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Tag: punish

Do courts make awards in divorce to “punish” adultery?

Do courts make awards in divorce to “punish” adultery? Great question.  

Adultery is considered a fault-based ground for divorce and a factor that can be considered when the trial court decides matters of alimony, property division, and child custody.  

I will answer this question according to what Utah statutory and case law provides.  

Utah Code § 30-3-5(9)(b) provides, “The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms of the alimony.”  

Utah Code § 30-3-5(9)(c) states that “‘Fault’ includes engaging in sexual relations with an individual other than the party’s spouse, if such wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the breakup of the marriage relationship.  

Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court discussed this very question in the divorce case of Gardner v. Gardner (Volume 425 Pacific Reporter 3rd, page 1134, decided in 2019. In that decision the Supreme Court stated: 

[C]ourts should keep in mind that the ultimate purpose of any property division or alimony award is to “achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.” For this reason, courts should consider fault only in an attempt to balance the equities between the parties. In other words, where one party’s fault has harmed the other party, the court may attempt to re-balance the equities by adjusting the alimony award in favor of the party who was harmed by that fault.[footnote 56] 

Footnote 56 states: 

We note that some Utah courts have struggled to articulate an appropriate role of fault in alimony determinations in light of our case law suggesting that the purpose of alimony is not to punish. See Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, ¶ 17, 223 P.3d 476 (“[I]f a trial court uses its broad statutory discretion to consider fault in fashioning an alimony award and then, taking that fault into consideration, adjusts the alimony award upward or downward, it simply cannot be said that fault was not used to punish or reward either spouse by altering the award as a consequence of fault.”). But other Utah courts have concluded that fault may be considered without constituting punishment if it is used only to rectify the inequity caused by the fault. See Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2003 UT App 348, 2003 WL 22361312 at *2 (“Fault may correctly be considered by the trial court without penalizing the party found to be at fault.”); see also [Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (1956)], 296 P.2d at 980 (explaining that equitable factors often cause courts to impose permanent alimony on “erring” spouses); [Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)], 2006 UT App 214, ¶ 24, 138 P.3d 84 (affirming the district court’s consideration of a husband’s fault as an important “factor in fairness to [Wife]” (alteration in original)). As this latter line of cases suggests, fault may be considered as long as it is used as a basis to prevent or rectify an inequity to the not-at-fault spouse. So in reviewing an alimony determination involving fault, Utah appellate courts should focus on whether a fault-based modification of an alimony award helped “achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties” rather than on whether it was punitive in nature. [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 168, ––– P.3d ––––], 2015 UT 79, ¶ 25, ––– P.3d –––– (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

With this in mind, could a court (a court, not all courts) award more alimony, divide marital property unevenly, or restrict custody or parent-time due to one of the spouse’s adultery to punish adultery? Yes, of course, even if the court went to great pains (sincerely or not) to articulate the alimony decision as not being punitive in nature.  

Some judges (some, not all) allow their personal antipathy for an adulterous spouse their impartiality and justify disregarding the law in favor of doing what the judge “feels is right” instead. And yes, it can happen to you. 

Bottom line: If you are in adulterer, and a serial and/or un repentant adulterer at that, it should come as no surprise to you that your adultery will do you no favors when it comes to the way the court can and may treat you in a divorce action. Fair or not, that is the nature of the way many people (and judges are people) view and treat adulterers. Does this mean that if you are in adulterer you should expect to be treated unfairly by a court? I think your odds are about 50-50, in my professional opinion. Do those odds mean that you should lie about adultery, if you believe you can get away with it? No, and for two reasons: 1) it is wrong to lie; and 2) if you commit adultery, then compound the problem by lying about it and get caught, you only increase your odds of being mistreated by the court. And odds are that if you lie about adultery you will be caught. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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Are there laws that protect one parent from being a victim of the other parent’s continuous reporting, through the other parent’s attorney, about violations of a restraining order that are all lies?

Are there laws that protect one parent from being a victim of the other parent’s continuous reporting, through the other parent’s attorney, about violations of a restraining order that are all lies?

Are there laws that protect one parent from being a victim of the other parent’s continuous reporting, through the other parent’s attorney, about violations of a restraining order that are all lies?

Practically speaking (and in my experience), yes and no.

I’ll start with the “no” part of my answer because it’s short. I say “no” because although there are rules against frivolous, bad-faith litigation (such as litigation based on lies), these rules are shamefully under-enforced. So even if you can make a clear case for an opposing party engaging in frivolous, bad-faith litigation, in my experience courts rarely punish such behavior. It’s one of the main reasons people lose faith in the legal system when they find themselves subject to the system.

