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Tag: Utah

Today’s blog post reviews House Bill 134 (HB0134 (utah.gov)), entitled “Marriage Modifications”.

It addresses the validation and recognition of a marriage regardless of the race, ethnicity, or national original of the parties to the marriage, and would repeal a current provision in the Utah Code on interracial marriage (i.e.Utah Code § 30-1-2.2)

H.B. 134 would, if passed into law, enact a new code section, § 30-1-2.4, which is proposed as follows:

28          30-1-2.4. Recognition and validation of marriage regardless of race, ethnicity, or
29     national origin of the parties.
30          (1) As used in this section, “governmental entity” means the state, a county, a
31     municipality, a special district, a special service district, a school district, a state institution of
32     higher education, or any other political subdivision or administrative unit of the state.
33          (2) (a) A marriage between two individuals may not be deemed invalid or prohibited
34     on the basis of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of those individuals.
35          (b) A marriage between two individuals that was not valid or legal before July 1, 1965,
36     on the basis of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of those individuals is considered valid and
37     legal in this state.
38          (3) (a) A county clerk may not refuse to issue a marriage license on the basis of the
39     race, ethnicity, or national origin of the individuals applying for the marriage license.
40          (b) If an employee Ĥ→ [or public official, a public official, or a designee, ←Ĥ of a
40a     governmental entity is authorized to
41     solemnize a marriage under Section 30-1-6, the employee Ĥ→ [or public official, public official,
41a     or designee ←Ĥ may not refuse to
42     solemnize a marriage on the basis of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the parties to the
43     marriage.
44          (4) A governmental entity, or an employee or public official of a governmental entity,
45     may not deny a right or claim arising from a valid and legal marriage between two individuals
46     on the basis of the race, ethnicity, or national origin of those individuals.

So, is H.B. 134 a good idea? In my view, no.

Utah does not ban interracial or inter-ethnic marriages, nor does it ban marriages on the basis of one’s national origin. We have no need of a law that “recognizes as valid” marriages that are already legally valid. I am not aware of anyone being denied a marriage license or marriage on the basis of his/her  race, ethnicity, or national origin in Utah in my lifetime either (Utah’s anti-miscegenation statute was repealed in 1963).

H.B. 134 appears to me to be unnecessary. If you were wondering whether Utah has a law on the books currently that bans or imposes restrictions on interracial marriage, it’s nothing that scandalous. Here is the law that H.B. 134 would repeal:

Utah Code § 30-1-2.2.  Validation of interracial marriages.

All interracial marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to July 1, 1965, to which one of the parties of the marriage was subject to disability to marry on account of Subsection 30-1-2(5) or (6), as those subsections existed prior to May 14, 1963, are hereby valid and made lawful in all respects as though such marriages had been duly and legally contracted in the first instance.

Indeed, the H.B. 134’s sponsor, Republican Rep. Anthony E. Loubet who told St. George News, “It was very clear that you couldn’t discriminate against somebody getting married, based off their race, ethnicity or national origin, but what this does is update the code so it reflects what our current practices are and then allows people the peace of mind knowing that if anything ever happens or changes on the federal side, they still have their protection on the state level.”

(‘We need to be colorblind’: Utah’s revised interracial marriage bill passes House – St George News (stgeorgeutah.com))

Even the bill’s sponsor acknowledges there is no gaping hole or shameful stain on Utah law that needs to be addressed with any new law. There is no justification to “fix” what ain’t broke. The last thing we need is superfluous laws on the books.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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Do you think the child support laws in your state are fair? If no, then describe the changes that you would make.

I can’t speak for all jurisdictions, but in the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah), child support awards are generally, in my opinion, 1) too high, 2) often wrongfully misused by those seeking child support (and by the courts that award child support) as a means of providing financial support for a parent (not just the child(ren)), and 3) not subject to enough (if any) oversight regarding their properly use.

One factor that can cause child support to be awarded unfairly to the child support recipient is this: I’ve attended the meetings of the committee that sets child support guidelines in my state. It was clear in my observations of the committee’s work that some on the committee don’t see child supporters as financial support exclusively for children, but for the parent receiving the child support payments also. I’ve seen courts award sole or primary child custody to a parent not because that was in the best interest of the child, but because the court wanted to ensure that the parent awarded custody got the extra child support money that comes with a sole or primary custody award. In my view, that is unfair. There are many times when a judge will award child support (and the associated child custody) not strictly for the purpose of providing some financial support for the children but for the custodial parent as well. When they do, it is manifestly inequitable and unjust (to child and parent alike), and a violation of the public trust, but it still happens. Not in every child support case, but it happens.

One factor that can cause child support to be spent unfairly by the child support recipient is: no accountability on the part of the child support funds recipient for the expenditure of the child support funds. Once the parent who was awarded child support receives the funds, he/she can spend them however he/she wants. If the child support recipient (also known as the child support obligee) does not actually spend the child support on the financial needs of the children, he/she gets away with it.

In my jurisdiction (Utah), while the law provides for accountability as to how child support funds are spent, that law is literally never applied (Play 26 years of practice I have never seen it ordered). There is no accountability for how child support funds are paid. That is not opinion, that is fact. About the only way to get accountability for use of child support funds is if the child support recipient so grossly and obviously misspends them that it cannot be denied, in which case the court may make some changes to the child support award as a result.

In fairness, while it may be a little easier to devise a means for a fairer calculation of needed child support than it is to devise a workable, reliable means of holding child support obligees accountable, both tasks are extremely difficult. Everyone has a different opinion of what is a “fair calculation,” and where there’s a will to misappropriate the child support funds with which one is entrusted without being detected, there’s a way (multiple ways, in fact, the number of which is limited only by the imagination).

