Tag: Domestic Violence

We Can Call It the “Presumption of Guilt Act”

Did you see this in the news in Utah (from the Salt Lake Tribune)?

A Utah man never hit his wife — until he tried to kill her. But how he treated her was a warning sign.

Saying that the proposed “coercive control” legislation is needed because of the “failure of the courts” to detect crime makes no sense. It’s not a judge’s job to detect crime. It’s the police and prosecutors’ jobs. The judge applies the law to the facts and the evidence and renders judgment.

Moreover, by its nature crime occurs in the shadows. It’s going to happen no matter how much anti-crime legislation is passed. Otherwise stated, crime does not occur due to a lack of laws on the books. Legislation might help to punish crime, but isn’t much a deterrent to crime (and never has been).

The idea that we “must work toward” zero domestic violence is absurd. Domestic violence has always occurred and always will in an imperfect world. Thus, domestic violence is going to occur regardless of how many laws are passed “in opposition to” it.

Proposed statutes like this can “work” only by having the public and law enforcement and the courts indulge in a mass group delusion.

Laws like this will result in a presumption of guilt as a way of getting rid of the pesky preponderance of evidence standard of proof and letting “better safe than sorry” and “abundance of caution” and “guilty until proven innocent” rule. Miraculously, this new not-a-real-standard standard will create a new class of abuser (i.e., those who self-proclaimed victims subjectively deem to be abusers and that the courts will treat as abusers unless and until the presumed abuser proves otherwise).

Perversely, proponents of such a bill will claim that it is reducing domestic violence by increasing arrests, prosecutions, and convictions–but at the cost of throwing the presumption of innocence and a preponderance of evidence and or beyond a reasonable doubt standards out the window. Not just thrown out the window, but shot at high velocity out the window beyond retrieval. This would create a net that will end up snaring innocent people who will be falsely accused and convicted in the name of “better” detection and prevention.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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2024 UT App 43 – domestic violence appeal

State v. Arce – 2024 UT App 43


STATE OF UTAH, Appellee, v. JOSE FELIPE ARCE, Appellant.

Opinion No. 20220006-CA Filed March 28, 2024

First District Court, Logan Department The Honorable Brandon J. MaynardNo. 191100762

Freyja Johnson, Emily Adams, and Hannah Leavitt-Howell, Attorneys for Appellant, assisted by law student Ryder Seamons[1]

Sean D. Reyes and Marian Decker, Attorneys for Appellee, assisted by law student Rebecca Barker

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.


¶1        A domestic dispute ensued on an emotional evening after Jose Felipe Arce had returned home from attending the birth of a child he believed he fathered as a result of an affair. Arce does not dispute that an argument occurred. He denies, however, that he hit or choked his spouse (Wife). This appeal centers on Wife’s statements near the time of the event and her complete recantation at trial. Arce claims numerous errors, including that the trial court should not have allowed the State to compel Wife to invoke her Fifth Amendment right 47 times in front of the jury, a deputy should not have been allowed to vouch for a particular version of Wife’s testimony, the State and a witness should not have used the word “victim” 29 times, and these errors cumulatively prejudiced him. Although we do not endorse the approach taken by the trial court or the parties, we affirm the convictions.


¶2           The State charged Arce with, and the jury convicted him on, one count of aggravated assault (domestic violence) and five counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child. At the center of this appeal are the different versions of events as related by Wife. We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346.

Alleged Assault and Wife’s Statements in the Subsequent Hours and


¶3           In July 2019, Arce visited the hospital for the birth of a child whom both Arce and Wife believed he may have fathered with another woman. Wife described the day as an emotional one filled with tears. When Arce returned from the hospital, the couple decided to take their kids swimming at a hot springs resort. The couple talked about the difficult situation on the drive there, with more crying from Wife. On the drive home, their conversation escalated into an argument while the children slept in the back seat. After Arce asked for forgiveness, Wife said she had forgiven him for “many things” but “this was just too much.” Arce pulled the car over, and Wife said that the two “couldn’t be together anymore.” Wife later told police and neighbors that after pulling over, Arce hit and choked her.

¶4          Arce then drove the family home, and he told the children to go inside. Wife later told police and neighbors that, as they continued arguing, Arce hit her, threw her to the ground, kicked her, pulled her hair, tried to choke her, and threatened to hit her with a beer bottle.

¶5          At this point, Wife ran to her neighbor’s (Neighbor) home. Neighbor could hear Arce yelling as she opened the door to find Wife out of breath, shaking, and crying. Wife was in a t-shirt with no pants. Neighbor and her husband (Neighbor’s Husband) believed Wife was seeking safety. Wife told them Arce was trying to hurt her. She also told the couple she wanted Arce out of the house. She then recounted the earlier fight that had happened during the drive home, including that after arriving home Arce had hit and kicked her and tried to choke her. Neighbor did not see any injuries on Wife. Neighbor’s Husband said that he saw “a red mark kind of on her collarbone on her left side.”

¶6          Neighbor’s Husband, a deputy sheriff, called police, who arrived fewer than ten minutes later. The responding officer (Deputy) interviewed Wife at Neighbor’s home that evening. Deputy testified that Wife appeared “extremely distraught,” “frantic,” and “emotionally distressed” and that she continuously wiped her eyes and nose from crying. During the interview, Wife told Deputy that Arce both struck and choked her. She also recounted that after returning home, Arce dragged her out of the car by her hair, threatened to hit her with a beer bottle, choked her, and slapped her. Deputy observed that the area under Wife’s right eye was “somewhat swollen” and that she had “some sort of reddish mark” on her collarbone that looked like it was beginning to bruise.

¶7          By that time, Arce had left the scene. Wife signed a request for a no-contact order and, with her children, went to emergency housing that the Deputy arranged. Wife also completed a lethality assessment. In the assessment, Wife indicated that she thought Arce might try to kill her. In an additional comment section, Wife noted that “having [Arce] at the home was a concern of safety for her.”

¶8          The following day, a police officer (Detective) interviewed Wife at her work. Wife again recounted the events, including Arce choking her, slapping her, grabbing her hair, throwing her to the ground, and threatening to hit her with a bottle. Wife also filled out a written statement during the interview with Detective recounting these same allegations. The top of the statement gave the following warning, “You are notified that the statements you are about to make may be presented to a magistrate or a judge in lieu of your sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statements you make and that you do not believe to be true may subject you to criminal punishment as a Class A Misdemeanor.” Wife signed the statement.

¶9          That same night, Deputy interviewed Arce by phone. Arce explained that he and Wife had taken the children to the resort “to have a good day” but Wife kept bringing up the infidelity and birth of the baby, so the two argued. Arce said that during the argument, he went through Wife’s phone, saw messages from another man, and asked, “[W]ho the f*** is this person?” When asked if he hit or choked Wife, Arce responded that he did not recall. Arce did, however, say that there was a miscommunication between them and that there was “some pushing and shoving.”

Wife’s Recantation and Testimony at Trial

¶10 The same day that Detective interviewed Wife, Deputy listened to a voicemail from Wife asking that all charges be dropped. When Wife later spoke with Deputy on the phone, she again asked that the charges be dropped. Wife explained that Arce “had a good job and that she needed help with the five children.”

¶11 At trial, Wife testified consistently with the prior statements she had made to law enforcement and her neighbors, however, she insisted that she made up the allegations of domestic violence against Arce. From the stand, Wife said, “This is why I wanted to just come up here because I hear all the charges and it’s really very selfish of me, you know. So this is why I’m sitting up here and I’m saying what really happened.” Wife testified that all the events occurred as she explained to law enforcement and the neighbors but that Arce never hit or choked her. Wife testified that after telling Arce they could not be together anymore, she told him to take her home, and he did. Wife testified that she opened the car door and sat on the edge of her seat while they continued arguing and yelling at one another but no physical altercation occurred.

¶12 When the State began asking her questions about police arriving the night of the incident and what she told them, the court stopped the questioning and excused the jury. The court explained to Wife that she had a right not to incriminate herself and that doing so would open her up to prosecution. The State asserted several times, “We won’t charge her.” The State also served Wife with a written notice of use immunity for purposes of the trial.[2] And the court provided her with the opportunity to speak with an attorney. Subsequently, Wife was appointed counsel.

¶13 Following a recess, the State asked that Wife be declared a hostile witness, allowing it to ask her leading questions, which the court granted. After speaking with his client, Wife’s counsel advised the court that Wife would be exercising her Fifth Amendment right moving forward. The State argued that the immunity it had offered Wife would protect her and that it was not the State’s intent “to ask the Court to hold [Wife] in this case in contempt” for refusing to testify. Wife’s counsel argued that the notice of use immunity was inadequate to protect her because it expressly did not grant immunity against a future perjury prosecution. The State again asked the court to treat Wife as a hostile witness. Arce’s counsel objected, arguing that the State knew weeks in advance that Wife might invoke her Fifth Amendment right. The State argued that knowing what Wife would do for weeks in advance was “a little bit of a stretch” and that its grant of use immunity was sufficient.

¶14        During further argument over whether to allow the State to treat Wife as a hostile witness, the State again said it would not seek to have the court hold her in contempt. The court ultimately granted the State’s request and received affirmation again from the State that it would not ask the court to hold Wife in contempt if she refused to testify.

¶15        The next day, the State retracted its written immunity offer and explained that it planned to ask Wife questions to which she could “choose to invoke the Fifth or to respond.” Wife’s counsel objected, arguing, “[T]he State’s going to try to . . . present their case by asking those questions and hearing the Fifth . . . . [T]hat’s just them trying to testify to the jury by the questions they’re asking.” The court disagreed, explaining that anything the State said was not evidence and that Wife could not make a “blanket” invocation of her Fifth Amendment right.

¶16 When Wife took the stand again, she invoked the Fifth Amendment 47 times in response to the State’s questions.[3] The State’s questions included asking Wife about the same things she had addressed the day before, prior to invoking her constitutional right to silence. Arce’s counsel did not object to or seek to limit the State’s leading questions or Wife’s invocations; neither did he request a mistrial.

Other Testimony at Trial

¶17 During the trial, the State called Neighbor, Neighbor’s Husband, Deputy, and Detective to the stand; each recounted the events and gave consistent testimony of the statements Wife made to them concerning the events during the evening in question— including the physical abuse she allegedly experienced at the hands of Arce.

¶18 During Deputy’s examination, the State asked, “And so ultimately what did your investigation lead you to believe happened that night?” Defense counsel made no objection. Deputy responded, “Based off all my observations and interview, I believe that the victim had been struck and choked and that there was a domestic violence assault that occurred.” The State then asked, “And I just want to emphasize, why is it that you believed that this truly happened?” Defense counsel again made no objection. Deputy answered,

I believe it truly happened given a number of things. Mainly, when I spoke to [Wife], she appeared to be honest and genuine in the emotion that she was describing things with was clearly emotional distress, upset that I’ve seen. And not every case is the same. I’ve seen other people who have been victims of assault act similar, so that’s why I believed it. She appeared to be honest and genuine.

¶19 During Detective’s testimony, the State moved to admit into evidence Wife’s written statement that was given under penalty of perjury, which the court allowed.

¶20 The State also called two expert witnesses. A clinical psychologist testified about patterns of domestic violence and that individuals experiencing abuse frequently stay in the relationship and/or recant their previous stories. And a pediatric nurse practitioner testified about strangulation, including that in over 50% of strangulation cases there are no visible injuries.

¶21 Throughout the trial, the State, Deputy, and Detective referred to Wife as “the victim” 29 times. And the State and its witnesses—primarily the clinical psychologist—used the term “victim” or “victims” generally an additional 45 times. The State also referred to Wife as the “alleged victim,” primarily during jury selection but also sporadically throughout the trial.

Closing Arguments and Verdict

¶22        In closing arguments, the State argued that the jury should believe Wife’s original statements to her neighbors and police as those were made instinctually to keep her family safe from a threat rather than out of “selfish[ness] or insincer[ity].” The defense argued that Wife had every reason to hate Arce but she wanted to set the record straight about her lies concerning the events of that night and that the State’s case fell apart without her lies.

¶23        During deliberation, the jury asked for access to the State’s “questions on day 2 to [Wife] when she pled the fifth.” The court did not grant the request.

¶24        The jury convicted Arce on all charges. Arce now appeals.


¶25 Arce raises three issues on appeal. First, Arce argues that the trial court incorrectly allowed the State to compel Wife to invoke her Fifth Amendment right 47 times in front of the jury. We give trial courts “broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including lay witness testimony, and will disturb [a trial court’s] ruling only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 31, 322 P.3d 624 (cleaned up). But the trial court must correctly interpret and apply the law. Id. ¶ 30. We review “the legal questions underlying the admissibility of evidence” for correctness. Dierl v. Birkin, 2023 UT App 6, ¶ 15, 525 P.3d 127 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 527 P.3d 1107 (Utah 2023).

¶26 Second, Arce argues that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel (1) did not seek to limit or remediate the continued questioning of Wife by objecting, moving to strike both the questions and invocations, or asking for a curative instruction; (2) failed to object to Deputy improperly opining on and vouching for the credibility of Wife’s report the night of the incident; and (3) failed to object to the State and witnesses referring to Wife as “the victim” 29 times during the trial. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 427 P.3d 1261 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 432 P.3d 1225 (Utah 2018).

¶27 Finally, Arce argues that under the cumulative error doctrine, the evidentiary error and ineffective assistance of counsel Arce received should undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. “We will reverse a jury verdict or sentence only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had.” State v. Lopez, 2019 UT App 11, ¶ 22, 438 P.3d 950 (cleaned up).


  1. Evidentiary Ruling

¶28 Arce argues that the trial court improperly overruled Wife’s counsel’s objection to the State questioning Wife despite knowing that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment right. Here, the trial court did not expressly say why it allowed the State, knowing Wife would invoke her constitutional privilege, to continually examine Wife. After Wife met with counsel and determined that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment right moving forward, the State asked the court to declare Wife a hostile witness and allow the State to continue examining her with leading questions. Wife’s counsel objected to declaring her hostile, arguing that the State already knew she would invoke her right for each question, which would allow the State, in Wife’s counsel’s words, to “present their case by asking those questions and hearing the Fifth” and to offer testimony “to the jury by the questions they’re asking.” The court responded that “anything [the State] says isn’t evidence, so it doesn’t matter.” And Wife’s counsel responded that the court should not allow it precisely because the State’s questions would not be evidence. The court disagreed and determined that the State could ask questions and that Wife could invoke her right to every question if she wanted to but she had to testify “if it [had] nothing to do [with a topic] that would incriminate her.” The court further determined that Wife’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment right could not be invoked in a blanket fashion and that she would have to invoke it for each question, as there may be some she could answer.

¶29 The State argues that regardless of the court’s reasoning, the court did not err because Wife waived her privilege by testifying earlier and recanting her story.[4] We note that the State did not make this argument during trial. Alternatively, the State argues that Wife never had the privilege to begin with because the State provided her with immunity.[5]

¶30 Notwithstanding each parties’ arguments, our review of the record indicates that Arce did not preserve this issue. It is “well within our prerogative to raise a preservation issue on our own initiative when it provides an alternative basis for affirmance, even if the State failed to brief the preservation argument.” State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 20 n.7, 469 P.3d 982. In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983), our supreme court confronted “[w]hether an objection by one party properly preserves an objection on appeal as to another party.” Id. at 1164. The supreme court followed what “[v]irtually every other jurisdiction that has considered the question has concluded,” which is that “an objection . . . by one or more parties at trial does not inure to the benefit of other parties who do not join in the objection.” Id. at 1164–65. In State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 55 P.3d 573, two brothers charged with murder were tried together. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. Following their convictions, one brother (Brother 1) appealed. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. As part of his appeal, Brother 1 argued that the trial court’s decision to admit specific evidence was an error that violated his constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 32. However, our supreme court held that this issue was not preserved for appeal, as it was the other brother (Brother 2) who had objected—an objection which Brother 1 did not join at trial. Id. ¶ 33. “[Brother 1] did not join in [Brother 2’s] objections on the record or make any objection of his own,” thus preventing him from claiming on appeal that it prejudiced him or undermined his constitutional rights. Id.

¶31 Similarly, in the case before us, Arce was not the one who objected to Wife taking the stand, knowing she would invoke her Fifth Amendment right for every question—it was Wife’s counsel who made the objection. Arce did not join that objection.[6]

Therefore, as in Calliham, Arce has not preserved the right to now claim on appeal that the court erred in its decision to allow Wife to testify, which in turn allowed the jury to hear her invocations 47 times.[7]

¶32        And the issue needed to be “preserved in order to give the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.” Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ¶ 11, 285 P.3d 1133 (cleaned up). Here, the trial court had no such opportunity. It is readily evident from our review of the record that the trial court was not focused on the impact these Fifth Amendment issues would have on Arce. Instead, the trial court ruled on this issue through the lens of its impact on Wife. Had Arce objected, the trial court may have fully engaged in an analysis of whether Wife’s Fifth Amendment right was waived or abandoned as the State suggests. But Arce made no such objection, and therefore the court engaged in no such analysis.

¶33        “As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal,” and it is “well-established” that this “preservation requirement applies to every claim, including constitutional questions.” Conner v. Department of Com., 2019 UT App 91, ¶ 48, 443 P.3d 1250 (cleaned up). Despite Arce’s arguments that he preserved this issue, the record does not support his assertions, as “a party must raise [the issue] before the [trial] court specifically, in a timely manner, and with support by evidence and relevant legal authority, such that the issue has been presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on it.” Id. (cleaned up). As discussed, the record does not reflect an objection from Arce on the issue but instead from Wife, which did not allow the court to review the issue as it pertains to Arce. Therefore, the issue is not properly preserved, and we do not consider the merits of his claim.

  1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶34        “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must meet the two-prong Strickland test: (1) counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice.” State v. Fleming, 2019 UT App 181, ¶ 9, 454 P.3d 862 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687–88 (1984)), cert. denied, 462 P.3d 803 (Utah 2020). “[D]eficient performance is not determined in a vacuum; rather, it involves asking whether the strategy [counsel] employed was that of a reasonable, competent lawyer in the real-time context” of a trial. State v. Wilkes, 2020 UT App 175, ¶ 24, 479 P.3d 1142, cert. denied, 485 P.3d 944 (Utah 2021). “However, even where a court cannot conceive of a sound strategic reason for counsel’s challenged conduct, it does not automatically follow that counsel was deficient. . . . [T]he ultimate question is always whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable.” State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 36, 462 P.3d 350. And a defendant establishes prejudice by showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Gonzalez, 2021 UT App 135, ¶ 8, 501 P.3d 1205 (cleaned up). “That is, the defendant’s showing must undermine our confidence in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). The impact of such alleged errors must “be a demonstrable reality.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶35        “Because both prongs of the Strickland test must be met to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not always address both prongs.” Fleming, 2019 UT App 181, ¶ 9 (cleaned up). “And if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice that course should be followed.” Gonzalez, 2021 UT App 135, ¶ 7 (cleaned up). Given the likelihood that similar events to those of this case can and will arise before the trial courts of this state, we address counsel’s alleged deficient performance, although we ultimately determine that Arce’s claims fail for lack of prejudice.

  1. Deficient Performance
  2. Invoking the Fifth Amendment

¶36 In addition to Arce’s arguments already discussed above regarding Wife’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment right, Arce argues that his counsel acted deficiently by not seeking to limit or remediate the State’s continued leading questions and Wife’s invocations by objecting, moving to strike both the questions and invocations, or asking for a curative instruction. Based on the reasoning in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), and In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th 176 (6th Cir. 2022), competent counsel could reasonably choose not to take any of these actions, as Wife had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by having voluntarily testified about the matter in question. A “witness . . . may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details.” Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 321. “When the witness testifies, the privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies.” In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th at 193 (cleaned up). Thus, Arce’s counsel, and correspondingly the trial court, could have concluded that Wife did not have the right to invoke the privilege. Therefore, we determine that Arce fails to show deficient performance.[8]

¶37 Arce claims his counsel should have objected and pointed the court to rule 403 (excluding evidence which is substantially more prejudicial than probative), rule 510(c) (disallowing comment by a judge or counsel about, or a factfinder making an inference from, the invocation of a privilege), or rule 611(a) (allowing a court to control the examination of witnesses so as to avoid wasting time or the harassment or embarrassment of a witness) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Arce makes no effort, however, to provide us with the context of Wife’s 47 invocations or the depth of her earlier testimony.[9] While Arce discusses Wife’s trial testimony prior to the court’s interruption to allow her to consult her counsel, he provides the court no comparison of that testimony with the subject matter of the questions asked on cross-examination when she began invoking the Fifth Amendment. As a result, the briefing leaves us with no understanding about whether all 47 invocations were directly addressing matters about which Wife had already testified—particularly her recantation. Assuming the questions were simply cross-examination of statements made earlier in trial, Arce’s counsel would have no basis for an objection because the privilege would be waived. Furthermore, without an understanding of the depth of Wife’s earlier testimony, we cannot gauge whether 47 invocations corresponded in an impermissible or potentially prejudicial way to Wife’s prior trial testimony. Within the confines of the briefing provided to us, we cannot fault Arce’s counsel for failing to object or make other efforts to limit the testimony.

¶38        Given that there is an obvious basis to believe that Wife no longer possessed a Fifth Amendment privilege and where the briefing does not delineate any context for the questions for which the privilege was invoked, Arce has not overcome the presumption that his counsel acted reasonably, and we cannot conclude that Arce’s counsel was objectively deficient in his representation. State v. Hart, 2020 UT App 25, ¶ 20, 460 P.3d 604 (stating that to prove deficient performance a defendant must overcome a “strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate assistance” (cleaned up)), cert. denied, 462 P.3d 805 (Utah 2020). We acknowledge that there certainly could be circumstances where compelling a witness to invoke a privilege 47 times would be troubling, but we can reach no conclusion about counsel’s failure to object to these questions here.

  1. Witness Opining and Vouching

¶39        Arce further argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to Deputy opining on and vouching for the credibility of Wife’s statement the night of the incident. Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence “permits testimony concerning a witness’s general character or reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness but prohibits any testimony as to a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion.” State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶ 44, 248 P.3d 984 (cleaned up); see also State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, ¶ 19, 5 P.3d 642 (detective testifying “he did not believe [the victim] was coached” was inadmissible vouching); State v. Jones, 2020 UT App 161, ¶ 14, 478 P.3d 1055 (per curiam) (“[A]dmission of testimony that bolsters the credibility of another witness’s testimony on a particular occasion is improper.”); id. ¶ 18 (officer testifying regarding interview techniques for domestic violence victims did not violate rule 608 because he did not opine on the victim’s truthfulness on a particular occasion); State v. Lewis, 2020 UT App 132, ¶ 26, 475 P.3d 956 (police sergeant describing variations he sees in victims’ statements when multiple accounts are given was not bolstering, as “he did not directly opine on [the victim’s] credibility”); State v. Cegars, 2019 UT App 54, ¶¶ 23–24, 440 P.3d 924 (school counselor testifying that she did not believe the victim would fabricate allegations was inadmissible bolstering); State v. Vail, 2002 UT App 176, ¶¶ 15, 17, 51 P.3d 1285 (detective testifying that two victims of child sexual abuse “exhibited the indicators that she equated with trustworthiness” was inadmissible bolstering); State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (social worker testifying that a victim of abuse “seemed to be quite candid” in an interview was inadmissible vouching (cleaned up)). For example, an officer cannot comment on whether a witness appeared “to be genuine” during an interview, as it is a direct comment on the witness’s truthfulness and clearly violates rule 608. State v. Bragg, 2013 UT App 282, ¶ 31, 317 P.3d 452 (cleaned up). We emphasize again today that the State’s use of a law enforcement officer’s testimony for bolstering and vouching in this manner is inappropriate. We perceive no strategic reason that Arce’s counsel would reasonably fail to object to this testimony.