The best way to protect yourself from having a court believe the opposing party’s lies is to prove them false by objective, independently verifiable evidence that cannot be denied. So, document your words and deeds six ways from Sunday. If it’s not a close call, the opposing side’s efforts to cheat won’t make any difference.

And here’s my “yes” part of the answer: Most jurisdictions, including the jurisdiction in which I practice law (Utah), have a rule or rules that is intended to prevent frivolous litigation. One such rule in Utah is the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 11 (which is almost identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 11). Utah’s rule 11 provides:

(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,

(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that paragraph (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated paragraph (b) or are responsible for the violation.

There are also laws against making frivolous and bad-faith claims. Utah’s law is:

78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.

(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).

(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:

(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or

(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Are-there-laws-that-protect-one-parent-from-being-a-victim-of-the-other-parents-continuous-reporting-through-the-other-parents-attorney-about-violations-of-a-restraining-order-that-are-all-lies/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

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If a parent exceeds parent-time by an hour or so, what can I do?

If a parent exceeds parent-time by an hour or so, what can I do? Our custody order provides that child visitation is 11 a.m. – 4 p.m. My ex and I agreed by e-mail to change it to 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. But now my ex picks up at 10 and returns the child at 4 p.m. instead of 3 p.m.Is there no recourse since the order says 4pm despite their agreement? 

Great question. 

If you were to take this problem to court for the judge to resolve, odds are that the hearing would unfold something like this and that the judge would do something like this:  

Argument from parents: 

  • Parent 1 “The custody order says child visitation is 11 a.m.-4 p.m. Parent 2 asked to make it 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., and I agreed, but now Parent 2 picks up at 11 a.m. and brings the kids back at 4 p.m. I want Parent 2 held in contempt of court!” 
  • Parent 2 “Parent 1 lies! It’s true that Parent 2 and I agreed to change visitation start and end times from 11 and 4 to 10 and 3, but I always bring the kids back by 3 p.m. Sometimes I may run into a traffic jam or something that causes me to run a little late, but I’m not trying to ‘steal’ an extra hour. I am outraged!” 

Judge’s decision:  

“Well, you both can’t be telling the truth, but it’s impossible for me to know which of you is lying. So, unless and until one of you has independently verifiable proof to support his/her argument, I am not going to reward one of you or punish the other on such a dearth of evidence and shaky evidence at that. Now both of you obey court orders. If there is a problem with Parent 2 going an extra hour over the court-ordered visitation period, and if Parent 1 has a problem with that, then Parent 1 may want to consider keeping a photographic or videographic log of pick up and return times to document the problem and provide the court with proof. If Parent 2 is being falsely accused, then Parent 2 may also want to consider keeping a photographic or videographic log of pick up and return times and a log of photos or videos showing that if and when Parent 2 is late it’s because of traffic jams or other things beyond Parent 2’s control.  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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What happens after an affair when you have kids?

What happens after an affair when you have kids? I will answer as if this question were asked in the belief that the affair will have a profound effect upon child custody, child support, and/or alimony.

If you have had an extramarital affair, it generally will not do your divorce case any favors, will not win you any sympathizers.

But will it generally result in you being “punished” by the divorce court? The answer to that question is, in my experience as a divorce lawyer: probably not (unless your affair could be shown to have done your spouse and kids egregious financial, physical, or emotional harm) and/or you were a serial, unrepentant adulterer/adulteress).

Child custody: in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce law (Utah), it has been my experience that extramarital affairs are rarely seen as rendering a parent “unfit” to exercise sole or joint custody of his/her children.

While the court is required to consider “the past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parent” (Utah Code § 30-3-10(2)(d)) in making its child custody evaluation and award, usually the court will reason that an adulterous parent is not inherently any worse as a parent than one who is not.

If the affair cause the parent to spend excessive time away from the children, caused the parent to neglect the children, or if the children’s knowledge of the affair caused the children serious psychological or emotional harm and/or the children distrust or hate a parent because of the affair, then it’s not really the affair that is the problem itself, but the effects of the extramarital affair.

Child support: I have never seen an extramarital affair cited as a reason for awarding more or less child support had the child support payor not committed adultery.

Alimony: in Utah (where I practice divorce law), adultery can affect the alimony award, but will not automatically have an effect on the alimony award. Here is what Utah Code § 30-3-5(9)(c)) provides:

“The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms of the alimony” and “”Fault” means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the breakup of the marriage relationship: engaging in sexual relations with an individual other than the party’s spouse[.]”