In my jurisdiction, there are different kinds of child support. Three different kinds, to be exact (sometimes four, under certain circumstances). What most people consider child support is known as base monthly child support in Utah. That is the amount that is paid directly to the custodial parent. But child support also includes sharing equally the cost of the child’s health, medical, dental, and hospital insurance premiums, and half of all uninsured medical, health, dental, and hospitalization expenses. Child support also includes the responsibility that the parents share equally the cost of all work-related childcare expenses. And in joint physical custody cases, often the court will order that the parties share equally the costs of certain expenses for the child in addition to base monthly child support to cover things like mandatory school expenses and cost of reasonable extracurricular expenses.

A parent has his/her own living expenses. While it is true that in some cases a parent may incur housing expenses greater than what they would be were there no need for extra room to house the child or children, child support is not needed for “extra” housing expenses if the size of the parent’s residence would have been the same regardless of the child custody award.

The problem with thinking that “half of all living expenses are the child’s”) is that rarely are half of all living expenses are, in fact, the child’s. For example, if a parent would have been residing in the same sized residence with or without the child present, then the “child’s portion” of rent is $0. Even if the residence is a 2-bedroom house/apartment, the second bedroom is not equivalent to half the cost of the residence. Children don’t eat as much food until they are older (and even so, they are not eating on the custodial parent’s dime every day because they eat some time meals the noncustodial parent). I cannot speak for all jurisdictions, but in Utah child support is usually more than what the child (the child, not the custodial parent, the child) needs to be sufficiently financially supported).

All common expenses clearly do not divide perfectly equally between the parent and child. A parent whose residence would have been the same size regardless of whether he/she shared it with a child would have $0 in child housing expenses, $0 in certain utilities expenses (i.e., heating, garbage removal, cable TV, internet), for example. So, the idea that child support must take into account that a child’s “shelter” expenses are equal to half the parent’s rent or mortgage payment is false on its face. If a court wants to indulge such a fiction for the sake of making it easier to calculate child support, that’s a different matter. A child’s transportation needs are not necessarily equal to half or 25% of those of the parent either.

In Utah, work-related daycare is an expense shared equally between the parents and is separate from the base monthly child support amount. To be clear: a noncustodial parent pays base monthly child support in addition to sharing half the costs of work-related child care expenses.

While it is true that a child’s food consumption changes as the child ages, that’s built in to the child support calculations, so that it averages out—child support is more than necessary to feed a 5-year-old and less than necessary to feed a 17-year-old, but the average child support amount accounts for both scenarios as the child ages. I have never, in 26 years of practice in Utah, personally witnessed a case (nor have I heard of any other case in which) child support was ordered increased for a teenaged child on the basis of “additional food and clothing expenses of a teenager”. Child support calculations are the same for all children, regardless of age.

The “poor hapless custodial parent” story is tired and not credible. Of course, there are many deadbeat noncustodial parents to pay less than full court-ordered child support and many deadbeats who pay none. But that is not the discussion here. The idea that child support that is awarded is somehow insufficient to meet a child’s needs (needs) is bunk. All the arguments that “child support is too low” are bunk too. Consider this: in Utah, both parents have a child support obligation (that includes the custodial parent). That means that that the custodial parent has an obligation to spend his/her own money on the child’s support in addition to the money he/she receives in child support from the noncustodial parent. So, if we have John and Jane Doe as parents, they have two minor children, John’s gross monthly income is $6,500 and Jane’s gross monthly income is $2,400, and John is the noncustodial parent, then John’s monthly child support obligation is $1,111. That’s $555.50 per child, per month, that John pays. Jane’s child support obligation is less, but still $411 per month (see the Utah child support worksheet below, calculated on a sole custody basis in this hypothetical scenario). That’s an additional $205.50 per child per month. Don’t tell me that $761 per month isn’t enough to provide for a child’s needs monthly. Remember: base monthly child support does not include both parents sharing the costs of child health insurance equally, uninsured child health care equally, and work-related daycare equally. That’s all in addition to the base monthly child support amount. In other words, the custodial parent doesn’t have to spend out of that $761 per month for child health insurance, uninsured out of pocket health care, and daycare (the parents bear those expenses separately on an equal shares basis). $761 is likely more than what the parents would have spent on the child’s support had the parents resided together with the children under the same roof.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Do-you-think-the-child-support-laws-in-your-state-are-fair-If-no-then-describe-the-changes-that-you-would-make/answer/Eric-Johnson-311

 

 

Don’t tell me that $761 per month isn’t enough to provide for a child’s needs monthly. Remember: base monthly child support does not include both parents sharing the costs of child health insurance equally, uninsured child health care equally, and work-related daycare equally. That’s all in addition to the base monthly child support amount. In other words, the custodial parent doesn’t have to spend out of that $761 per month for child health insurance, uninsured out of pocket health care, and daycare (the parents bear those expenses separately on an equal shares basis). $761 is likely more than what the parents would have spent on the child’s support had the parents resided together with the children under the same roof.

Don’t tell me that $761 per month isn’t enough to provide for a child’s needs monthly. Remember: base monthly child support does not include both parents sharing the costs of child health insurance equally, uninsured child health care equally, and work-related daycare equally. That’s all in addition to the base monthly child support amount. In other words, the custodial parent doesn’t have to spend out of that $761 per month for child health insurance, uninsured out of pocket health care, and daycare (the parents bear those expenses separately on an equal shares basis). $761 is likely more than what the parents would have spent on the child’s support had the parents resided together with the children under the same roof.

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The Problem with Private Guardians ad Litem. Part 2 of 3

As any attorney can do with any client, a PGAL clearly has the right to argue on a child client’s behalf, and the Utah Code makes clear that a PGAL can express a child client’s “intentions and desires”. (See Utah Code Section 78A-2-705(13)(d))

When a PGAL tells a court, “I’ve spoken to my client, and based upon those discussions, I can tell you that his/her intentions and desires are . . .” is hearsay or, at the very least, inferential hearsay. It can’t be anything else. Such a hearsay declarant is at least subject to cross examination (URE 806).