¶40 But even so, Arce can prevail only if he establishes both deficient performance and prejudice. And for the reasons set forth in Part II.B, we conclude that he was not prejudiced by this deficient performance.

  1. Referring to Wife as “the Victim”

¶41        Finally, Arce argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the State and witnesses referring to Wife as “the victim” 29 times in front of the jury. Our supreme court “recognize[s] the gravity of referring to witnesses as victims during a trial.” State v. Vallejo, 2019 UT 38, ¶ 102, 449 P.3d 39. In cases, such as the one before us, “where a defendant claims that the charged crime did not actually occur, and the allegations against that defendant are based almost exclusively on the complaining witness’s testimony—the trial court, the State, and all witnesses should be prohibited from referring to the complaining witness as ‘the victim.’” State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, ¶ 17, 138 P.3d 90. Though in this case we do not exclusively rely on such testimony because there was a “sort of reddish mark” on Wife’s collarbone and Arce told Deputy there was “some pushing and shoving,” we still restate today that the action of referring to the complaining witness as “the victim” by anyone in front of the jury is inappropriate. Again, we perceive no strategic reason that Arce’s counsel would reasonably fail to object to this testimony.

  1. Prejudice

¶42        Ultimately, Arce has not shown that any of these alleged errors prejudiced him. There is not a reasonable probability that but for Arce’s counsel failing to object further to the State’s questioning of Wife, moving to strike, or asking for a curative instruction, the result of Arce’s trial would be different. As mentioned, the jury heard testimony from four witnesses, each of whom told the same story, namely, that Wife said Arce hit and choked her that night. The testimony of these four witnesses matched Wife’s own words in the statement she gave to Detective. Furthermore, the reason Wife provided to Deputy for dismissing the charges was not that she had lied but that she needed Arce to keep his job as well as his help with their children. As we point out above, even Arce in his statement to Deputy admitted there was “some pushing and shoving,” which is inconsistent with Wife’s recantation. And Arce did not explicitly deny that he hit, kicked, or choked Wife, instead stating only that he could not recall doing so. Most reasonable jurors would think that physical assault is something that one would remember having committed. Furthermore, and perhaps most convincingly, Wife’s own statement to Detective was entered into evidence for the jury to read. In short, finding that none of these alleged errors undermines our confidence in the outcome of this case, each of Arce’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice. Moreover, because none of these alleged errors were sufficiently prejudicial alone, we, for the same reason, conclude that the errors do not cumulatively undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial.[10]


¶43 Arce’s claim that the court erred by allowing the State to repeatedly compel Wife to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury fails because the issue was not preserved. Furthermore, Arce’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail because his counsel’s failure to object to Wife’s invocations, Deputy’s vouching for Wife’s credibility, and repeated references to Wife as “the victim” do not present a reasonable probability that but for Arce’s counsel’s failure the result of the proceeding would have been different. We therefore affirm Arce’s convictions.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

[1] See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-807 (governing law student practice in the courts of Utah).

[2] A “grant of use immunity [prohibits] any prosecutorial use of [a witness’s] testimony or evidence gained from it” against the witness. State v. Morris, 2017 UT App 112, ¶ 17, 400 P.3d 1183, cert. denied, 409 P.3d 1049 (Utah 2017).

[3] The State argues that she invoked the Fifth Amendment 45 times, but the discrepancy of two invocations is not dispositive in this case, so we will use Arce’s number moving forward.

[4] Though we make our decision on preservation grounds, it appears the State is correct that a witness cannot testify about a subject and later invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege in order to avoid cross-examination on that same topic. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999); In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th 176, 193 (6th Cir. 2022). This issue is addressed further below. See infra ¶ 36.

[5] The State argues that a valid claim of privilege “turns in part on the likelihood of future prosecution.” A witness may not “employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he simply would prefer not to give,” Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 n.7 (1980); instead, the witness must face real—not remote or speculative—dangers, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). Therefore, a grant of immunity nullifies the witness’s privilege as it forecloses the possibility of subsequent prosecution. State v. Morris, 2017 UT App 112, ¶ 18, 400 P.3d 1183, cert. denied, 409 P.3d 1049 (Utah 2017). Here, the State argues that while it did withdraw the written immunity offer, the offer was “irrelevant” as the State put on the record several times that it would not seek to have the court hold Wife in contempt for refusing to testify. We do not agree and fail to understand how a promise not to seek to have a trial court hold Wife in contempt is sufficient to rise to the level of granting her “effective blanket immunity,” as the State argues. Wife still faced the very real danger of prosecution for perjury, for which the State offered her no protection. Thus, the State did not provide Wife with immunity—either written or through promises not to charge her with contempt—and Wife’s Fifth Amendment privilege remained intact. However, the State is likely correct that the right had been waived for subjects about which she freely had already testified. And, as discussed, this issue was not preserved, so there is no need for further consideration of whether allowing the State to continue questioning Wife was an error and, if so, whether there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Arce absent the questioning.

[6] Arce acknowledges that it was Wife’s counsel rather than his own who made the objection to Wife taking the stand knowing she would invoke her Fifth Amendment right. Despite this, Arce argues that the issue is preserved by primarily relying on Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 285 P.3d 1133. But Kell is distinguishable from the present case. In Kell, the question was whether an issue was preserved when the State opposed a criminal defendant’s rule 60(b) motion and the criminal defendant did not respond to the State’s arguments yet later sought to appeal the decision. Id. ¶¶ 9– 10. The State and a criminal defendant are not in an analogous adversarial position to the criminal defendant and nonparty witness, Wife, present here. Kell is simply inapposite.

[7] Arce does not claim the application of any exception to preservation.

[8] Arce points to State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 361 P.2d 104, for us to consider. But Bond is not particularly helpful here. The witness in Bond did not attempt to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid answering a question regarding a subject about which he had testified previously. Id. ¶ 10Also, the analysis in Bond must be viewed in context. In Bond, the Utah Supreme Court was reviewing the denial of a motion for a mistrial—a trial court decision reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard—and an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. ¶¶ 13, 22. Thus, unlike the case before us, Bond does not address these issues as evidentiary rulings.

[9] We acknowledge that Arce has appended a transcript containing the invocations to his brief. But beyond the appendix, Arce’s brief makes no attempt to address the context of the invocations—referring to them only as a whole rather than providing any information as to the subject matter of the questioning that provoked them. Arce does not attempt to explain, for example, if one, two, or three questions might be permissible. Neither does he explain at which point the line would have been crossed to render his counsel’s inaction objectively unreasonable.

[10] “The cumulative-error doctrine requires us to reverse if (1) we determine, or assume without deciding, that two or more errors occurred and (2) we determine that the cumulative effect of those errors undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had.” ConocoPhillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2017 UT App 68, ¶ 30, 397 P.3d 772.

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Have You Heard That Fathers Defeat Mothers’ Claims of DV and Child Abuse by Claiming Parental Alienation?

We all know the aphorism, “If it looks/sounds to good to be true, it probably is [not true].” This also means, however, that if it looks/sounds too 𝙗𝙖𝙙 to be true, it probably is [not true] too.

Can we all agree that the following claim looks, on its face, too bad to be true?:

A George Washington University Law School article shows that mothers are statistically up to 90% more likely to lose custody of their children when they go on record about abuse. Abusive fathers, who claim parental alienation are almost always granted custody.

So, is the claim true?

I found the article: Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations, by Joan S. Meier George Washington University Law School.

Here is what that article actually claims (this is not the entire article, of course, and I have my doubts about the methodology and the resulting accuracy of the claims themselves, but I digress):

Spoiler alert: the article does not make any “women lose custody 90% of the time when they report abuse” claim.

Quotations directly from the article itself:

“Focusing on cases where it was determined that mothers started with possession of the children, and alleged some type of abuse by the father, the data show mothers losing custody in 26% (284/1111) of cases.”


It is also notable that when mothers report mixed types of child abuse (sexual and physical) their custody losses skyrocket (from under 30% (39/135) up to 50%)(11/22).


• When Fathers cross-claim alienation, courts are more than twice as likely to disbelieve Mothers’ claims of (any) abuse than if fathers made no alienation claim; and

• When Fathers cross-claim alienation, courts are almost 4 (3.9) times more likely to disbelieve Mothers’ claims of child abuse than if fathers made no alienation claim.


As the chart indicates, when fathers claim alienation, the rate at which mothers lose custody shoots up from over 25% to over 50%. That is, fathers’ alienation claims roughly double mothers’ rates of losing custody. When courts credit the alienation claim, rates of maternal losses of custody increase more drastically:

Mothers’ Custody Losses When Courts Credit Fathers’ Alienation Claims

Type of Abuse Alleged Mother Lost Custody:

DV (domestic violence): 60% (15/25)
CPA (child physical abuse): 59% (10/17)
CSA (child sexual abuse): 68% (13/19)
DVCh (domestic violence and child physical abuse): 79% (19/24)
CACSA (child physical abuse and child sexual abuse): 100% (6/6)
Any abuse: 73% (60/82)


“AKA” cases: those in which a court viewed a mother as alienating in her behavior but did not use the term “alienation.”

Mothers’ Custody Losses when Found to have Committed AKA


Custody Losses by Type of Abuse Alleged

Custody Losses When Abuse was Proven

DV  62% (24/39) DV  60% (3/5)
CPA  61% (17/28) CPA  50% (1/2)
CSA  58% (25/43) CSA  –
DVCh  55% (16/29) DVCh  –
CACSA  78% (7/9) CACSA  100% (1/1)
Any  60% (89/148) Any  63% (5/8)


The article is definitely food for thought, but clearly does not find that mothers who allege abuse are 90% more likely to lose/not win custody.

Additionally, one of my critiques of the article is this: it does not reveal whether the abuse-alleging mothers who lost/did not win custody was due purely to their alleging abuse or purely because they were found to have engaged in parental alienation or something like it. For example, if these mothers were themselves child abusers or were found to be unfit parents for other reasons (i.e., child neglect, substance abuse, lacking sufficient housing, ability to provide financially, practicing poor hygiene, insufficient bonding, etc.), how many of them would have lost/not won custody anyway? The article does not address this.

But even if the only reason these mothers lost/did not win custody was due to the court finding them to have engaged in parental alienation, would that not be reason enough? Now, I’m not asserting that all cases of actual parental alienation should cause a mother (or father committing alienation) to lose/not win custody (level of severity must be considered), but parental alienation would be, in my professional opinion, sufficient grounds for awarding custody of children to the other parent, assuming the other parent were found, on balance to be 1) sufficiently fit as a parent; and 2) the more fit of the two parents.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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What are the child custody factors that judges consider?

What are the child custody factors that judges consider when determining what’s in a child’s best interest in custody disputes according to Utah’s family law statutes?

The main factors are found in Utah Code § 30-3-10 (and the main factors of § 30-3-10 itself are highlighted below in red text, but you should read the entire applicable code section for all factors):

30-3-10.  Custody of a child — Custody factors.

(2) In determining any form of custody and parent-time under Subsection (1), the court shall consider the best interest of the child and may consider among other factors the court finds relevant, the following for each parent:

      (a) evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, the parent, or a household member of the parent;

      (b) the parent’s demonstrated understanding of, responsiveness to, and ability to meet the developmental needs of the child, including the child’s:

             (i) physical needs;

             (ii) emotional needs;

             (iii) educational needs;

             (iv) medical needs; and

             (v) any special needs;

      (c) the parent’s capacity and willingness to function as a parent, including:

             (i) parenting skills;

             (ii) co-parenting skills, including:

     (A) ability to appropriately communicate with the other parent;

     (B) ability to encourage the sharing of love and affection; and

     (C) willingness to allow frequent and continuous contact between the child and the other parent, except that, if the court determines that the parent is acting to protect the child from domestic violence, neglect, or abuse, the parent’s protective actions may be taken into consideration; and

            (iii) ability to provide personal care rather than surrogate care;

     (d) in accordance with Subsection (10), the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent;

     (e) the emotional stability of the parent;

     (f) the parent’s inability to function as a parent because of drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other causes;

     (g) whether the parent has intentionally exposed the child to pornography or material harmful to minors, as “material” and “harmful to minors” are defined in Section 76-10-1201;

     (h) the parent’s reasons for having relinquished custody or parent-time in the past;

     (i) duration and depth of desire for custody or parent-time;

     (j) the parent’s religious compatibility with the child;

     (k) the parent’s financial responsibility;

     (l) the child’s interaction and relationship with step-parents, extended family members of other individuals who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;

     (m) who has been the primary caretaker of the child;

     (n) previous parenting arrangements in which the child has been happy and well-adjusted in the home, school, and community;

     (o) the relative benefit of keeping siblings together;

     (p) the stated wishes and concerns of the child, taking into consideration the child’s cognitive ability and emotional maturity;

     (q) the relative strength of the child’s bond with the parent, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the relationship between the parent and the child; and

     (r) any other factor the court finds relevant.

(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody, as defined in Section 30-3-10.1, is in the best interest of the child, except in cases when there is:

     (a) evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse involving the child, a parent, or a household member of the parent;

     (b) special physical or mental needs of a parent or child, making joint legal custody unreasonable;

     (c) physical distance between the residences of the parents, making joint decision making impractical in certain circumstances; or

     (d) any other factor the court considers relevant including those listed in this section and Section 30-3-10.2.



     (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), a court may not discriminate against a parent due to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody.

     (b) The court may not consider the disability of a parent as a factor in awarding custody or modifying an award of custody based on a determination of a substantial change in circumstances, unless the court makes specific findings that:

         (i) the disability significantly or substantially inhibits the parent’s ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; and

         (ii) the parent with a disability lacks sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to supplement the parent’s ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue.


(7) This section does not establish a preference for either parent solely because of the gender of the parent.

(8) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint physical custody or sole physical custody, but allows the court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.


(10) In considering the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each party under Subsection (2)(d) or any other factor a court finds relevant, the court may not:

     (a) consider or treat a parent’s lawful possession or use of cannabis in a medicinal dosage form, a cannabis product in a medicinal dosage form, or a medical cannabis device, in accordance with Title 4, Chapter 41a, Cannabis Production Establishments and PharmaciesTitle 26B, Chapter 4, Part 2, Cannabinoid Research and Medical Cannabis, or Subsection 58-37-3.7(2) or (3) any differently than the court would consider or treat the lawful possession or use of any prescribed controlled substance; or

     (b) discriminate against a parent because of the parent’s status as a:

         (i) cannabis production establishment agent, as that term is defined in Section 4-41a-102;

         (ii) medical cannabis pharmacy agent, as that term is defined in Section 26B-4-201;

         (iii) medical cannabis courier agent, as that term is defined in Section 26B-4-201; or

         (iv) medical cannabis cardholder in accordance with Title 26B, Chapter 4, Part 2, Cannabinoid Research and Medical Cannabis.

Just how does a court consider the child custody factors? The recent case of Lamb v. Lamb (2024 UT App 16) provides a concise explanation:

¶26 Section 30-3-10 states that in “determining any form of custody and parent-time . . . , the court shall consider the best interest of the child and may consider . . . other factors the court finds relevant,” including factors for each parent articulated in the code. Utah Code § 30-3-10(2) (emphasis added). These factors a court may consider are “not on equal footing.” Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ¶ 26, 989 P.2d 491. Instead, “it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight.” Id. (emphasis added). “And where significant evidence concerning a particular factor is presented to the district court, findings that omit all discussion of that evidence must be deemed inadequate.” Twitchell v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 21, 509 P.3d 806. Thus, to “ensure that the trial court’s custody determination, discretionary as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better person to care for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate conclusion is justified.” Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

But note that § 30-3-10 does not constitute the only list of factors the court can consider in making its child custody and parent-time award decisions.

Equal physical custody factors

30-3-35.2.  Equal parent-time schedule.

(1) (a) A court may order the equal parent-time schedule described in this section if the court determines that:

         (i) the equal parent-time schedule is in the child’s best interest;

         (ii) each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life; and

         (iii) each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule.

     (b) To determine whether each parent has been actively involved in the child’s life, the court shall consider:

         (i) each parent’s demonstrated responsibility in caring for the child;

         (ii) each parent’s involvement in child care;

         (iii) each parent’s presence or volunteer efforts in the child’s school and at extracurricular activities;

         (iv) each parent’s assistance with the child’s homework;

         (v) each parent’s involvement in preparation of meals, bath time, and bedtime for the child;

         (vi) each parent’s bond with the child; and

         (vii) any other factor the court considers relevant.

     (c) To determine whether each parent can effectively facilitate the equal parent-time schedule, the court shall consider:

         (i) the geographic distance between the residence of each parent and the distance between each residence and the child’s school;

         (ii) each parent’s ability to assist with the child’s after school care;

         (iii) the health of the child and each parent, consistent with Subsection 30-3-10(6);

         (iv) the flexibility of each parent’s employment or other schedule;

         (v) each parent’s ability to provide appropriate playtime with the child;

         (vi) each parent’s history and ability to implement a flexible schedule for the child;

         (vii) physical facilities of each parent’s residence; and

         (viii) any other factor the court considers relevant.

(2) (a) If the parties agree to or the court orders the equal parent-time schedule described in this section, a parenting plan in accordance with Sections 30-3-10.7 through 30-3-10.10 shall be filed with an order incorporating the equal parent-time schedule.

     (b) An order under this section shall result in 182 overnights per year for one parent, and 183 overnights per year for the other parent.

     (c) Under the equal parent-time schedule, neither parent is considered to have the child the majority of the time for the purposes of Subsection 30-3-10.3(4) or 30-3-10.9(5)(c)(ii).

     (d) Child support for the equal parent-time schedule shall be consistent with Section 78B-12-208.

     (e) (i) A court shall determine which parent receives 182 overnights and which parent receives 183 overnights for parent-time.

         (ii) For the purpose of calculating child support under Section 78B-12-208, the amount of time to be spent with the parent who has the lower gross monthly income is considered 183 overnights, regardless of whether the parent receives 182 overnights or 183 overnights under Subsection (2)(e)(i).

(3) (a) Unless the parents agree otherwise and subject to a holiday, the equal parent-time schedule is as follows:

         (i) one parent shall exercise parent-time starting Monday morning and ending Wednesday morning;

         (ii) the other parent shall exercise parent-time starting Wednesday morning and ending Friday morning; and

         (iii) each parent shall alternate weeks exercising parent-time starting Friday morning and ending Monday morning.

     (b) The child exchange shall take place:

         (i) at the time the child’s school begins; or

         (ii) if school is not in session, at 9 a.m.

(4) (a) The parents may create a holiday schedule.

     (b) If the parents are unable to create a holiday schedule under Subsection (4)(a), the court shall:

         (i) order the holiday schedule described in Section 30-3-35; and

         (ii) designate which parent shall exercise parent-time for each holiday described in Section 30-3-35.

(5) (a) Each year, a parent may designate two consecutive weeks to exercise uninterrupted parent-time during the summer when school is not in session.

     (b) (i) One parent may make a designation at any time and the other parent may make a designation after May 1.

         (ii) A parent shall make a designation at least 30 days before the day on which the designated two-week period begins.

     (c) The court shall designate which parent may make the earlier designation described in Subsection (5)(b)(i) for an even numbered year with the other parent allowed to make the earlier designation in an odd numbered year.

     (d) The two consecutive weeks described in Subsection (5)(a) take precedence over all holidays except for Mother’s Day and Father’s Day.

Parent-time factors

30-3-32.  Parent-time — Definitions — Considerations for parent-time — Relocation.

(1) As used in Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:

     (a) “Child” means the child of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents.

     (b) “Supervised parent-time” means parent-time that requires the noncustodial parent to be accompanied during parent-time by an individual approved by the court.

     (c) “Surrogate care” means care by any individual other than the parent of the child.

     (d) “Uninterrupted time” means parent-time exercised by one parent without interruption at any time by the presence of the other parent.

     (e) “Virtual parent-time” means parent-time facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant messaging, video conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet or other communication media, to supplement in-person visits between a noncustodial parent and a child or between a child and the custodial parent when the child is staying with the noncustodial parent.

(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and the parent who experiences domestic or family violence.

     (b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child:

         (i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce;

         (ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with the parent’s child consistent with the child’s best interests; and

         (iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting the child.

(3) An order issued by a court pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 6, Cohabitant Abuse Protective Orders, shall be considered evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child.

(4) If a parent relocates because of an act of domestic violence or family violence by the other parent, the court shall make specific findings and orders with regards to the application of Section 30-3-37.

30-3-33.  Advisory guidelines.

In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the following advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents.

(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution.

(2) The parent-time schedule shall be used to maximize the continuity and stability of the child’s life.

(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule.

(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the court when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent modification is made to the parent-time order.

(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is returned.

(6) If the custodial parent will be transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the appointed place at the time the noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to be picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable alternate arrangements for the custodial parent to pick up the child.

(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parent-time by either parent.

(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent but may not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5.

(9) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time.

(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent’s failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule.

(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully.

(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency.

(13) Each parent shall provide the other with the parent’s current address and telephone number, email address, and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change.

(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into consideration:

     (a) the best interests of the child;

     (b) each parent’s ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and

     (c) any other factors the court considers material.

(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to transport the children, to provide the child care. Child care arrangements existing during the marriage are preferred as are child care arrangements with nominal or no charge.

(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.

(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.

(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, based on Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the parents should consider if an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor children so that parent-time is uniform between school aged and non-school aged children, is appropriate.

(19) When one or both parents are servicemembers or contemplating joining a uniformed service, the parents should resolve issues of custodial responsibility in the event of deployment as soon as practicable through reaching a voluntary agreement pursuant to Section 78B-20-201 or through court order obtained pursuant to Section 30-3-10. Servicemembers shall ensure their family care plan reflects orders and agreements entered and filed pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 20, Uniform Deployed Parents Custody, Parent-time, and Visitation Act.

30-3-34.  Parent-time — Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.

(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may:

     (a) establish a parent-time schedule; or

     (b) order a parent-time schedule described in Section 30-3-3530-3-35.130-3-35.2, or 30-3-35.5.

(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled.

(3) A court may consider the following when ordering a parent-time schedule:

     (a) whether parent-time would endanger the child’s physical health or mental health, or significantly impair the child’s emotional development;

     (b) evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, a parent, or a household member of the parent;

     (c) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;

     (d) a credible allegation of child abuse has been made;

     (e) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child’s well-being during parent-time;

     (f) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child during periods of parent-time;

     (g) the preference of the child if the court determines the child is of sufficient maturity;

     (h) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility;

     (i) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;

     (j) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or other related activities of the child;

     (k) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;

     (l) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled parent-time;

     (m) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents’ relationship before the conception of the child;

     (n) the parent-time schedule of siblings;

     (o) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and

     (p) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.

(4) The court shall enter the reasons underlying the court’s order for parent-time that:

     (a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or

     (b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5.

(5) A court may not order a parent-time schedule unless the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent-time schedule is in the best interest of the child.

(6) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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House Bill 81 ” Domestic Violence Modifications”

Today’s blog post treats another proposed law that is up for consideration during the 2024 Utah legislative session: House Bill 81 (HB0081 (, entitled “Domestic Violence Modifications”.

It would add the crime of propelling a bodily substance or material to the list of crimes that qualify as a domestic violence offense in certain circumstances. ‘Not sure how often bodily substances get propelled between spouses and cohabitants, not sure this was a gaping hole in our domestic violence law, and knowingly propelling bodily substances at others is already a separate crime (a class B misdemeanor, see Utah Code § 76-5-102.9), so I see no pressing need for this legislation. Do you?

