talking. You’re not listening. You are in contempt. I’m tired of it.

. . . .

Mr. Mason: You’re a disingenuous liar, sir.

The Court: You are in contempt.

Mr. Mason: Okay. Enjoy it.

¶3        Based on Mason’s behavior in its presence, the judge found Mason “guilty of contempt pursuant to Utah Code 78B-6­301(1) and (5)” for disrupting its proceedings and disobeying its order to stop talking and sentenced him to forty-eight hours in jail. The next day, however, the court “suspend[ed] the balance of the jail time” and ordered Mason released from jail. Mason now appeals his contempt conviction.


¶4 As a threshold issue, we must determine whether Mason’s appeal is moot in light of the fact that he has already completed his sentence. If “the requested relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the matter is moot and we will not consider it.” Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108, ¶ 30, 233 P.3d 500 (quotation simplified). And we consider the issue of mootness as a question of law. See State v. Legg, 2018 UT 12, ¶ 12, 417 P.3d 592 (explaining that mootness is reviewed “de novo”).

¶5        Mason raises several substantive challenges to the district court’s contempt order. First, he asserts that the court denied his right to counsel. Next, Mason asserts that he could not be held in contempt for statements he made after the court had adjourned and that the court exceeded its discretion in holding him in contempt because the court did not impose a clear order. Mason did not preserve these issues for our review, but he asks that we nevertheless review them for plain error and exceptional circumstances.

¶6        Normally, “[w]hen a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443. Plain error and exceptional circumstances are such exceptions. However, here the State raised the issue of mootness and briefed Mason’s challenges to the court’s contempt order on their merits. And as discussed below, we agree with the State that the issues Mason raises fail on their merits. Where this is the case, we possess the discretion to reject claims on their merits, even when those claims have not been properly preserved. See State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶¶ 27–28. We elect to exercise that discretion here, and after first determining that Mason’s appeal is not moot, we address, and reject, Mason’s claims on their merits.


  1. Mason’s Appeal Is Not Moot

¶7        “A challenge to a conviction of criminal contempt is not moot if there is a possibility that collateral legal consequences may result from the conviction.” Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108, ¶ 33, 233 P.3d 500. The State maintains that there is no possibility of collateral legal consequences, asserting that a criminal contempt conviction will not appear in Mason’s criminal record and is not the type of criminal conviction that can be used for impeachment purposes. However, even assuming, without deciding, that the State’s assertions are correct, the State does not respond to Mason’s argument that “because this criminal contempt conviction comes in the midst of a family law case where child custody is involved, a record of criminal contempt may affect future decisions on custody.” Cf. State v. C.H., 2008 UT App 404U, para. 2 (explaining that a criminal contempt conviction may have “ramifications on future investigations or adjudications by the Division of Child and Family Services” and could therefore affect a person’s right to parent their children). “The burden of persuading the court that an issue is moot lies with the party asserting mootness,” State v. Legg, 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 9, 380 P.3d 360 (quotation simplified), aff’d, 2018 UT 12, 417 P.3d 592, and we cannot say with certainty that Mason’s contempt conviction could have no possible impact on future child custody determinations or in future encounters with the legal system. Thus, we agree with Mason that this appeal is not moot.[1]

  1. Mason Was Not Entitled to the Appointment of Counsel in a Direct Contempt Summary Proceeding

¶8 Mason argues that the district court improperly denied his right to be represented by counsel during the proceeding in which it found him in contempt and imposed a sanction. Mason argues that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel in these criminal contempt proceedings and that the court’s failure to advise him of that right or to facilitate the appointment of counsel violated his constitutional rights and prevented him from adequately challenging the merits of the contempt finding. Although a defendant in most criminal proceedings—including many criminal contempt proceedings—generally has the right to counsel, see Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993), the Supreme Court previously held, in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), that such a right does not exist in summary criminal contempt proceedings involving conduct committed in the presence of the judge, see id. at 534 (“There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority is necessary.”).