What does this mean?

The Utah Supreme Court construed that section of the Utah Code in the case of Gardner v. Gardner (2019 UT 61, 452 P.3d 1134 (Supreme Court of Utah 2019)): “Substantially contributed” to the breakup of the marriage is conduct that was a significant or an important cause of the divorce. Under this definition, conduct need not be the sole, or even the most important, cause for it to substantially contribute to a divorce.

So, when an important or significant cause falls into a category of conduct specifically identified in section 30-3-5(8), courts are authorized to consider it in an alimony determination, even if the at-fault party can point to other potential causes of the divorce. And this: “Under the plain language of section 30-3-5(8), courts have discretion to depart from the default economic rules where one party’s fault makes it appropriate to do so. Because the district court determined that Ms. Gardner’s conduct qualified as fault under the statute, the court was authorized to depart from the default alimony rules by reducing Ms. Gardner’s alimony award by some amount.”

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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Spouse abused me emotionally, so I get more money in divorce now, right?

My spouse abused me emotionally, so I get more money in divorce now, right?

Strongly believing or feeling that “I deserve” an unequal division of the marital estate does not mean that you do legally deserve any such thing or that the court will agree with you. That is not how divorce law works. There are exceptions to this rule, but they are very rare.

You need to understand first that courts generally do not divide and distribute the marital estate (“marital estate” is the term for the property and assets acquired during the marriage) to reward or to punish a spouse.

The presumption is that the marital estate will be divided equally, unless there is some extenuating, exceptional circumstance that would warrant an unequal division and distribution (such as showing that one spouse inexcusably diminished the value of the estate and/or dissipated marital assets during the marriage to the detriment of the other spouse).

Rarely, if ever, is an unequal division of the marital estate made merely because the other spouse was physically or emotionally abusive or engaged in “unethical behavior.” If the court does make an unequal division of the marital estate based upon physically or emotionally abuse and/or unethical behavior, such misconduct would usually need to be 1) first, shown to be severe or chronic and 2) second shown to warrant/justify an unequal distribution of the marital estate property.

Meet and talk with a knowledgeable attorney to find out what the specific law is on this subject in your jurisdiction to find out what the law is where your divorce action is or will be filed.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Divorce-attorneys-If-one-party-deserves-more-in-divorce-distribution-maybe-due-to-abuse-unethical-behavior-from-partner-etc-then-how-does-opposing-attorney-react-Do-they-give-as-deserved-or-still-fight-to-keep-for/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

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Can a parent discipline a child by taking the child’s phone away?

Can a parent discipline a child by taking the child’s phone away?

Before researching this question, I thought the answer was obvious. It’s not. As a both a lawyer and a parent myself, I always believed that I had control over my minor children’s property, meaning I could, among other things, withhold use of a phone or a bike as a disciplinary measure. Now I’m not so sure. Here’s what I found. What do you think? (read this whole thing because if you don’t you’ll be fooled):

I found two cases (in Texas and Michigan) in which a parent was arrested and charged with theft of a phone. In the Texas case, a father was charged with theft, but the court found the father not guilty because there was insufficient evidence of theft. The mother of the child claimed the phone was hers, but the court could not determine ownership. In the Michigan case, a mother was charged with theft, but charges were dropped when it was discovered that the phone was not the property of the ex-husband/father, but that the minor daughter’s owned the phone.

From what I can tell from the cursory research I have conducted, I can confidently conclude: 1) courts and prosecutors generally don’t want to deal with these kinds of family disputes (good for them) and 2) these kinds of cases can turn out however the prosecutors and/or courts want, i.e., they can construe the same facts and the same law to reach the desired outcome either way. Otherwise stated, if a conviction for theft is wanted, it can be found “as a matter of law” that taking a child’s phone is theft, and if a conviction for theft is not wanted, it can be found “as a matter of law” (often times referring to the same statutes) that a parent taking the child’s phone away was not theft.

But is there a more definitive legal answer? Here’s what I found on that question:

See 61 A.L.R.2d 1270 (Originally published in 1958):

§ 1. Generally [Cumulative Supplement]

Although a parent, either as natural guardian or otherwise, has no title to the property of his minor child, nor any custody or control over it, and may make a gift inter vivos to such child which, when fully executed, is irrevocable, property furnished by a parent to his child for the purpose of support and maintenance, or education, unless in some definite way given to the child as his own property, or unless the child has been emancipated, from which a gift may be implied, appears to remain the property of the parent, who is entitled to recover for damage thereto or loss thereof.