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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Encourage Your Legislators to Vote Against H.B. (House Bill) 272 (2024 Utah General Legislative Session)

According to the “General Description” of H.B. 272, what’s not to like?:

Highlighted Provisions:

This bill:

▸ defines terms;

▸ in certain proceedings involving child custody:

  • specifies requirements for the admission of expert evidence; and
  • requires a court to consider evidence relating to domestic violence or abuse by a parent;

▸ imposes certain requirements and limitations regarding orders to improve the relationship between a parent and a child;

▸ requires the state court administrator to make recommendations regarding the education and training of court personnel involving child custody and related proceedings;

▸ requires that certain protective order proceedings comply with specific standards; and

▸ makes technical and conforming changes.

H.B. 272’s intentions are laudable, but the implementation, if H.B. 272 was made law, would be disastrous (and I choose my words carefully).

We don’t need more laws to prevent domestic violence and child abuse, reason being that more laws never have prevented and never will prevent (because they cannot prevent) domestic violence and child abuse.

Can you identify a single domestic violence victim who wouldn’t have been victimized but for a lack of legislation? Laws in the abstract don’t protect anyone. It’s the fair, effective, creation and enforcement of (needed) laws that protects. Passing more laws cannot guarantee anyone’s safety; laws and court orders don’t stop fists and bullets.

There are real DV and child abuse cases in the courts, but there are far too many fake ones in the courts (more than you likely imagine), and everyone knows why courts are afraid to acknowledge and condemn it: because they’re afraid they’ll be branded as “insensitive” and “uncaring” about DV and child abuse. So judges and commissioners who don’t want to “get it wrong,” overcompensate by “finding” DV and abuse that isn’t there. That way, nobody can claim the courts don’t care, and if innocent people go to prison and become pariahs as a result, “well, better him/her than me.” That’s not justice. That’s not rule of law.

Regarding the proposal in H.B. 272 for amending Section 30-3-10, determining credibility is the sole province of the court. Thus, the problem with “a credible allegation of child abuse” is that few courts can resist the temptation to err on the side of caution by treating virtually any allegation of child abuse as “credible”. To err on the side of caution is still error. Worse, it’s error knowingly committed for the sake of protecting the commissioner or judge from being criticized (or worse) for “getting it wrong.” See the article: Erring on the Side of Hidden Harm.

When judges are told “you need to do a better job identifying protecting DV and child abuse victims,” you’re telling judges to do a job that is not theirs. Overwhelmed judges will (unfortunately) respond to such unfair burdens simply by “finding” more DV and child abuse victims, and then say to the legislature, “Satisfied now?” That benefits no one. It erodes public trust in the courts.

There is a tremendous volume of false DV and child abuse claims. Indeed, I deal with more false claims than real claims at the district court level as a divorce and family law attorney. If you feel judges must “get more training” in the field of DV and child abuse, then requiring them to learn how better to identify real DV and child abuse inherently requires requiring them to learn how better to identify fake DV and child abuse claims.

It is unfair to demand of judges that they compensate for what the litigants might fail to do, i.e., gather and present the evidence necessary to prevail.

“More DV and abuse detection training for judges” sounds good but isn’t. If the state can’t afford more and better judges (and we need to accept that, if it can’t), “more DV and abuse training” is a counterproductive half-measure. If the legislature wants to spend more money on judge training, then spend that money helping judges learn and develop better command of the law, of evidence, and of sound adjudication.

The idea that state district court judges “need more training” in every particular dispute they hear is a problem generally. Our judges cannot become experts on every area of law, nor are they expected to be. All that a judge needs to do competently (and can be expected to do competently) is weigh the evidence presented to him/her correctly and apply the facts to the law that governs the case correctly.

We could “protect kids” from abuse by locking up every parent–that way they can’t abuse their kids. Of course, that way they can’t love and take care of their kids either. We will never solve DV and child abuse with more laws, but we will victimize the innocent if we howl for more witch hunt lawmaking.

Draconian creation and/or enforcement of laws like those proposed by H.B. 272 “protects” some by violating the rights of others. As does legislating and adjudicating on a “better safe than sorry” basis (regardless of whether it’s sincere), instead of on the facts (including the lack thereof). Experts can be helpful, but most cause more confusion than they dispel. Child custody cases today don’t suffer from a lack of expert input, rarely from a lack of needed or even warranted expert input, competent expert input, or justice-promoting expert input. “Expertise” on abuse (whatever this ever-expanding definition of “abuse” is coming to mean) is too subjective and pseudoscientific. This is why HB 272 would ultimately do more harm than good.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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Mandatory Lethality Assessments on Domestic Violence Calls. In Other Words: Pandora’s Box

The Utah State Legislature passed this into law an amendment to Utah Code § 77-36-2.1, which was effective May 3, 2023. The newly amended code section now requires police officers to conduct “lethality assessments” in response to domestic violence calls under certain circumstances.

My immediate reaction to this news was: Oh, no, but I didn’t share that on my blog because I wanted to ensure I didn’t come to any hasty, erroneous conclusions. Now that I’ve had time to reflect on the subject, my reaction is: Oh, no.

While I have no doubt that the intention behind lethality assessments is sincere, I worry about whether lethality assessments will be conducted to protect domestic violence victims or conducted to protect the police.

If you’re a law enforcement officer who doesn’t want to be blamed for failing to protect a victim or potential victim, then what reason would you have not to “err on the side of caution” when you conduct lethality assessments? Essentially, the thinking goes: “I don’t want to be blamed for failing to protect someone from domestic violence. I don’t want to be accused of being insensitive to the vulnerable. So, if the mere allegation of domestic violence arises, I will punish the accused and I 1) won’t look like I’m soft on domestic violence and 2) will appear to be preventing crime (even if there is no crime).”

I’m concerned that lethality assessments can be abused by those who report domestic violence and those who respond to reports of domestic violence, that lethality assessments, which are intended to be a shield to the vulnerable, would be abused as a weapon against innocent people who aren’t violent and/or who don’t pose a threat of violence.

As a divorce lawyer, I am particularly concerned about the potential for lethality assessments to be abused by spouses and parents who are plotting a divorce or child custody action and who make false allegations of domestic violence to gain an advantage over the other spouse or parent in the divorce and or child custody action. Then, not only do we have to worry about police officers who might err on the side of caution when conducting lethality assessments, but we also have to worry about judges who would do the same (“I have my doubts about the credibility of that lethality assessment in the record. But if I say I don’t believe it, then I might appear indifferent to domestic violence. Or if it turns out that the accused is violent, then I’ll be blamed for ‘ignoring’ the lethality assessment. Better for me to err on the side of caution.”).

I am also worried that, following the mandate to conduct lethality assessments, the domestic violence hustlers will “discover” a raft of domestic violence “risk” or “danger” that had heretofore gone “undetected” based upon the lethality assessments data, and that it will be offered as proof that lethality assessments “work”. I’m worried that people will claim that the self-proclaimed domestic violence victims are proof that they are domestic violence victims because of the lethality assessment, which is nothing other than a record of one’s subjective claims of being a victim.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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No. 20200890-CA

Filed May 18, 2023

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Joseph M. Bean

No. 191902454

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, and Cherise Bacalski,

Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and William M. Hains,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which


FORSTER concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1        After Cody Murray pleaded guilty to violating a protective order, the district court ordered him to pay the victim’s moving expenses and 12 weeks of lost wages as restitution. Murray now appeals that restitution order, arguing that his criminal conduct did not proximately cause either of those losses. On the moving expenses, we agree with Murray and reverse that portion of the order. On the lost wages, however, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to link Murray’s criminal conduct to the claimed loss. We accordingly affirm that portion of the order.


¶2        Murray married C.M. in March 2018, and they lived together throughout their short marriage. On January 2 or 3, 2019, C.M. filed a report with law enforcement alleging that Murray had engaged in sexual intercourse with her without her consent while she was medicated and sleeping. On the same day that she filed this report, C.M. obtained a temporary protective order against Murray based on this same allegation.

¶3        On January 3, 2019, law enforcement served Murray with the protective order at the residence he shared with C.M., and Murray complied with the order by packing his belongings and leaving the residence. Within an hour of leaving, however, Murray asked a friend to contact C.M. on his behalf. As subsequently alleged in a probable cause affidavit, C.M. soon received “phone calls and text messages” from the friend’s phone in which the friend relayed messages that Murray “loved her” and “missed her.” As also alleged, while the friend was on the phone speaking to C.M., Murray “passed a paper note” to the friend asking him “to let C.M. know that [Murray] was scared.” C.M. reported these communications to law enforcement as a violation of the protective order.

¶4        The State later filed two cases against Murray. The two cases were filed separately and were not consolidated. In the first case, the State charged Murray with one count of rape. That charge was based on C.M.’s allegation that Murray had sexual intercourse with her without her consent while she was sleeping. That case was later dismissed.

¶5        In the second case, which is the case at issue in this appeal, the State charged Murray with one count of violating a protective order. See Utah Code § 76-5-108 (2018). This charge was based on Murray’s indirect communications with C.M. on January 3, 2019. In March 2020, Murray pleaded guilty to the charged offense. As a result of a plea deal, the charge was reduced from a class A misdemeanor to a class B misdemeanor. In his affidavit in support of the plea, Murray admitted that “[o]n or about January 3, 2019,” he “knowingly and intentionally communicate[d] with C.M. through a mutual friend . . . through phone calls and text messages.” Murray also agreed that he “may be ordered to make restitution to any victims of [his] crimes.”

¶6        Murray agreed to be sentenced at that same hearing. During the sentencing portion of the hearing, C.M.’s attorney asked the court to leave open C.M.’s restitution claim for the “one year statutory time limit,” informing the court that she would “submit any restitution” after receiving further documentation. The court left C.M.’s restitution claim open as requested.

¶7        In July 2020, the Utah Office of Victims of Crime (UOVC) filed a motion for restitution, asserting that it had paid C.M. a total of $6,264.47.[1] Of that amount, $5,520.28 was designated as reimbursement for “[l]oss of wages” and $744.19 was designated as reimbursement for “[r]elocation.”

¶8        Murray objected to UOVC’s motion for restitution and requested a hearing. At that hearing, UOVC’s attorney called two witnesses: (1) a representative from UOVC (Representative) and (2) C.M.

¶9        Representative testified that UOVC received C.M.’s application for restitution in November 2019. Representative testified that C.M. listed both the protective order violation and the alleged rape as the bases for her restitution claim. Representative further noted that in reviewing C.M.’s restitution claim, “the reparations officer indicated that the claim was approved based on both incidents”—the alleged rape and the protective order violation—because “they were so close together” that “the reparations officer couldn’t separate them into two separate claims.”

¶10      Representative testified that UOVC ultimately approved and paid C.M.’s expenses for “loss of wages” in the amount of $5,520.28, as well as “relocation” or moving expenses in the amount of $744.19, thus totaling $6,264.47. With respect to the lost wages claim, Representative testified that UOVC received a document from C.M.’s employer that explained “how much [C.M.] made at the time and how long she was out of work.” Representative said that UOVC also received a “health provider statement” that corroborated that C.M. missed work. Representative further said that from these documents and other verification efforts with C.M.’s employer, UOVC determined that C.M. missed “over 68 days” of work, and that it had then paid “12 weeks of lost wages” for the work C.M. missed from “January 3rd of 2019 through March 15th of 2020” at “[s]ixty-six percent of the full-time salary,” which in C.M.’s case amounted to $5,520.28.

¶11      With respect to the moving expenses, Representative testified that UOVC paid C.M. $744.19 to cover “reimbursement for movers.” Representative said that C.M. told UOVC that she had moved because “she didn’t feel comfortable in having [Murray] know where she lived.”

¶12      UOVC’s attorney then called C.M., who testified that she obtained the protective order against Murray because of the “actions he was making to [her] in [her] sleep.” C.M. also provided and referred to a note from a doctor indicating that C.M. had been seen because “[f]or the duration of her marriage her husband was sexually assaulting her in her sleep,” “[s]he was experiencing UTIs on many occasions from the sexual abuse,” and she had “[m]ajor depressive disorder” and “post-traumatic stress disorder.”

¶13      During C.M.’s testimony, UOVC’s attorney asked, “[A]s a result of the violation of the protective order, can you tell us what effect the violation of the protective order, the conduct that the defendant caused—what happened to you as a result?” C.M. responded that she suffered “severe panic attacks” and flashbacks, “live[d] in fear nearly every day,” felt a “[l]oss of trust of people in general,” and had “a hard time concentrating or focusing.” She said she had “severe depression” and was simply not “able to function like [she had] always been able to.”

¶14      UOVC’s attorney then asked if Murray’s conduct “in December or January of 2018, ’19 . . . interfere[d] with [her] ability to interact with people,” to which C.M. responded, “Definitely.” C.M. testified that because these issues “interfere[d] with [her] ability to work,” there were times where she had to take leave from work. She testified that the “very first time” she “took leave was for a doctor’s appointment . . . back in December of 2018” and that she was out of work periodically after that, thus agreeing with the suggestion from the attorney that she missed work “every few days, a couple hours here, a few hours there, a full day here, a few days there” until March 2020, when she was “out of work altogether and couldn’t work at all.” UOVC’s attorney asked if C.M.’s requests to take leave from work starting in “December of 2018” were “related to [Murray’s] conduct . . . that was occurring at that time,” and C.M. responded, “It was.”

¶15      With respect to the moving expenses, C.M. testified that she moved from the home she’d shared with Murray because the divorce decree ordered her to sell it. C.M. said that she moved in May 2020—17 months after Murray violated the protective order—and that her restitution request was based on the movers she had hired to assist with that move.

¶16      Murray didn’t call any witnesses at the restitution hearing. Instead, after UOVC’s attorney rested, each side presented closing arguments. UOVC’s attorney asked the court to order restitution for lost wages because C.M. had to take leave from work “[a]s a result of [Murray’s] conduct . . . because she wasn’t able to fully perform the job.” UOVC’s attorney asked for restitution for moving expenses because “it was [Murray’s] conduct which caused” C.M. to move and she “had reason to hide her whereabouts from” Murray out of fear.

¶17     Murray, however, argued that under the restitution statute, “restitution has to be tied directly” to the offense for which he’d been convicted—which, here, was a class B misdemeanor violation of a protective order. In Murray’s view, restitution for the lost wages was not appropriate because C.M. “missing all of [that] work . . . [could not] be tied” to his violation of the protective order (as opposed to the underlying rape allegation that the protective order was based on). Murray also argued that the moving expenses could not be tied to this conviction because C.M.’s decision to move was based on an order from the divorce decree requiring C.M. and Murray to sell the house.

¶18      At the close of arguments, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $6,264.47 to cover lost wages and moving expenses. In its oral ruling, the court noted that Murray was “alleged to have committed sexual offenses against [C.M.] in her sleep” in the latter part of 2018. The court said that it would “take the testimony of the witness at face value with regard to what she felt was a violation that caused the fear,” and the court then found that Murray’s “past history” of “sexual[ly] assaulting” C.M. “in her sleep” caused her “fear” and “anxiety.” With respect to C.M.’s missed work, the court found that “whatever happened, certainly enhanced or contributed to [C.M.’s] anxiety, depression, [and] fear,” and that “after the circumstances giving rise to whatever happened in December, there was a definite downturn with regard to [C.M.’s] ability . . . to work.” And with respect to the moving expenses, the court found that the “moving expenses [were] also reasonable and arising out of the crime that occurred.”

¶19      Murray objected to the court’s ruling. Murray argued that the court could “only tie restitution to what [Murray] was convicted of or pled guilty to, which would be the violation of the protective order,” and he further argued that the court should not “consider any of the alleged sexual misconduct” in its determination of restitution. In response, the court referred to the document submitted by C.M. in her restitution application, noting that “for the duration of the marriage, [Murray] was sexually assaulting [C.M.] in her sleep” and that she “was experiencing UTIs on many occasions from the sexual abuse.” The court observed that C.M. suffered from depression and post-traumatic stress as a result. Of note, the court then wondered whether these conditions were “exacerbated . . . or caused by a violation of a protective order,” “especially the loss of work after his commission of the violation of the protective order.” (Emphasis added.)

¶20      In a subsequent written restitution order, the court ordered Murray to pay UOVC a total of $6,264.47 for lost wages and moving expenses. In its Findings of Fact, the court found that C.M. “suffered emotional trauma as a result of [Murray’s] conduct in this case” and that her “fear, anxiety, and depression . . . rendered [her] unable to perform her duties and required her to miss work.” The court found that the trauma C.M. suffered “also caused her to relocate because she feared [Murray] and didn’t want him to know where she lived.” Murray filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment.[2]


¶21      Murray argues that the district court improperly ordered restitution for C.M.’s lost wages and moving expenses. “We will not disturb a district court’s restitution determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.” State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127, ¶ 12, 521 P.3d 920 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1268 (Utah 2023). “To the extent that the district court made legal determinations in connection with its restitution analysis, we review those legal determinations for correctness.” State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 15, 427 P.3d 495 (quotation simplified). But when “a defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a restitution order, the defendant must demonstrate that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the court’s ruling.” State v. Chadwick, 2021 UT App 40, ¶ 6, 486 P.3d 90 (quotation simplified).


¶22      The Crime Victims Restitution Act (the CVRA) requires the district court “to determine restitution for any pecuniary damages proximately caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.” State v. Blake, 2022 UT App 104, ¶ 9, 517 P.3d 414. Here, Murray challenges the court’s decision ordering him to pay C.M.’s moving expenses and her lost wages. In Murray’s view, his criminal conduct did not proximately cause either loss.

¶23      We first quickly dispense with the moving expenses issue. Murray argues that “[n]o evidence tied C.M.’s move from the marital home” to his criminal conduct, but that “the evidence on the record was that C.M. had to move because of the divorce decree.” Based on this, Murray argues that there was no basis for requiring him to pay these expenses as part of restitution. In its responsive brief, the State concedes this point. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Murray’s argument and the State’s concession are well taken. We accordingly reverse that portion of the restitution order.

¶24      The remaining and principal issue on appeal, then, is whether the court also erred in ordering Murray to pay C.M.’s lost wages. On this, Murray argues that the court erred in two key respects: (I) by taking into account the alleged rape and (II) by then determining that Murray’s criminal conduct proximately caused C.M. to miss work. We address each argument in turn.

I. Alleged Rape

¶25      Murray argues that the district court improperly based the restitution order for lost wages on C.M.’s rape allegation, rather than limiting itself to considering the sole offense to which he had pleaded guilty: violating a protective order. We see no legal error in the court’s decision.

¶26      As a general rule, we “apply the law in effect at the time of the occurrence regulated by that law.” State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 24, 478 P.3d 1048 (quotation simplified). The version of the restitution statute in effect at the time of Murray’s sentencing provided that

[w]hen a defendant enters into a plea disposition or is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition.

Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1) (2019); see also id. § 77-38a-302(5)(a) (2019) (“For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or for which the defendant agrees to pay restitution.”).[3] Under these statutes, Murray therefore could not “be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which he did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.” State v. Randall, 2019 UT App 120, ¶ 13, 447 P.3d 1232 (quotation simplified)

¶27      It’s true that Murray was not convicted of raping C.M. As noted, the separate criminal case that was based on the rape allegation was dismissed. It’s also true that Murray did not admit to raping C.M. in this case either. But contrary to Murray’s arguments, this doesn’t mean that his alleged sexual misconduct against C.M. could play no role in the court’s restitution analysis.

¶28      Again, Murray pleaded guilty to violating a protective order, and the elements of that offense were that Murray was “subject to a protective order” and “intentionally or knowingly violate[d] that order after having been properly served or having been present . . . when the order was issued.” Utah Code § 76-5­108(1) (2018). In his plea agreement, Murray acknowledged these elements and agreed that he had “committed the crime.” In the factual basis portion of the plea agreement, Murray further agreed that he had “knowingly and intentionally communicate[d] with C.M. through a mutual friend . . . through phone calls and text messages.” Pulling this together, the criminal activity for which Murray was convicted (by way of plea) included these key pieces:

·        Murray was subject to a protective order;

·         Murray intentionally or knowingly violated the protective order; and

·         Murray did so by knowingly and intentionally communicating with C.M. through a mutual friend through phone calls and text messages.

¶29      Once Murray was convicted of this offense, the district court could then order restitution for any damages that were “proximately caused” by that offense. State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶¶ 31–48, 416 P.3d 1132.[4] Our supreme court has explained that restitution is intended “to compensate the victim for pecuniary damages,” as well as “to rehabilitate and deter the defendant, and others, from future illegal behavior.” State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 18, 214 P.3d 104. Because the question before a restitution court is what damages were proximately caused by the offense, the court isn’t confined to just the narrow elements of the offense of conviction. Rather, while the “restitution statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution,” “it is only the initial crime for which liability must be legally certain.” State v. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, ¶¶ 3, 5, 182 P.3d 922 (quotation simplified). Once guilt for the offense has been firmly established, the court then has “broad discretion, after reviewing the evidence presented at the restitution hearing,” to “order restitution for any pecuniary damages clearly resulting from” that offense. Id. ¶ 5 (quotation simplified). In other words, once the defendant is convicted of “criminal conduct,” the defendant can “be held responsible for all damages proximately caused by that conduct.” State v. Huffman, 2021 UT App 125, ¶ 9, 501 P.3d 564 (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 509 P.3d 198 (Utah 2022).

¶30      Our decision in Huffman is illustrative. Therethe defendant pleaded guilty to possessing drugs. Id. ¶ 7. Although the offense of drug possession doesn’t include, as an element, the destruction of property, we held that it was appropriate for the court to order restitution for damage that was done to the victim’s motorhome. This was so because evidence before the court established that the defendant’s possession of drugs inside the motorhome proximately caused those damages. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.

¶31      A similar dynamic is in play here. Again, Murray pleaded guilty to violating a protective order. In doing so, he acknowledged both the existence of the protective order and that he had violated its terms. Once these things were firmly established through the guilty plea, the court then had broad discretion to order restitution for any damage that was proximately caused by Murray’s criminal conduct.

¶32      When making that proximate cause determination, the court had at least some latitude to consider the conduct that had led to the protective order, and this is largely so because of the nature of the offense. After all, Murray wasn’t convicted of a crime because he contacted a stranger with whom he had no prior history. Rather, Murray was convicted of intentionally or knowingly contacting a person who had obtained a protective order against him. In this key sense, it was the protective order that made Murray’s communications criminal.

¶33      A protective order acts as a “mechanism” for giving victims a measure of “protection against their abusers.” State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, ¶ 17, 54 P.3d 645; see also State v. Baize, 2019 UT App 202, ¶ 20 n.5, 456 P.3d 770. One of the principal ways that a protective order does this is by creating a legal barrier between the victim and the abuser. If a person who is subject to a protective order subsequently breaches that barrier, a court couldn’t realistically be expected to decide whether the victim was traumatized by the violative act by considering that act as if it had occurred in a vacuum. Given that the victim had previously obtained judicial protection from the person, the nature of the alleged prior conduct would very likely have some bearing on the interconnected questions of whether and why the illegal contact had proximately caused any trauma or harm to the victim (not to mention how much damage the victim had actually suffered).

¶34      In short, because Murray pleaded guilty to violating a protective order, the district court could consider the fact that C.M. had obtained a protective order against him as part of its restitution analysis. And from there, it then had discretion to consider the conduct that led to the issuance of the protective order, at least to the extent that such conduct could inform its decision about whether Murray’s actions proximately caused any harm to C.M.

II. Proximate Cause

¶35      Murray next argues that the evidence before the district court was insufficient to show that his criminal conduct proximately caused C.M. to miss 12 weeks of work. We disagree.