¶9        Mason asserts that subsequent Supreme Court case law acknowledging that “[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense” and that “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings,” International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994) (quotation simplified); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”), should be interpreted as repudiating the Court’s previous position that the appointment of counsel is not required in summary criminal contempt proceedings. However, the Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm the exception for summary criminal contempt. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 441 (citing Cooke with approval and stating that “an indigent defendant [has] the right to state-appointed counsel in . . . criminal contempt proceedings (other than summary proceedings)” (quotation simplified)); Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (explaining that “constitutional protections for criminal defendants,” including the right to the assistance of counsel, “apply in nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions just as they do in other criminal prosecutions” (emphasis added)). Although these more recent holdings may not address the issue head-on, the Court’s continued reference to the exception without repudiating Cooke leaves us with no basis, under the federal constitution, for recognizing a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in summary criminal contempt proceedings. Because Mason had no right to counsel, the court could not have erred by not informing him of such a right or by choosing not to appoint counsel to assist him in the summary proceeding.

III. We Reject Mason’s Challenges to the Court’s Contempt Finding

¶10 The court found Mason in contempt based on both subsections (1) and (5) of Utah Code section 78B-6-301. Mason raises challenges with respect to the court’s findings under both provisions.

  1. The Court Did Not Err by Holding Mason in Contempt After Stating That Proceedings Were Adjourned

¶11      In his challenge to the contempt order, Mason asserts on appeal that the court erred in holding him in contempt under Utah Code section 78B-6-301(1), because his comments occurred after the judge had stated that proceedings were adjourned. That subsection defines contempt as “disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to interrupt the course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). Mason asserts that the plain language of subsection (1) limits the definition of contemptuous behavior to “behavior that occurs during a formal court proceeding, not after it has adjourned.” He maintains that because the judge had announced, “[W]e are adjourned,” before Mason’s statements, the judge was no longer “holding the court” and that Mason’s actions therefore could not have “interrupt[ed] the course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.” Id.

¶12 We disagree with Mason’s formalistic interpretation of what constitutes a judicial proceeding or “holding the court.” We acknowledge Mason’s assertion that disorderly or insolent behavior toward a judge outside of court cannot justify a finding of contempt under subsection (1) of the contempt statute. See Robinson v. City Court, 185 P.2d 256, 257–58 (Utah 1947) (overturning a contempt conviction based on behavior that occurred while the contemnor and the judge were near or in a courthouse elevator because “[t]he judge was not holding court, he had already adjourned the morning session, he was on his way out of the building, and no trial or other judicial proceedings were then in progress”). But we do not agree that the contempt statute should be so rigidly interpreted in a situation involving a litigant who engages in contemptuous behavior while in the courtroom and directly before the judge. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 2000 PA Super 165, ¶¶ 5, 21–24, 753 A.2d 856 (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that his action of “raising his middle finger and stating, ‘F—k You’” to the judge as he “was being led from the courtroom” could not have obstructed the administration of justice, explaining that his actions “belittl[ed] the entire process of the administration of justice” and that “had the Court not acted in response to the [defendant’s] actions it would have eroded the Court’s authority in the eyes of all those present”); Rhoad v. State, 641 S.E.2d 35, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that a finding of direct contempt against a defendant who made an obscene gesture to his trial counsel on his way out of the courtroom was justified because “[r]egardless of whether [the defendant’s] hearing had concluded, [the defendant] failed to show proper decorum in the courtroom and exhibited a disrespect for the court”).

¶13 Here, although the adjournment of the hearing had been announced, the court proceedings had not actually concluded. See Williams, 2000 PA Super 165, ¶ 22 (“Court proceedings are concluded after the defendant leaves the courtroom, the trial judge goes to the next case or adjourns court and leaves the courtroom.” (emphasis added) (quotation simplified)). Mason’s conduct occurred in the courtroom while the judge was still on the bench,[2] and he made his comments, directed at the judge, immediately after the judge announced the adjournment of the hearing but before adjournment had been accomplished. Simply stating that court was adjourned was not equivalent to being out of court. Nor did the court’s interest in maintaining order evaporate simply because it had announced the adjournment of Mason’s hearing.[3] “It is essential to the proper administration of . . . justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). Because Mason’s conduct fell within subsection (1)’s definition of contempt, the court’s contempt finding was not error.