And see:

5 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Family Law § 8:38 (2d ed.) | June 2020 Update

§ 8:38. Parent’s right to control of child’s property

A parent has no authority to sell and convey the interest of a minor child in real or personal property. Parents are also precluded from bargaining away the rights of their minor children.

But then you get cases like Kemp v. Kemp, 485 N.E.2d 663, 665 (Ind.Ct.App.1985):

Court necessarily grants to divorced parent some degree of control over child’s property in process of determining which parent acquires or retains custody of child upon dissolution of marriage.

Inherent in the concept of “child custody” is the right and obligation to care for, control, and maintain the child. It is a matter of common sense, then, that in the process of determining which parent acquires or retains custody of a child, a court necessarily grants to that parent some degree of control over the child’s property.

For example, no one would deny a “divorce” court’s jurisdiction when dissolving a marriage and disposing of marital property to order a husband to surrender to his former wife a motorcycle belonging to their sixteen-year-old child, now in the wife’s custody. An argument that the court in such a hypothetical has thereby “awarded property not owned by the parties” or “distributed assets in excess of the marital estate” misses the mark entirely. In fact, such a court has awarded nothing and distributed nothing. It has simply decided which parent should exercise the guidance and control over the minor’s life and property that inhere in the concept of parental custody.

Before and after the dissolution the motorcycle “belongs” to the child; the court has merely determined which party ultimately possesses what might be termed parental dominion over the property by virtue of having custody of its owner. Thus, even though the mother might subsequently deny her minor child the use of his motorcycle, her right to do so lies in her rights and duties as custodial parent, not in any rights of legal ownership. See McKinnon v. First National Bank of Pensacola (1919) 77 Fla. 777, 82 So. 748 (In McKinnon, the Florida Supreme Court noted that while a father had given money to his children as an absolute gift, he “did not intend for them to acquire extravagant habits by permitting them to use the money as they pleased before they were eighteen years old. This, as their natural guardian, he had the right to do, and if the gifts had been made by a third person he could have controlled his children in its expenditure until they reached an age when he considered it was advisable for them to use it as they saw fit.” 82 So. at 749, 750 (emphasis supplied)).

. . . and like State v. Udell (Court of Appeals of Kansas, July 22, 2005 34 Kan.App.2d 163, 115 P.3d 176):

a parent/child relationship gives rise to a presumption of control of property. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330. The Rith court noted evidence which would tend to rebut that presumption included the child’s payment of rent, a lock on the bedroom door, or an implicit or explicit agreement the parents never enter a particular area. 164 F.3d at 1331.

. . . and like L. A. M. v. State (Supreme Court of Alaska. March 15, 1976, 547 P.2d 827)

While there is much discussion of parental rights in reported cases, few cases attempt to define those rights making discussion difficult. A careful review of the literature, including case law, treatise and law review, indicates that the following have been listed as ‘parental rights’ protected to varying degrees by the Constitution:

*****

(4) The right to control and manage a minor child’s property.*

*I can’t find any U.S. Supreme Court or other case law supporting this claim.

But then there are cases such as In re Casey (December 4, 2008, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d2008 WL 51229895 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 1172008 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,952)

(Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 cal.2d 421, 432 [minor child’s property is his or her own, and not that of child’s parents]; see also Fam.Code, § 7502 [parent has “no control over the property of [a] child”]; In re Tetsubumi Yano’s Estate (1922) 188 Cal. 645, 649 [minority does not incapacitate a person from taking and holding real estate].)

Black’s Law Dictionary ((11th ed. 2019), under the definition of “parental rights”) has this, but then gives no citations to the Constitution or statutes or case law:

parental rights (18c) A parent’s rights to make all decisions concerning his or her child, including the right to determine the child’s care and custody, the right to educate and discipline the child, and the right to control the child’s earnings and property.

Before researching this question, I thought the answer was obvious. It’s not.

See 61 A.L.R.2d 1270 (Originally published in 1958):

§ 1. Generally [Cumulative Supplement]

Although a parent, either as natural guardian or otherwise, has no title to the property of his minor child, nor any custody or control over it, and may make a gift inter vivos to such child which, when fully executed, is irrevocable, property furnished by a parent to his child for the purpose of support and maintenance, or education, unless in some definite way given to the child as his own property, or unless the child has been emancipated, from which a gift may be implied, appears to remain the property of the parent, who is entitled to recover for damage thereto or loss thereof.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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What does a judge ask a child in a custody case?

In Utah (where I practice divorce and child custody law) the answer is: it’s almost impossible to say. Why?