There is a pervasive belief among Utah family law attorneys and judicial officers that a child represented by a PGAL cannot even be cross-examined. There is no legal authority for this. Indeed, all legal authority is to the contrary.

Children testify in Utah juvenile court proceedings, and when they do, they often do under various circumstances (regarding child custody and parent-time) that are substantively indistinguishable from testifying in a child custody and parent-time in a divorce or district court child custody case. When district courts try to make a distinction between testifying in juvenile court and barring testimony in district court, they fail. They must. It is a distinction without difference.

I really do not understand why everyone frames (or tries to frame) asking questions of children who are the subject of a child custody and/or parent-time dispute as inherently harmful to children. One can ask certain questions that harm, or elicit answers that harm, but all forms of questioning are not innately harmful to children. Moreover, there is a level of harm that is, frankly, justified when the value of the testimonial evidence elicited is greater than the harm caused or that may be caused (it’s why we jail witnesses who are afraid to testify against the mob, yet put them in witness protection). Where there’s a will, there’s a way.

Unless they are very young, children are not so ignorant as to have no idea what is happening in a child custody dispute case. They know that if there is a dispute over custody that one parent will be unhappy. The children aren’t surprised when one parent or both parents try to lobby to support their candidacy for “best parent” or “custodial parent”. They aren’t surprised if a court wants to know what the children have experienced, how children feel, and what the children want on the subject of the child custody and parent-time awards.

There are clearly ways to obtain valuable evidence that children and only children are uniquely able to provide (in the form of their about their experiences, observations, feelings, opinions, preferences, and desires on the subject without it harming or unduly harming them.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

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I Bought a House, Then Got Married. Me and My Partner Then Divorced. Can She Take the House? This Is in NY.

I am not licensed to practice law in the state of New York, but I will answer your question according to the law of the jurisdiction where I do practice law (Utah) because that may give you an idea of how the issue is treated in Utah. You will need to consult with a knowledgeable New York family law attorney to know the correct answer to your question as it applies under New York law.

The decision in the Utah case of Lindsey v. Lindsey (392 P.3d 968, 833 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2017 UT App 38) is a perfect explanation of the circumstances under which a spouse’s separate property can be awarded to the other spouse in a divorce case, so I will cite excerpts from that decision below (I did not include the footnotes from the decision):

ANALYSIS

¶31 When distributing “marital property in a divorce proceeding, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly divided between the parties.” Granger v. Granger, 2016 UT App 117, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d 1043 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, a trial court must first “identify the property in dispute and determine whether it is marital or separate.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 121 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Marital property ordinarily includes “all property acquired during marriage,” “whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.” Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Separate property ordinarily includes premarital property, gifts, and inheritances, including any appreciation that may accrue during the marriage. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 143; Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).

¶32 The presumption is that marital property will be divided equally while separate property will not be divided at all. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 121; Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323. Married persons have a right to separately own and enjoy property, and that right does not dissipate upon divorce. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. Thus, equity generally requires that “each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation” thereof. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320, 1323; accord Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 143; Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.

¶33 But separate property “is not totally beyond a court’s reach.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Before carving property out of the marital estate, a trial court must consider whether circumstances warrant an equitable override of the separate-property retention rule. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d 837. Three circumstances have been identified under Utah law as supporting an award of separate property at the time of divorce. These exceptions are when separate property has been commingled [the Lindsey v. Lindsey case did not treat the commingling exception, so I will provide some information on that in a footnote to this answer[1]]; when the other spouse has augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property [the contribution exception]; and in extraordinary situations when equity so demands. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. The latter two exceptions are at issue here.

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¶35 Under the contribution exception, a spouse’s separate property may be subject to equitable distribution when “the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it.” Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. This exception may be satisfied when one spouse brings assets into the marriage and the other spouse’s prudent investment of those assets substantially increases their value, see Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1973), or when marital funds are expended or marital debt is incurred for the benefit of one spouse’s separate property, see Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, this court has contemplated that the exception might apply when one spouse works for a business owned by the other spouse but is not “paid a wage or salary,” see Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), or when a spouse elects to forgo salary or related compensation that would have benefited the marriage so that those funds may be reinvested in his or her separate business, see Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ¶ 30, 351 P.3d 90. Under such circumstances, one spouse’s effort or investment may render the other spouse’s underlying asset, its appreciated value, or some portion thereof subject to equitable distribution. See, e.g., Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 602-03.

¶36 While spouses often contribute to one another’s financial success in a variety of ways, Utah law draws a line between contributions that qualify as “enhancement, maintenance or protection” of a spouse’s separate property and those that do not. See Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ¶¶ 11, 16, 203 P.3d 1020 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Utah law, perhaps the most common type of spousal assistance-taking on some measure of household or family responsibilities to allow the other spouse to spend time enhancing the value of his or her separate property-has been rejected as a standalone basis for awarding separate property under the contribution theory. See id. ¶ 16.

¶37 As this court concluded in Jensen, one spouse’s efforts to “maintain[] the household,” provide childcare, and run a part-time business that “contributed to [the] family finances” were insufficient to justify awarding even “part” of the appreciated value of the other spouse’s interest in the corporation of which he was president. Id. ¶¶ 4, 10-11, 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the wife’s efforts may have enabled her husband to devote his attention to his employment, she had not sufficiently contributed to the increase in value of the corporation’s equity: “Wife did not assist in running the business nor contribute in any way to its increase in equity. Moreover, it [was] unclear whether the increase in equity was due to anything other than inflation.” Id. ¶ 16. Likewise, in Kunzler v. Kunzler, the contribution exception was not triggered by one spouse’s assumption of household responsibilities, which allowed the other spouse “to focus his time and energy on preserving and increasing the value” of his separate property. 2008 UT App 263, ¶¶ 19 & n.5, 32, 37, 190 P.3d 497.