  1. Mason Cannot Demonstrate That the Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding That He Had Disobeyed a Court Order

¶14 Mason also maintains that the court abused its discretion by finding him in contempt under Utah Code section 78B-6­301(5). Under that subsection, a person can be held in contempt for “disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) (LexisNexis 2018). “[T]o prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). Mason asserts that the judge did not clearly order him to stop talking and therefore could not properly hold him in contempt for talking.

¶15 In his written contempt order, the judge described his earlier verbal orders to Mason by stating that he had “instructed the parties . . . that there should be no talking despite what either side thought of the court’s decision” and that after Mason began making “disrespectful comments toward the court,” the judge “suggested that Mr. Mason should stop talking” and “instructed Mr. Mason to stop talking.” Mason points out that before issuing his ruling, the judge actually ordered the parties not to talk to each other rather than ordering them not to talk at all. Thus, he maintains that the order was unclear as to what he was required to do. See id.

¶16 But even accepting Mason’s argument regarding the judge’s initial order not to talk, the record shows that after Mason began making disrespectful comments, the judge “instructed” Mason not to talk anymore. Nevertheless, Mason “continued with similar accusations and disrespectful comments even after he was taken into custody by bailiffs.” It was this behavior that the judge identified as disobedience to “the court’s order to stop.” We agree with the State that Mason’s disregard of the judge’s instruction to stop talking after he had begun could constitute contempt, and we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by finding Mason in contempt on that basis. Moreover, because a district court has discretion to deal with contemptuous actions occurring in its presence, the judge did not have to let Mason “wear himself out” before imposing a sanction. In addition, even if there had been error in the court’s contempt finding under section 78B-6-301(5), it would have been harmless in light of the additional grounds for contempt it found under section 78B-6-301(1). See supra ¶¶ 11–13.


¶17 Although we determine that this appeal is not moot, we conclude that a person accused of direct contempt, committed in the presence of the court, is not entitled to the appointment of counsel in a summary contempt proceeding. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Mason in contempt for his insolent behavior under the facts presented here. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s contempt order.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

In court cases, how does taking an oath make any difference?

In court cases, how does taking an oath make any difference?

From what I can tell, yes, it appears that taking an oath or affirming to tell the truth before being questioned as a witness in a legal proceeding (whether in court or whether the testimony is being given in relation to the court proceedings) does make a difference because lying under oath or affirmation is an element of the crime of perjury. No oath or affirmation, no perjury.

Lying without being under oath or affirmation can still be a crime or otherwise punished by law in other settings other than a court proceeding (for example, lying a law enforcement officer), so bear that in mind.

Clearly, the purpose of questioning a witness in a court proceeding is to gather factual and/or honest (truthful) information to help the court decide the case. Some information is factual, meaning it is not in dispute, it can be independently verified as true. Other information is “honest,” meaning that it may not be true but the witness believes what he or she is saying is true and is doing his/her best to testify as to what he/she remembers.

If one can be convicted of lying in court or in relation to court proceedings without having sworn an oath or affirmed to tell the truth I do not know of such a law (but that’s not to say such a law does not exist). Why one cannot be convicted of lying in court without having sworn an oath or affirmed to tell the truth I do not know.

I see no good reason why a law could simply be passed that any witness is guilty of perjury if the witness, when, after first being notified that the witness is questioned in the course of or in relation to the court proceedings, the witness makes a false statement of a material fact; and knowledge of the falsity made in a proceeding, or in relation to a matter, within the jurisdiction of the tribunal or officer before whom the proceeding was held or by whom the matter was considered.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Click to listen highlighted text!