  1. For reasons that I assert I can demonstrate are not highly rational*, the majority of judges are extremely reluctant to question children on the subject of the child custody award.
  2. Case files for child custody cases are classified as private and not accessible to the public, so unless the child is questioned in a public court proceeding (which happens so rarely one could honestly state that, statistically speaking, it never happens), we will never know (we can never know) what the child was asked or what the child said in response. Those judges who are willing to question children—as they are authorized by the Utah Code to do—almost never question children in public court proceedings but instead question them in chambers, although the questioning is conducted on the record and not covertly.
  3. The law gives judges the opportunity to avoid hearing directly from a child by instead appointing an attorney for the children known as a “guardian ad litem” and thus avoid ever actually hearing any testimony from the child’s own mouth by having the GAL claim to have spoken to the child, albeit not on the record (and thus there is no objectively verifiable way to confirm this), to have elicited from the child his/her experiences, observations, feelings, opinions, and desires (again, without there being any objectively verifiable way to confirm this) and then, based upon literally nothing that is objectively verifiable, make recommendations to the judge as to how the judge should rule on the issue of the child custody award.

*The ostensible reasons that most judges give for refusing to question children or allow children to be questioned by an attorney or attorneys are that they:

  1. A) fear that if parents find out what the child says, then the child may feel guilty for expressing a preference or preferences for one parent over another on particular subjects of parental abilities and fitness;
  2. B) fear that once parents discover what the child had to say the child may be punished or retaliated against if what the child said upsets or offends one or both parents; and/or
  3. C) conclude, without first questioning the child, that children in general are incompetent witnesses and that their testimony would be of little help to resolving child custody questions.

Here is why I assert that such reasons are not rational:

1) First, parents are going to find out what a child thinks, feels, and wants with regard to child custody irrespective of whether the judge questions the child in court proceedings. Parents are going to learn of this (whether directly from the child or from his/her siblings, extended family members, friends, neighbors, teachers, counselors, coaches, ministers, etc.) before the child custody case is filed, during the pendency of the child custody case in court, at trial, and after the trial. It’s unavoidable. It’s inevitable. I submit that i) the belief that not questioning a child about his/her opinions and preferences regarding child custody will prevent the child’s parents from discovering those opinions and preferences, and ii) the believe that the only time and place in which the child will express such things is when questioned by the judge, is rather naive; it’s impossible to prevent parents from learning this information from and about the children.

Second, the value that many judges place on preventing children from feeling guilty or uncomfortable is misplaced. For two reasons. One, children who are going to feel guilty and uncomfortable about their child custody preferences, who are going to feel as though they are betraying a parent by expressing a preference for one over the other. are going to feel that way regardless of whether they express those preferences to the judge or a custody evaluator or a guardian ad litem (GAL). Two, getting to the truth about how children feel and why—when it comes to their child custody preferences—is far more important than sparing them from feeling guilty (especially when we already know they’re going to feel guilty regardless of whether they testify). Otherwise stated, preventing child testimony does no good: it protects the children from nothing, while denying the judge the clearest, purest sources of information about the children’s experiences, observations, feelings, opinions, and preferences as they relate to the child custody award.

2) If the judge believes that children will not be punished for expressing a preference for one parent over another, so long as those preferences are not expressed to the judge, again, that’s not rational either. It is impossible for a judge to prevent parents from learning a child’s feelings, opinions, and preferences regarding child custody. Thus it is impossible for a judge to prevent a parent who gets upset by those feelings, opinions and preferences from learning about them and from punishing and retaliating against his/her child once he/she learns of them. A judge can’t even mitigate the amount and severity of the retaliation and punishment because the judge is powerless to prevent the child’s feelings, opinions, and preferences from being discovered. And so once again, we find the court depriving itself of one of the clearest and purest sources of information and guidance on the subject of thee child custody award based upon a fear and a belief that has no rational basis. Closing one’s ears and eyes to what a child can say on the subject displays, frankly, a shocking disregard for the best interest of the child.

3) Concluding, without first questioning the child, that children in general are incompetent witnesses and that their testimony would be of little help to resolving child custody questions. See self-fulfilling prophecy. While it is certainly true that some children may be, for various reasons (such as being too young to talk, too young to have a consistent and reliable understanding of right and wrong and truth and falsity, placed in circumstances that call the veracity or credibility of the child’s testimony into question from the outset, etc.), one sure way to guarantee that we never determine how informative, probative, and reliable a child’s testimony may be and what weight to give such testimony is to dispense with allowing the child to testify in the first place.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/What-does-a-judge-ask-a-child-in-a-custody-case/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

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