¶38 The division of labor among married parties may take any number of forms, and the give-and-take often inherent in marital relationships is generally not a sufficient basis for judicially rewriting title to property. The presumption that parties retain their separate property at divorce would be rendered largely irrelevant if rebutted by any spousal effort that freed the other spouse to work on his or her separate property. Thus, for purposes of this exception, direct involvement with or financial expenditures toward a spouse’s separate property appear to be key.

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  1. The Extraordinary Circumstances Exception

¶46 Under Utah law, a spouse’s separate property may be awarded to the other spouse “in extraordinary situations where equity so demands.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The bar for establishing an extraordinary situation is high, traditionally requiring that “invasion of a spouse’s separate property” is “the only way to achieve equity.” Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ¶ 35, 190 P.3d 497. A quintessential extraordinary situation arises when a spouse owns separate property but lacks income to provide alimony; in that circumstance, “an equitable distribution of the [separate property] would be well within the trial court’s discretion.” See id. ¶ 37; see also Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“The court may award an interest in the inherited property to the non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony.”). An extraordinary situation has also arisen under “very unique” circumstances in which, absent the exception, a husband would have shared in profits his wife created as to their marital property, but she would not have shared in profits he created-and which she enabled him to create-with respect to his separate property. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 24 & n.5.

¶47 Depending on the facts of a specific case, a court might take into account the rate of return earned on separate property during the marriage when determining whether an extraordinary situation exists or in calculating the amount of any such award. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20, 26, 29-30 (affirming an award of “a small share of the appreciation on [the husband’s] partnership interests,” which was “only above a reasonable rate of appreciation”). But an award of separate property may also be independent of any rate of return earned on the property during the marriage. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 20 n.7, 271 P.3d 837 (rejecting the argument that, because the spouse’s separate property declined in value during the marriage, the other spouse could not receive an equitable interest under the “extraordinary situations” exception (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). If a court were to award separate property due to a spouse’s inability to pay alimony, for example, that award could well be made irrespective of the rate of return earned on the property during the marriage.

[1] On the commingling exception:

See Dahl v. Dahl, 459 P.3d 276 (Utah 2015), 2015 UT 79

¶143 “Generally, premarital property, gifts, and inheritances [are considered] separate property, and the spouse bringing such … property into the marriage may retain it” in the event of a divorce. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App. 169, ¶ 22, 235 P.3d 782 (internal alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But premarital property may lose its separate character where the parties have inextricably commingled it with the marital estate, or where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate with the intent that it become joint property. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. Courts look to a party’s actions as a manifestation of a spouse’s intent to contribute separate property to the marital estate. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, ¶ 28, 217 P.3d 733.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

(15) Eric Johnson’s answer to I bought a house, then got married. Me and my partner then divorced. Can she take the house? This is in NY. – Quora

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Can the Non-custodial Parent Consent to a Tattoo for His/Her Minor Child?

Can my non-custodial parent consent to a tattoo for me? I’m a minor and my mom has full custody of me. She’s thought about allowing a tattoo but has never gone through with it. My dad would be for me getting a tattoo as long as it wasn’t stupid.

First, my personal opinion, then my professional opinion, if you don’t mind.

Personal opinion: Tattoos are a bad idea for many reasons, but basically, they make people less attractive than they were without them. Even the beautifully executed tattoos (and there are some tattoos that are aesthetically stunning) lose their appeal sooner than later and eventually make people look worse for them (self-indulgent, trendy, insecure, trashy). Some people get tattooed without caring what others think about them, but even then, a tattoo strikes me as an odd way to enjoy your time, money, and art (especially if you’re tattooed where you can’t see the tattoo). If you feel you must get a tattoo, less is more. Some might say, “But lots of people come up to me and tell, ‘I like your tattoo’” as a form of proof that people like the look of tattoos, but that is misleading. The socially acceptable thing is to say something complimentary or to say nothing at all. For everyone who says, “I like your tattoo” there are more who, out of courtesy, won’t tell you they find it ugly and off-putting.

Don’t tattoo a minor child. Let him or her make that decision when he or she is mature enough to be responsible for the consequences of his or her own choices.

Professional opinion (I am basing my answer on the law where I practice family law (Utah), so be sure to consult the law as it applies in your particular jurisdiction).

Utah has a statute on the subject of tattoos for minors:

76-10-2201. Unlawful body piercing and tattooing of a minor — Penalties.

(1) As used in this section:

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(b) “Consent of a minor’s parent or legal guardian” means the presence of a parent or legal guardian during the performance of body piercing or tattooing upon the minor after the parent or legal guardian has provided:

(i) reasonable proof of personal identity and familial relationship; and

(ii) written permission signed by the parent or legal guardian authorizing the performance of body piercing or tattooing upon the minor.

(c) “Minor” means a person younger than 18 years of age who:

(i) is not married; and

(ii) has not been declared emancipated by a court of law.

(d) “Tattoo” means to fix an indelible mark or figure upon the body by inserting a pigment under the skin or by producing scars.

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(3) A person is guilty of unlawful tattooing of a minor if the person performs or offers to perform a tattooing:

(a) upon a minor;

(b) without receiving the consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian; and

(c) for remuneration or in the course of a business or profession.

(4) A person is not guilty of Subsection . . . (3), if the person:

(a) has no actual knowledge of the minor’s age; and

(b) reviews, photocopies, and retains the photocopy of an apparently valid driver license or other government-issued picture identification for the minor that expressly purports that the minor is 18 years of age or older before the person performs the body piercing or tattooing.