¶36      The “proximate cause standard requires a showing that the crime, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury and that the injury would not have occurred absent the crime.” Blake, 2022 UT App 104, ¶ 9 (quotation simplified). The “burden is on the State to prove proximate cause,” State v. Morrison, 2019 UT App 51, ¶ 13, 440 P.3d 942, and this “requires proof of two elements: (1) but-for causation and (2) foreseeable harm,” State v. Watson, 2021 UT App 37, ¶ 15, 485 P.3d 946.

¶37      Proximate cause is generally a “fact question[] to be resolved by the fact finder.” State v. Barzee, 2007 UT 95, ¶ 81, 177 P.3d 48; see also Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 1233 (noting that proximate cause is a fact question). Because of this, we review a district court’s finding of proximate cause for clear error. State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶¶ 24, 35, 499 P.3d 176, cert. denied, 505 P.3d 56 (Utah 2022). Thus, when “a defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a restitution order, the defendant must demonstrate that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the court’s ruling.” State v. Chadwick, 2021 UT App 40, ¶ 6, 486 P.3d 90 (quotation simplified).

¶38      Here, we see no clear error in the court’s finding that Murray’s violation of the protective order proximately caused C.M. to miss 12 weeks of work.

¶39      At the restitution hearing, C.M. testified that she obtained the protective order because of “actions [Murray] was making to [her] in [her] sleep” that began “at the end of December of 2018.” She further agreed that this “conduct” was “the reason for the ongoing protective order.” Of note, C.M. then testified that, “as a result of the violation of the protective order,” she has “severe panic attacks,” “severe depression,” and flashbacks; that she “live[s] in fear nearly every day”; that she has a “[l]oss of trust in people” generally; that she has a “hard time concentrating or focusing”; and that she was unable “to function like [she has] always been able to.” (Emphasis added.) When C.M. was then asked whether “the problems” that she was having “interfere[d] with [her] ability to work,” she responded, “Definitely.” While she said that the “very first time” she “took leave was for a doctor’s appointment . . . back in December of 2018” (which would have predated Murray’s violation of the protective order), C.M. also agreed that she missed work “every few days, a couple hours here, a few hours there, a full day here, a few days there” until March 2020, when she was “out of work altogether and couldn’t work at all.” The district court determined that C.M.’s testimony was credible, and on appeal, we give deference to that credibility determination. See State v. Miles, 2020 UT App 120, ¶ 34, 472 P.3d 978 (noting that “because of the district court’s advantaged position in observing the witnesses firsthand, we defer to its credibility findings” (quotation simplified)); State v. Taylor, 2017 UT App 89, ¶ 10, 402 P.3d 790 (noting that “we accord deference to the trial court’s ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor” (quotation simplified)).

¶40      As also noted, UOVC introduced evidence showing that C.M. missed “over 68 days” of work, and UOVC’s Representative testified that UOVC paid for 12 weeks of work that she missed “span[ning] from January 3rd of 2019 through March 15th of 2020” because that missed work was “related to the incident in this particular case, which is the violation of a protective order.” When coupled with C.M.’s testimony about the effects of the protective order violation itself on her psyche and her ability to function, this provided an evidentiary basis for the court to find that Murray’s criminal conduct proximately caused C.M. to miss this work.

¶41      Murray nevertheless pushes back on several fronts, none of which are availing.

¶42      First, Murray points to testimony showing that C.M. was traumatized by the alleged rape (as opposed to the protective order violation), as well as testimony establishing that C.M. began missing work even before the unlawful communication. Both things are, on this record, unquestionably true. But even if the alleged rape caused psychological trauma to C.M. on its own, and even if that trauma caused her to miss work (either before or even after January 3, 2019), this doesn’t mean that Murray’s violation of the protective order couldn’t proximately cause her to miss work too.

¶43      Again, if there was sufficient evidence to establish that C.M.’s losses were proximately caused by the communication, then those losses were compensable. The fact that the losses may have been linked to some other causal source does not change this. In civil cases, it has long been recognized that there can be multiple causes for an injury or a trauma. See, e.g.McCorvey v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993) (confirming “there can be more than one proximate cause” of “an injury”); Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“There can be more than one proximate cause of an injury so long as each is a concurrent contributing factor in causing the injury.” (quotation simplified)). And this is true in a criminal case too. See, e.g.State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, ¶ 21, 56 P.3d 969 (“A defendant’s acts may be found to be the proximate cause of the victim’s death even if the victim actually died as a result of the combination of the defendant’s acts plus some other contributing factor.” (quotation simplified)).[5]

¶44      Here, we agree with Murray that C.M.’s trauma and associated anxiety from the violation of the protective order was likely linked in some measure to the alleged rape. As discussed above, however, the alleged rape was the very reason that C.M. had previously obtained a protective order against Murray. And as also discussed, C.M.’s testimony at the restitution hearing supported the conclusion that when Murray contacted her in violation of that order, this both exacerbated her prior trauma and caused additional trauma too, thereby further interfering with her ability to work. Given this sworn and court-credited testimony, we cannot conclude that it was against the clear weight of the evidence for the court to conclude that, even accounting for the trauma associated with the alleged rape, the violation of the protective order itself proximately caused C.M. to miss work.

¶45      Second, Murray argues that it could not have been “reasonably foreseeable that C.M. would miss 12 weeks of work” because he sent her “a single indirect text message.” As an initial matter, it’s unclear from the record if this case really does involve just a single text message. For “the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or for which the defendant agrees to pay restitution.” Utah Code § 77-38a-302(5)(a) (2019). Here, the probable cause affidavit alleged that C.M. had “received phone calls and text messages” from Murray through their mutual friend. And in his plea affidavit, Murray agreed under oath that he “knowingly and intentionally communicate[d] with C.M. through a mutual friend . . . through phone calls and text messages.” On this record, the court could therefore assess the restitution question in light of Murray’s admission that there had been multiple communications.

¶46      In any event, whether viewed as multiple communications or even just a single communication, this argument still fails because the effect of the communication(s) can’t meaningfully be divorced from the surrounding context. Again, Murray wasn’t convicted of sending a message to a stranger with whom he had no prior history. Rather, Murray was convicted because he knowingly or intentionally communicated with C.M. in violation of a protective order. By communicating with C.M. despite the existence of an order from a judge that prohibited him from contacting her, Murray undermined the sense of distance and security that the protective order was intended to give her. Because of this context and history, we disagree with Murray’s assertion that it could not have been reasonably foreseeable that C.M. would be traumatized and miss work as a result.

¶47      Finally, Murray argues that the restitution order was at odds with our decision in State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 582. We disagree. In Bickley, the defendant was charged with criminal nonsupport, and the “Amended Information listed the nonpayment period from February 1, 1997 to January 10, 2000.” Id. ¶ 3. After the defendant pleaded guilty to this offense, however, the district court awarded restitution for arrears that occurred prior to 1997. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. We reversed that decision on appeal, concluding that the court could not impose restitution for pre-1997 arrears “without making inferences.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation simplified). Because of this, we held that it was not “firmly established” that the defendant was in fact responsible for the pre-1997 arrears. Id.

¶48      Bickley is readily distinguishable. The arrears at issue in Bickley plainly fell outside the conviction (which, again, was specifically limited to arrears that occurred from February 1997 on). As discussed above, however, the offense at issue here was the violation of a protective order, and that protective order was by definition linked to some prior conduct. Thus, unlike Bickley, it’s not at all clear that this restitution order was based on damages that fell outside of the offense at issue. In addition, there’s no suggestion that the district court in Bickley based its restitution award for the pre-1997 arrears on any evidence or testimony. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 12. This is why we faulted the court for “making inferences” and imposing restitution for arrears that were not “firmly established.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation simplified). But again, this was not the case here, where the restitution order was based on sworn testimony from the hearing itself.

¶49      In short, we can overturn the court’s proximate cause determination only if Murray has established “that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the court’s ruling.” Chadwick, 2021 UT App 40, ¶ 6 (quotation simplified). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that C.M.’s testimony about the effects of the protective order violation on her psyche and her ability to function, coupled with the evidence presented by UOVC about the days that she missed at work, was sufficient to support the court’s finding that Murray’s criminal conduct proximately caused C.M. to miss this work, thereby causing these damages. Because the court’s ruling was not against the clear weight of the evidence before it, we affirm that determination.


¶50      The district court erred when it required Murray to pay $744.19 in restitution for moving expenses. We accordingly vacate that portion of the court’s order. But the court did not err when it ordered restitution in the amount of $5,520.28 for lost wages. We accordingly affirm the restitution award of $5,520.28 for lost wages.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

Click to access State%20v.%20Murray20230518_20200890_52.pdf


[1] UOVC was represented by an attorney from the Utah Attorney General’s office who serves as “agency counsel” for UOVC.

[2] In between the court’s oral and written rulings, Murray filed a motion to reconsider. But after the written ruling was entered, Murray filed a timely notice of appeal. Despite the fact that this notice of appeal had been filed, and over an objection from UOVC, the district court subsequently held oral argument on Murray’s motion to reconsider, after which it denied the motion.

On appeal, both parties now agree that Murray’s notice of appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion to reconsider. We agree with the parties. Because the motion to reconsider was filed before the written ruling, it was a prejudgment motion to reconsider the oral ruling. While the court was “free to consider” what was essentially a request for “reargument” at “any time before entering the final judgment,” Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 7 n.2, 135 P.3d 861, the court did not do so. Instead, it issued the written final judgment. When Murray then filed his notice of appeal after that final judgment had been entered, his notice of appeal “divest[ed] the district court of jurisdiction.” Garver v. Rosenberg, 2014 UT 42, ¶ 11, 347 P.3d 380. Of note, our supreme court has held that a prejudgment motion to reconsider does “not toll the time for appeal once a final judgment [is] entered.” Gillett, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 7 n.2. We likewise see no basis for holding that a prejudgment motion to reconsider would somehow undermine the finality of a written final judgment or allow the court to retain jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed. As a result, we agree with the parties that the only ruling properly before us is the original restitution order.


[3] The legislature recently amended the CVRA. The most recent version of the statute provides that the “court shall order a defendant, as part of the sentence imposed,” to “pay restitution to all victims: (i) in accordance with the terms of any plea agreement in the case; or (ii) for the entire amount of pecuniary damages that are proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a) (2023).

[4] The version of the statute that governed at the time of Murray’s sentencing did not expressly state that restitution could be awarded for damages “proximately caused” by the offense, see Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1) (2019), but our supreme court had interpreted that statute as containing such an allowance, see State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶¶ 31–48, 416 P.3d 1132. The statute has since been amended to expressly incorporate the proximate cause standard. See Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(ii) (2023).

[5] Something somewhat similar can be true outside the proximate cause context too. In State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 38, 274 P.3d 992, for example, we recognized “a basis under Utah law for holding a defendant culpable for causing death even when other factors contributed to the victim’s death.”

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Twitchell v. Twitchell – 2022 UT App 49 – child custody and support

Twitchell v. Twitchell – 2022 UT App 49








No. 20200546-CA

Filed April 14, 2022

First District Court, Logan Department

The Honorable Brian G. Cannell

No. 184100383

Ryan L. Holdaway and Diane Pitcher, Attorneys

for Appellant

Robert L. Neeley, Attorney for Appellee



¶1 Joseph N. Twitchell appeals from a divorce decree and appurtenant findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that the district court failed to consider relevant statutory factors when forming its custody determination, awarded him less parent-time than the statutory minimum, and erroneously calculated his child support obligation based on an inaccurate accounting of the income of his ex-wife, Jazmin S. Twitchell. We find Joseph’s arguments persuasive on each of these issues, and accordingly, we remand for further proceedings.


¶2 Joseph and Jazmin[1] were married in 2016 and share one child (Child), who was born in May 2017. The parties “separated about a year after she was born.” Shortly thereafter, in June 2018, Jazmin filed for divorce, citing “irreconcilable differences.”

¶3 The court issued temporary orders in December 2018, awarding the parties joint legal custody of Child and designating Jazmin as the primary physical custodian, “subject to [Joseph’s] right to parent-time.” As to the parent-time schedule, the court directed the parties to follow the minimum schedule set out in section 30-3-35 of the Utah Code, with Joseph generally “designated as the non-custodial parent,” meaning that he could exercise parent-time on alternating weekends. In addition, the temporary orders granted Joseph an additional overnight with Child “every Thursday night,” with Joseph keeping Child for the weekend when it was one of his parent-time weekends and returning Child to Jazmin’s care by noon on Friday when it was not.

¶4 As the case proceeded to trial, Jazmin filed her financial disclosures, dated November 7, 2019. In her disclosures, Jazmin reported her gross monthly income as $2,111. In this document, under an entry entitled “Employment Status,” Jazmin listed the name of a child care center where she worked at some point. Under an entry for “Name of Employer,” she listed a local private school. Jazmin also filed a supplemental disclosure, dated September 23, 2019, informing the court that she had been serving as a “houseparent” at the private school since September 1, 2019, for which she received no monetary compensation but was provided room and board. Jazmin included a letter from a representative of the school who estimated that the value of the housing and utilities provided to Jazmin was $980 per month.

¶5 A two-day trial was held in December 2019, at which multiple witnesses testified. During Joseph’s testimony, he described instances of physical and verbal altercations beginning a few months into the parties’ marriage. He averred that the first time things became physical between the two was in November 2016, when stress regarding the upcoming holiday season resulted in an argument and Jazmin eventually “going after [him] with a knife,” cutting his hand. Joseph also described a time in Spring 2017 when he and Jazmin were in another argument, and he “went to go give her a hug and apologize . . . and she bit [his] right arm.” He then described one more instance where Jazmin told Joseph “she hated [him], over and over and over again,” which prompted him to threaten leaving with Child. In response, Jazmin “slapped or hit [him] with something across the face.” Joseph also presented photographs of injuries he sustained from each of these incidents, which were admitted into evidence without objection.

¶6 Several witnesses also testified as to their observations of Child’s condition once she went from Jazmin’s to Joseph’s care. One witness testified that on multiple occasions when Joseph received Child from Jazmin, Child had “severe diaper rashes” with blistering, “yeast infections,” and “bite marks on her feet,” and that she was “really dehydrated” to the point of not “even having a bowel movement for a day or two after.” Another witness also confirmed that Child had severe diaper rashes when she came to Joseph, to the point that Joseph had to seek care from a pediatrician, and testified that Child often “had bite marks on both her hands . . . and her feet.” Joseph also produced evidence documenting incidents of what he characterizes as “assaults” from other children at a daycare while Child was in Jazmin’s care.

¶7 Jazmin testified about her employment history since the parties’ separation. During the marriage, Jazmin had been “a stay-at-home mom,” but she started a job “within two weeks of leaving” to help provide for Child. She testified to working at a child care center from approximately July 2018 until March 2019, when she left to accept an offer to work for higher pay at another daycare center. She worked at that second center full-time until October 2019. Jazmin began serving as a houseparent at the private school in September 2019, a role she was still working in at the time of trial.

¶8 In addition to her financial disclosure in which she reported the aforementioned $2,111 figure, Jazmin also offered her 2018 tax return into evidence. That return listed only the first child care center as her employer and an annual gross income of $7,044.75—which would translate to approximately $587 per month. Jazmin nevertheless confirmed at trial that her gross monthly income was $2,100. When asked if that amount included the $980 value of her housing and utilities, she stated, “No. That . . . doesn’t have anything to do with that.” When asked about her current employment, she testified that she had just started working as a substitute teacher earning $75 per day, which she “guesstimate[d]” she did two to three days per week. Based on that “guesstimate,” Jazmin testified that she earned approximately $813 per month from substitute teaching as opposed to the $2,100 in her financial declaration. Jazmin also confirmed that, at the time of trial, she had no sources of income other than her “service as a houseparent, [and her] income from substitute teaching.”

¶9 Later, on cross-examination, when asked about the $2,111 reported as her gross monthly income in her disclosure, Jazmin admitted that there was actually “no documentation being provided with that [disclosure] that would substantiate that number.” While Jazmin was being cross-examined, the court interjected and expressed its confusion as to whether the $980 value of her housing expenses had been included in her reported monthly income; although Jazmin never answered the court directly, her attorney asserted that it was included within that amount (contradicting Jazmin’s earlier testimony in which she had stated the opposite). Jazmin also stated that at the time of trial, she had actually worked as a substitute teacher on only one occasion up to that point.

¶10 Testimony was also given by a representative of the private school, whom Jazmin had contacted to secure documentation of the value of her housing and utilities. A final draft of a letter from the representative was attached to Jazmin’s supplemental disclosure. But at trial, Joseph offered evidence of an earlier draft of the letter in which the representative had originally stated that the value of what Jazmin received was estimated at $1,800 per month for rent and $1,000 per month for utilities, whereas the amount given in the final letter was $980 for both rent and utilities. The representative testified that she had sent the initial draft to Jazmin’s grandmother asking if it was “acceptable,” and either Jazmin or her grandmother had then asked additional questions about the square footage and what portion of the house Jazmin was actually living in, and whether that was reflected in the amount the representative gave. This prompted the representative to change the amount to $980 in the final letter, based on a “pro-rated amount” that seemed more consistent with the part of the house where Jazmin was living.

¶11 The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in April 2020.[2] While it awarded the parties joint legal custody of Child, it also found that it was in Child’s “best interest” that Jazmin be awarded primary physical custody. In support, the court cited the following findings: Jazmin had primary physical custody of Child since the parties separated, and the parties had been “following” the parent-time schedule imposed by the court in its temporary orders, consisting of “alternating weekends, with [Joseph] being awarded overnight every Thursday”; Child was “happy and well[-]adjusted and [was] progressing well developmentally”; Child was “closely bonded to [Jazmin] as she ha[d] been the primary custodial parent since birth, while [Joseph] was the primary bread winner in the family”; it was in Child’s “best interest . . . to maintain a close relationship with her half sister,” of whom Jazmin has primary physical custody; Jazmin had “exhibited good parenting skills” and was “of good moral character, and emotionally stable”; Jazmin had “exhibited a depth and desire for custody of [Child] since . . . birth”; Jazmin had “a flexible work and school schedule and she ha[d] the ability to provide personal care rather than surrogate care”; Jazmin had experience in early childhood education; and Jazmin “exhibited sound financial responsibility” whereas the court was “concerned about [Joseph’s] lack of financial responsibility” based on his debt accumulations. In the findings, the court also expressed its “concern[] about the alleged physical abuse between the parties during the marriage” and therefore found it “appropriate” for the exchanges of Child to occur at a police department safe zone located roughly halfway between the parties’ homes.

¶12 The court additionally noted its consideration of the factors outlined in section 30-3-10.2 of the Utah Code, finding in particular that Child’s “physical, psychological, emotional and development needs will benefit from the parties sharing joint legal custody.” But the court listed several reasons under these factors why joint physical custody would not be appropriate, finding that the “parties do not effectively communicate with each other”; they lived “approximately 60 miles” apart; Joseph “participated in raising [Child] but not to the extent that [Jazmin] did”; “[t]o date there ha[d] not been . . . opportunities for either parent to protect [Child] from any conflict that may arise between the parties, due to [Child’s] age”; and “the parties’ relationship ha[d] stabilized and once these divorce proceedings have concluded it is anticipated the parties will be able to cooperate with each other and make appropriate joint decisions regarding [Child].”

¶13 As to parent-time, the court concluded that Joseph’s parent-time “shall be, until [Child] starts Kindergarten, every Thursday overnight and every other weekend from Friday (after school) to Sunday evening at 6 p.m.” And on weeks that ended with Jazmin’s designated weekend, Joseph “shall return [Child] to [Jazmin] by Friday at noon, after his Thursday overnight visit.” The court also concluded that “[t]he parties shall follow the holiday parent time pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35” but that Joseph “shall be awarded six[ ]weeks of extended summer vacation instead of four[ ]weeks, consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 and by stipulation of [Jazmin] at closing arguments.”

¶14 Regarding child support, the court found that Jazmin “earn[ed] $980 per month gross wage from her house parent job” and “approximately $780 per month” from substitute teaching. It therefore calculated her gross monthly income at $1,760 for child support purposes. The court then found that Joseph’s average gross income is $5,011 per month, and therefore his “child support obligation is $582 per month.”

¶15 The court entered a decree of divorce in June 2020, in which it largely echoed the parent-time findings, ordering that Joseph’s parent-time “shall be every Thursday overnight and every other weekend from Friday (after school) to Sunday evening at 6 p.m. On [Jazmin’s] weekend with the parties’ child, [Joseph] shall return [Child] to [Jazmin] by Friday at noon following his Thursday overnight parent time.” And once Child “commences Kindergarten [Joseph’s] parent time shall change[] to every other weekend from Friday (after school) to Sunday at 6 p.m., and a mid-week from after school until 7 p.m.” The decree did not mention a schedule for holidays or extended/vacation parent-time. The decree also reiterated what the court found to be the parties’ respective incomes, and accordingly it memorialized its decision ordering Joseph to pay $582 per month in child support.

¶16 Joseph promptly appealed the findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the divorce decree.


¶17 On appeal, Joseph presents two main issues for our consideration. First, he attacks the district court’s custody determination on two bases, arguing that the court’s custody conclusion and the underlying factual findings are deficient because it failed to consider certain relevant factors and that the court erred in awarding him less than the minimum time provided by statute without explaining a reason to depart from the statutory minimum. “[W]e review the district court’s custody and parent-time determination for abuse of discretion.” T.W. v. S.A., 2021 UT App 132, ¶ 15, 504 P.3d 163. “This discretion is broad; indeed, as long as the court exercises it within the confines of the legal standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions, we will not disturb the resulting award.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶18 Second, Joseph challenges the district court’s child support determination, asserting that it made errors in calculating Jazmin’s income, resulting in an inaccurate child support obligation.[3] “In reviewing child support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the [district] court’s findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate relief. We will not disturb that court’s actions unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or there has been an abuse of discretion.” Hibbens v. Hibbens, 2015 UT App 278, ¶ 17, 363 P.3d 524 (quotation simplified).


I. Custody and Parent-Time

A. Consideration of the Relevant Factors

¶19 Joseph first asserts that the district court erred by failing to adequately consider certain statutory factors in formulating its custody determination. Specifically, he asserts that two factors did not receive the attention he feels they deserved by the district court, namely, any “evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, the parent, or a household member of the parent” and “the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent.” See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2)(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2019). We agree with Joseph that it is not clear from the district court’s findings that it considered evidence regarding abusive behavior by Jazmin, neglect and injuries to Child, or Jazmin’s moral character. Accordingly, we remand for the court to fully evaluate that evidence through supplemented or additional findings.

¶20 “In all custody determinations, the district court’s primary focus must be on the best interests of the child.” Pingree v. Pingree, 2015 UT App 302, ¶ 7, 365 P.3d 713 (quotation simplified). Furthermore, when “determining any form of custody and parent-time” arrangement, the district court “shall consider the best interest of the child and may consider [any] factors the court finds relevant” to that end, including certain factors that are specifically articulated in the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2). Importantly, not all these factors are “on equal footing”; instead, the district court generally has “discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight.” T.W. v. S.A., 2021 UT App 132, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d 163 (quotation simplified).