(5)

(a) A person who violates Subsection (2) or (3) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

(b) The owner or operator of a business in which a violation of Subsection (2) or (3) occurs is subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 for each violation.

So, in Utah, it appears that if a parent does not have legal custody of a minor child (or has joint legal custody but doesn’t get the consent of the other parent*) and pays to have his or her minor child tattooed (whether for a fee or free of charge) by one who performs tattooing as a business or profession, that parent has committed a crime. Even if it weren’t a crime, if a parent who is the non-custodial legal parent or a parent who is a joint legal custodial parent were to get a child tattooed without the other parent’s consent, it is likely that the court would punish that parent.

* There are some situations in which the parents are awarded what is called joint legal custody, yet one of the parents has what is known as “final decision-making authority.” What that means is the parents seemingly must make decisions for their children jointly and by agreement so that legal custody decisions are made jointly, when in reality, it means that if both parents don’t agree, the parent with final decision-making authority gets to decide the matter. Which means, after just a moment’s thought, a so-called “joint legal custody” parent vested with final decision making authority is not really a joint legal custodial parent at all but a sole legal custodial parent.

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

(15) Eric Johnson’s answer to Can my non-custodial parent consent to a tattoo? I’m a minor and my mom has full custody of me. Shes thought about allowing a tattoo but has never gone through with it. My dad would be for me getting a tattoo as long as it wasn’t stupid. – Quora

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Why Are Family Courts Biased Against Husbands and Fathers?

We should note first that not all courts/judges/judicial officers are against fathers.

Some courts/judges/judicial officers are against fathers (far too many), but not all of them.

Why are the judges who are biased against fathers biased? There are at least 4 reasons that I have observed while I have been a practicing divorce and family lawyer:

    • a belief that fathers aren’t nearly as important to children (especially young children) as are their mothers

o   a belief that dads care about children less than do mothers

o   a belief that dads are more inept caregivers than are mothers

o   a belief that “the only reason Dad wants joint custody is because it will reduce the amount of child support he’ll have to pay”

    • a belief (based upon the biases stated above) that reducing Dad to the status of a “visitor” in his children’s lives is OK because “it’s the quality of the time together, not the quantity”. It’s not true. Children whose fathers are marginalized naturally become emotionally detached from their fathers, they wonder “why doesn’t daddy want me?”, and the feel as though they did or failed to do something that has caused Dad to make himself scarce.
    • a belief that exercising joint physical custody of children causes more turmoil and conflict between Mom and Dad, with the children suffering as a result. It’s not true. Joint custody has been shown generally to reduce such conflict. And even when there is conflict between Mom and Dad, there are many kids who still don’t want that fact to result in a parent being prevented from spending as much time with them as possible.
    • a belief that joint custody requires that the children spend time much time “bouncing back and forth between their parents’ respective residences.” It’s not true. While it is possible to create a poorly devised joint custody plan with a lot of unnecessary back and forth, there are joint custody schedules that involve as many or fewer trips back and forth than a sole custody visitation or parent-time schedule.

Biases need busting, and you bust bias by standing up to judges who indulge biases and refuting those biases with courage, vigilance, facts, and sound reasoning.

 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

(14) Eric Johnson’s answer to Why are family courts biased against husbands and fathers? – Quora

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Why Should Divorce Not Be Legalized?

There is no rationally or morally justified reason for making divorce illegal in any and all circumstances.

That stated, most would agree that while it was instituted with the best of intentions, “no-fault divorce” had unintended adverse consequences by making a divorce too easy to obtain, leading many marriages that might otherwise have weathered a difficult period in the relationship and survived.

 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277

https://www.quora.com/Why-should-divorce-not-be-legalized?no_redirect=1

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Utah Social Media Law Is Ambitious, but Is It Enforceable?

From KSLnewsradio.com:

Utah social media law is ambitious, but is it enforceable?

Utah social media law is ambitious, but is it enforceable?

The answer to the question of whether it is enforceable is: No. What the kids don’t do to get around the barriers the social media companies will do by changing to thwart the barriers. That’s the way it’s always been and the way it will always be. Frankly, there is no better way to protect against social media harms than 1) to protect people’s individual liberty and freedom, and 2) teach sound moral principles and reasoning to recognize and understand them.

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Do I have to pay the court to go to trial?

Do I have to pay the court to go to trial?

I am a divorce and family lawyer. I was asked this question and was a little surprised that this wasn’t widely known: 

In Utah, do I have to pay the courthouse and/or the judge or courthouse personnel for every day my divorce or child custody trial takes place?  

Answer: No.  

You are charged nothing for use of the courthouse, judge, and courthouse personnel for your trial, no matter how long the trial is set to take. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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How long do you pay alimony in Utah?

The law governing the duration of alimony is pretty simple and straightforward: 

See Utah Code § 30-3-5, subsections (1)(c) and (11)(e): 

(1) As used in this section: 

***** 

(c) “Length of the marriage” means, for purposes of alimony, the number of years from the day on which the parties are legally married to the day on which the petition for divorce is filed with the court. 

***** 

11(e) 

(i) Except as provided in Subsection (11)(e)(iii), the court may not order alimony for a period of time longer than the length of the marriage. 

(ii) If a party is ordered to pay temporary alimony during the pendency of the divorce action, the period of time that the party pays temporary alimony shall be counted towards the period of time for which the party is ordered to pay alimony. 

(iii) At any time before the termination of alimony, the court may find extenuating circumstances or good cause that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time than the length of the marriage. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/How-long-do-you-pay-alimony-in-NC/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

 

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When are my ex’s things deemed abandoned?

I was awarded the house in the divorce. My ex’s things are still here and he/she won’t pick them up. When are they deemed abandoned? 

Utah Code § 67-4a-201 provides, in pertinent part that property is presumed abandoned if the property is unclaimed by the apparent owner “the earlier of three years after the owner first has a right to demand the property or the obligation to pay or distribute the property arises.” 

Utah Code § 67-4a-208 (Indication of apparent owner interest in property) provides, in pertinent part: 

(1) The period after which property is presumed abandoned is measured from the later of: 

(a) the date the property is presumed abandoned under this part; or 

(b) the latest indication of interest by the apparent owner in the property. 

(2) Under this chapter, an indication of an apparent owner’s interest in property includes: 

(a) a record communicated by the apparent owner to the holder or agent of the holder concerning the property or the account in which the property is held; 

(b) an oral communication by the apparent owner to the holder or agent of the holder concerning the property or the account in which the property is held, if the holder or the holder’s agent contemporaneously makes and preserves a record of the fact of the apparent owner’s communication; 

(c) presentment of a check or other instrument of payment of a dividend, interest payment, or other distribution, or evidence of receipt of a distribution made by electronic or similar means, with respect to an account, underlying security, or interest in a business association; 

(d) activity directed by an apparent owner in the account in which the property is held, including accessing the account or information concerning the account, or a direction by the apparent owner to increase, decrease, or otherwise change the amount or type of property held in the account; 

(e) a deposit into or withdrawal from an account at a banking organization or financial organization, including an automatic deposit or withdrawal previously authorized by the apparent owner other than an automatic reinvestment of dividends or interest; 

(f) any other action by the apparent owner which reasonably demonstrates to the holder that the apparent owner knows that the account exists; and 

(g) subject to Subsection (5), payment of a premium on an insurance policy. 

(3) An action by an agent or other representative of an apparent owner, other than the holder acting as the apparent owner’s agent, is presumed to be an action on behalf of the apparent owner. 

(4) A communication with an apparent owner by a person other than the holder or the holder’s representative is not an indication of interest in the property by the apparent owner unless a record of the communication evidences the apparent owner’s knowledge of a right to the property. 

(5) If the insured dies or the insured or beneficiary of an insurance policy otherwise becomes entitled to the proceeds before depletion of the cash surrender value of the policy by operation of an automatic premium loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision contained in the policy, the operation does not prevent the policy from maturing or terminating. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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New Laws Affecting Utah Divorce and Family Law in 2022

Here is a summary of new law affecting divorce and family law that was created by the Utah State Legislature in 2022: 

HB (House Bill) 122 1st Substitute, entitled “Family Terminology Amendments.” This bill amended language regarding marriage and legitimacy. That means terms like “legitimate” or “illegitimate” in the context of children born out of wedlock have been replaced with “legally recognized relationship.” As I’ve always said, why use one word when you can use three? And as I’ve also always said, “I know how to prevent stigmas attached to words: change the word!” Look how well that’s worked in the past! Your tax dollars at work.  

HB 175, entitled Protection of Animals Amendments. This bill modified the definition of “emotional distress” related to the offense of stalking to include significant mental or psychological suffering resulting from harm to a household pet. But wait, there’s more: it also provides that protection of an animal can be requested certain protective order request forms and protective orders, and it permits the court, when issuing certain protective orders, to enjoin the respondent from injuring, threatening to injure, or taking possession of certain animals.  

HB 231 1st Substitute, entitled “Fishing and Hunting Restrictions for Nonpayment of Child Support.” This bill: amended the restrictions for a license, permit, or tag related to fishing or hunting when an individual is delinquent in child support and makes certain accommodations for obtaining a hunting or fishing license if a child support payor is temporarily unable to pay child support due to transition to new employment. 

SB 74 3rd Substitute, entitled “Alimony Modifications”. This bill defined the term, “length of the marriage” to mean the  number of years from the day on which the parties are legally married to the day on which the petition  for divorce is filed with the court; it provides that if a party is ordered to pay temporary alimony during the pendency of the divorce action, the period of time that the party pays temporary alimony shall be counted towards the period of time for which the party is ordered to pay alimony. It also provides that if a party establishes that a current spouse cohabits with another individual during the pendency of the divorce action, the court: may not order the party to pay temporary alimony to the current spouse; and shall terminate any order that the party pay temporary alimony to the current spouse. 

SB 85 4th Sub, entitled “Protective Order and Civil Stalking Injunction Expungement”. This bill defined terms relating to the expungement of protective orders and stalking injunctions; makes statutory provisions for the expungement of protective orders and stalking injunctions retroactive; allows for the expungement of certain protective orders and stalking injunctions; provides the requirements for expunging certain protective orders and stalking injunctions; and addresses the distribution and effect of an order for expungement of certain protective orders and stalking injunctions. It’s about time. If the courts are going to hand out protective orders like stale candy, consistently flout the preponderance of evidence standard in favor of a “ 

SB 164, entitled “Marriage Solemnization Amendments”. This bill amended the list of individuals authorized to solemnize a marriage to include the state attorney general, the state treasurer, the state auditor, and members of the state’s congressional delegation. After all, haven’t we all felt it just plain common sense that the state treasurer, the state auditor, and members of the state’s congressional delegation ought to have the power to perform wedding ceremonies? I mean, how did we get along without this to this point? 

SB 217, entitled “Protective Order Revisions”. This bill clarifies that a protective order or civil stalking injunction may be filed in the county where a party is temporarily domiciled. 

SB 242, 1st Sub, entitled “Child Support Amendments”. This bill modifies the child support tables; provides the effective dates of the child support tables. 

SB 243 1st Sub, entitled “Parent-Time Amendments”. This bill: defines terms; modifies and clarifies parent-time schedules. More particularly, it specifies transfer time for Christmas holiday on December 27th at 7 p.m. Creates summer parent-time notice dates of May 1st and May 15th. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277 

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What are the primary parenting issues of concern by the court?