¶21 Determining which factors the court must address in a given case, and to what degree, presents a tricky task. Inevitably, some factors will loom larger in a given case than other factors, and “[t]here is no definitive checklist of factors to be used for determining custody.” Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Consequently, “courts are not required to render a global accounting of all evidence presented or to discuss all aspects of a case that might support a contrary ruling.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 258. On the other hand, a “court’s factual findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (quotation simplified). And where significant evidence concerning a particular factor is presented to the district court, findings that omit all discussion of that evidence must be deemed inadequate. See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“The record is replete with highly disputed evidence relevant to the custody issue which is not dealt with at all in the findings. The findings do not show whether the court considered the moral conduct or emotional stability of the parties and what evidence the court found determinative in deciding the best interests of the children.”); Sukin, 842 P.2d at 925 (“Whenever custody is contested and evidence presents several possible interpretations, a bare conclusory recitation of factors and statutory terms will not suffice. We must have the necessary supporting factual findings linking those factors to the children’s best interests and each parent’s abilities to meet the children’s needs.” (quotation simplified)).

¶22 Joseph asserts that the district court failed to consider evidence presented at trial of domestic violence Jazmin had perpetrated against him as well as neglectful behavior Jazmin had purportedly inflicted on Child. Specifically, Joseph points to his own testimony at trial that Jazmin had slapped him in the face hard enough to leave red marks, had attempted to stab him with a pocket knife, and had bitten him. Joseph also presented photographic exhibits purporting to show his injuries from these incidents. Joseph also points to testimony at trial and an exhibit he introduced into evidence tending to show injuries that Child sustained while she was in Jazmin’s care. One witness testified that when Joseph received Child from Jazmin, Child often had “severe diaper rashes” with blistering, “yeast infections,” and “bite marks on her feet,” and that she was “really dehydrated” to the point of not “even having a bowel movement for a day or two after.” Another witness also confirmed that Child had severe diaper rashes when she came to Joseph, such that Joseph had to seek care from a pediatrician, and testified that Child often “had bite marks on both her hands . . . and her feet.” Finally, Joseph asserts that the court did “not analyze or even mention . . . multiple incidents” in which Jazmin supposedly “engaged in deceitful tactics” during the litigation. Specifically, Joseph asserts that Jazmin instructed a witness on what to testify regarding Jazmin’s income from her houseparent job, that Jazmin and another witness mischaracterized the events that precipitated an incident when the police were called around the time of the parties’ separation, that Jazmin claimed that the parties were married on a date different from that indicated on their marriage certificate, and that Jazmin supposedly attempted to manipulate the testimony of her ex-husband in the case.

¶23 With respect to “evidence of domestic violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse, involving the child, the parent, or a household member of the parent” and “the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent,” see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2)(a), (d), the court made only the following finding: “[Jazmin] has exhibited good parenting skills, is of good moral character, and emotionally stable.” It then proceeded to emphasize the facts it believed supported Jazmin’s bid for custody: that Jazmin had been Child’s primary caretaker; that Child had a bond with Jazmin’s other child, her half-sister; that Jazmin had made sure Joseph received his parent-time in accordance with the temporary orders; that Jazmin had “a depth and desire for custody”; that Jazmin had a flexible schedule that would allow her to provide personal care for Child; that Jazmin had taken Child to her medical appointments; and that Jazmin was financially responsible, “industrious,” and “goal oriented.” The court made no findings regarding Joseph’s parenting abilities, past conduct, bond with Child, etc., except to express concern that he was in debt.[4] Finally, the court stated that it was “concerned about the alleged physical abuse between the parties” and concluded it was therefore appropriate for them to exchange Child at a police department safe zone.

¶24 “To ensure that the trial court’s custody determination, discretionary as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better person to care for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate conclusion is justified.” Sukin, 842 P.2d at 924 (quotation simplified). The court’s finding that Jazmin “has exhibited good parenting skills, is of good moral character, and emotionally stable” is inadequate for us to determine whether the court exceeded its discretion in assessing the abuse/neglect and moral character factors or how those factors impacted Child’s best interests. Likewise, the court’s expression of “concern[] about the alleged physical abuse between the parties during the marriage” tells us nothing about how or even if the court weighed the abuse allegations in its custody evaluation. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the court considered this factor at all in assessing which parent should be awarded custody, as it mentioned the factor only in the context of concluding that it would be “appropriate” for the exchanges of Child to occur at a police department safe zone. Without at least some discussion of the evidence the court relied on in assessing the factors and how the court related the factors to Child’s best interests, the court’s findings regarding the custody factors are inadequate. See, e.g.K.P.S. v. E.J.P., 2018 UT App 5, ¶¶ 30–42, 414 P.3d 933 (determining that the court’s factual findings were inadequate where it made factual conclusions but did not discuss the evidence underlying those conclusions and rejected the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without explanation); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 2015 UT App 2, ¶ 6, 342 P.3d 296 (rejecting the court’s conclusory finding that the mother was “better able and equipped to support and sustain a positive relationship between the children and their father” where the “court identified no subsidiary facts supporting this finding” and had, in fact, “admonished Mother for denying Father court-ordered access to the children” (quotation simplified)); Barnes, 857 P.2d at 261 (rejecting as inadequate the court’s finding that “[t]he Plaintiff’s level of commitment to her children during the course of this separation has exceeded that of the Defendant and that’s been established by their actions during the course of their separation” because “[t]he findings do not show whether the court considered the moral conduct or emotional stability of the parties and what evidence the court found determinative in deciding the best interests of the children”); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 196–97 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (deeming inadequate findings that “Husband has physically abused Wife during the marriage” and that “both parties have participated in acts that bear on their moral character,” accompanied by a recitation of examples of each party’s bad behavior because the recitation did not give any “guidance regarding how those acts bear on the parties’ parenting abilities or affect the children’s best interests” (quotation simplified)); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 478–79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing the district court’s custody determination based on its failure to make findings regarding evidence relating to important custody factors); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the court’s findings to “omit any reference” to a custody evaluation and evidence relating to the bond between father and son, the father’s status as primary caretaker pending trial, the fact that the child thrived while in the father’s care, and the son’s preference for living with his father).

¶25 Thus, we conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to include in its findings any discussion of the evidence relating to the abuse allegations against Jazmin, her alleged neglect of Child, and her moral character, as well as the effect that evidence had on its best-interest analysis. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s custody and parent-time order and remand for the court to revisit that evidence and enter additional or supplemented findings, as necessary.

B. Deviation from Statutory Minimum Parent-Time Schedule

¶26 Joseph next argues that the district court committed reversible error by awarding him less than the minimum parent-time he is guaranteed by statute. Because we agree that the court’s custody award indeed creates a situation in which Joseph is guaranteed less than the statutory minimum, without explaining its reasoning in adequate factual findings, we conclude that this is an additional reason to vacate the court’s parent-time order.

¶27 In the event that the parents of a minor child litigating that child’s custody are unable to agree to a parent-time schedule, our legislature has codified a “minimum parent-time [schedule] to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled.” See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-35(2), 30-3-35.5(3) (LexisNexis 2019 & Supp. 2021). In fashioning its parent-time order, the court may either “incorporate[] a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or . . . provide[] more or less parent-time” than outlined in those sections, but in either case “[t]he court shall enter the reasons underlying the court’s order for parent-time.” Id. § 30-3-34(4) (Supp. 2021). The court’s reasoning must be outlined in adequate factual findings, which must “contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally based.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (quotation simplified). Thus, the statutory minimum “provides [the court with] a presumptive minimum, but the district court still retains discretion to award more [or less] time” to the noncustodial parent, so long as it identifies “the reasons underlying its order” in sufficiently detailed factual findings. See T.W. v. S.A., 2021 UT App 132, ¶ 30, 504 P.3d 163 (quotation simplified).

¶28 There is a separate section dealing with the minimum schedule for children who are under five years of age, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35.5 (2019), and those who are between five and eighteen years of age, see id. § 30-3-35 (Supp. 2021). As Child was born in May 2017, she is still currently younger than five, so section 30-3-35.5 applies. Under that section, Joseph is entitled to “one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.,” “alternative weekends . . . from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday,” certain holidays, and “two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial parent.” See id. § 30-3-35.5(3)(f) (2019).

¶29      Under the court’s findings and the divorce decree, Joseph receives parent-time “every Thursday overnight and every other weekend from Friday (after school) to Sunday evening at 6 p.m.,” and when it is Jazmin’s weekend, he returns Child to Jazmin “by Friday at noon following his Thursday overnight parent time.” Although Joseph correctly points out that the parent-time order requires him to return Child one hour earlier on Sundays than provided for in the statutory minimum schedule, Joseph ultimately receives more than the minimum parent-time required by statute while Child is under five, because he receives an additional weekday overnight, whereas the statute requires only a weekday evening visit. See id. Thus, for the time being, Joseph receives more than the statutory minimum.

¶30 But the situation changes when Child starts school. The district court ordered that once Child “commences Kindergarten,” Joseph’s parent-time “shall change[] to every other weekend from Friday (after school) to Sunday at 6 p.m., and a mid-week from after school until 7 p.m.” This schedule deviates from the statutory minimum, under which Joseph is entitled to “[a]lternating weekends . . . from 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p.m.,” and one weekday evening from either “5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.” or, “at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child’s school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m.” Id. § 30-3-35(2)(a)(i), (2)(b)(i)(A) (Supp. 2021) (emphases added). Thus, under the court’s parent-time order, once Child begins kindergarten Joseph is required to return her to Jazmin one hour early on his weekends and one-and-a-half hours early during his weekday evenings.

¶31 As Joseph convincingly points out, while these discrepancies “may seem minor” to a casual observer, for “the non-custodial parent on a minimum visitation schedule, hours matter.” And, more importantly, the court did not explain—or even acknowledge—that it was departing from the statutory minimum. While section 30-3-35 is referenced in the findings of fact with respect to Joseph’s parent-time for holidays and summer vacation, the court made no other mention of the statutory minimum schedule.[5] As noted, when making its custody decision the court must give the “reasons underlying” its decision. See id. § 30-3-34(4); T.W., 2021 UT App 132, ¶ 30. The court did depart from the statutory minimum in this case, and it gave no reason for doing so in its findings.

¶32 As a result, we are prevented from conducting meaningful “appellate review to ensure that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally based.” See Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, the findings in support of the district court’s parent-time order are insufficient, leaving us with no choice but to remand the matter for the court to adopt the statutory minimum schedule or otherwise explain its reasoning for departing from the minimum through adequate factual findings. See id.

II. Child Support

¶33 Joseph next challenges the district court’s child support determination, arguing that its determination of Jazmin’s income was entirely unsupported by the evidence and insufficiently explained. Because we agree that the court did not sufficiently explain how it reached the number it did in calculating Jazmin’s monthly income, we remand for entry of additional findings.

¶34 “A noncustodial parent’s child support obligation is calculated using each parent’s adjusted gross income.” Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 11, 334 P.3d 994. Each parent’s “gross income” for purposes of child support “includes prospective income from any source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, . . . [and] rents.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(1) (LexisNexis 2018). “Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job.” Id. § 78B-12-203(2). “[C]hild support is appropriately calculated based on earnings at the time of trial,” but district courts also “have broad discretion to select an appropriate method” of calculating each parent’s income. Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

¶35      In this case, there were a number of potential bases for the court to assess Jazmin’s income. First, it could have accepted the declared full-time income in her financial declaration of $2,100, which she initially reaffirmed at trial. Second, it could have used her part-time substitute teaching income of approximately $813 per month combined with her in-kind income of $980 per month to reach a monthly income of $1,793. Third, it could have imputed her full-time income based on her substitute teaching salary of $75 per day for a total of $1,625 per month. There may, perhaps, have been other methods the court could have employed as well, had it adequately explained its reasoning.

¶36 Generally, “so long as the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached are apparent, a trial court may make findings, credibility determinations, or other assessments without detailing its justification for finding particular evidence more credible or persuasive than other evidence supporting a different outcome.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 258 (quotation simplified). And had the court taken one of the approaches outlined above, or another approach for which its reasoning was apparent, we would be inclined to affirm the court’s decision.[6] However, here the district court’s finding that Jazmin earned “approximately $780 per month” from substitute teaching does not align with any evidence submitted at trial, nor, so far as we can tell, can it be extrapolated from that evidence.[7] As Joseph observes, this number “do[es] not appear to come from the documentary or testimonial evidence at all.” Jazmin testified that she earned $75 per day working as a substitute teacher but that she worked only two to three days a week. Using these numbers, she reached a “guesstimate” of her monthly income of $813 per month ($75 per day x 2.5 days per week x 52 weeks per year / 12 months). While Jazmin was admittedly unsure about the amount she would be able to earn, the $780 figure adopted by the court appears to not be supported by the evidence presented at trial. While we are reluctant to reverse a district court’s child support order on this basis considering the small discrepancy between the $813 and $780 figures, the fact remains that we are unable to identify the “steps by which the ultimate conclusion on [this] factual issue was reached.” See id. (quotation simplified).

¶37 In such situations, “without the benefit of the reasoning and additional findings by the [district] court,” we must remand the child support decision to the district court to detail its full reasoning, through adequate findings, for why it chose the income amount for Jazmin that it did. See Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 19, 312 P.3d 951.


¶38 This appeal compels us to remand the case because the district court’s findings and conclusions were infirm in several respects. First, the court failed to address disputed evidence that was highly relevant to the court’s custody determination. Second, the court’s order awards Joseph less than the statutory minimum parent-time once Child starts kindergarten, without explaining why or recognizing that it did so. And third, the court’s findings regarding Jazmin’s income contain insufficient detail for us to adequately review its reasoning.

[1] Because the parties share the same surname, we follow our oft-used practice of referring to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.

[2] Other than mentioning that “both parent[s] can step up and be good parents and both parents in large part have been good parents,” the court did not announce a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the trial. Instead, it asked both parties to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and heard closing arguments at a subsequent hearing. Ultimately, with only a few minor alterations, the court adopted Jazmin’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety.

While we would not go so far as to say that it is inappropriate for the court to fully adopt one party’s proposed findings, before signing off the court should confirm that those findings conform to the evidence presented at trial and that the findings sufficiently explain the court’s reasoning for the decision. In this case, it appears that the court adopted Jazmin’s version of the evidence without confirmation of that evidence and without disclosing the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.

[3] As part of his broader challenge to the district court’s child support determination, Joseph purports to include another argument: that the court erred in dividing the parties’ debts. However, Jazmin points out that while Joseph included this argument in his articulation of the issues on appeal, he “did not [substantively] address the debt issue in his brief.” Indeed, we find a dearth of any argument regarding the debt distribution in Joseph’s brief; accordingly, Joseph has failed to properly raise such an argument for our consideration.

[4] We are troubled by the manner in which the district court’s findings focused exclusively on Jazmin rather than comparing hers and Joseph’s relative character, skills, and abilities. See Woodward v. LaFranca, 2013 UT App 147, ¶¶ 22, 26–28, 305 P.3d 181 (explaining that a court’s findings must “compare the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents” and reversing a finding that the emotional stability factor weighed in favor of mother because it was based solely on the determination that mother was emotionally stable without any findings regarding father’s emotional stability; “the question for the court was not whether Mother was emotionally stable, but whether Mother was more emotionally stable than Father” (quotation simplified)), abrogated on other grounds by Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6, 366 P.3d 422. We urge the court on remand to make the appropriate comparisons in revising its findings.

[5] Furthermore, section 30-3-35.5 is not referenced at all, which would have been the operative section from the time the decree was entered until Child turns five.

[6] While a finding that aligned with the various numbers presented at trial would have met the bare minimum threshold for sufficiency, we note that this case would substantially benefit from further analysis. First, the court did not address the inconsistencies in Jazmin’s trial testimony regarding her income. Jazmin first agreed that the $2,111 monthly income in her financial declaration was accurate but then went on to testify that she made only $75 per day substitute teaching and worked only two to three days per week. But the court did not address or explain the reasoning behind its resolution of this inconsistency. Second, Joseph presented evidence that Jazmin’s housing and utilities had been undervalued. The court’s decision included no discussion of the conflicting evidence regarding the value of Jazmin’s in-kind earnings or its assessment of that conflicting evidence. On remand, the court’s findings could benefit from a more thorough discussion of the evidence and explanation for its resolution of these conflicts.

[7] In Jazmin’s post-trial brief, she stated, without any supporting evidence, that she earned $72 per day, for a total of $780 per month. This appears to be the source of the court’s number. As assertions in the post-trial brief are not evidence, the court could not rely on this number to calculate child support.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277 

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These Moving Companies Move Domestic Abuse Victims for Free

Today’s blog post is a guest post from Hire A Helper. This is not a paid placement. We hope you find it useful, if you or a loved one need this kind of help.

Domestic abuse happens more than you might think, and for a lot of reasons, it’s a complex issue to address.

According to “DoSomething”, a wide-reaching non-profit organization in the United States, about a quarter of women around the world will experience domestic abuse in their lifetime, and in fact, 85% of domestic abuse victims are women. It’s been estimated that half of all homeless women and children in the U.S. are fleeing domestic violence. 

Victims are often left with nowhere to go due to emotional, social, and economic barriers for leaving an abusive relationship. For these reasons and more, it’s common for victims to stay in an abusive relationship when facing the alternative of living in a shelter or on the street.

Yet despite all this, some have discovered that oftentimes cyclical abuse can be stopped by simply solving for the economics of being able to afford a move.

The Movers Who Rescue Victims

Aaron and Evan Steed are co-founders of Meathead Movers, a brick-and-mortar chain that offers professional moving services. If you’re moving soon and you reside in California, they offer a variety of moving and storage services at the rate of 18,000 moves a year, which they claim makes them the largest independently owned moving company in the state.

But perhaps more impressive is that for domestic abuse victims, they offer these services for free.

Meathead Movers is one of a growing number of moving companies committed to helping victims of domestic violence move out of their abusive households at no cost.

After the California-based company was founded in 1997, frantic phone calls would come in from victims without financial means who were seeking to flee dangerous domestic violence situations, according to Dawn Ventura, Director of Marketing and Communications for Meathead Movers. They were pleas they couldn’t turn away, explained Ventura. “The brothers knew it was the right decision to get them out of there.”

The choice to provide moving services to victims for free was decided right away. It has remained their business policy for over 25 years.

Risks on the Job

victim moversMeathead Movers quickly found out there are more than financial risks when taking on this type of endeavor.

During one of their earliest rescue moves, the situation turned volatile when the alleged abuser of the victim came home in the middle of the move, Ventura told HireAHelper. “It was very scary for the (founders of Meathead),” she said. “Luckily, they were able to call law enforcement, who came to the scene and removed the abuser so that the move could be completed.”

After this experience, Meathead Movers decided to partner with a local shelter to make sure the victims and moving crew were safe and supported throughout the rescue process. In 2000, the company began its first official affiliation with a shelter called SLO Women’s Shelter.

“For the safety of our team and the victim, we only complete moves that the shelter partner has first had a chance to vet,” Ventura explained. The shelter determines the greatest need and works with the movers accordingly. “There is also always a shelter representative onsite throughout the move, and sometimes law enforcement, as needed,” she added. The company has since partnered with an additional seven shelters across California to help facilitate moves.

Though dangerous, this too remains far from the only challenge the company has faced over the years.

Back in 2008, during The Great Recession, Meathead Movers encountered what they described as “enormous” financial struggles. Ventura said that at one point, they thought they’d be closing their doors due to financial hardship. Even still, the company continued to offer free services to abuse victims. “We knew that it was our purpose and mission,” Ventura explained.

Today, Meathead Movers remains in operation after two decades of gradual growth and expansion, despite challenges. They have continued the policy of free rescues all throughout, and feel their success is proof altruism can exist within a successful moving business model.

As of 2022, they’ve helped relocate “hundreds” of domestic violence victims in the Southern Californian area for free.

A Moving Trend

Unfortunately, rescue services continue to be needed. No matter how many free moves Meathead Movers offers, as a localized chain, their reach covers only a small portion of victims of abuse. “In light of the growing cases of domestic violence, and on the heels of the national attention this free moving program has garnered, Meathead Movers is now encouraging businesses across the nation to step up and make an impact in their local communities as well,” Ventura said.

The good news is that many businesses have stepped up, including other moving companies.

Meathead Movers teammembers

In 2016, Meathead Movers launched the #MoveToEndDV campaign, challenging businesses to donate services for victims of domestic violence in their respective communities. Searching this hashtag still helps people find resources through social media. This trend has garnered the commitment of an increasing list of moving companies, as well as businesses in other sectors.

College HUNKS Hauling Junk and Moving — another store-run chain that offers professional moving services in dozens of cities across the U.S. — began offering its services for free during the month of October 2020 (which is Domestic Violence Awareness Month) in response to news reports of increasing domestic violence during pandemic lockdowns. Within the past year, College HUNKS has helped move more than 400 victims of domestic violence across the U.S., all at no cost to the victims.

How to Move Out Safely From a Domestic Violence Situation

There are multiple things to consider before you can safely remove yourself from an abusive situation.

Finding a moving company that can assist you in leaving an abusive household is incredibly helpful. But domestic abuse can be greatly helped just by beginning to plan. Here are what experts say are important steps along a successful path to freedom.

Call or email a professional helper for free. 

First, know that you are not alone in your struggle. Every single day there is someone waiting for you to reach out.

Before you do anything, it’s useful to speak with a professional who can help you assess the situation and point you toward local resources. “Always, always, always contact your local shelter,” Ventura urged. “The resources that they offer are remarkable. And if there’s any way to call a domestic violence hotline, they are sure to help.”

You can contact the National Domestic Violence Hotline by calling 1-800-799-SAFE (7233) or texting “START” to 88788. Its website also has a live chat option. Though if you are in immediate danger, please call 911.

Physically look at a calendar, imagine by which day you could realistically remove yourself, essential items, and potential children from your location.

Some situations may require getting out of your home as soon as possible; but if you can help it, visualize the exit ahead of time.

Start by literally glancing at a calendar. Figure out the best times to pack up and leave, and where you already know you could stay once you’re out — even if it’s just temporary. Google nearby shelters and moving companies that may be able to help, even if you don’t plan on using them. Always explain your situation in private, and have a contingency plan in case your abuser shows up on move day.

Squirrel away some cash, if possible.

Though shelters and some moving companies provide their services for free, it’s still very helpful to have cash on hand when you move out. If possible, try to set up your own checking or savings account online or over the phone at a separate bank from your abuser so they can’t restrict access to the money.

Gather up your important documents and items into one portable place. 

Start making copies of documents such as birth certificates, Social Security cards, insurance cards, health records, and anything else you’ll need as you transition to a new home. If you have extra car keys, medications, clothes, or evidence of domestic abuse (e.g., photos, police records), be sure to set those aside too. Store these items in a private place until you need them.

Prearrange school release permissions for any children you have.

If you have kids you can’t personally pick up from school, change the release privileges to a trusted friend or family member, so your abuser can’t pick them up.

Keep your activity private, as you may be being spied on. 

It’s not unusual for abusers to monitor activity or even spy on their victims, so you should be very careful about leaving behind any evidence of your planning.

Avoid using your home computer for research and visit the public library or a friend’s house instead. If you can, get your own, private cell phone, since there are many apps that allow partners to surveil your phone activity and accounts. Always turn off your Bluetooth and location services inside apps like Snapchat or Messenger, and close all tabs and clear all browsing history after searching for resources. Also, get rid of or “lose” any compromised cell phone if you fear it may be monitored, or do a factory reset. But make sure you have a handheld device ready to call for help if things become dangerous.

On move day, act quickly and confidently.

If you know of any weapons in the home, lock them away ahead of time if possible, just in case. Change the login settings and security questions to your online accounts and turn off the GPS in your car. Though it is not always easy, attempt to follow through with your plan with confidence.

These Movers Offer Free Services to Domestic Violence Victims 

Encouragingly, Meathead Movers and College HUNKS are only just the beginning.

Below is a non-exhaustive directory as a resource to help you or anyone you may know who is a victim. If you don’t see a company near where you live, search for movers in your area, or call a local company and ask if they have any connections or knowledge of a similar service.