What are the primary concerns of the courts in determining parenting issues? Why?

In Utah (and in no particular order), the court must consider the factors articulated in these sections of the Utah Code when making a legal and physical custody award: 

  1. § 30-3-10. Custody of a child — Custody factors.
  2. § 30-3-10.2. Joint custody order — Factors for court determination — Public assistance.
  3. § 30-3-34. Parent-time — Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.
  4. § 30-3-35.1. Optional schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age.
  5. § 30-3-35.2. Equal parent-time schedule. 

If I were to create a list of all factors from the above-referenced Utah Code sections, this answer would be too long, which is why I have provided hyperlinks to the Code sections for your review. 

CONCERN FOR FATHERS. What fathers encounter far too often (not always, but far too often): denials of requests to maintain their already-existing rights of joint equal legal and physical custody that are contrary to the facts, contrary to the best interest of the children, irrational, biased, arbitrary, inequitable, discriminatory, and unconstitutional.  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-primary-concerns-of-the-courts-in-determining-parenting-issues-Why/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

 

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What is MyCase and why should I care?

MyCase is an online system developed by the Utah State Courts system that you can sign up for free of charge and use in your family law case and certain other kinds of cases, but because this is a divorce and family law blog/video, we’ll focus on its features in a divorce and family law context. You can use MyCase to:  

  • view your case history (a record of what has happened in your case)  
  • see the date and time of your next scheduled court appearance 
  • view the documents that the opposing party and the court have also filed in your case 
  • pay fees  

Can a pro se party (meaning a party who is not represented by an attorney) file a divorce complaint or petition using MyCase? No, not currently. As of now there is no case filing available through MyCase. 

Can a pro se party file documents with the court through their MyCase account? No, not currently. As of now divorce is not a case type that is active for accepting electronically filed (also known as “e-filed”) documents through MyCase. 

Only those who are parties to a case can use MyCase. MyCase cannot be used to look up information about other cases. Even if you are represented by an attorney in your divorce or separation case, you look up information about your case on MyCase, if you have a MyCase account. To learn more about other features of MyCase and to create your own MyCase account, go to: 

https://www.utcourts.gov/mycase/  

and 

https://pubapps.utcourts.gov/MyCaseWEB/LoginServlet  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

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If you get a divorce but everything is in your name, do you have to split it?

If you get a divorce but everything is in your name, do you get to keep everything or do you have to split it? 

I will answer your question in the context of the law of the jurisdiction where I practice divorce law (Utah): 

First, a short answer to your question: whether property acquired in the individual name of a spouse during a marriage (other than by gift or inheritance) does not somehow shield that property from being awarded in whole or in part to the other spouse in divorce. 

Second, it will be helpful to understand a few terms that are key to understanding property in divorce (See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)): 

– marital property. Property that is acquired during marriage and that is subject to distribution or division at the time of marital dissolution. • Generally, it is property acquired after the date of the marriage and before a spouse files for separation or divorce. The phrase marital property is used in equitable-distribution states and is roughly equivalent to community property. — Also termed marital estate; matrimonial property. 

– separate property. 1. Property that a spouse owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by inheritance or by gift from a third party, and in some states property acquired during marriage but after the spouses have entered into a separation agreement and have begun living apart or after one spouse has commenced a divorce action. — Also termed individual property. 

– community property. Assets owned in common by husband and wife as a result of their having been acquired during the marriage by means other than an inheritance by, or a gift or devise to, one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the property. • Only nine states have community-property systems: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. A community-property regime is elective in Alaska. 

– quasi-community property. Personal property that, having been acquired in a non-community-property state, would have been community property if acquired in a community-property state. • If a community-property state is the forum for a divorce or administration of a decedent’s estate, state law may allow the court to treat quasi-community property as if it were community property when it determines the spouses’ interests. 

– equitable distribution (1893) Family law. The division of marital property by a court in a divorce proceeding, under statutory guidelines that provide for a fair, but not necessarily equal, allocation of the property between the spouses. • With equitable distribution, when a marriage ends in divorce, property acquired during the marriage is divided equitably between the spouses regardless of who holds title to the property. The courts consider many factors in awarding property, including a spouse’s monetary contributions, nonmonetary assistance to a spouse’s career or earning potential, the efforts of each spouse during the marriage, and the length of the marriage. The court may take into account the relative earning capacity of the spouses and the fault of either spouse. Equitable distribution is applied in 47 states (i.e., all the states except California, Louisiana, and New Mexico, which are “equal division” community-property states). — Also termed equitable division; assignment of property. 

Utah is an equitable distribution state in the context of divorce. Here is how Utah defines the difference between separate and marital property, and what a divorce court is empowered to do with separate and marital property. See Lindsey v. Lindsey, 392 P.3d 968 (Utah Ct.App. 2017), 2017 UT App 38: 

When distributing “marital property in a divorce proceeding, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties.” Granger v. Granger, 2016 UT App 117, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d 1043 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, a trial court must first “identify the property in dispute and determine whether it is marital or separate.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 121, ––– P.3d –––– (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Marital property ordinarily includes “all property acquired during marriage,” “whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.” Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317–18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Separate property ordinarily includes premarital property, gifts, and inheritances, including any appreciation that may accrue during the marriage. SeeDahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 143, ––– P.3d ––––; Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 

¶ 32 The presumption is that marital property will be divided equally while separate property will not be divided at all. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 121, ––– P.3d ––––; Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323. Married persons have a right to separately own and enjoy property, and that right does not dissipate upon divorce. SeeMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. Thus, equity generally requires that “each party retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation” thereof. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320, 1323; accordDahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 143, ––– P.3d ––––; Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 

¶ 33 But separate property “is not totally beyond a court’s reach.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Before carving property out of the marital estate, a trial court must consider whether circumstances warrant an equitable override of the separate-property retention rule. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d 837. Three circumstances have been identified under Utah law as supporting an award of separate property at the time of divorce. These exceptions are when separate property has been commingled; when the other spouse has augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property; and in extraordinary situations when equity so demands. SeeMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/If-you-get-a-divorce-but-everything-is-in-your-name-do-you-get-to-keep-everything-or-do-you-have-to-split-it/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Do you think it’s fair for a non-custodial parent to pay more child support?

Do you think it’s acceptable for the non-custodial parent to have to pay more child support because the custodial parent chooses to barely work or not work at all?  

Generally, no, it is not acceptable. In the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah): “Every child is presumed to be in need of the support of the child’s mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children.” (78B-12-105(1). Duty of parents.) A parent is not legally permitted, by being unemployed or underemployed, to avoid his/her financial support obligations to a child and/or burden the other parent with his/her share of financial responsibility. See Utah Code § 78B-12-203 entitled “Determination of gross income — Imputed income.”  

Subsection (8) provides that one, income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held in a judicial or administrative proceeding and findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation are made. If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings considering, to the extent known:  

(i) employment opportunities;  

(ii) work history;  

(iii) occupation qualifications;  

(iv) educational attainment;  

(v) literacy;  

(vi) age;  

(vii) health;  

(viii) criminal record;  

(ix) other employment barriers and background factors; and  

(x) prevailing earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.  

Subsection (8)(c) further provides, “If a parent has no recent work history or a parent’s occupation is unknown, that parent may be imputed an income at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater or lesser income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.”  

Subsection (8)(d) further provides, “Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a temporary nature:  

(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents’ minor children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;  

(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;  

(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or  

(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent’s presence in the home. If you are an underemployed or unemployed parent who believes you can gain the child support system, you are mistaken.  

So, in Utah if you you are an underemployed or unemployed parent who believes you can game the child support system, you are mistaken. If you are the other parent who is confronted with an underemployed or unemployed parent who is trying to game the child support system, know that the law is on your side, so long as you can prove that the other parent is underemployed or unemployed and needs to have a reasonable income imputed to him/her for the purpose of determining each parent’s financial child support obligations. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Do-you-think-its-acceptable-for-the-non-custodial-parent-to-have-to-pay-more-child-support-because-the-custodial-parent-chooses-to-barely-work-or-not-work-at-all-4/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Is it illegal for a lawyer to charge their ex client for a copy of their case file?

Is there anything illegal about a previous lawyer wanting to charge their ex client for a copy of their case file?

I can’t answer for all jurisdictions, but in Utah the answer is: 

  • If you were previously given your case file or previously given a copy of your file—and lost those—so now you want another copy of your file (and assuming your lawyer still has a copy of your file), then it’s fair for your former lawyer to charge you a reasonable fee for the cost of making you another copy of your file. You’re not entitled to a free copy or copies. 
  • If you were not previously given your case file or previously given a copy of your file, then Rule 1.16(d) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice – Rules of Professional Conduct provides: “The lawyer must provide, upon request, the client’s file to the client. The lawyer may reproduce and retain copies of the client file at the lawyer’s expense.” Thus, if you have not requested a copy of your file, you are entitled to your file (not a copy, the file itself). 
    • How long must your attorney keep your file after representation terminates? I’ve been told no less than three and no more than five years. Rule 1.15(a) provides, “[O]ther property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.” So if representation terminated more than 5 years ago, your old lawyer is not required to keep your file any longer, and so if you want a copy of your file then, you are likely out of luck. 

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Is-there-anything-illegal-about-a-previous-lawyer-wanting-to-charge-their-ex-client-for-a-copy-of-their-case-file/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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Is it possible to get court transcripts for custody hearings?

Every jurisdiction is different regarding which court hearings are open to the public and whether recordings of their proceedings are available to the public or even to the parties’ themselves. 

Every jurisdiction is different regarding how court proceedings are recorded too. 

Not every jurisdiction makes a written transcript of court proceedings. 

Most jurisdictions make audio or video recordings of court proceedings at a certain level, and divorce and family law proceedings are on that level. 

In the jurisdiction where I practice divorce and family law (Utah), the court makes its own audio recordings of divorce another family law court proceedings. These proceedings are open to the court, and thus the audio records of the court proceedings are public record, meaning that they are available to the public. Utah courts do not, at the trial court level, make written transcriptions of court proceedings. 

If you wanted to obtain a transcript of Utah family law court proceedings, you would need to take the audio recording of those proceedings and have them transcribed. If you wanted to use the transcription for appeals purposes, you would have to have the record transcribed by a stenographer approved by the court. It might also be possible to make your own transcript and to utilize that, if the opposing party agreed that your transcript was a true and complete and accurate transcription of the proceedings. 

Generally speaking, if all you want is a written transcription of the recordings of court proceedings for your own personal use, there’s nothing to stop you from doing so. And with advances in transcription technology, the cost of transcription have plummeted from what they were just 10 or 20 years ago. There are online transcription services such as http://Rev.com or Otter.ai – Voice Meeting Notes & Real-time Transcription that don’t do a perfect job of transcription, but do a very good job of transcribing for very little money. These types of services make obtaining transcriptions of court proceedings easier and less expensive than ever before. 

Transcripts can be very useful in establishing certain facts that may have otherwise escaped the court’s attention had they not been recorded and transcribed. Judges hate listening to audio recordings, but are much more receptive to reading a transcript of the very same recording because it’s much easier to isolate those portions of the recording in the transcript that are relevant to the issues before the court.  

Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277  

https://www.quora.com/Is-it-possible-to-get-court-transcripts-for-custody-hearings/answer/Eric-Johnson-311  

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