Always Professional in Moving, Inc. (Gilbert, AZ)

Contact: 480-633-5555,

Always Professional in Moving, Inc. is a family-owned and operated moving company in the Maricopa County of Arizona. They pledge to provide free moves to distressed victims in need of moving services in order to get away from domestic violence. Its owner, Bernadette Lavigne, is a victim of domestic violence and has made addressing the issue an important foundation of her company.

Aussie Moving (Santa Barbara, CA)

Contact: 805-273-8756,

Aussie Moving provides full-service residential moving, as well as commercial moving and storage. The company pledges to provide free moving services to victims of domestic violence in coordination with a local shelter in Santa Barbara County.

Brown Box Movers (Denton, TX)

Contact: 972-953-MOVE (6683)

Located in the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area, Brown Box Movers offers a variety of services, from residential moving, to move in/move out cleaning, to junk removal. The company pledged these services to help those experiencing domestic violence in the area.

Einstein Moving Company, LLC (Austin, TX)

Contact: Choose a location and send a message

Einstein moving company has locations throughout Texas, including Austin, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio and more, and is able to complete statewide moves. The company pledges up to $2,000 per month worth of moving services to Safe Place in Austin.

Elite Moving Services (Newton, IA)

Contact: 641-275-9412,

Elite Moving Services serves the entire state of Iowa. They pledged to offer three moves every month to domestic violence victims at no charge. Their free service includes the trailer, labor, and all moving equipment needed to move within 75 miles of the victim’s location.

Gentle Giant Moving Company (Somerville, MA)

Contact: (800) 442-6863

Gentle Giant is involved with several charities, including a strong alliance with charities involved with housing assistance and homeless prevention. Gentle Giant pledges to offer a free move to those in need of help getting out of a domestic violence situation.

Helping Hands Moving and Maids (Salt Lake City, UT)

Contact: (801) 562-0093 (Sandy), (801) 809-7800 (SLC), (801) 735-4144 (Provo) or send a message

You may recognize Helping Hands Moving and Maids from the show Extreme Makeover, or from its extensive charity work in Utah, as well as overseas. The company pledges its services to domestic violence victims in need.

Moving at Ease (Scottsdale, AZ)

Contact: 602-357-7459 or send a message

Moving at Ease is a family business that tailors its moving services to senior citizens and their families. It can accommodate local and long-distance moves. The company pledges to volunteer its time and resources to help those in need in the Phoenix metro area.

Parks Moving & Storage (Bellefonte, PA)

Contact: (866) 790-1560 or send a message

Parks Moving & Storage is a fourth-generation, family-owned business with locations in Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and State College, PA. It is a women-owned business, and the owner is also a victim of domestic violence. The company pledges to offer packing and moving services to victims and their affected family members who need them.

Veterans Moving America (Fort Worth, TX)

Contact: (817) 989-6362,

VMA employs a 100% veteran workforce and self-identifies as a “values-based company”. It is partnered with SafeHaven to provide free services to victims of domestic violence.

Illustrations by Tara Jacoby
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State v. Redden – 2022 UT App 14 – protective orders – enhanced penalties

2022 UT App 14




No. 20200700-CA

Filed January 27, 2022

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department

The Honorable Keith C. Barnes

No. 191500842

Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik, Attorneys
for Appellant

Gary W. Pendleton, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.


¶1       Joel Chance Redden committed two domestic violence offenses in October 2019, and the district court entered judgment on those convictions in January 2020. In the present case, Redden was charged with violating a protective order in October 2019 when he allegedly called his former girlfriend ten times. Later, the State sought to amend the information to add new charges for violating the protective order, enhanced from class A misdemeanors to third degree felonies based on the domestic violence enhancement statute. Redden opposed the enhancement, arguing that the new crimes had to be committed after his January 2020 convictions. The magistrate agreed with Redden and bound him over for trial on the new charges as class A misdemeanors. The State now appeals, arguing that it could enhance the charges so long as Redden is actually convicted of the new crimes within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. We agree with the State and therefore reverse.


¶2       Redden was subject to a protective order that prohibited him from contacting or communicating in any way with Michelle,[2] his former girlfriend. Notwithstanding this directive, Redden contacted Michelle on October 4, 2019, and threatened her. This conduct led the State to prosecute Redden in Weber County, and he pleaded guilty to stalking and violating a protective order, both third degree felonies. Redden entered his plea on December 4, 2019, and the judgment was entered on January 22, 2020 (the January 2020 convictions).

¶3       The present case arises out of Redden’s conduct on October 9, 2019. At that time, Redden was jailed in Texas on unrelated charges, and Michelle was visiting Cedar City, Utah. Beginning at 8:34 a.m., Redden allegedly telephoned Michelle ten times over the next three hours. According to Michelle, she answered the second call, which was a collect call from Redden from the Texas jail. Michelle accepted the call and spoke to Redden briefly. She told him, “Just don’t ever call me again,” and hung up. She also answered one of Redden’s later calls and recorded it, but she did not accept it to speak with him.

¶4       After Michelle reported these phone calls to law enforcement, the State filed an information against Redden in Iron County on December 30, 2019. It charged Redden with two counts of violation of a protective order for his October 9 conduct. It pursued both counts as third degree felonies enhanced from class A misdemeanors based on Redden’s conduct underlying his January 2020 convictions. Yet the State did not present evidence of the January 2020 convictions at a May 2020 preliminary hearing, and consequently, Redden moved to reduce both counts to class A misdemeanors. Although the State moved to continue the hearing, the magistrate denied that request. The magistrate then agreed with Redden and found the State had not met its burden on enhancing the misdemeanors to felony charges, and the magistrate instead bound Redden over on the two counts as class A misdemeanors.[3]

¶5       The State next moved for leave to amend the information. While it would still pursue the two misdemeanor counts (Counts 9 and 10) that had already been bound over for trial, the State sought to include eight additional counts of violation of a protective order, which would be enhanced to third degree felonies based on Redden’s prior convictions. Over Redden’s objection, the magistrate allowed the State to amend the information.

¶6       At the preliminary hearing on the eight additional charges, the State presented evidence to support those eight counts. And unlike in the first preliminary hearing, the State included evidence of the January 2020 convictions. Still, Redden argued that the eight counts could be bound over only as misdemeanors because the January 2020 convictions did not qualify as “prior conviction[s]” to the eight alleged offenses

committed on October 9, 2019. Relying on Utah Code section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B), which applies when “the individual is convicted of the domestic violence offense . . . within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense,” Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019), Redden asserted that to be enhanced to third degree felonies, the new offenses had to be committed within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. The State responded that even though “the prior conviction was for facts arising from October 4,” the enhancement provision in Utah Code section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) required only that Redden be convicted of the new crimes within ten years after his January 2020 convictions.

¶7       The magistrate agreed with Redden that the eight counts could not be enhanced to third degree felonies under the statute. He then determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause “that the offenses of violation of [a] protective order were committed in eight instances.” Accordingly, the magistrate bound Redden over for trial on all ten counts as class A misdemeanors.

¶8       In light of the magistrate’s decision finding no probable cause that Redden had committed the eight third-degree felonies as charged in the amended information, the State “decline[d] to file a second amended information bringing the charges in line with the Court’s findings.” Instead, it moved to dismiss all charges in lieu of amending the information.

¶9       The magistrate granted the State’s request and dismissed all charges against Redden. The two original misdemeanor charges were dismissed pursuant to rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the eight additional charges were dismissed pursuant to rule 7B(c).[4] The State now appeals the order of dismissal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”); id. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2018) (providing that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from criminal cases not involving first degree felonies).


¶10     The State contends that the magistrate misinterpreted the

enhancement statute when he refused to bind Redden over on the eight counts as third degree felonies. The decision to bind over a criminal defendant for trial typically presents a mixed question of law and fact to which we grant some deference to the magistrate. See State v. Prisbrey, 2020 UT App 172, ¶ 18, 479 P.3d 1126. But because the bindover decision here turned on a question of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness. See State v. Thompson, 2020 UT App 148, ¶ 13, 476 P.3d 1017.

¶11 Rather than defending the magistrate’s decision on its merits, Redden contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s appeal, asserting that the State was not entitled to appeal from a dismissal order entered at its own request. “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we decide in the first instance.” State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶ 12, 343 P.3d 709 (cleaned up).


  1. The State’s Argument on Appeal

¶12     The State argues that the magistrate erred in determining that the domestic violence enhancement statute did not apply to the eight additional counts that it raised in the amended information. According to the State, it could enhance those charges from class A misdemeanors to third degree felonies so long as Redden is ultimately convicted on the charges within ten years after his January 2020 convictions. Thus, the State argues, “until and unless the State fails to convict Redden of the new domestic violence charges before January 22, 2030, the [statute] allows the State to prosecute the new charges as third-degree felonies.” We agree.

¶13 When we interpret a statute, “we look first to the best evidence of a statute’s meaning, the plain language of the act, and we do not look beyond a statute’s plain language unless it is ambiguous.” State v. Thompson, 2020 UT App 148, ¶ 33, 476 P.3d 1017 (cleaned up). “Wherever possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, avoiding any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.” State v. Stewart, 2018 UT 24, ¶ 12, 438 P.3d 515 (cleaned up).

¶14 The crime that Redden is alleged to have committed— violating a protective order—is a class A misdemeanor but is subject to increased penalties in accordance with the domestic violence enhancement statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). That enhancement statute states, in relevant part,

(2) An individual who is convicted of a domestic violence offense is: . . .

(c) guilty of a felony of the third degree if:

(i) the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) is designated by law as a class A misdemeanor; and

(ii)(A) the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) is committed within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense that is not a criminal mischief offense; or

(B) the individual is convicted of the domestic violence offense described in this Subsection (2) within 10 years after the individual is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense that is not a criminal mischief offense.

Id. § 77-36-1.1 (emphases added). As we read this plain language, section 77-36-1.1(2)(c) allows the State to enhance a class A misdemeanor charge to a third degree felony when a defendant either “commit[s]” or “is convicted of” the current crime “within 10 years after” the defendant “is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense.” Id. Thus, we agree with the State’s reading of the statute. Redden, tellingly, has not offered an alternative interpretation.

¶15 Further, we agree with the State’s application of the statute to this case. The parties do not dispute that Redden’s January 2020 convictions constitute “a qualifying domestic violence offense” under the statute.[5] Because it is still possible that Redden could be “convicted of” the eight current charges “within 10 years” after he was convicted of qualifying domestic offenses in January 2020, section 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) permits the State to enhance the eight counts to third degree felonies. The magistrate erred in concluding otherwise. The magistrate appears to have reasoned that subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) applies only if the defendant’s current charges stem from conduct that occurred after the defendant was convicted of the qualifying domestic offense. But this interpretation would render subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(A) superfluous because that subsection expressly addresses such circumstances—when the current offense “is committed” after the conviction on the qualifying domestic offense. We will not read the statute in a way that would conflate both subsections and make one subsection inoperative. See Stewart, 2018 UT 24, ¶ 12.

¶16 In sum, we conclude that for the enhancement under subsection 77-36-1.1(2)(c)(ii)(B) to apply, the State has until January 22, 2030, to obtain a conviction against Redden for the eight counts. We therefore reverse the magistrate’s decision binding Redden over on these counts as class A misdemeanors and direct that Redden be bound over on them as third degree felonies.

  1. Redden’s Procedural Arguments

¶17 While Redden concedes that the State’s reading of the enhancement statute is appropriate, he nevertheless argues that the State’s appeal is improper, given that the State itself moved for the order of dismissal. In Redden’s view, the State could have petitioned for interlocutory review of the magistrate’s second bindover decision, but it was not allowed to “circumvent the appellate court’s discretion to grant or deny petitions for review by requesting a dismissal and then relying on the statutory provision granting [the] prosecution an appeal of right from a final judgment of dismissal.”[6] Redden thus asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal.

¶18     Redden’s argument is foreclosed by precedent. In State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986), the trial court agreed with the defendant that the charges should be reduced to a lesser offense. Id. at 748. In response, the State refused to amend the information to conform to the court’s ruling and instead urged the court to dismiss the information. Id. The court then dismissed the information and the State appealed that dismissal. Id. at 748–49. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the defendant’s threshold argument that the State could not use the order of dismissal, which the State itself requested, as a means of obtaining review of “a decision that would not otherwise be appealable as a matter of right.” Id. at 749. The supreme court explained that “the trial court’s determination that the charges should be reduced to an offense carrying a lesser penalty not charged in the original information prevented the State from proceeding on the original charges.” Id. Importantly, “[t]he effect of the trial court’s ruling was to block prosecution and, in effect, to dismiss the original charges.” Id. The supreme court concluded that, under these circumstances, “the State properly suggested that the trial court formally dismiss the information and then appealed from a final judgment of dismissal.” Id. (cleaned up). This court reached the same conclusion on similar facts in State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, 343 P.3d 709. Id. ¶¶ 15– 17 & n.4 (allowing the State to appeal after it had voluntarily moved for dismissal after the magistrate bound the defendant over on only a lesser and uncharged offense).[7]

¶19 Like Gomez, the magistrate’s decision binding Redden over on eight new misdemeanors rather than the charged eight third-degree felonies had the “effect of . . . block[ing] prosecution and . . . dismiss[ing] the [eight] original charges.” See Gomez, 722 P.2d at 479. The State therefore acted properly in moving to dismiss the information and then appealing from “a final judgment of dismissal.” See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”); see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 479; Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶¶ 15–17. Thus, Redden’s challenge to appellate jurisdiction is unavailing.

¶20     Lastly, in two ways, Redden challenges the fairness of the State’s actions. He first suggests that the State’s filing of the eight new charges against him violated the principles set forth in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). In Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is prohibited from “refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling.” Id. at 647 (emphasis added). Redden’s reliance on Brickey is misplaced, however, because no charges have been refiled against him. Rather, the State amended the information to add eight new charges that had not been addressed at the first preliminary hearing. The rules of criminal procedure allow such amendments “at any time before trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). The court also held a second preliminary hearing to address the eight additional charges. See id. (“If an additional or different offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary hearing on that offense . . . .”). Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, a prosecutor’s initial charging decision “should not freeze future conduct” and “does not necessarily define the extent of the legitimate interest in prosecution.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, 382 (1982); accord State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App 282, ¶ 23 n.11, 362 P.3d 926.

¶21 Second, Redden generically complains that he pleaded guilty to the charges in Weber County as “a global resolution of the charges” related to Michelle and that he did not realize the resulting convictions “would later be asserted as a basis for enhancing additional charges” filed in Iron County. Although he suggests that his due process rights have therefore been violated, he has not established his lack of understanding as a factual matter. Nor has he established that he was not actually afforded all the process to which he was entitled under the law.

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, Redden’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.


¶23 Having rejected Redden’s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we conclude that the State’s appeal is well taken and that the magistrate erred in binding Redden over on the eight new counts as class A misdemeanors. Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate’s bindover and dismissal orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

[1] “At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.” State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, ¶ 2 n.2, 343 P.3d 709 (cleaned up). Because this appeal arises from a preliminary hearing, we recite the background facts with that standard in mind.

[2] A pseudonym.

[3] The State does not contest this bindover ruling on appeal.

[4] Rule 25(a) states, “In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.” Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a). Rule 7B(c) provides, “If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe the crime charged has been committed or the defendant committed it, the magistrate must dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” Id. R. 7B(c).

[5] As used in the statute, the term “domestic violence offense” includes “commission or attempt to commit” stalking and violating a protective order when committed “by one cohabitant against another.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(4)(j), (l) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). The term “cohabitant” includes, among other things, individuals who “reside[] or [have] resided in the same residence” or who are or were “in a consensual sexual relationship.” Id. § 77-36-1(1); id. § 78B-7-102(2)(f), (g) (2018).

[6] Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the procedure regarding discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. The Utah Code allows the prosecution an appeal, as a matter of right, from a final judgment of dismissal. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . (a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial . . . .”).

[7] Redden relies on State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223 (Utah 1985), to support his position. In that case, the trial court granted a defense motion to suppress certain evidence, and the State chose to dismiss the information and attempted to appeal the dismissal in order to challenge the suppression ruling. Id. at 223. The supreme court concluded that the State’s appeal was improper under those facts. Id. at 224. The case at hand, however, is much more like Gomez than Waddoups, and Redden overlooks that the supreme court in Gomez specifically decided that the facts of Waddoups were “quite different” given that Waddoups did not involve the trial court reducing the original charges. See State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986).

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In re Z.C. W. – 2021 UT App 98 – Utah Court of Appeals

In re Z.C.W. – 2021 UT App 98 



R.D., Appellant, v.  C.L.W., Appellee. 


No. 20200039-CA 

Filed September 23, 2021 

Third District Juvenile Court, West Jordan Department 

The Honorable Renee M. Jimenez 

No. 1135445 

Julie J. Nelson and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant 

Lisa Lokken and Kirstin H. Norman, Attorneys for Appellee 

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem 

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

HARRIS, Judge: 

¶1 This termination-of-parental-rights case—in which R.D. (Mother) seeks to terminate the parental rights of her ex-husband, C.L.W. (Father), regarding their two children, C.C.W. and Z.C.W. (collectively, Children)—comes to us for a second time. In our previous opinion, we reversed the juvenile court’s order dismissing Mother’s petition and remanded the case with instructions for the court to redo its “best-interest” analysis, this time taking into account evidence that it had previously discounted regarding Father’s history of domestic violence toward Mother and another woman. See In re C.C.W., 2019 UT App 34, ¶¶ 19–25, 440 P.3d 749. On remand, the juvenile court reconsidered best interest and this time took into account Father’s history of domestic violence, but it conducted its analysis as of early 2017—the time of the previous trial—and not as of late 2019, when the post-remand proceedings took place. The court denied Mother’s motion to amend her termination petition to include new facts and circumstances that she asserted had occurred after the earlier trial, and the court refused to consider any evidence regarding best interest that had not been placed into the record at the previous trial. After reevaluating best interest as of 2017, this time not compartmentalizing Father’s history of domestic violence, the court again concluded that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in Children’s best interest, and again dismissed Mother’s petition. 

¶2 Mother appeals the dismissal of her petition, but does not raise a substantive challenge to the juvenile court’s new findings and conclusions—that is, Mother does not claim that the findings are unsupported by the evidence presented at the 2017 trial. Instead, Mother’s challenge is procedural: she asserts that the court erred by conducting its post-remand best-interest analysis in light of the evidence available in 2017, and by refusing to consider facts and circumstances arising after 2017 that might have affected its analysis. We agree with Mother, and hold that when we remand a case for a court to reconsider the best-interest question, we generally intend for that renewed inquiry to be conducted in the present tense, and for the effective date of that analysis to be the date of the post-remand proceeding. Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court’s order of dismissal, and remand for a new best-interest analysis that should be conducted based on the facts and circumstances in existence as of the date the inquiry is made. 


¶3 Many of the salient facts that inform the legal issues in this case are set forth in detail in our previous opinion, see id. ¶¶ 2–12, and we see no need to repeat them here. For present purposes, we include only a brief summary of the pre-remand facts. 

¶4 Mother filed a private petition seeking termination of Father’s parental rights regarding Children and alleged, among other things, that Father had a history of domestic violence toward her and another woman and had been incarcerated twice for such offenses. Id. ¶¶ 2–5. After a trial in early 2017, the juvenile court found that Father had abandoned Children, and that there were therefore statutory grounds for termination, id. ¶ 7, but concluded that it was not in Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated, id. ¶¶ 9–12. The court made factual findings that Father had indeed brutally attacked Mother and had a history of domestic violence, id. ¶ 8 & n.1, but nevertheless concluded that those facts had little bearing on the termination inquiry, because Father had never been violent toward Children, id. ¶ 8. After determining that Mother had not carried her burden on the best-interest inquiry, the juvenile court dismissed Mother’s petition, and Mother appealed. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 

¶5 On appeal, we concluded that the juvenile court’s best-interest “analysis was materially flawed” because, rather than evaluating the impact Father’s acts of domestic violence could have on Children, the court “completely separate[d] or compartmentalize[d]” Father’s “history of domestic violence toward other adults from the best-interest inquiry.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 19, 22. Accordingly, we vacated the order dismissing Mother’s petition and remanded for the juvenile court to “reconsider[]” its best-interest inquiry. Id. ¶ 25. We directed the court, in conducting its renewed inquiry, to “adequately consider[] all of the proper factors,” including “what effect, if any, Father’s history of domestic violence might have on his efforts to reestablish a relationship with the Children.” Id. 

¶6 Soon after remand, Mother filed a motion seeking leave to amend her petition to include additional relevant information. Mother asserted that “significant events, developments and incidents” bearing on Children’s best interest had occurred in the two years since the 2017 trial. Among other things, Mother alleged that, since the trial, Father had committed violent acts against another woman, and that Father’s parole had been revoked due to drug and alcohol use. In addition, Mother asserted that her own situation had changed, alleging that she had remarried and her new spouse now wanted to adopt Children. The guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to represent Children endorsed Mother’s position. Nevertheless, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to amend, explaining that it interpreted our opinion as requiring only a “reconsideration” of its previous ruling. The court declined to consider the new material alleged by Mother in connection with its renewed best-interest analysis, stating that it would “listen to the testimony” presented at the 2017 trial and would “read and consider the various literature cited” in our opinion, after which it would issue a written ruling without further hearing. 

¶7 A few weeks later, the juvenile court issued a written decision setting forth its renewed best-interest analysis. This time, the court did consider Father’s history of domestic violence. The court again noted that there was no evidence that Father had ever “physically abused his biological or stepchildren,” and found that “Mother did not fear Father’s interaction with the Children.” The court also observed that, under the district court order then in effect governing the parties’ divorce proceedings, Father was entitled only to supervised parent-time with Children. The juvenile court concluded that Father was at low risk to commit domestic violence in the presence of Children, and gave several reasons for its conclusion: Father had little contact with Mother; Father had “engaged in mental health services and medication management” and had “developed coping skills”; Father was “remorseful” and “desire[d] to correct his past actions”; and Father “was married with a support system in place.” In the court’s view, this evidence demonstrated that Father had taken “meaningful steps to change his life in order to be reintroduced” to Children. The court also noted that Father was Children’s only “African American father figure,” and that by keeping Father’s parental rights intact, Children could “maintain their legal relationship” with Father’s extended family, including their older half-sister. For these reasons, the court concluded—based on reconsideration of the evidence presented at the 2017 trial— that Mother had not carried her burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be in Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. On that basis, the court again dismissed Mother’s petition, doing so without considering any evidence regarding events that allegedly occurred between the 2017 trial and the date of the court’s order. 

¶8 Soon after issuance of the juvenile court’s post-remand ruling, Mother and the GAL each asked the court for a “new trial,” contending that the court should “re-open the evidence” because it was “impossible for the court” to properly consider best interest “without considering evidence of events that have occurred in the two and a half years since the trial.” In the documentation supporting her motion, Mother provided additional detail regarding some of the new evidence, asserting that Children’s half-sister had reached adulthood, no longer lived with Father, and had her own independent relationship with Children; that Father had reduced his financial support of Children and let their insurance coverage lapse; and that C.C.W. had recently been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, allegedly heightening the need for stability in his life.1 The court denied these motions, offering its view that it had complied with this court’s instructions by “considering all of the evidence presented” at the 2017 trial, and that Mother’s remedy was either to appeal or to file a new petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. 


¶9 Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s second dismissal of her termination petition, and raises one issue for our review: whether the juvenile court erred when it conducted its post-remand best-interest inquiry in past-tense fashion, as of 2017, and refused to consider facts and circumstances that allegedly occurred after 2017.2 Both Mother and Father contend that we should review this issue for abuse of discretion. We disagree. The narrow question of whether a post-remand best-interest inquiry should be conducted in past-tense or present-tense fashion presents a procedural legal issue, not a factual issue, and one that we review for correctness.3 See Berman v. Yarbrough, 2011 UT 79, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 905 (“We review procedural issues for correctness and afford no deference to the lower court’s ruling.”); see also State v. Kragh, 2011 UT App 108, ¶ 9, 255 P.3d 685 (“Procedural issues present questions of law, which we review for correctness.”). The question also involves interpretation of the remand instructions contained in our previous opinion, and no other court is better positioned on that score than we are. See State v. Lopes, 2001 UT 85, ¶¶ 11, 17–19, 34 P.3d 762 (stating that “the issues before us involve legal determinations” that are reviewed “for correctness,” including the “crucial question” of “what we meant when we remanded the case for a new trial” (quotation simplified)). Accordingly, we review the juvenile court’s post-remand procedural decisions for correctness. 


¶10 “[T]he Utah Constitution recognizes and protects the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child.” In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982). Indeed, our legislature has “declared that ‘a parent possesses a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the parent’s child.’” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 24, 472 P.3d 827 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-503(1) (LexisNexis 2017), now recodified at id. § 80-4-104(1) (Supp. 2021)). Before severing this important parent-child bond, a court must ensure that the party seeking to terminate a parent’s rights has made a two-part showing by clear and convincing evidence. See In re F.B., 2012 UT App 36, ¶ 2, 271 P.3d 824 (per curiam); see also In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶¶ 44–54. First, the court must find grounds for termination under applicable statutory law. See In re F.B., 2012 UT App 36, ¶ 2; see also Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2021).4 Second, the court “must find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest[] of the child.” In re F.B., 2012 UT App 36, ¶ 2; see also Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-104(12)(a) (stating that the “best interest of the child” is “of paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered”). 

¶11 We have explained that the best-interest inquiry “requires courts to examine all of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the child’s situation.” In re C.C.W., 2019 UT App 34, ¶ 18, 440 P.3d 749 (quotation simplified). “This analysis should be undertaken from the child’s point of view, not the parent’s.” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶¶ 63, 64 (quotation simplified). A child’s best interest can be determined only by considering “the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re T.E., 2011 UT 51, ¶ 41, 266 P.3d 739 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-509 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011), now recodified at id. § 80-4-303 (Supp. 2021)). “[A]ny evidence that is probative of what is in the child’s best interest” may be considered. Id. In sum, the best-interest inquiry is “wide-ranging” and “asks a court to weigh the entirety of circumstances . . . to determine what is in the best interest of the child under all of the circumstances,” In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35, 463 P.3d 66, with the court’s focus being “firmly fixed on finding the outcome that best secures the child’s well-being,” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 64. A court may not, simply due to concerns about judicial economy, limit the scope of the best-interest inquiry. See In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that, when considering “the best interest[] of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of artificial constraints that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy”). 

¶12 In the context of evaluating the termination of a parent’s rights, we have stressed that “[c]onsiderations regarding a child’s welfare are rarely, if ever, static,” and that often “the child’s environment is constantly evolving.” Id. at 163; see also In re H.J., 1999 UT App 238, ¶ 45, 986 P.2d 115 (stating that a child’s “needs and circumstances can, and do, change rapidly,” and in many cases “the passage of time itself can result in substantially different circumstances” for a child). For these reasons, the best-interest inquiry is generally to be conducted in present-tense fashion, with the effective date of the inquiry being the date of the hearing, trial, or other judicial determination. In a best-interest inquiry, the relevant question is almost always this one: what outcome is in the child’s best interest now? 

¶13 This conclusion is bolstered by the language of the current governing statute. Although this particular language was not in effect at the time the juvenile court entered its post-remand findings, our legislature in 2020 added the following language— as immaterially amended in 2021—to the relevant statute: 

In determining whether termination is in the best interest of the child, and in finding that termination of parental rights, from the child’s point of view, is strictly necessary, the juvenile court shall consider [certain factors, including reunification efforts and kinship placement possibilities]. 

Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-104(12)(b) (emphasis added). This statutory language uses the verb “is,” indicating that the best-interest inquiry is to be undertaken in a present-tense fashion. See Scott v. Scott, 2017 UT 66, ¶ 24, 423 P.3d 1275 (“Typically, we understand ‘is’ as a present tense . . . verb . . . . Accordingly, we assume that the legislature used ‘is’ here as a present-tense verb.” (quotation simplified)); see also W.N. v. S.M., 424 P.3d 483, 490 (Haw. 2018) (concluding that a lower court erred, post-remand, by conducting its custody analysis in past-tense fashion as of the date of the previous trial, and emphasizing that the governing statute’s present-tense locution “requires the court to consider if the person ‘is fit and proper’ to care for the minor child at the time of the contemplated custody award”). 

¶14 In situations where we have remanded a case for a trial court to redo its best-interest analysis, we have sometimes given explicit instructions for courts to do so in present-tense fashion. See, e.g.In re H.F., 2019 UT App 204, ¶ 18 n.6, 455 P.3d 1098 (remanding for a new best-interest analysis, and stating that “any number of circumstances may have changed since trial, and the court should take such changes into account in reconsidering its decision”); Ross v. Ross, 2019 UT App 104, ¶ 20, 447 P.3d 104 (remanding for renewed consideration of a parent’s relocation, including whether such relocation was in the child’s best interest, and stating that, in reconsidering the relocation question, the court “should consider the present circumstances of the parties and the Children and not simply re-litigate the issues as they were at the time of the now-vacated custody order”). In this case, unfortunately, our remand instructions were not quite as explicit. We concluded that “the juvenile court’s best-interest determination was materially flawed,” vacated the court’s order on that basis, and remanded “for proceedings consistent with this opinion,” stating that the court should “reconsider[]” the best-interest question. See In re C.C.W., 2019 UT App 34, ¶ 25. We did not directly instruct the court to undertake that “reconsideration” in a present-tense fashion. In hindsight, we wish we had been more explicit. But our intent was that the court would redo its entire best-interest analysis, this time taking into account the domestic violence evidence, and that it should undertake that analysis in present-tense fashion, evaluating best interest as of the time of the post-remand proceedings. We take this opportunity to clarify that, unless we direct otherwise in a particular case, courts should assume that we intend for post-remand best-interest analyses to be undertaken in a present-tense manner. 

¶15 Post-remand application of a present-tense analysis will not, however, always require a new evidentiary hearing. It may be that, in certain cases, the situation will not have changed at all, and the parties will not have any new evidence to present; in such a situation, given the absence of any new evidence, a present-tense and past-tense analysis will not differ. In other situations, a court may examine the proffered new evidence and conclude that, even assuming the veracity of the new allegations, the court’s analysis would remain unchanged; such analysis is, in its own way, a present-tense analysis, even though no new hearing will be necessary. Cf. In re G.D., 2021 UT 19, ¶¶ 80–82, 491 P.3d 867 (concluding that a lower court appropriately dealt with proffered new evidence in a termination case when it concluded that “none of the [new] evidence would have altered the court’s [previous] decision” (quotation simplified)). In still other situations, the parties may agree that the new allegations, even if material, are not disputed; in those cases, a court would be within its discretion to undertake its present-tense analysis, including consideration of the new undisputed evidence, without holding a new evidentiary hearing. And in many other situations, one or both of the parties may wish to offer new material disputed evidence; in those cases, a court conducting a post-remand best-interest analysis will likely need to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings regarding the veracity and the materiality of the new allegations, and will need to consider whether additional discovery or other pre-hearing proceedings would be appropriate. See, e.g.W.N., 424 P.3d at 491 (determining that a lower court erred, post-remand, when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider new disputed factual allegations that “would have directly pertained” to the issue at hand). But regardless of the posture of the particular case, a court conducting a proper post-remand best-interest analysis must—in some manner—consider and appropriately deal with proffered new evidence. 

¶16 With these principles in mind, we now examine the juvenile court’s handling of Mother’s proffered new evidence in this case. As noted above, the court refused to allow Mother to amend her petition to include new allegations, and after issuing its post-remand ruling it denied Mother’s motion for “new trial” in which Mother again asked the court to consider the new allegations.5 The court espoused a narrow interpretation of the remand instructions in our previous opinion, and opted to conduct a “reconsideration” of the evidence that had been presented at the 2017 trial, without any consideration of the new evidence Mother proffered. And the court instructed Mother that the proper avenue to facilitate adjudication of the new allegations was to file an entirely new petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. 

¶17 The juvenile court erred by undertaking its best-interest analysis as of 2017, the date of the previous trial. As discussed above, the court should have undertaken its best-interest analysis in present-tense fashion, as of 2019, the date of the post-remand proceeding. And the court erred by refusing to consider, in some form, the new evidence proffered by Mother. The court made no determination that the proffered evidence was immaterial or inadmissible;6 we offer our own observation that at least some of the proffered evidence—in particular, the allegation that Father has committed additional acts of domestic violence against additional women—if true, appears to be at least potentially material and at odds with some of the court’s post-remand findings. And the court made no effort to ascertain the extent to which the new evidence was disputed. The court needed to consider the new evidence in some fashion, rather than simply relying on previously submitted evidence. 

¶18 Mother could, of course, alternatively file a new termination petition. In such a proceeding, Mother could air all of the new allegations, and would not be barred by res judicata from incorporating into her presentation facts found by the court during the previous proceedings. See In re A.C.M., 2009 UT 30, ¶ 18, 221 P.3d 185 (“We . . . adopt the rule . . . that in child welfare proceedings res judicata does not bar courts from considering both newly discovered facts, whether or not they were knowable at the time of the earlier proceeding, and facts determined in previous termination proceedings when considering a later termination petition.”); see also Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 922–23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that res judicata does not preclude reconsideration of previously admitted evidence because res judicata, in this context, is “subservient to the child’s best interest[]”). But filing a new termination petition would entail some inefficiencies; as Mother pointed out at oral argument before this court, if a new petition were filed the juvenile court would be required to start from scratch, and re-adjudicate the entire case, including the “statutory grounds” portion that is no longer in dispute here. Moreover, the mere fact that Mother has the option of filing another action does not mean that her preferred option is thereby foreclosed. When two valid procedural litigation options exist, it is up to the litigant to choose which one to utilize. See, e.g.Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, 2019 UT 7, ¶ 36, 439 P.3d 593 (“[A] core component of our adversary system [is] the notion that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint. We leave it to the parties to plead claims and defenses in the time and manner designated by our rules.”). A court may not close one door simply because another one exists, even if the court considers the litigant’s preferred option inefficient. See In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that, when considering “the best interest[] of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of artificial constraints that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy”); cf. AFA Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that federal courts asked to exercise diversity jurisdiction “cannot close the door to the federal courts merely because [a diversity] case involves a difficult question of state law”). 


¶19 The juvenile court erred by conducting a past-tense—rather than a present-tense—analysis while reconsidering best interest during its post-remand proceedings. The best-interest inquiry is, in most cases, not to be based on a snapshot from the past. Rather, a proper best-interest inquiry requires evaluating all relevant past and present circumstances bearing on a child’s welfare as of the date of the proceeding. Where an appellate court remands a case for a trial court to redo its best-interest analysis, that analysis should generally be conducted as of the date of the post-remand proceedings, and the court must consider, in some fashion, any new evidence proffered by the parties. 

¶20 Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court’s order dismissing Mother’s petition, and we again remand for the juvenile court to redo its best-interest analysis, this time doing so in a present-tense fashion, and not as of 2017 or as of 2019. We once again express no opinion on the substance of the best-interest question, and emphasize that our opinion should not be construed as urging one outcome or another on remand. 


Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277 

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2021 UT App 28 – Utah Ct. Appeals – In re C.Z.

M.Z., Appellant,
STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.

No. 20200227-CA
Filed March 12, 2021

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Mark W. May
No. 1156353

Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE KATE APPLEBY concurred.[1]

HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 M.Z. (the father) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to his son, C.Z. (the child). We conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father had not remedied the circumstances that led to the child’s removal and affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.


¶2        The child was born in May 2017.[2] In December 2017, C.Z.’s mother (the mother) was charged with aggravated assault and domestic violence in the presence of a child for stabbing the father in the chest in front of the child. At the time, the mother was already under juvenile court jurisdiction for criminal trespass and habitual truancy. The juvenile court issued a no-contact order between the mother and the father and ordered that the child be assessed as “at risk of removal” from the mother’s care.

¶3        Throughout January and February 2018, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) “worked with the family in devising a safety plan for the child to remain” in the home with the mother. DCFS reported that the mother had several “thinking errors,” including her beliefs that she did not need to abide by the no-contact order, did not need therapy, and that there was no harm in smoking marijuana while breastfeeding the child. DCFS also reported that the father and mother had smoked marijuana in the presence of the child on multiple occasions, including one instance where the father was caught smoking in the mother’s family’s house, resulting in the family’s eviction. At the end of February, the mother was ordered “to be held in the Salt Lake Valley Detention Center” for a brief period.

¶4        In March 2018, DCFS again attempted to meet with the mother to establish a safety plan so the child could remain in her custody. The mother missed the meeting, and DCFS received a report that she had been smoking marijuana and had violated the no-contact order by spending the weekend with the father. As a result, the State filed a motion for the child’s expedited placement in temporary custody. At the shelter hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion, placing the child in the temporary custody of DCFS. At a follow-up hearing later that month, the court made official findings. In relation to the mother, the court found the child was “neglected” under Utah Code subsection 78A-6-105(41). In relation to the father, the court found the child was “[d]ependent” under Utah Code subsection 78A-6-105(14), meaning that the child was deemed “homeless or without proper care through no fault of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.”

¶5        Two months later, in May of 2018, the court held a disposition hearing to establish permanency goals for the child pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-312. The court determined that the child’s primary permanency goal would be “first and foremost reunification” with the parents and “the concurrent plan” would be “adoption.” The court ordered DCFS to “provide reunification services to the parents consistent with the services identified in the service plan.” The court ordered all parties to follow the service plan, which included a requirement that the parents complete domestic violence assessments. After father’s counsel raised concerns that the father would “get assessed as a perpetrator rather than a victim,” the court ordered that the plan be “amended to have the father participate in a [domestic violence] class as a victim.”

¶6        At the first child welfare review hearing in July 2018, the court authorized unsupervised visits for the father, but not for the mother, whose parent-time continued to be supervised. The caseworker noted that the parents still seemed to be spending time together and suggested couples therapy if they hoped to co-parent someday. The court lifted the no-contact order but warned the parents that it was for the purpose of domestic violence therapy only and “that doesn’t mean you drop by any time you want.” At the next child welfare review hearing, in September 2018, the court found that both parents were “doing really well” and “marching toward reunification.”

¶7        The steady progress did not continue, however. At the third child welfare review in December 2018, the court found that the mother was smoking marijuana again, the father was not following through with his therapy and, most alarming, there had been another domestic violence incident in the presence of the child on Thanksgiving Day. The parents, apparently living together again, fought about the child’s nap, and the mother hit the father in the face. He responded by pushing her away by the throat. She grabbed him by the hair and tried to prevent him from leaving. Once he got away, the father ran to a nearby school, where the responding police officer found him with a bloody nose and no shoes. The officer cited the mother as “the predominant aggressor” but allowed the father to remain in the home because, the officer later testified, the father “basically wanted to go back because he said his child was a ward of the State, that this was the only time they got to spend time with him.” The juvenile court warned both parents this was “a step back” and warned the father in particular about the domestic violence, saying, “You have to go to therapy. . . . [Y]ou’ve got to do all these things” and there is “not a lot of time left.” The court informed both parents that, if it was not safe for the child to return home by the time of the final permanency hearing, the court would have no choice but to “terminate services” toward reunification and instead move toward adoption, and “[n]obody wants to go down that road.”

¶8        The final child welfare review hearing was sixty days later, in February 2019. Report of the parents’ progress was still mixed. The State expressed ongoing concerns about the father’s ability to “hold boundaries with Mom and keep kiddo safe.” The DCFS caseworker also reported that the father’s attendance at therapy had not been consistent, although father’s counsel complained that the father still had not received enough of the type of specialized domestic violence therapy he needed as a victim. The court informed the parents that if the permanency hearing were that day, it could not return the child to them. The court warned the father, in particular, that if reunification of the child with the mother was not going to be possible, the father had better start giving “full effort” and decide, “Is this what you want?”

¶9        At the permanency hearing on March 19, 2019, the court found that “return to the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child at [that] time.” But, the court did find, by a preponderance of the evidence that there had been substantial compliance, reunification was probable within ninety days, and an extension would be in the best interest of the child. The court warned the parents that the report in ninety days had “better be a great report.”

¶10 At the continued permanency hearing on May 30, 2019, the DCFS caseworker reported that the father “had been fully engaged” and wanted reunification to continue, but the mother had “reached the point that she believe[d] that she’s not in the child’s best interest” and was ready to relinquish her parental rights voluntarily. The caseworker also expressed concern that the parents were apparently living together even though the father reported moving out of the mother’s residence several months earlier. The guardian ad litem reported that she did not feel it was safe to return the child to either parent that day. She had particular concern about the father’s “relationship with the mother.” The court gave the father one more extension, but with the following warning:

[T]here’s continued domestic violence . . . . [E]ven if [the father] is the victim, he was stabbed the first time and he went back into that relationship with his child, and then there’s been another domestic violence incident, and they’re still together . . . . He is supposed to be in treatment, and he hasn’t gone .

. . .

. . . .

Dad, you have to get in treatment. I mean that’s the bottom line. I don’t need any more excuses. You have to be in treatment. You keep going back to a toxic relationship, and if you’re going to do that, then whatever her baggage is is your baggage. That’s the way the law works.

¶11 At that final permanency hearing in August 2019, the court found that returning the child to the father would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The court explained, “[T]he law is pretty firm and . . . at this point I can’t give another extension, and it’s not safe today to send the child home. So under the law, . . . I have to terminate reunification services, I have to change the goal to adoption.”

¶12 The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the court set the matter for trial. In the interim, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.

¶13 At trial in January 2020, the State presented evidence of the father’s continued unhealthy relationship with the mother. The father’s therapist, provided by DCFS, testified that the father had “symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder” as a result of “having been attacked by” the mother. Nevertheless, the father testified that the mother had accompanied him on the last few visits with the child, after she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. The foster parent, who dropped off the child for visits with the father, testified that the mother was with the father at every visit in December and January. When the State asked the father why the mother went along, he answered twice that the mother “wanted to see” the child and the father had never gotten a clear answer from the case worker as to whether that was allowed. The child’s guardian ad litem asked the court to expressly order that the mother was not allowed to attend visits with the child.

¶14 In February 2020, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights. Applying a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court made extensive factual findings and concluded that those findings supported four statutory grounds for termination: (1) that the father had been “an unfit or incompetent parent of his child”; (2) that the child had “been cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision” of DCFS, the father had “substantially neglected, willfully refused, or ha[d] been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the child to be in an out-of-home placement,” and “there [was] a substantial likelihood that the parent [would] not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future”; (3) that there had been a failure of parental adjustment; and (4) that the father had made “only token efforts to provide support” for the child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(c)–(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020). The court concluded that, “based on the totality of the evidence, it [was] in [the child’s] best interest to be adopted by the foster parents” and that it was “strictly necessary to terminate the father’s parental rights to permit that adoption.”


¶15 The father contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights. “Whether a parent’s rights should be terminated presents a mixed question of law and fact.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. “The ultimate conclusion that a parent is unfit or that other grounds for termination have been established is a legal question.” In re L.M., 2019 UT App 174, ¶ 5, 453 P.3d 651 (per curiam) (cleaned up). But because “such decisions rely heavily on the juvenile court’s assessment and weighing of the facts in any given case,” that “decision should be afforded a high degree of deference.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, we will overturn the juvenile court’s decision only when that decision is “against the clear weight of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). A decision is against the clear weight of the evidence when the court “either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence.” See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12. Indeed, “an appellate court must be capable of discriminating between discomfort over a trial court’s findings of fact—which it must tolerate—and those that require a court’s intercession. It must forebear disturbing the ‘close call.’” In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ¶ 33, 147 P.3d 401 (cleaned up).


¶16 Utah law recognizes that “the right of a fit, competent parent to raise the parent’s child without undue government interference is a fundamental liberty interest . . . and is a fundamental public policy of this state.” In re Adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶ 25, 390 P.3d 278 (cleaned up); see also Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020).[3] Indeed, there is a “strong . . . presumption that it is in a child’s best interests to be in the custody of his or her natural parent.” In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). But, “parental rights are not absolute. A parent’s rights must be balanced against the state’s important interest in protecting children from harm.” In re J.A., 2018 UT App 29, ¶ 44, 424 P.3d 913 (cleaned up).

¶17 In this case, the child was adjudicated dependent as to the father in March 2018, shortly after the initial shelter hearing that placed the child in DCFS custody. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6­105(14) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020). A determination of dependency rebuts “the presumption that the child is best served by being in the parent’s custody.” In re J.M.V., 958 P.2d at 948. But even though the parental presumption does not apply, the petitioner—in this case, the State—always has the burden to “establish the facts” justifying termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-506(3) (LexisNexis 2018).

¶18 “To terminate parental rights, a juvenile court must make two separate findings.” In re C.T., 2018 UT App 233, ¶ 12, 438 P.3d 100 (cleaned up). First, the “court must find by clear and convincing evidence that there is at least one statutory ground for termination.” Id. (cleaned up). Second, “the court must assess what is in the child’s best interest” and determine “whether termination is strictly necessary to promote the child’s welfare and best interest.” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 76, 472 P.3d 827.

¶19 The father’s arguments on appeal are limited to challenging the first step in the juvenile court’s analysis— whether a statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. Where the juvenile court finds multiple grounds for termination, “we will affirm when we are able to sustain one of the grounds and need not consider the other grounds relied on by the court.” In re D.M., 2020 UT App 59, ¶ 10, 462 P.3d 1278; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020) (stating that “the court may terminate all parental rights with respect to the parent if the court finds any one” statutory ground).

¶20 We focus our analysis on the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights was justified because the father failed to remedy the circumstances causing the child’s removal under Utah Code subsection 78A-6-507(1)(d) (Supp. 2020).[4] To terminate parental rights on this ground, the court must find,

(i) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the court or the division;

(ii) that the parent has substantially neglected, willfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement; and

(iii) that there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(d).

¶21 In this case, the child was in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the court and DCFS. The “circumstances” that had caused the child to be placed in foster care included the child’s dependency status and the child’s exposure to domestic violence. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the father failed to remedy either of those circumstances.[5]

¶22 First, the father was unable to remedy the circumstances that led to the removal of the child based on the dependency adjudication. To remedy those circumstances, the father needed to ensure that he could provide a home and proper care for the child. See id. §§ 78A-6-105(14), -507(1)(d).

¶23 Although the father made progress at maintaining employment and ending his drug use, he bounced back and forth between living with the mother and staying at his father’s house where the conditions were unsuitable for a child. Even if the father assumed until late in the child welfare proceedings that the mother would provide the primary home for the child, the court warned him to be prepared to step up when it appeared doubtful that the child would be reunited with the mother. The court found that the father, having gone through the two previous permanency hearings, was aware that by the final permanency hearing “changes in his life had to be in place” so “that it was safe for [the child] to return to him that day.”

¶24      Despite having eighteen months to achieve such stability, the father did not have appropriate housing or a plan for childcare until three days before the final permanency hearing. Given the father’s track record, the juvenile court was skeptical about the stability of these last-minute living and childcare arrangements. “The weight which a juvenile court must give any present ability evidence is necessarily dependent on the amount of time during which the parent displayed an unwillingness or inability to improve his or her conduct.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 13, 171 P.3d 435 (cleaned up). Therefore, “if a parent has demonstrated some improvement in parenting ability but not a strong likelihood that the parent can provide a proper home for the child in the very near future,” we cannot “overturn a court’s order terminating parental rights.” Id. (cleaned up). After eighteen months of services, the father had not progressed to even a single overnight visit with the child and had exhausted all possible extensions of time. The court reasonably concluded that the father’s efforts were “far too little far too late.”

¶25      Perhaps more importantly, the father failed to protect the child from exposure to domestic violence by the mother. The mother’s serious assault on the father in the presence of the child was one of the circumstances that led to the child’s removal. Despite a no-contact order, the father continued spending time with the mother, and there was another incident of domestic violence in the presence of the child on Thanksgiving Day. Even after the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights, the father continued bringing her to visits with the child, placing the child in an unsafe environment.

¶26 That evidence supported the court’s finding that the father “and the mother still have an ongoing relationship” and that the father “would likely allow the mother to parent” the child. The court found that “the mother is an unfit parent” and that allowing her to parent was “of serious concern because: (a) the mother stopped participating in services; (b) the mother was the aggressor in the domestic violence incidents; (c) she had positive drug tests on the rare occasions when she chose to test; and (d) the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.” The father’s choice to remain involved with the mother— whether romantically or as a co-parent—placed the child at continued risk.

¶27 The father points to evidence that he received mixed messages from the caseworker about his relationship with the mother and whether she was permitted to join him for visits with the child. But the juvenile court was “in the best position to weigh [this] conflicting testimony, to assess credibility, and from such determinations, render findings of fact.” See In re J.H., 2012 UT App 195, ¶ 2, 283 P.3d 971 (per curiam). We will not overturn the juvenile court’s determinations unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence. See In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ¶ 33, 147 P.3d 401. The existence of the no-contact order, as well as the court’s admonitions to the father, support the conclusion that the father had “chosen to remain with the mother” despite the danger posed to the child.

¶28      The father also argues that the juvenile court “abused its discretion in not properly evaluating [him] as a domestic violence survivor.” Specifically, the father suggests that the court employed something of a double standard and analyzed his “reactions to domestic violence perpetrated upon him differently than a female victim.” We disagree. The juvenile court ordered that the father be provided treatment as a victim and faulted the mother for the domestic violence.

¶29 We recognize that “extricating oneself from an abusive relationship can pose an extremely difficult hurdle for victims of domestic abuse,” regardless of gender. See In re L.M., 2019 UT App 174, ¶ 8, 453 P.3d 651 (per curiam). Nevertheless, we have consistently held that a juvenile court faced with a victim parent who does not leave the abusive relationship “may find that the parent has failed to remedy the circumstances that led to a child’s removal.” Id. For example, in In re T.M., we affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights in part because he had “effectively prioritized his relationship with” his abusive spouse over the protection of his children. 2006 UT App 435, ¶ 9, 147 P.3d 529. In that case, the juvenile court found that “although [the father] completed most of the treatment plan—albeit a significant portion only in the eleventh hour, . . . he [had] been unable to quit his self-described ‘addiction’ to [the mother], and his unwillingness to give up his ongoing relationship with [the mother] . . . endanger[ed] the [c]hildren.” Id. ¶ 9. We agreed, stressing that the father’s “present and ongoing failure to detach himself from this relationship and protect the [c]hildren from exposure to [the mother was] especially significant to the court’s finding of unfitness.” Id. ¶ 19. This court has reached the same conclusion in numerous cases where the mother was the victim of domestic violence. See, e.g., In re L.M., 2019 UT App 174, ¶¶ 3, 6–7, 11 (holding that “the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that [the mother] had failed to remedy the circumstances leading to [the child’s] removal” where mother did not show up to domestic violence victim therapy appointments, “had not internalized the lessons from the domestic violence therapy,” and brought [the father] to visits after his parental rights had been terminated); In re F.M., 2002 UT App 340, ¶¶ 3, 7–8, 57 P.3d 1130 (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights where evidence showed she had co­dependent relationship with abusive father, had talked about leaving father long enough to regain custody of the children and then going back to him, and then had contact with him just two weeks before the termination trial); In re G.B., 2002 UT App 270, ¶ 17, 53 P.3d 963 (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights where mother claimed she had complied with the service plan, but juvenile court found that she continued to reside in a home with the abusive father, and had no intention of separating from him); In re G.D., 894 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights in part because she “failed to sever all relationships with the father within a reasonable time” and failed to “eliminate the risk of continued abuse”).

¶30 In these cases, juvenile courts are not “unnecessarily drawing negative inferences from a [victim’s] decision to maintain a relationship with the batterer.” In re C.C.W., 2019 UT App 34, ¶ 19 n.4, 440 P.3d 749. Rather, they are focusing on the well-being of the child, whose safety is of primary importance, by assessing whether the parent’s ongoing refusal to sever the relationship poses a continuing threat to the child. Domestic violence has a negative effect on a child even if the child is not the direct recipient of or witness to the violence. See id. ¶ 20, (recognizing that children in these situations learn lessons such as “that the violence toward a loved one is acceptable” and that “coercive power and violence” are “a way to influence loved ones[,]” and noting that such children “fail to grasp the full range of negative consequences for the violent behavior” (cleaned up)). “Utah case law indicates that courts have minimal empathy for parents whose strong emotional ties to their spouses or significant others jeopardize their children’s safety.” In re T.M., 2006 UT App 435, ¶ 20. Here, the juvenile court’s conclusion that the father had not remedied the circumstances that led to removal was supported by clear and convincing evidence that he was unable or unwilling to extricate himself from a relationship with the mother that was toxic and that posed an ongoing threat to the child.

¶31 In concluding that the father failed to remedy the circumstances that led to the child’s removal and would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future, the juvenile court noted that it “truly struggled with this decision.” It “extended reunification services twice, admittedly based on sympathy for [the father’s] circumstances as opposed to strict compliance with the statutes governing extension of services.” But permanency adjudication occurs on a strict timeline because the passage of time seriously affects the child waiting in “legal limbo.” See In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 42, 995 P.2d 17 (explaining that the “overarching purpose” of our child welfare laws “is to provide stability and permanency for abused and neglected children, and to end the ‘legal limbo’ of state custody as quickly as possible” (cleaned up)). And, as the juvenile court found, “[t]he length of time that [the child] has been out of the home relative to his age and the length of time that it took [the father] to . . . become stable had a significant destructive effect on their parent/child relationship.” Viewing the record as a whole, the juvenile court’s finding that the father had not remedied the circumstances that had created the out-of-home placement was not against the clear weight of the evidence.


¶32 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding under Utah Code subsection 78A-6­507(1)(d) that the father had failed to remedy the circumstances that caused the child’s out-of-home placement. This is true as to both the child’s dependency status and the risk of exposure to domestic violence. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277


[1] Senior Judge Kate Appleby sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).

[2] The mother and the father were not married at the time of the birth, but the father’s paternity was undisputed and officially established prior to the dependency adjudication in March 2018.

[3] Where, as here, amendments to a statute do not affect the issues in this case, we refer to the current version of the statute.

[4] Because we do not address unfitness as an alternative ground for termination, we have no need to reach the father’s argument that the juvenile court “improperly deferred to the caseworker

regarding the ultimate issue of unfitness.”

[5] In applying this provision, the juvenile court did not improperly shift the burden to the father to demonstrate his fitness as a parent. Although the parent has a responsibility to remedy the circumstances that led to removal, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)(d), the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to do so, id. § 78A-6-506(3). The court properly applied that burden in this case.

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How do I know if my relationship is abusive? How abusive does it have to be to get sole custody of my children?

How do I know if my relationship is abusive? How abusive does it have to be to get sole custody of my children? 

How do I know if my relationship is abusive? How abusive does it have to be to get sole custody of my children? For some people who read your question they might think, “That’s kind of a stupid question; it’s obvious if you’re being abused.” I was one of those people who thought that way in the past. While some forms of abuse are obvious or easily identified, other forms of abuse are not, such as things like Stockholm Syndrome, gaslighting, and other abusive behaviors that make abuse hard for the victim of abuse to recognize. 

Before I state anything further, I must make one thing clear: among those of us who are fortunate to live in First World countries are some who are emotionally immature and/or wimpy; people with nothing better to do than feel like victims simply because someone says something critical of them or does not do for them or give to them whatever they want. These are not the kind of people who qualify as abused and they do not suffer the kind of treatment that constitutes abuse. 

But there are situations that arise where the abuse is real, but subtle, unnoticeable at first, and builds gradually in severity until the abuse victim cannot remember what life was like before the abuse and becomes unsure of whether he/she is being abused. 

Stockholm Syndrome. This is a good brief description of Stockholm Syndrome from 

Stockholm syndrome is a psychological condition that occurs when a victim of abuse identifies and attaches, or bonds, positively with their abuser. This syndrome was originally observed when hostages who were kidnapped not only bonded with their kidnappers, but also fell in love with them. 

Professionals have expanded the definition of Stockholm syndrome to include any relationship in which victims of abuse develop a strong, loyal attachment to the perpetrators of abuse. Some of the populations affected with this condition include concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war, abused children, incest survivors, victims of domestic violence, cult members, and people in toxic work or church environments. 

Battered partners or spouses are a prime example of Stockholm syndrome. Oftentimes, they are reluctant to press charges or initiate a restraining order, and some have attempted to stop police from arresting their abusers even after a violent assault. After the relationship has ended, victims of domestic violence may often make statements such as, “I still love him,” even after being brutally beaten. 

Gaslighting. “Gaslighting” is a trendy term these days, and as is the case with all trends, they become overexposed and diluted. Some people like feeling like victims (they’re emotional hypochondriacs), and those who do will see the gaslighting bogeyman (or claim to see it) behind every tree. Other people will accuse those with whom they disagree of gaslighting. 

But real gaslighting can and does cause series emotional and psychological harm. described gaslighting as follows (I have taken the liberty of correcting the grammar in this excerpt): 


Gaslighting is an abusive tactic aimed to make a person doubt his/her own thoughts and feelings. The abuse is often subtle at first. For example, if a person is telling a story, the abuser may challenge a small detail. The person may admit his/her was wrong on a detail, then move on. The next time, the abuser may use that past “victory” to discredit the person further, perhaps by questioning the person’s memory. 

The person may argue back at first. He/she may intuit something is wrong in the relationship or marriage. But because each gaslighting incident is so minor, his/her can’t pinpoint any specific cause for their unease. Over time, the person may second-guess his/her own emotions and memories. He/she may rely on their abuser to tell them if their memory is correct or if his/her emotions are “reasonable.” Abusers use this trust to gain control over their targets. 

Popular culture often depicts gaslighting as a man abusing his wife. Yet people of any gender can gaslight others or be gaslighted themselves. Gaslighting can also occur in platonic contexts such as a workplace. Anyone can be a target. 

Gaslighting can take many forms. Sometimes it can involve manipulating a person’s environment behind his/her back. Other times, the abuse is entirely verbal and emotional. 

Common techniques include: 

  • Withholding: Refusing to listen to any concerns or pretending not to understand them. Example: “I don’t have time to listen to this nonsense. You’re not making any sense.” 
  • Countering: Questioning the target’s memory. An abuser may deny the events occurred in the way the target (accurately) remembers. Abusers may also invent details of the event that did not occur. Example: “I heard you say it! You never remember our conversations right.” 
  • Forgetting/Denial: Pretending to forget events that have happened to further discredit the victim’s memory. An abuser may deny making promises to avoid responsibility. Example: “What are you talking about? I never promised you that.” 
  • Blocking/Diversion: Changing the subject to divert the target’s attention from a topic. An abuser may twist a conversation into an argument about the person’s credibility. Example: “Have you been talking to your sister again? She’s always putting stupid ideas in your head.” 
  • Trivializing: Asserting that a person is overreacting to hurtful behavior. This technique can condition a person into believing his/her emotions are invalid or excessive. Example: “You’re so sensitive! Everyone else thought my joke was funny.” 

A gaslighter often uses the target’s “mistakes” and “overreactions” to cast the abuser as the victim. For example, an abuser may scream accusations at a person until the other party must raise his/her voice to be heard. The abuser may then cut the conversation short, claiming the other person is “out of control” and “too aggressive.” In some cases, the abuser may accuse the other person of being the true gaslighter. 

I also found a post on what the author calls “reactive abuse” to be useful. 

And I thought this post on to be a good article on how to spot an abuser before it’s too late.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277  

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Unique challenges for men and women face in divorce and child custody

The unique challenges men and women face in divorce and child custody cases

What follows is my opinion, but my honest and sincere opinion born of experience over the past 23 years in the practice of divorce and family law. It is an educated opinion that nevertheless may, and likely will,  lead to my being disparaged and to me making some enemies, but if we don’t exercise the precious right of free speech by letting the heckler’s veto silence any of us, we have no one to blame but ourselves. And we all lose.

Men and Women, women and men can encounter—and more often than not do encounter—unique challenges in divorce and child custody cases. Some lawyers and judges and others in the legal system deny that there are cultural biases or prejudices ever affecting treatment of men and women, but that is just not true.

Mothers are awarded sole or primary custody of children in the overwhelming majority of cases, no matter how hard a father has worked and striven to prove he can make joint custody work.

Mothers are awarded sole or primary custody of children in the overwhelming majority of cases, even when the mother is less fit (I am not saying unfit, just less fit) than the father.

This is an undeniable bias against men, seeing and treating them, falsely and unfairly, as second-class parents.

Interestingly, it does not matter whether your judge is a man or a woman, the bias is cultural and institutional.

I will note that this bias is weaker now that it was in the past, and it is getting weaker, yet it is still surprisingly strong against men.

Another bias: modern women have a lot to say about being just as qualified as men are to do the same work and thus be paid the same amount of money, so the cognitive dissonance is unavoidable in a divorce case when the subject of alimony arises. These same strong independent women are the most helpless creatures in the world when it comes to claiming a desperate need for alimony, and quite often the courts buy it. Do not misunderstand me. There are clearly many women and even some men who are, through no fault of their own, financially dependent upon their spouses and who are clearly deserving of alimony and spousal support post-divorce. But men get the short end of the stick when it comes to alimony far more often than do women. While this bias is waning, it is still present and still undeniable.

Interestingly, it does not matter whether your judge is a man or a woman, the bias is cultural and institutional.

I will note that this bias is weaker now that it was in the past, and it is getting weaker, yet it is still surprisingly strong against men.

Another bias against men is revealed in the realm of domestic violence and the way the law treats it. If a man seeks police help or protection from a violent wife or girlfriend, he is often laughed at or humiliated for failing to man up and defend himself. If such a man is fool enough to take that kind of advice, he will find himself the one arrested for committing domestic violence. I have witnessed personally situations where the man is bloodied and bruised, and the wife complains that he pushed her down while she was beating him, and the police will arrest the man for “assaulting” the woman.

Courts are far more willing to believe claims of domestic violence made by wives and mothers against the men in their lives. This is not a matter of opinion; this is a matter of fact. Anyone can confirm this to be true by simply attending the protective order and restraining order and civil stalking injunction court hearings that are open to the public. While I will be the first to acknowledge that there are clearly genuine incidents of domestic violence that are reported and for which protective orders are issued, you can witness for yourself protective and restraining orders issued on literally nothing but one’s word over another’s. No objectively verifiable evidence to support the claims at all. And yet the protective orders and restraining orders get issued, nonetheless. And who gets these orders at least 9 out of 10 times? It is women. That does not square with that the statistics kept by law enforcement, which shows that wives and girlfriends are more violent towards men than 10% of the time.

I will note that this bias is weaker now that it was in the past, and it is getting weaker, yet it is still surprisingly strong against men.

What does this mean? It means that men often have to win the child custody, alimony, and domestic violence disputes six ways from Sunday. They generally need far, far more and far better evidence than the women to get the same things women get with less and lower-quality evidence.

So, guys, if your marriage is crumbling, and you happen to be married to a woman who is vindictive and or crazy, keep the foregoing in mind. And take the necessary steps to protect yourself. One of the ways that crazy vindictive women take advantage of men in divorce and child custody cases is accusing them of domestic violence as a cheap and incredibly rapid way to remove the man from the house and to keep him out. As I alluded to earlier, one of the most common ways this is done is by the woman calling the police claiming that the man has assaulted her, attempted to assault her, or threatened to assault her. Sometimes all they have to do is make no claims of assault, attempted assault, or threatened assault and merely claim that they “don’t feel safe around” the man they live with, without even providing any plausible basis for such an ostensible “fear”. To protect yourself from being arrested and forcibly removed from your house, from false allegations of domestic violence, and fraudulently sought protective orders, and character assassination, you may find the following the difference between defeat and victory:

First, unless your safety or life is truly in jeopardy by remaining in the same house with your vindictive and/or crazy wife or girlfriend, do not move out of the house. If you do, your vindictive and/or crazy wife or girlfriend will claim that you abandoned her and the children, as well as the house itself, meaning that you should be forever barred from living there, even though it’s your house, even if you can show the court that you have nowhere else you can go. After all, so the thinking goes, you abandoned the family and you abandoned the house, so you should be forever barred. Do not move out if you don’t have to.

Second, if your house is the kind that has a distinct upstairs and downstairs, move downstairs. Then put it in writing to your spouse and get it on audio and video too, if you can, showing that your vindictive and/or crazy wife or girlfriend is clearly on notice that you are trying to stay away from her for the purpose of maintaining the peace and protecting yourself. That way if she tries to claim that she does not understand why you have done what you have done, you have clear proof as to why and proof that she knew why.

Notify your crazy and/or vindictive wife or girlfriend that you will be placing locks on closets in the downstairs to protect your property from theft or vandalism by her. Do not lock her out of the basement itself, but do point out that you will have the downstairs wired for sound and video, so that if she ever goes down there with the purpose of robbing you or vandalizing your living quarters or property, she will be undeniably caught.

In your written and video recorded notices to your crazy and/or vindictive wife or girlfriend also inform her that you are placing cameras and microphones everywhere throughout the basement in every room and every space to ensure that your movements and hers in the basement are tracked. Tell her she has no expectation of privacy anywhere in the basement. Post it in writing on the basement door and on the wall on the stairs leading downstairs. Post it on the bathroom door. Inform her that you have taken both photographic and video footage of the cameras and microphones and the written notices, so that if she tries to claim you violated her privacy downstairs, or if she tries to remove or damage them, there will be no way she can remove them at least one camera and microphone capturing her misconduct and making a record of it. You may even want to go so far as to buy one of those wearable cameras and microphone combinations on your person at all times when you are in the house with your crazy and/or vindictive wife or girlfriend, so that they don’t get any ideas about trying to pick fights and frame you for a fraudulent claim of domestic violence.

Again, this may seem extreme and over-the-top, but I have seen what happens to men who fail to protect themselves adequately. I’ve also seen men avoid being so much as charged with a crime, let alone convicted, because they — as soon as they got an inkling that their wives or girlfriends might be up to no good — took steps to document and secure and protect themselves.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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Practical steps to take to prepare to leave an abusive relationship?

Fredric Garms’s answer to What are practical, tangible steps someone can and should take when preparing to leave an abusive relationship?

I would add that if you reasonably believe you have some time to prepare:

  • save up some money to help you get on your feet in your new location and life
  • avoid communicating in writing and with your personal phone with those who are helping you, so that your abuser will have a harder time discovering your fears and plans
  • have a P.I. (private investigator)
    • sweep your vehicle and phone for tracking devices and teach you how to sweep your vehicle and phone for tracking devices
    • teach you how to avoid attention, tracking, and surveillance by your abuser
    • teach you how and/or help you to disappear without leaving a trace and without your abuser being able to victimize you after you disappear by ruining your credit or things like that.

If it’s emotional abuse:

  • try to get your abuser to realize what he/she is doing is abusive and that you want it to change
  • urge your abuser to make an earnest good faith commitment to some couple’s therapy or counseling
  • look at yourself and ask whether you need to change, regardless of being a victim of emotional abuse
  • If reasonable—reasonable—efforts (made over a reasonable time) to get your abuser to change fail, break off the relationship. Easier said than done, but you can’t expect things to get better if your abuser won’t even try to change.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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Do prosecutors enjoy convicting people, even if there’s a question of guilt?

As a general rule, no, I don’t think so.

There will always be some sick, twisted people in every profession, but it has not been my experience that the majority of prosecutors enjoy seeing people go to jail, even if they have doubts as to the defendants’ guilt.

That stated, I can tell you from personal experience that there are prosecutors who, while they may not enjoy seeing people of questionable guilt convicted, don’t particularly care whether innocent people are convicted. I believe that such prosecutors behave and act this way either

  • because some prosecutors have ambitions to advance in the office or to become judges or politicians, and high conviction rates lead to such advancement; or
  • as a defense mechanism against letting the pressures and the stakes of the job destroy them emotionally and psychologically. Prosecutors are confronted with the worst of humanity on a daily basis, so it’s easy for people in such a job to see their professional detachment deteriorate as some prosecutors become jaded, numb, and uncaring. That does not make prosecutorial indifference and apathy acceptable, but it is understandable.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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What do you do about domestic abuse?

I have not been the victim of domestic violence or abuse, but I have had some clients who are. If you have a good, honest, and responsive police force in your jurisdiction, coupled with the court that is willing to issue protective orders AND enforce them, then police and courts can help.

Regardless of whether the police and courts in your jurisdiction do or not take domestic violence and abuse seriously, you should never rely upon law enforcement or the court’s to protect your life and physical safety. You and you and you alone are best equipped to protect your physical safety and life.

If the police and courts in your jurisdiction will not bring to bear their resources to protect you, then protect yourself. Get away from the abuser, if you can. Yes, run. Stay alive. The National Domestic Violence Hotline | Get Help Today | 1-800-799-7233 provides help for women and for men who are abuse victims.

You can complain all you want about your rights, but that won’t stop a bullet or a fist. Learn how to own and carry and use a gun for self-defense. learn how to secure your home with locks and surveillance cameras and alarm systems.

If you are the victim of domestic violence and/or abuse, report it as quickly as you can after it occurs. If you are threatened with domestic violence, report that too. and if you have any written or recorded evidence of those threats, make sure you share that with law enforcement and with the court. Not only can you report violence or threats of violence, you can take action to protect yourself from future violence by requesting a protective order or civil stalking injunction.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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2019 Utah Legislative Session – animal cruelty is now domestic violence

Welcome back to our feature on new laws from the 2019 Utah Legislative Session. There were a lot of changes in family law in 2019,  and one amendment was made by Senate Bill 45, which adds aggravated cruelty to an animal to the list of offenses that may qualify as a domestic violence offense. Specifically, “domestic violence” or a “domestic violence offense” now includes “aggravated cruelty to an animal, as described in Subsection 76-9-301(4), with the intent to harass or threaten the other cohabitant.”

Aggravated cruelty to an animal means torturing an animal; administering, or causing to be administered, poison or a poisonous substance to an animal; or killing an animal or causes an animal to be killed without having a legal privilege to do so.

So now you can commit domestic violence against somebody without laying a hand on’em, without even attempting to hurt them or threatening to hurt them. You can commit domestic violence against someone else by committing aggravated cruelty against any old animal at all. Not even the person’s own dog or cat. Buy a goldfish (or just borrow someone else’s) and stomp it to death, with “intent to harass or threaten” a cohabitant, and you committed domestic violence. I guess the intent to harass or threaten isn’t enough. You gotta kill the goldfish too. Or just poison it or torture it. Too.

Utah Family Law, LC | | 801-466-9277

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